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Still, if you will not fight for the right when you can easily win without bloodshed, if 
you will not fight when your victory will be sure and not so costly, you may come to 
the moment when you will have to fight with all the odds against you and only a 
precarious chance for survival. There may be a worse case. You may have to fight 





0.1 Opening and Thesis Statements 
The governments of Britain, France, the Soviet Union and the United States 
endeavoured after 1945 to create a new Germany out of the ruins of Adolf Hitler’s Reich.  
Never again should German military formations resolve regional disputes by force of arms 
or penetrate the frontiers of neighbouring states in pursuit of national aggrandizement.  This 
peacemaking or peacebuilding principle, one that terminated a perceived German 
predilection of violence based on an almost unnatural European distribution of industrial 
power1, represented the starting point of a postwar pacification process.  The policymakers 
targeted both the material and the immaterial elements of military power.  But these men 
most importantly sought a new era of peace built on the disappearance of all military 
industrial capacities from the German body politic.  This revolutionary concept redefined 
the geopolitical weight of the central European state and thereby represented a significant 
departure from the traditions of international relations and all previous approaches to the  
“German question”.  The victors no longer sought power containment.  They instead 
advocated the creation of a gigantic vacuum. 
Flanked by the smouldering ruins of the German capital, a sight that appeared to 
inaugurate this new course, the Allies met at Potsdam to repeat and anchor their 
determination to remould the defeated state.  The victors on the surface appeared unified in 
these negotiations.  Despite the difficulties involved in welding together a policy derived by 
officials from widely disparate political regimes, the diplomats, specialists and politicians 
formulated a common policy at Potsdam that emphasized denazification, decentralization, 
deindustrialization, democratization and demilitarization.  Industrial demilitarization, a 
fusion of deindustrialization and demilitarization, stood at the top of this policy list.2  A new 
meaning of disarmament had therefore appeared.  The Allies focused on the creation of a 
straightforward plan that aimed to close and dismantle the facilities of war built during 




bombing pundits during the 1920s and 1930s by accepting the possibility of imposing a 
state of powerlessness on the enemy’s industrial system through selective destruction. 
This sharp separation between the civilian and military segments of modern 
industry and the virtual dismissal of borderline dual-use industries purported a reality that 
did not accord with the economic and later military theories of the period.  The experience 
of the bomber crews during the war cast serious doubt on the feasibility of allying state 
belligerence through the wreckage or paralysis of military industry.  This strategy, one that 
predated the deliberations concerning industrial demilitarization and emerged after 1918, 
dictated that airpower alone could demolish the enemy's military center of gravity or the 
military industrial manufacturing system during wartime.  The strategic bombers of the 
combined American-British air fleets, designed and equipped to systematically destroy the 
enemy’s industrial system, pounded German cities and factories during World War II.  The 
Allied “B-17s” and “Lancasters” dropped 2,690,000 metric tons of explosives and 
incendiaries on a long list of targets in hopes of fatally wounding armaments manufacturers.  
Any notion of a strict theoretical separation between civilian and military targets vanished 
during the war.  The awareness of a complex symbiotic relationship between military 
productive power and all areas of modern industry instead took hold.  The pundits even 
strove to negatively influence civilian morale and reduce productive output by killing the 
worker. 
The Volkswagen plant in Fallersleben represented one such dual-use industrial 
target.  The “vehicle industry”, Allied policymakers constantly repeated during this period, 
“is a major force for war”.3  This factory had for example switched production of the 
civilian “KdF-Wagen” or “Käfer” to the military “Kübelwagen” used by the Wehrmacht 
after 1939.  The plant retained the highest capacities for the production of motor vehicles in 
Nazi Germany and was endowed with considerable industrial equipment.4  Yet the 
devastating air raids against these facilities only smashed the factory walls and more 
devastatingly burned much of the surrounding city to a cinder.5  The civilians of 
Fallersleben, true of so many German and European cities and villages, fared less well.  
Over two-thirds of the factory itself, the outer shell protecting the machine-tools from the 
elements, burned in the fires of war.  The sinews of industrial power nevertheless remained 
largely unaffected.  Labour gangs had moved machinery to protected areas and repair crews 
worked diligently to mend what the bombs had battered. 
The military significance of Volkswagen evaporated after 1945 despite official 




war to repair the bombing damage continued their efforts in the immediate postwar.  These 
men and women, under the watchful eyes of Anglo-American military government 
officials, largely rebuilt the Fallersleben plant and generally repaired the industrial 
equipment in the months after defeat.  The dictates of the occupation determined that the 
American military officials in Germany cut themselves loose from official policy in order to 
cope with the economic problems that gripped the country.  The policy succeeded.  
Volkswagen returned to production and managed to build 10,000 automobiles by the end of 
1946.  Output soared even higher during the next year and long before the economic 
miracle gripped Germany.6  The millionth “Käfer” rolled off the production lines in 1954.  
Western German automobile manufacturers had surpassed the production levels of Hitler’s 
Reich by the end of the 1940s.  The dual-use capacities in this important case—automobile 
manufacturing representing a “major force for war”—remained intact despite aerial 
bombing and official Allied policies of industrial restructuring. 
This dissertation examines the postwar plan and course of industrial 
demilitarization in Germany after 1945.  The pages of this inquiry therefore search for the 
specific formula used by the Allied military governments to try to create a unique and 
unprecedented industrial form known as the demilitarized industrial state.  The Fallersleben 
contradiction demonstrates that the meaning of the program changed dramatically between 
the war years and 1950.  The struggle to produce a meaningful definition of dual-use 
potential ultimately proved exceedingly difficult.  Economic realities fuelled this process.  
The chapters of this dissertation in fact demonstrate that the Allied policy goal of a pacified 
Germany suffered from a serious if not insurmountable dilemma.  Industrial items required 
for the prosecution of war, ranging from fixed nitrogen to machine-tools, included all those 
essential to the civilian economy.  The effective American administration of a defeated 
Germany required a postwar policy that balanced national security concerns with sound 
economic policy.  Washington’s devotion to western European economic regeneration, a 
policy that hoped to resurrect markets for American export, also helped transform 
perspectives concerning the defeated state.  A new policy emerged that advocated the 
retention and even expansion of the German dual-use industrial base.  The widening breach 
between Washington and Moscow after 1945 only refocused attention on the military 
possibilities of the reactivation of existing German industrial capacities.  These residual 
dual-use capacities later escalated or increased Cold War tensions as Washington scrambled 




in Germany therefore acted as another factor in the bipolar split of Europe.  Western 
German military potential itself fuelled the need to rearm the defeated state. 
0.2 Historiography and Methodology 
Industrial demilitarization, like all other elements of Allied policy in Germany, 
represented an idea whose translation into reality required the formulation of a concrete and 
workable program.  “Ideas”, Peter Novick points out, “are frequently defined with reference 
to what they oppose”.7  The Allied policy of demilitarization on one level confronted the 
rabid militarism worshipped by Nazism.  The German propensity to use violence for state 
ends, manifested in two world wars, appeared to deviate markedly from western norms.  
The Allied struggle against German militarism therefore took on the spiritual qualities of a 
moral crusade. The prosecution at the Nuremberg trials even rejected the need for rational 
analysis when confronting German militarism. 
We must not become preoccupied with the niceties of a chart or details of military 
organization at the expense of far more important things which are matters of common 
knowledge...We are at grips here with something big and evil and durable; something 
that was not born in 1933 or even 1921; something much older than anyone here; 
something far more important than any individual in the dock; something that is not 
yet dead and that cannot be killed by a rifle or a hangman's noose.8 
 
Industrial demilitarization promised to bypass the difficulties of constructing a viable 
disarmament system by removing the industrial capacities required for the manufacture of 
armaments.  The program therefore seemed the perfect solution to the issues raised by 
Nuremberg lawyers and others throughout this period.  The nobility of the enterprise should 
not however blind scholars to the importance of evaluating the concrete program of 
industrial demilitarization adopted after 1945 that included a specific definition of military 
industry and various procedures for extirpating German military industrial capacities.  Only 
a detailed analysis of the operation according to strict academic standards and methods can 
determine whether the Allies in fact disarmed and industrially demilitarized German 
society. 
Traditional disarmament strategies did not characterize the Allied plan to destroy 
German military industrial potential.  Even these confront a serious dilemma. Evgeniy 
Gorkovskiy, the Director of the Department for Disarmament Affairs and Deputy to the 
Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs at the United Nations, summarized the 
disarmament conundrum at a conference in Mexico in April 2001: 
First of all, we have to understand the meaning of the term “disarmament.” The task of 
arriving at a clear, working definition of this term is most challenging indeed and there 




Because there is no official legal definition of this term, it has come to mean different 
things to different people. The critics of disarmament have tended to view it as a 
romantic, rather naïve - and therefore somewhat dangerous - concept, tied to the 
whimsical goal of eliminating literally all weapons from the face of the Earth. This is, 
however, surely not an interpretation consistent with centuries of international 
diplomacy in this field…Real disarmament is a painstaking process, demanding a lot 
of perseverance, patience, honesty and good will of all partners and civil societies.9 
 
Industrial demilitarization originally meant far more than disarmament.  The idea held that 
the Allies could rip the capacity to produce weapons from German soil.  Since most 
American policymakers did not agree with Henry Morgenthau’s policy of pastoralization, 
the concept of industrial demilitarization did not include all industrial activity and was 
therefore predicated on the notion of a clear delineation between military and civilian 
industries.  Some form of industry was meant to survive.  The question related to which 
branches and how much capacity.  This dissertation is an exploration of this distinction.  
Industrial demilitarization, like the Anglo-American strategic bombing of Germany 
during the war, seemed a relatively straightforward exercise based primarily on the 
analytical determination of targets vital to the enemy’s military industrial system.  The 
strategic bombing pundits and demilitarization specialists easily located scores of potential 
objectives that ranged from assembly plants to refineries and power stations.  This process 
reflected a particular understanding of modern military power.  The large number of targets 
strewn over hundreds of square kilometres in fact overwhelmed the authorities.  Concern 
for the future viability of the civilian economy did not however hamstring military planning 
prior to and during the war.  The air pundits did not therefore construct a real delineation 
between military and civilian.  On the contrary, this dissertation demonstrates in chapters 
one and two that military calculations combined both worlds into a symbiotically merged 
entity.  The strategists generally understood that no truly important distinguishing 
characteristics divided civilian and military industrial realms.10  The bombing of marshal 
ling yards actually took on greater importance than the demolition of explosives plants. 
Yet Allied policymakers chose to ignore the lessons taught by the strategic 
bombing campaign and placed renewed faith in the ability of specialists to determine the 
boundaries and dimensions of military industry.  This belief, that a visible gulf between 
civilian and military industrial production existed, permeates much of the literature devoted 
to the demilitarization process.  Demilitarization, like denazification, seemed a relatively 
straightforward exercise calling for the destruction and dismantling of quantifiable 
phenomenon–in this case military material and production facilities.  Special Allied teams 




and destroyed tons of armaments.  The historiography hypothesizes that the victorious 
powers purged the German state of militarism and especially military industrial capabilities 
by instituting a number of measures that included the destruction of the instruments of war 
after 1945.11 
The rigidity of this position does not accord with other aspects of the occupation.  
The historiography demonstrates that scholars expose degrees of failure in other elements 
of Allied postwar policy in Germany and challenge the successful implementation of 
decentralization or decartelization, democratization, civilian deindustrialization and even 
denazification.  Part of the problem with denazification for example rested with the broad 
definition adopted.  The occupation authorities energetically attempted to remove Nazi 
influence from the defeated state by rounding up tens of thousands of suspects and 
disbanding all of Hitler’s institutions.  The “Law for Liberation from National Socialism 
and Militarism” ultimately determined that the German “Spruchkammern” tried 887,252 of 
the 3,623,112 Germans regarded as chargeable by 30 June 1948.  Only 8,385 people found 
themselves behind bars when the dust settled.  The judicial system forced the vast majority 
of offenders to pay minor fines.  The authorities also temporarily removed another 314,000 
people from their places of employment.12  The western military governments found 
denazification a far more complex operation than simply rounding up and incarcerating 
suspected ideological criminals.  The general nature of the adopted definition threatened to 
remove valuable and experienced personnel from administrative positions and thereby 
significantly reduce the efficient management of Germany.  The urgency to punish party 
members diminished in the years after 1945 as the victors turned to more pressing matters 
such as economic recovery.  The historiography of the enterprise therefore generally asserts 
that the western democracies failed in this undertaking.13  Thousands of “former” Nazi 
members freely walked the streets of Germany after 1945, returned to their lucrative former 
professions, and went generally unpunished for their adherence to an abhorrent political 
ideology. 
Scholars treat other aspects of the immediate postwar period with a similar measure 
of scrutiny.  A comprehensive range of perspectives concern when and why the Cold War 
began, the principal actors of this bipolar or even multipolar split, the geographical 
boundaries of the conflict and ultimately the impact of the Cold War on overall policy in 
Germany.  The spirit of these debates does not curiously enough influence the accounts of 
western German rearmament.  The traditional interpretations posit that the destabilizing 




victory in China and most importantly the Korean War heightened the fear of a military 
confrontation with Josef Stalin in central Europe.  American military planners and 
government officials, according to this logic, responded to these strategic concerns by 
advocating a German military contribution in mid-1950.  Historians link the decision to 
remilitarize the former enemy inexorably to the outbreak of serious political tensions between 
the United States and the Soviet Union.  In other words, the postwar political crisis and 
brewing conflict inspired politicians and generals to draw on additional power bases to 
increase military strength.  This process redefined industrial demilitarization policy in 
Germany. 
Even marginal critics of this rigid interpretation do not depart from the central 
teachings.  Donald Abenheim alludes to the contradiction that the Anglo-American 
authorities still busily dismantled a small number of factories while simultaneously 
planning for a German military contribution at the outset of the 1950s.  The western 
powers, that is, still removed certain industrial facilities even though West Germany now 
received new stocks of machine-tools and more importantly the currency to fund a new 
program of rearmament as part of the 1950s American military defensive programs.  The 
simple fact that the selective dismantling continued at so late a juncture incidentally casts 
severe doubt on the successful conclusion of the industrial demilitarization policy.  Despite 
the obvious implications of a lack of direction or even a confused state of affairs, Abenheim 
emphasizes that the full demilitarization of Germany transpired.14  David Clay Large goes 
further than Abenheim in drawing attention to severe deficiencies within the definitions of 
Allied industrial demilitarization policy.  Large argues that the imprecise nature of the 
terminology and differing interpretations set the former Allies at loggerheads.  The disputes 
that resulted helped split the former alliance.15  Both studies cast a degree of doubt on the 
success of the industrial demilitarization program.  A major contradiction emerges.  If 
certain aspects of policy failed, then what percentage and what branches of the dual-use 
industries did the Allies in fact demilitarize. 
Scholars have devoted far more energy towards analysing the fate of the German 
army after 1945.16  These inquiries focus on the punishment of war criminals and the Allied 
policy of social engineering in Germany.  American soldiers hunted down those persons 
who broke faith with the accepted code of ethics set into law after 1945.  The military 
governments also “encouraged” the vanquished population to reject a concept of militarism 
and soldierly values deemed unique to the central European population.17  Washington in 




policy.  Here, as in other investigations of the psychological aspects of Allied policy, Large 
points out that this “dubious” concept “proved unworkable because of the complexity of 
historical legacies and contemporary challenges faced by the victors in the postwar era”.18  
While important correctives, punishment and psychological cleansing did not hammer 
swords into ploughshares.  The academic evaluation of the success of these programs does 
not even recognize that mid-century states derived swords and ploughshares essentially 
from the same steel. 
Other works cite the destruction of Nazi military hardware during and after the war 
and proclaim the success of demilitarization.  This literature indicates that academics 
depend on a quantitative analysis of direct military hardware.  This methodology reduces 
military power to a crude calculus of finished products and omits the vast dual-use 
industrial infrastructure—itself a complex mix of organizational ability, labour and 
resources—required to begin the mass production of armaments.  A look at the direct 
destruction of weapons and the dissolution of military organizations does not assist the 
investigation of military industrial capacities.  This dissertation asserts that these traditional 
modes of explanation suffer from a twisted Cartesian logic or the notion that “once you 
have a name for something, it is presumed to exist”.19  This incessant repetition by 
historians of the success of industrial demilitarization presumes a definition and quantifiable 
data where none exists.  An investigation of the Allied program must evaluate the fate of 
German dual-use capacities between 1945 and 1950. 
Scholars therefore view the eventual birth of the Bundeswehr in 1955 as a new 
starting point or break with the immediate postwar past.  The story of West German 
remilitarization therefore follows a conventional format that is worth reiteration.  According 
to this view, the Allies vanquished the Wehrmacht in 1945 and on 5 June 1945 the Berlin 
Declaration transferred all German state functions to the United Kingdom, France, the 
United States and the Soviet Union.  The Allies took charge of a chaotic Germany reeling 
under massive wartime destruction.  The victors stepped into the chaos and set out to 
remove all Nazis from positions of influence, demobilize and incarcerate the Wehrmacht's 
remaining personnel, destroy all military production installations and the associated 
scientific infrastructure, reduce what remained of the factories to a level corresponding with 
peaceful purposes, and then create a new democratized state totally devoid of any 
theoretical ability to act militarily.  The traditional perspective posits that the Allies largely 




This work rejects the consideration of Germany as industrially demilitarized based 
on observations of direct armament production after 1945 as inclusive proof.  This standard 
of analysis does not accord with immediate Allied postwar objectives.  Later chapters 
demonstrate that George C. Marshall took up this argument in early 1947 to deflect 
attention away from the American plan for comprehensive western German industrial 
recovery based on indigenous dual-use capacities.  The argument of German military 
powerlessness acted as a sop to quiet those groups agitating against the former enemy’s 
economic rehabilitation.  British conservatives of the period even looked warily on this 
theoretical demilitarized state as evidence of a significant increase in overall German 
geopolitical power.  The total reduction of armament production, they believed, freed the 
economy from the associated drains on raw materials, investment and labour.  This so-
called “peace dividend” implied an improvement in the competitiveness of German firms at 
the expense of the victors.21  This dissertation asks questions that penetrate the issue 
somewhat deeper.  How did specialists understand the separation between military and 
civilian industries?  Which branches of industry according to this logic constituted the 
primary targets?  How did the dismantling teams proceed with their work?  How and when 
did the politicians and specialists acknowledge Germany as industrially demilitarized? 
Another major contradiction concerning western German dual-use capacities arises 
in appreciations of American military concerns in Germany.  Why should military planners 
have feared the loss of a demilitarized—and therefore pacified—Ruhr industrial complex to 
either Soviet political or military encroachment later in the 1940s?  In order to answer this 
question, this dissertation examines the military’s strategic calculations concerning a 
potential Soviet offensive against western Europe and points out that the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (J.C.S.) dreaded the loss of German industrial regions.  The Soviet occupation of the 
Ruhr promised to revolutionize the global balance of power and eliminate major trading 
partners needed by the American economy.  This fear, one expressed by all Cold War 
schools of though, appears utterly groundless and contrived if the dismantling teams had 
demilitarized German industry in the immediate postwar. 
The reliance on the Office of the Military Government United States (O.M.G.U.S.) 
for quantitative data relating to industrial demilitarization suffers from several severe 
shortcomings.  The Military Governor of Germany General Lucius D. Clay never received 
clear guidelines concerning the delineation between civilian and military industries.  Nor 
did the governor enthusiastically embrace the hopelessly convoluted attempts by 




(F.E.A.), to influence his management of the occupation.  Clay therefore operated 
according to a personal definition of military industries that in no way accorded to 
prevailing opinion.  This dissertation emphasizes that Clay and others viewed the German 
urban landscape in 1945 and generally believed that wartime developments had already 
“demilitarized” the state.  German society, according to Clay, could no longer threaten 
Europe with a war of expansion.  While this perspective proudly proclaimed Germany 
demilitarized, O.M.G.U.S. quantitative evidence, the reports concerning the dual-use 
industries, clearly indicated a contradiction with the original policies established through 
inter-Allied negotiation. 
The Allied Control Council (A.C.C.), the administrative body granted the authority 
to demilitarize Germany according to a unified concept, did establish a formula for success.  
This dissertation examines the antecedents of this plan, the A.C.C. prototype itself, and the 
modifications that followed.  When judged against the J.C.S. assessments of intrinsic 
western German military power during the late 1940s, it becomes clear that serious 
problems surface concerning any determination of Germany as industrially demilitarized.  
These statistics confirm Melvyn P. Leffler’s interpretation that segments of the Truman 
administration actively pursued and countenanced full and unlimited German economic 
rehabilitation in the immediate postwar period.22  A large number of documents from 
various departments in Washington demonstrate the political commitment to 
reconstruction.  Leffler, bolstered by an army of economists, argues that the entire project of 
European reconstruction made absolutely no sense without considerable western German 
participation.23  The overall policy of the Truman administration placed a premium on 
domestic economic success and tried to stimulate trade with European states to fight a 
return to depressed economic conditions and consolidate the democratic victory with 
capitalist security.  This policy placed western Germany at the heart or “nexus” of policy.  
Traditional accounts of demilitarization cannot explain how Washington managed to 
balance the required dismantling of thousands of industrial facilities with the promotion of 
reconstruction, how widespread dismantling could ultimately benefit Europe and most 
importantly how a rebuilt or even “reformed” German economy—whatever that means—
could be considered industrially demilitarized. 
Washington’s revision of the American economic policy in Germany predated the 
Korean War by at least three years.  Only a few dissenters might question whether the 
inclusion of western Germany into such schemes as the Marshall Plan in early 1947 truly 




whether intentionally or not, improve the German industrial base in order to permit at least 
a return to military production after a period of reorganization?  This dissertation argues that 
the Truman administration pursued a policy of German military industrial enhancement 
long before the political decision to sponsor a direct military contribution echoed through 
the halls of Congress.  The contemporary understanding of the proximity of civilian 
economic capacities to military potential influences this observation.  The weak evidence 
that dismantling harmed the overall economy, in conjunction with a host of reports and 
analyses of the German economy, indicate further severe contradictions in the dominant 
explanation of Allied demilitarization policy. 
This certainty glosses over the immense difficulties encountered by the Truman 
administration in defining the dimensions of modern military power and therefore lifting 
the veil obscuring the German military industrial infrastructure after 1945.24  The occupiers 
initially employed primitive methods for the conversion and destruction of weapons.  Allied 
soldiers disregarded any severe ecological risks and detonated explosives on German soil at 
the points of production.  The Allied authorities even dumped German and Japanese 
chemical weapons stocks of mustard gas and other toxic substances in the Baltic Sea and 
near the Japanese coast after the war.25  But American policymakers did not believe that 
guns, grenades and gas constitute true military strength.  The Truman administration 
understood that war consumed military hardware at an extraordinary pace.  The workers 
and infrastructure behind the frontlines determined military efficacy.  In other words, “the 
success of a modern fighting force…is directly and immediately dependent upon the ability 
of the nation’s resources”.  Warfare signifies a “struggle in which each side strives to bring 
to bear against the enemy the coordinated power of every individual and every material 
resource at its command”.26  The American example illustrated that a modern democratic 
industrial power could mobilize within months and beat a more sophisticated enemy force 
into the ground with brute strength. 
The simple destruction of equipment furthermore corresponded to similar 
developments in Allied countries.  The Truman administration followed the same pattern at 
home.  Washington severely reduced the outward military power of the United States in the 
months after the victory against Germany and Japan.  Millions of soldiers returned home, 
weapons were mothballed, and factories converted to civilian production.  Various 
weapons, weapon platforms and military equipment such as trucks found easy and smooth 
integration into the civilian economy.  The substance of Allied demilitarization strategies in 




elsewhere.  The decision by scholars to proclaim Germany the first demilitarized state in 
history owing to the destruction of weapons and weapons systems conflicts with the similar 
actions of Germany’s enemies in 1945. 
Reducing demilitarization to a crude definition based on a single factor and set of 
quantifiable statistics disregards other equally important elements of military strength.  
Allied demilitarization policy of course represented more than the straightforward task of 
collecting and destroying guns and grenades.  The historical community in particular 
emphasizes the spiritual aspects of postwar German demilitarization.  The Allied authorities 
either impressed more than willing German soldiers and scientific specialists into their 
services, imprisoned or executed the recalcitrant, and forced those who survived the purges 
in Germany into a different line of work.  The demilitarization teams moreover dismantled 
or closed military bases, laboratories and production facilities.  Historians seize on these 
activities to add support to the hypothesis that the German industrial system did not retain 
any significant military capabilities.  The military elements of German society, from this 
perspective, witnessed a “Stunde Null”. 
Even though the political administrations of the United States, Britain, France and 
the Soviet Union placed primary emphasis on repairing the immense destruction within 
their specific state boundaries, or in the case of the United States avoiding an economic 
spiral downwards, the policymakers hoped to stabilize the international order according to 
their distinct perceptions of peace.  Economic issues intersected with national security 
concerns from the outset of the postwar and generally reflected a continued concentration 
on military industrial matters.  The priorities of defence determined specific American and 
Soviet notions of economic reconstruction that collided in Germany and forced a 
reevaluation of their policies concerning their alliance and the future of Germany. 
Both the traditionalist and revisionist accounts of the American-Soviet split 
generally underplay the commonality of the nearly desperate postwar search for domestic 
stability and international security.  The quest for the determining factors of the split masks 
any commonality of purpose.  The Cold War historiography generally points out that an 
extremely polarized American-Soviet ideological framework influenced specific reactions 
to particular “trigger events” such as the form of political control in the respective zones of 
control or the immediately manifest European economic malaise after 1947.  Much of the 
debate revolves around whether the extreme ideological polarization influenced the 
American-Soviet reactions to “trigger events” or whether these episodes widened the 




Charles F. Pennacchio succinctly argues that the American and Soviet struggle over 
German reparations after 1945 culminated in the American rejection of Soviet participation 
in the administration of the western Zones that forced the Soviets to demand the American 
vacation of Berlin.27  The reparations as a primary “trigger event” is further explored by 
Carolyn Eisenberg and Wilfried Mausbach.  Eisenberg for example points out that the 
conflicting reparations conceptions promoted an immediately apparent American 
unwillingness to work closely with Stalin and jointly run the occupation after May 1945.28  
The inter-Allied friction regarding the matter of reparations and the administration of 
Germany certainly charged the international atmosphere and therefore helped promote the 
Cold War split.29  But, as this chapter demonstrates, the respective American-Soviet 
understanding of the reparations issue reflected a common search for national security.  
Differences between American and Soviet policymakers concerning their respective 
policies in Germany reflected the wartime experience in addition to overall ideological 
cleavages.  These differences promoted a vehemently opposed understanding of occupation 
priorities that drove the former allies apart. 
Stalin’s perceived need for German industrial resources in order to buttress Soviet 
industrial and military power, and the particularly destructive nature of Soviet reparations, 
competed with the Truman administration’s conception of tying domestic and European 
economic success to the continuation of a viable German economy.  Stalin’s hard stance on 
German reparations helped convince American policymakers that the Soviet Union did not 
desire coexistence with the west or, as revisionists and some postrevisionists contend, 
represent a restrained world power aiming at retention and entrenchment of World War II 
gains.  Revisionist condemnation of the traditional perspective reasonably charges the 
postwar American political elite with manufacturing a nonexistent Soviet grab at world 
domination and adopting an expansionist policy that provoked the Kremlin to respond.30  
But the revisionists fail to understand how Soviet policy in Germany forced a radical 
American response to protect their interests in Europe and elsewhere.  The American policy 
of containment stopped Stalin from drastically altering the face of German society and 
ripping out the industrial sinews of strength which American policymakers believed vital 
for the economic interests of both the domestic and global economies.  The traditional 
portrayal of Stalin’s policy as brutally expansionist holds true for Germany.31  But the 
orthodox image of a lumbering American giant, slow to react to Soviet policy in Germany 
and elsewhere, misrepresents the urgency with which United States policymakers and 




and Europe.  Stalin’s plundering of eastern and central Europe, a policy which historians 
cannot simply trivialize through the phenomenon’s classification as defensive or “reactive”, 
nourished the already manifest anti-communism of the Truman administration by 
indicating that the dictator’s regime placed the interests of the Soviet Union far above the 
creation of a viable postwar European economy deemed an essential prerequisite of 
continued American prosperity.32  Truman reacted to Stalin’s destruction of eastern 
German society and industry in order to save western Germany and western Europe and 
maintain the most important market for American production. 
This dissertation therefore technically falls in line with the postrevisionist portrayal 
of American policy in Europe as essentially credible.33  The dissertation does not however 
accept the revisionist and postrevisionist contention that the United States bears mutual 
responsibility for forcing a negative and defensive Soviet reaction in Europe.  Nor did 
American policymakers misperceive Soviet policy in Germany.  American observation of 
the outward manifestation of Soviet policy in eastern and central Europe justified the anti-
communist and anti-Soviet perspective of American elites.  Revisionists incomprehensibly 
circumvent the impact of the Soviet slaughter of millions of innocent civilians, the forced 
movement of entire national groups, and the ravenous rape of foreign economies on 
American perceptions of Soviet policy.  This dissertation builds on the work of international 
relations theorists and rejects the contention that anti-communism formed the core of 
American reactions to Stalin after 1945 and instead accepts to a certain degree that “non-
ideological” power considerations influenced policy.34  Ideological factors did contribute to 
a fundamental shift in American perceptions of the Soviet Union in 1945, but not in terms 
of anti-communism.  The research of Gaddis demonstrates that Washington did not actually 
believe in an international communist conspiracy aimed at world domination.35 
Stalin’s rabid pursuit of national security in Germany and eastern Europe in 1945 
shifted American perceptions within Germany in connection with a simultaneous shift in 
the vision of demilitarized industry.  The Soviet Union and United States policies in 
Germany, as determined by a similar postwar demand for greater national security, clashed.  
In addition, the policies largely clashed because Stalin could not tolerate the continued 
existence of German industry for reasons of national security.  Even if Stalin did not 
envision Soviet expansion, his policies represented a significant threat to the national 
security and economic viability of Europe and the United States.  Nowhere was the threat 




This dissertation portrays both Washington’s and Moscow’s postwar policies in 
Germany as divergent from the “consensus” achieved at Yalta, Potsdam and as manifested 
in the Level of Industry agreement.  Stalin aimed at further enhancing Soviet national 
security by stripping Germany of virtually all industry even remotely linked to armaments 
production and leaving a rump state in total abject poverty behind.  The Truman 
administration recognized the need to transform industrial demilitarization and placed that 
policy in second place to the overall health of the American economy.  America promoted 
trade and the Soviet Union dismantling.  When the United States reacted to worsening 
conditions in Europe with the argument of suspending efforts at industrial demilitarization 
in order to secure European recovery, Stalin responded in a belligerent manner because he 
misperceived the American actions as harming Soviet state interests.  Stalin perceived 
American changes to the reparations and industrial provisions, both in terms of policy but 
more importantly in terms of substantial changes on the ground, as an attempt to rebuild 
German power. 
This dissertation argues that simultaneous execution of divergent interpretations of 
how to best achieve national security ripped the wartime alliance apart.  Stalin opposed the 
American conception of utilizing German industry to fuel European recovery in order to 
guarantee domestic recovery because the American occupation authorities stopped the 
widespread dismantling he demanded.  The Truman administration opposed the imposition 
of a Soviet-style process of dismantling in the Ruhr to protect their European and domestic 
interests.  Stalin, on the other hand, continued in the immediate postwar period to rape 
eastern Germany for Soviet benefit and therefore indicated a total disregard for American 
policies.  Stalin viewed the actions of the American military government in Germany as 
indicative of an attempt to maintain German power and reacted in the clumsy and crude 
manner typical of his paranoid regime.  Stalin fixed his attention on providing for the Soviet 
Union and consequently viewed all foreign attempts at blocking the realization of his goal 
as a threat to the security of the Soviet Union.  Both states reacted to the national security 
aims of the other. 
While appearing to support the postrevisionist contention that both states bear 
responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities, this dissertation rejects American guilt for 
moral and intellectual reasons.  The dissertation takes issue with accounts of Cold War 
origins that do not clarify the revolutionary nature of Stalinist policy towards the German 
economy and how the execution of this policy influenced American perceptions.  Geir 




an unwilling United States to assume a leadership role in order to assist in reconstruction 
efforts and counter the Soviet menace.37  A host of investigations of foreign attitudes 
towards Soviet communism during the postwar generally demonstrate the widespread 
belief in a communist grab at world power and the plea for American support.38 
This dissertation analyses the historical debate concerning the place of Germany in 
the individual national security strategies of the victorious powers and the starting point for 
the mutations of the respective policies.  Because the immediate breakdown of consensus 
characterized the early postwar period, and the international community settled into the 
bipolar split of the Cold War, the question of responsibility necessarily colours the 
investigation of national security strategies.  In wrestling with the national security 
dimension of Cold War origins, this dissertation demonstrates weaknesses in the traditional 
accounts of American perceptions of German demilitarization and remilitarization that have 
dominated the historiography of this subject. 
This dissertation dismisses the orthodox conclusion by focusing on why the Truman 
administration adopted to assist German economic recovery in the first place.  Washington 
of course hoped to root out and destroy militarism by addressing a complex range of 
elements that included a particular understanding of war industries in Germany.  This 
concept stemmed from the realist desire to protect American industrial growth by 
enhancing trade with foreign markets.  The conservatives in Washington realized quickly 
that the employment of Germany as the nexus of European economic recovery offered an 
opportunity to protect domestic industrial interests, enhance the American strategic position 
in Europe and offset the revolutionary conditions that led to the rise of the totalitarian 
ideologies.  American policy stressed the need to solve Europe’s problems quickly and 
cheaply.  Massive German reparations that stressed an extreme shift in production 
threatened to unravel American designs without offering to protect Europe over the longer 
term.  A demilitarized society by definition could furthermore not be protected against a 
Soviet onslaught without the expenditure of fantastic sums to recreate the infrastructure 
required or spending the resources on a large American contingent.  The American decision 
to remilitarize Germany in the late 1940s grew out of the Marshall Plan.  The need to 
rebuild from the destruction of the war influenced the decision to integrate western 
Germany into a European economic structure that in turn emphasized the vulnerability of 
that state to Soviet pressures or an outright offensive.  A major problem that the Truman 
administration needed to overcome after May 1945 concerned the battle between various 




their effects on German industry.  Until the partial resolution of this problem in 1947, the 
Truman administration could not balance industrial demilitarization and economic 
recovery.  This conflict negatively influenced economic conditions in western Germany, 
Europe and ultimately the United States.  The realization by high-ranking policymakers in 
Washington that industrial disarmament retarded general economic rehabilitation and 
prosperity spelled the end of the noble dream of a pacified industrial order. 
0.3 The Interrelationship of Civilian and Military Industries 
This dissertation acknowledges the postulate that no truly significant or substantive 
differences existed between the means of production of military and civilian goods during 
the first half of the 20th Century.  Both depended on an interchangeable foundation.39  
Certain chemical compounds required for industrial, agricultural and medical applications, 
for example, also function as the basis of chemical weapons.40  The German army 
introduced the world to chemical weapons by employing simple chlorine gas against 
French and Canadian troops near Ypres on 22 April 1915.41  Chlorine of course represented 
a relatively harmless weapon.  Other substance proved more deadly and equally simple to 
refine and adapt from civilian processes.  Thiodiglycol for example is a component of felt 
pen ink and textile dyes as well as a precursor of mustard gas. Armaments producers of the 
period could also employ phosgene and hydrogen cyanide, used for certain plastics, for 
chemical weapons.  Civilian industry employed Triethanolamine, another precursor for 
nitrogen mustard gas, for detergents, industrial lubricants and surfactants.42  German 
scientists in search of pesticides for agricultural use developed far more dangerous nerve 
agents such as “Tabun”, “Soman” and “Sarin” in the 1930s.  These men derived the deadly 
gases from the same chemical group of organo-phosphorus compounds needed to defend 
crops against armies of insects.43  Both chlorine and pesticides are nevertheless 
indispensable for certain industries and of course agriculture.  The long list of other 
commodities used for either civilian or military purposes covers a list ranging from 
combustion engines to fertilizers.  The postulate of inter-reliance is therefore based on the 
conclusion that “moderate technical capability and economic means” can produce a wide 
range of conventional, chemical and biological weapons through the adaptation of basic 
civilian technologies.44 
Severely restricting a state’s ability to employ civilian industrial resources for 
military purposes, the essence of demilitarization conceptions, obviously remains a 
questionable undertaking unless significant percentages of the civilian sector are themselves 




age.  The interdependency postulate indicates that disarmament theory must entail more 
than scrapping tanks and guns or blowing up munitions.  This half-hearted approach, as 
pointed out by Mitchel B. Wallerstein, “is less effective when the armament in question is 
produced substantially on the basis of dual-use technology”.45  But mid-century 
industrialists derived all wartime weapons systems from rockets to nuclear bombs from the 
civilian sector.  Clark C. Abt’s remark that only “universal amnesia” could erase the 
knowledge of weapons construction indicates a severe problem with the logical basis of 
what might be termed materialist disarmament conceptions.46  Real industrial disarmament, 
defined by the United Nations as “the progressive elimination of the capacity to produce 
new weapons and the release and integration into civilian life of military personnel”,47 by 
definition requires the destruction of a vast number of factories producing an endless array 
of consumer goods.  Reconversion from military to civilian production maintains the 
capacities to manufacture the instruments that kill.  And the number of potential candidates 
for industrial demilitarization in modern industrial states reaches into the thousands.48 
Various politicians and organizations demonstrate an inability to accept the fused 
relationship between civilian and military industry.  Two contemporary examples illustrate 
this point.  A report issued by Doug Beason in 1995 for the American William Clinton 
administration of the 1990s questioned the belief in a strict separation between military and 
civilian sectors.  The author claimed that Washington’s demand to divert resources from the 
military to the civilian sector failed to understand that expenditures on either sector benefit 
the other through “spinoffs, R&D investments, re-investment, and infrastructure 
building”.49  Beason continued to point out that the debate over reductions in military 
investment set in motion by the Clinton administration reintroduced the old argument of 
whether state organizations or private enterprise should receive financial support for the 
development of industrial technologies to enhance American national security.50  Whether 
or not civilian industry develops technologies of direct use by military organizations or 
simply increases the overall industrial strength of a state should not obscure the close 
connection between both in the determination of national power.  In any case, the Clinton 
administration declared the willingness to encourage “the cost-effective development of 
new technologies for national defense” by deriving military technologies from 
developments in the civilian sector and vice versa.51  The potential military use of civilian 
technologies remains an inescapable reality of the modern age. 
A series of United Nations studies published during the 1970s and early 1980s also 




sector development in industrialized countries and especially developing states.  A number 
of scholars such as Michael Edelstein support these conclusions and argue that the wars of 
the 20th Century retarded normal economic growth in the industrialized states by restricting 
civilian consumption and investment.  The United Nations specialists explained how 
military expenditures damaged the economy by decreasing state spending on civilian 
infrastructural projects or diverting labour and raw materials.  “For the most part”, a report 
from 1981 outlined, “military expenditures do not contribute to the production of capital 
goods and so do not increase the productive capacity of an economy”.52  Disarmament, 
these reports outline, promised to alleviate the tensions of declining economic growth and 
unemployment by increasing investment in the civilian sector and creating jobs.53 
This dissertation does not take issue with this strong hypothesis.  But the reports 
outline a major problem concerning dual-use industries.  The United Nations experts 
separated military production into several categories according to their relevance to the 
civilian sector.  The writers correctly pointed out that some products such as tank turrets 
and artillery shells were without civilian applications, but stressed the dual-use applications 
of transport vehicles and office equipment.54  The reports however concluded that a “wide 
variety of industrial products...are used or consumed by the military... [and] …are otherwise 
indistinguishable from civil products” and that modern economies have a “considerably 
inbuilt capacity to convert resources from one activity to another”.55  Even in the case of 
tank turrets and artillery shells, the authors suggested that modern states shift productive 
capacities towards civilian goods as part of a normal process of economic change.56  A 
change in direct production, therefore, would not significantly influence overall military 
industrial potential.  The United Nations conclusions in fact again imply the symbiotic 
relationship of military and civilian industries.  Investments, the allocation of human and 
material resources, flow interchangeably depending on political decisions.57 
Did the mid-century American understanding of industrial demilitarization imposed 
on the defeated German state after 1945 acknowledge this symbiotic relationship?  The 
evidence presented in later chapters suggests that the concept as conceived during the war 
years represented a political and military strategy that sought a specific objective.  This 
objective generally disregarded the logic of fused or interrelated industries even though the 
issue was correctly understood on numerous levels.  The disarmament conceptions 
conceived of modern military industry largely as a separate entity.  This artificial separation 
did not correspond with either the dominant modes of thinking of contemporaries or recent 




hypothetical acts attempting to achieve a solution to a conflict of power, which 
disarmament also is”.58  Disarmament in theory reduces the direct military power of a state.  
However, disarmament does not necessarily touch the potential capacities of a state to 
reorganize civilian industry and rearm. 
The Allied program of industrial demilitarization, a potential solution to the 
contradictions of disarmament, represented an untested concept aimed at addressing a 
modern problem.  Several theoretical issues arise when industrial demilitarization as a 
concept is put under scrutiny.  The scheme of unilaterally disarming German industry 
promised to alter the geopolitical composition of European society and therefore 
represented much more than a localized political or economic change.  A general longing 
for a positive alteration to the behaviour of the global community was of course embodied 
in the notion of pacifying Germany.  The operation attempted to define and solve the 
modern problem of pinpointing the elements of rearmament potential for the purposes of 
establishing a workable disarmament strategy to stabilize European politics.  Nevertheless, 
the Allied plan took complex historic economic developments, such as the domestic 
relationship of population size with industrial agriculture or even inter-state trade, largely 
for granted. 
The Allied policymakers also originally chose to focus predominantly on 
technological and industrial issues and failed to account for the complexity of modern 
warfare and industry.59  Michael E. Howard demonstrates that the ability to wage war 
comprises four dimensions including the operational arts, logistical capabilities, social 
willingness and technological ability.60  By focusing on technology and industry, two 
power factors that exercised the fantasies of soldiers and the public throughout the 20th 
Century,61 the policymakers misunderstood the complexity of the fused industrial-military 
relationship.  Some form of German industry would survive the postwar alterations.  The 
German civilian capacity to rebuild factories and resurrect a new industrial system geared to 
war, by definition utterly non-military in appearance, took on military qualities.  Industrial 
disarmament or even downsizing did not therefore mean peace.  Which industrial branches 
maintained dual-use capacities and what level of reduction was necessary to ensure 
permanent pacification?  “It is the greatest mistake to mix up disarmament with peace”, 
Winston Churchill believed, “When you have peace you will have disarmament”.62  
Disarmament like war remains an “expression of culture”.63  Effective and long-term arms 
control from this perspective required the compliance of all parties.64  Industrial 




things—the destruction of all military outlays, a significant downsizing of all civilian 
industrial capacity and a permanent system of control.  
Even the idea of industrial conversion complicated disarmament conceptions.  The 
supporters of sweeping demilitarization, both contemporary and historically, often fail to 
acknowledge that the reallocation of national resources to civilian objectives in fact 
enhances military capabilities over the long-term.  Nicholas Balabkins points out that the 
initial attention to the elimination of a German military potential after 1945 “led many high-
level policy makers in Washington to forget, or wilfully to overlook, the fact that war 
potential constitutes also recuperational potential”.65  The reverse also holds true.  Seen in 
this way, demilitarization by way of conversion paradoxically threatened to increase overall 
German industrial potential.  Allied demilitarization concepts therefore suffered from a 
misplaced faith in the “peace dividend” illusion.  Widespread belief that military 
expenditures constitute an economic burden determined the fallacious view that the 
conversion of military industry promised to release significant industrial capacities for the 
creation of a peaceful and thriving economy.  The “peace dividend”, when balanced by the 
postulate that military strength depends directly on the viability of the civilian industrial 
base, appears suspect.  The “peace dividend”, in strengthening the general economy, in fact 
enhances military potential.66 
Demilitarization through dismantling alone did not of course promise short-term 
positive economic results.  Errol A.  Henderson, in analysing the association of military 
spending and poverty in the United States between 1959-92, points out that military 
conversion programs that simply cut spending instead of diverting funds reduced overall 
“aggregate demand” and therefore spawned an economic decline that in turn increased state 
poverty.  Defence reductions in particular affected the highly skilled labour force associated 
with armaments such as “aeronautics, industrial and mechanical engineering, and 
metalworking”.  Only increased economic growth with a commensurate increase in civilian 
productivity in the civilian sector can, the argument goes, compensate for this industrial 
displacement.67  Industrial conversion in Germany represented an important issue owing to 
the high levels of industrial militarization during wartime that characterized the economies 
of all belligerents.  The destruction of military outlays threatened millions with permanent 
unemployment and a severe drop in national productivity unless alternatives were found. 
The 20th Century witnessed the blurring of war and peace into indistinguishable 
elements.  The world wars of the past century demanded the systematic exploitation of 




reasons.  This fusion of civilian and military technology and industry, one that represents a 
“comparatively recent development”,68 stands out as a dominant factor in all modern power 
calculations.  The effective application of force demanded the creation of military 
institutions that both reflected the societies from which they were derived and utilized a 
large chunk of civilian resources.  In particular, the need to exploit new technologies for 
national security, no matter how seemingly unimportant to direct military power, blurred 
the definitions of military hardware and therefore of war and peace.  Advances in the 
synthetic production of chemical compounds such as pesticides, normally perceived as an 
exclusive domain of the civilian economy, forced fundamental changes in all aspects of 
warfare in a manner that equalled the development of more deadly explosives or even jet 
propulsion.  The continual changes within the civilian sector sent shockwaves throughout 
the military and forced a high degree of adaptation.69 
0.4 A Note on Sources 
The inquiry into the postwar occupation of Germany confronts an astounding 
amount of primary and secondary source materials.  The investigation of industrial 
demilitarization from the American perspective involves much more than the presidency, 
the State, Treasury and War Departments.  Narrowing the field of inquiry to the State and 
War Departments and contingent organizations, the historian is nevertheless faced with a 
vast array of organizations and individuals including the A.C.C., C.C.S., E.A.C., J.C.S., 
O.M.G.U.S., S.H.A.E.F., U.S.F.E.T., the U.S.S.B.S. and a large number of State 
Department committees.  The nature of this inquiry demanded the utiliization of a wide 
range of primary materials.  In addition to the extensive records available on microfilm and 
in printed volumes such as F.R.U.S., the actors involved have handed subsequent 
generations a large collection of memoirs and interviews.  This dissertation offers a wide 
selection of these documents in addition to important documents found at Auwärtiges Amt 
Archiv and the Landesarchiv Berlin. 
CHAPTER 1 
 
Dual-Use Industry and Military Mobilization 
 
A commodity appears at first sight an extremely obvious, trivial thing.  But its analysis 







The military organizations that fought Adolf Hitler’s war between 1939 and 1945 
relied on their respective society’s technological and industrial base to equip and supply the 
soldiers they trained for battle.  The dependency on the civilian economy in particular 
transformed the battlefield and the methods and strategies of warfare.  The Prussian 
regimental officer Carl von Clausewitz theorized in the 18th Century that disarming the 
enemy represented the “object of war in the abstract” or “the ultimate means of 
accomplishing the war’s political purpose”.1  With this objective in mind, disarming and 
therefore defeating an enemy in the industrial age represented a new challenge for 
strategists.  The large armies equipped by the means of mass production defied traditional 
tactics.  Civilian and military power attributes therefore seemed to fuse together.  Scholars 
in the present century suggest that the raw statistics of productive output have replaced 
traditional qualitative indicators of military strength such as soldierly discipline as the 
means of calculating national power.2  This conclusion obscures the fantastic complexity of 
modern military industry and the armed men drawn from the rank and file of workers and 
the middle classes.  The forward-looking Prussian offered a more comprehensive definition 
and cited political, economic, technological, intellectual and social factors as the primary 
components of military and national power.  The symbiotic relationship between military 
and civilian industrial power implied that wartime disarmament encompassed more than 
striking at purely military targets such as groups of armed men or even armament 
manufacturing.  While highly dependent on economic capabilities and productive 
capacities, armaments manufacturing also reflected a range of political choices and 
therefore social or cultural values.  The second of two World Wars in the first half of the 
20th Century, as described in this chapter, was truly total. 
This chapter therefore examines the assumption that the mobilization of a state’s 




transfer of men and resources from the civilian sector.  The American and German 
examples demonstrate that military strategists viewed the civilian economy as the starting 
point of military industrial power.  Both governments redirected the same raw materials and 
human effort that built machines and commodities for civilian markets towards constructing 
the weapons of war.  Armaments production, seen in this way, was therefore tied to factors 
that influenced the civilian economy such as industrial growth rates, access to raw 
materials, the quality of the workforce, currency stocks and the level of technology.  The 
historian Michael Geyer defines armament production as a politically directed social and 
economic activity that transfers resources from the civilian sector for a political purpose.3  
The primary difference between the production of a tank and an automobile or explosives 
and fertilizer, according to this logic, rests in a political choice made by politicians.  
Clausewitz theorized: “war is merely the continuation of policy by other means”.4  In the 
military industrial arena, armament production is merely the adaptation of economic and 
industrial policy using the same means. 
1.2 American Civilian Industry and Rearmament 
Historians tend to describe the tremendous increases in American armaments 
output after 1941 as legendary.  John Keegan calls this phenomenon the “largest, most rapid 
and sustained expansion ever known”.5  The production statistics reveal the dimensions of 
the accomplishment.  The United States essentially started from what might be termed a 
“disarmed” state—an arsenal of insignificant proportions relative to other powers in most 
areas except for the navy.  Civilian manufacturers nevertheless responded to the needs of 
war and produced 303,717 aircraft, 6,500 naval vessels and 88,430 tanks during the war.  
This output dwarfed that of Germany.  In 1943 alone, after only two years of war, the 
United States built 29,500 tanks or more than Germany’s total wartime production of 
24,050.  The disparity was immense.  The United States built 2.4 million trucks to 
Germany’s 35,000, 97,810 bombers to the Luftwaffe’s 18,225, and doubled Germany’s 
totals in fighter aircraft.6  These numbers seriously erode the hypothesis that a fascist 
economy devoted to military production could outperform a democratic state that 
emphasized investment in the civilian sector. 
The unprecedented growth of the American armaments industry after 1941 did not 
however constitute a miracle.  A far stronger and tighter bond linked the American military 
with civilian industrialists.  The capitalist ethos of the United States impacted the thinking 
of military professionals.  General Lucius D. Clay, working as Deputy Director of War 




logistics and control of military procurement and production is essentially a part of the 
strategy governing the…use of our armed forces”.  Clay added that the centrality of 
industry to warfare emphasised that civilian agencies should continue to control the 
economy during war.7  The rational exploitation of resources by men such as Clay should 
not however mask the fact that the United States was responsible for 32.2 percent of global 
manufacturing output prior to 1939 and significantly outperformed Germany by a factor of 
three to one.8  This base technically forgave the few misguided perceptions and wasted 
efforts of a country so lacking in continental Europe’s military traditions.9  The strength of 
American civilian industry, added to the productive capacities of the other allies and 
balanced with those of the enemy, kicks the mystery out of any historical analysis.  
American achievements reflected the prewar strength of the civilian industrial base.  This 
base mattered. 
Fortified by the world’s largest industrial base, American manufacturers required a 
mere two years to retool the automotive and chemical plants and initiate the wave of 
military production that turned the war irretrievably against Hitler in 1943.10  As stated, 
Washington did not maintain a large arsenal during the interwar years.  Prior to the 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, industrialists proved unwilling to back 
the military’s mobilization plans, such as the “Industrial Mobilization Plan of 1939” and 
generally retarded weapons production.  The lack of preparedness and the civilian nature of 
the economy did not however chain the emerging American juggernaut.  Armaments 
production nevertheless peaked after only two years.  The factories produced more tanks, 
planes, artillery pieces and munitions than all other belligerents combined.  Not only did the 
United States assemble a huge military force on two fronts, something that German 
generals intensely feared since the days of Alfred Graf von Schlieffen, industrialists also 
supplied America’s allies with finished products, critical industrial commodities such as 
machine-tools and millions of tons of raw materials.11  Richard Overy’s conclusion that the 
adaptive skills of American industry resulted in the tremendous output of military hardware 
offers a valid explanation of the phenomenon.  His focus on bureaucratic achievements by 
men such as Clay however misses the point somewhat.12  The United States maintained the 
world’s largest industrial base prior to 1941.  The prewar concentration on civilian 
commodities did not decrease theoretical military power. 
Various comments by Franklin D. Roosevelt during the 1930s indicated that the 
president understood the basic military industrial advantages offered by investments in the 




interpretation of his day that a fundamental difference between Nazi-Germany and the 
United States existed in terms of state investment.  The president first lashed out at what he 
believed to be a Nazi rearmament program that aimed at enhancing national security and 
only secondly curing such depression ills as high unemployment.  Speaking in Buenos 
Aires to the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace on 1 December 1936, 
Roosevelt condemned such a policy as “false employment” since “Nations guilty of these 
follies inevitably face the day when either their weapons of destruction must be used against 
their neighbors or when an unsound economy, like a house of cards, will fall apart”.13  On 
another occasion, he obliquely insinuated that German state expenditures on armaments 
production or direct rearmament ran approximately between 30 and 50 percent of the 
budget.  The president commented that his government focused on “bridges and 
boulevards, dams and reforestation, the conservation of our soil and many other kinds of 
useful works” and only spent about 11 percent on weapons.14 
This perspective clouds two important points that Roosevelt understood.  The United 
States first of all, owing to the country’s high standard of living, could financially support a 
military at far less cost to the general population than other great powers.15  More 
importantly, the president clearly appreciated that a large civilian industrial infrastructure 
translated directly into military potential.  Roosevelt stated on numerous occasions that any 
rearmament program in the United States was built on the entire breadth of the nation—a 
breadth that even included the social and economic reforms that his government undertook 
to solve the economic crisis of the depression.16  Immediately after the outbreak of war in 
September 1939, in an attempt to alter the embargo provisions of American neutrality 
legislation, the president clarified his position concerning the parallels between military and 
civilian industrial sectors.  Roosevelt’s speech demonstrated far more than a ploy to 
encourage trade with the democracies.  The president tossed out any strict delineation 
between civilian and military industries and merged both in terms of national security 
calculations.  
Let me set forth the present paradox of the existing legislation in its simplest terms: If, 
prior to 1935, a general war had broken out in Europe, the United States would have 
sold to, and bought from, belligerent nations such goods and products of all kinds as 
the belligerent nations, with their existing facilities and geographical situations, were 
able to buy from us or sell to us. This would have been the normal practice under the 
age-old doctrines of international law…If a war had broken out in Europe prior to 
1935, there would have been no difference, for example, between our exports of sheets 
of aluminum and airplane wings; today there is an artificial legal difference…Before 
1935 there would have been no difference between the export of cotton and the export 
of gun cotton. Today there is…Before 1935 there would have been no difference 




Today there is…Before 1935 there would have been no difference between the export 
of a motor truck and an armored motor truck. Today there is…Let us be factual, let us 
recognize that a belligerent nation often needs wheat and lard and cotton for the 
survival of its population just as much as it needs anti-aircraft guns and anti-submarine 
depth-charges. Let those who seek to retain the present embargo position be wholly 
consistent. Let them seek new legislation to cut off cotton and cloth and copper and 
meat and wheat and a thousand other articles from all of the nations at war.17 
 
The swift expansion of the American military demonstrated the importance of the 
president’s words.  Rather than requiring years of technological development and a new 
generation of factories designed for a new generation of military hardware, civilian 
industries of all types swiftly converted to arms production in order to defend American 
interests and turn a profit in the process.  Locomotive and automobile plants churned out 
tanks and truck manufacturers retooled to build aircraft engines and airplanes.  The 
“militarization” of International Silver offers a startling but not unique example.  The 
company manufactured tableware prior to 1941.  Conversion over a three-year period 
resulted in a diversification of production that eventually included  
surgical instruments, Browning automatic rifles, 20-mm shells, cartridge and shell 
brass for many calibers of weapons, machine-gun clips and cartridge belts, magnesium 
bombs, gasoline bombs (3,000,000 of them monthly at peak production), adapter 
casings, combination tools, large and small rotors, contact rings, spring assemblies, 
forgings, connecting rods, trigger pins, lock bolts for all pins, flange and tube 
assemblies, front-sight forgings for guns, etc.18 
 
This tableware firm revealed an impressive potential to direct capacities towards armaments 
manufacturing that characterized the overall American economy.  Conversion and not the 
creation of new military outlays lay behind the successful adaptation of the world’s 
strongest industrial system. 
A dominant problem emerged during the change from peace to war that further 
reveals the close proximity of civilian with military industrial production.  Balancing 
military and civilian needs for raw materials in fact proved the most complex task facing 
the American Munitions Board.  Donald Nelson, the executive director of the Office of 
Production Management, had responded to the crisis of war by building some new factories 
but he had more importantly encouraged the lowering of civilian output to point 
industrialists in the right direction.  New facilities did not necessarily constitute weapons 
assembly plants.  In 1938, for example, only a single American producer of primary 
aluminium existed and the company maintained an annual capacity of 136 million 
kilograms of the commodity.  The wartime expansion program erected new smelting 




Filling the skies with airplanes required vast quantities of this light metal.  By 1945, the 
United States had grabbed 42 percent of total world capacities.19  But Nelson more 
importantly halted the production of automobiles after 1941 in order to free up capacities 
for new weapons systems.  General Motors, Ford, Chrysler, Packard and other 
manufacturers answered the call.  These factories, some of world’s largest producers, were 
responsible for over 20 percent of total American output, and built “more than 50 percent of 
all aircraft engines, 33 percent of all machine guns, 80 percent of all tanks and tank parts, 
one-half of the diesel engines, and 100 percent of the trucks the Army moved on”.20  
Civilian companies, therefore, and not necessarily a state-run military industrial complex, a 
term first coined by Dwight D. Eisenhower in a speech on 17 January 1961 to describe 
what he viewed as dangerous postwar developments, waged the war against Hitler’s 
industrialists.21 
American military industrial output, as impressive as it was, did not generate the 
impression of a colossus utterly devoted to the conflict at hand.  The postwar statistics 
accumulated by the Bureau of the Budget in fact demonstrated that industry could have 
pushed the numbers much higher.  Wartime armaments production did not divert more than 
40 percent of American industrial capacities during the war.22  This evidence neatly 
explained that the capitalist democracies and in particular the United States overwhelmed 
their fascist enemies using the interchangeable civilian-military potential of industry.  The 
Bureau of the Budget understood this point with crystal clarity. 
With a long antimilitaristic tradition, we were suddenly faced in late 1941 with war 
against the two most militaristic nations on earth.  Both enjoyed the advantage of long 
preliminary planning and preparations.  We faced the task of preparing simultaneously 
for two wars—one largely a land-air operation with naval support; the other primarily 
a naval-air operation with land support.  In both cases the battlefronts were several 
thousands of miles distant, imposing severe logistical problems.  A third task was also 
thrust upon us: that of producing the supplies needed by our Allies and building a fleet 
of ships to carry these products to our Allies...The German leaders knew well that her 
productive potential was no match for a group of opponents which included the united 
States, and the Japanese were not unaware of the very great inferiority of their 
productive capacity.  Both relied upon what they believed to be the “decadence” of our 
way of life and government to assure them that our superior resources would not be 
adequately employed to prevent the success of their challenge.  Both relied further 
upon the strengthening of their economic potential by exploiting the resources of 
conquered territories.  By the time we entered the war, Germany had brought all 
Western Europe into her economic orbit and Japan was in the process of vastly 
expanding the territory which she controlled in Asia.  Both probably underestimated 
the time required to overcome the difficulties of such exploitation.23 
 





1.3 German War Industries and Rearmament 
The Bureau of the Budget did not however realize that the rearmament of Germany 
after 1933 exhibited a similar symbiotic relationship between civilian industrial capacities 
and armaments output.24  While unquestionably determined to rearm Germany after seizing 
power in January 1933 and pursue the twisted dream of Lebensraum.25  Hitler’s 
government did not divert a majority of state resources to the direct production of 
armaments during the 1930s.  The Nazis initially invested heavily in less military and what 
might be termed traditional infrastructural projects.  These projects aimed at creating work 
for the masses of unemployed and developing the structural basis on which to build a 
massive military.26  Gian Peri Gentile speculates that Hitler’s preoccupation with civilian 
morale shifted attention away from pure armament production.27  Hitler, Albert Speer 
pointed out after the war, feared that the strains of remilitarization might diminish German 
public support for his grandiose war plans.28  This interpretation disguises the fact that 
German policymakers and military experts emphasized the need to expand civilian 
industrial capacities and subsequently translate this base into explosive rates of armament 
production. 
While Hitler’s disregard for the welfare of the population prior to and during the 
war might lessen the persuasiveness of Gentile and Speer’s interpretation, another 
explanation of the 1930s remilitarization push helps illuminate the importance that the 
military and Nazi leadership placed on civilian capacities as a critical component of military 
power.  The appointment of General Werner von Blomberg as defence minister in the final 
days prior to Hitler's seizure of power at the start of 1933 helped revolutionize military 
industrial strategic concepts in Germany.  The general advocated returning the military to a 
position of strength.  He aimed at building the muscle necessary to conduct operations on 
multiple fronts without the assistance of allies.29  Blomberg's strategic vision, shared by 
Hitler, demanded large military industrial capacities based on an enormous civilian sector.  
Nazi economic doctrine did not deviate from the military's argument that rearmament 
demanded a positive civilian economic climate.  The levels of direct military expenditure 
after Hitler’s accession to power in 1933 surprisingly only constituted 1.3 percent of 
Germany’s national product until 1936.30  Civilian programs were another matter 
altogether. 
An old argument advanced during the Nuremberg trials, namely that the various 
branches of the German military conducted a form of secret rearmament long before the 




of dubious value in evaluating real military strength.  The Allied lawyers immediately after 
1945 focused on a range of what to the contemporary observer now appear as obscure and 
questionable methods of enhancing military power.  These examples hoped to demonstrate 
the illegal activities of the German military services and not offer a solid explanation for the 
general success of German arms in the early years of the war.  Two general observations 
suffice to question the real impact of secret rearmament.  Hitler's new regime organized the 
future transfer of civilian pilots from a host of clubs and private companies to fill the ranks 
of a new Luftwaffe after 1933.  This policy certainly represented an illegal challenge to the 
spirit of Versailles.  However, German factories required time to build and more 
importantly organize the infrastructure necessary to equip the new squadrons.  Until fighters 
and bombers poured from the factory floor, an obvious necessity in the German case since 
Hitler demanded a Luftwaffe capable of dealing with the world's largest and best-trained air 
forces, these civilian pilots hardly constituted a real rearmament measure.  This argument in 
fact underlined the importance of a large and capable industrial infrastructure in the 
prosecution of 1940s warfare.  Pilots could be—and in the German case were—quickly 
trained and impressed into combat.  The qualitative and quantitative factors of design and 
manufacturing acted as two major ingredients in airpower proficiency. Historians cannot 
accurately assess the impact of “paramilitary” programs, such as glider training by the 
Hitlerjugend, on overall German military performance in 1939.31  By what method can an 
historian gauge the impact of a six-week introductory course in glider handling on the 
outcome of the war or indeed as a serious militarization measure?  Other states maintained 
large numbers of pilots far more thoroughly trained than those men coming from the 
rudimentary German attempts at addressing the large deficits brought on by Versailles.32 
The lawyers also discovered that the German navy operated a host of measures 
after 1918 aiming at the maintenance of maritime military power.  The laughable list they 
offered at Nuremberg must be tempered with the understanding that real quantitative and 
qualitative industrial and technological factors and not strangely obscure and even desperate 
measures determine fighting power.  The bizarre list included the “[s]aving of coastal guns 
from destruction to removal of artillery equipment and ammunition, hand and machine 
weapons”, the “[l]imitation of destruction in Helgoland [a naval base]”, “[a]n attempt to 
increase the personnel strength of the Reich Navy”, “[c]ontributing to the strengthening of 
patriotism among the people”, “[p]reparation for the resurrection of the German U-boat 
arm”, and an “[a]ttempt to strengthen our mine arm”.  It is hard to imagine how outdated 




even the 36 U-boats available in 1939 could underline a long-term program of subterfuge.  
Nazi Germany never operated a real navy in the proper sense of the word.33 
German industrialists generally welcomed the Nazi fusion of civilian and military 
concerns and Hitler’s approval of a colossal public works program.  Invited by 
Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring, 25 German industrialists met with Hitler in Berlin on 20 
February 1933.  Hitler informed the captains of industry such as Gustav Krupp von Bohlen 
und Halbach that he planned a large rearmament program and the restoration of German 
military strength.  The fateful elections of 5 March 1933 loomed on the horizon and Hitler 
offered a precise definition of his rearmament strategy that certainly lifted the spirits of 
those assembled.  The future dictator of Germany stated that remilitarization required the 
rebuilding of “internal strength” through “internal peace”.34  A calm interlude of industrial 
development and expansion would precede the storm that he intended to unleash.  It is not 
all that difficult to gauge the reaction of the industrialists to Hitler’s words.  The new Nazi 
government promised an end to the economic stagnation of the early 1930s that had driven 
down production levels and profit margins.35  Krupp for one keenly set to work 
reorganizing German industry in line with Hitler’s conceptions for the road ahead.  State 
concentration on infrastructural projects and not just orders for new weapons filled the 
depleted coffers of his company.  There is no reason to speculate that this trend upset the 
German captains of industry—or those of other countries later in the decade. 
Government officials and military officers for example viewed the relatively low 
numbers of automobiles driving along German roads with alarm.  Both groups advocated 
huge investments in the automotive sector to encourage the production of trucks and cars 
for the civilian economy.  “The bigger the number of vehicles used for civilian traffic is”, 
Wehrmacht officers argued, “all the more quickly and more inclusively can mobile military 
units be prepared at the outbreak of war”.36  State subsidies increased in response and 
production soared.  The output of automobiles increased from 108,029 in 1928 to 274,849 
in 1938 and the total of trucks streaming off the assembly lines rose from 8,234 to 63,470 
during the same period.37  A large civilian automotive network intentionally became the 
initial starting point of rearmament.  Similar to their American counterparts, German 
automotive manufacturers such as Daimler-Benz later represented core components of the 
industrial war effort and, among a long list of contributions, motorized the army and 
supplied the air force with engines.38 
Direct investment in the civilian economy took precedence over rearmament by 




pace prior to 1936, Overy hypothesizes, that “German forces would have found it difficult 
to fight any neighbouring state”.39  Military officers, despite agreeing with the principle of 
investment in the civilian sector, protested the lack of attention to the production of 
weapons and questioned the overall utility of pouring millions of Reichsmarks into new 
railways, roads, bridges, barracks, refineries, docks, airbases and bunkers.40  These civilian-
oriented projects indicated that the recovery and expansion of the civilian economy 
remained a top priority prior to what might be termed direct rearmament after 1936.41  The 
available statistics for the aeronautical industry, like that of the automotive manufacturers, 
underline the Nazi emphasis on the civilian economy.  Only 18 percent of all aircraft 
produced between 1934 and 1938 represented combat types.42  Of the 8,295 aircraft 
manufactured by the German aeronautical industry in 1939, the year in which Hitler 
unleashed his war of expansion, 3,562 constituted civilian models.43  
The emphasis on expanding the capacity of civilian industries negated much of the 
need to develop large and centralized military industrial plants.  Heavyweight German 
companies such as MAN A.G., Messerschmidt A.G., and others increasingly relied on the 
converted facilities of other smaller firms that included textile producers and repair shops.  
The political decision to divert funds to a rearmament program that stressed airplanes and 
cars had also induced the smaller firms to shift production and cash in on the program.44  
Ever larger industrial networks spanned the various regions of Germany and manufacturers 
depended heavily on the rail and road systems expanded by order of Hitler to move all of 
the various components required to build civilian goods and weapons systems at the 
assembly points.  Literally tens of thousands of firms were associated with the rearmament 
program and they produced a dizzying array of components such as ball-bearings and 
engines, fertilizer and explosives, and steel wire and armoured plating.45 
In August 1936 Hitler composed a memorandum that ordered a substantial rise in 
armament output and a simultaneous increase in overall industrial capacity.  A grave 
problem, at least from the perspective of contemporaries, however surfaced as weapons and 
civilian commodities poured from the factories.  A wide and general belief that German 
military preparations overheated the economy emerged.46  German economic realities 
appeared to reinforce this view.  By May 1936 stocks of raw materials fell so sharply that 
significant manufacturing capacity went unused.47  Rubber shortages for example stalled 
production in 30 percent of the munitions factories alone.48  These bottlenecks hampered 
overall military production.  German companies could only meet 58.6 percent of military 




months of 1939.49  Clay had suggested that the allocation of raw materials represented the 
largest bottleneck impeding industrial performance.  German industrialists experienced the 
same phenomenon. 
Ideology played as large a role as other factors such as currency shortages.  An 
inability to import adequate amounts of raw rubber, partly because of political resistance to 
foreign trade and demands for autarky, encouraged ever-larger state expenditures on 
synthetic production to lessen the impact of deficiencies.50  The emerging shortages 
reinforced the need to address the entire industrial system and precipitated another wave of 
investment in infrastructure.  Hitler’s Four-Year Plan transformed the economy through 
investment in the synthetic production of raw materials such as Buna and oil on a grand 
scale.  Overall output increased dramatically as the new synthetic facilities provided every 
aspect of the economy with resources in short supply.51  Overy points out that the Nazi 
emphasis on autarky and synthetic plants, aiming at preparing Germany for war and the 
potential shortages brought by an economic blockade, did not correspond with a 
conventional peacetime spending program.  By fusing the civilian infrastructural program 
with direct spending on weapons, Overy suggests that the Nazi authorities diverted 17 
percent of the German national product or 52 percent of the state budget into military 
spending.52 
The dividing lines between civilian and military industries were far less clear than 
Overy suggests.  Fritz Haber and Carl Bosch, at the outset of the 20th Century, discovered a 
method of synthesizing ammonia from nitrogen gas taken from the atmosphere and 
hydrocarbons derived from coal.  Coal formed the starting point of German industrial 
production.  German coal deposits stretched across much of the country from the Dutch and 
Belgian border to Silesia.  Even though German society developed over eight industrial 
regions including the North Sea ports, the Hanover-Braunschweig region, the Saar, the 
upper Rhine and Bavaria, and various areas in eastern Germany including Berlin, the Ruhr 
represented the industrial heartland prior to 1945.  While the Ruhr region predominantly 
produced steel, the factories that surrounded the area utilized the materials and by-products 
of the coking and steel-making processes for chemicals and heavy engineering.  Every coke 
oven in the Ruhr for example produced ammonia, sulphuric acid, tar, benzol and 
phosphates for the chemicals industry.  The steel and chemical by-products manufactured 
by the Ruhr’s mills represented the raw materials for every conceivable form of industrial 
production.  Coal therefore represented the Ruhr’s “life-blood” and that of German civilian 




The Haber-Bosch process enabled chemical companies, among other things, to 
develop fixed nitrogen capacities for the synthetic manufacturing of fertilizer for domestic 
and foreign consumption.  According to American postwar estimates, the German facilities 
produced 1.316 million tons of fixed nitrogen in 1935 and 1.71 million tons in 1937.  The 
authorities diverted approximately 85 percent of these totals to the production of fertilizers.  
The process allowed chemical companies to compete against the naturally occurring 
compounds extracted in Chile.  German firms dominated 25 percent of world fertilizer 
production between 1929 and 1934.  Britain, France and even the United States imported 
the agricultural commodity from Germany.  However, the Haber-Bosch process offered 
much more than an alternative method of increasing crop yields.54 
Table 1: Capacities of Principle German Chemical Plants Prior to 1 May 
1944 (Metric Tons per Annum)55 
Location Nitrogen Synthetic Oil 
Leuna Merseburg 298,800 645,000 
Ludwigshafen-Oppau 204,000 63,000 
Heydebreck 24,000 3,000 
Ruhrchemie (Sterkrade-Holten) 43,200 60,000 
Linz 60,000 # 
Hibernia (Wanne-Eickel) 49,200 38,400 
Victor (Castrop-Rauxel) 49,200 60,000 
Other Plants 241,200 147,000 
Total 969,600 1,016,400 
# No oil production existed at this plant, but it was bombed as an oil target. 
 
 The Haber-Bosch process in particular enabled the manufacturing of two vital 
resources needed by the military—explosives and oil.  “The Germans waged World War II 
with oil, chemicals, rubber, and explosives”, an American study reported in the postwar, 
“made largely from coal, air, and water”.  Coal provided the energy necessary to heat 
homes, propel the locomotives, drive power stations and smelt iron ore and coke into the 
high-carbon steel used to produce armoured plating.  The same method of synthesizing 
nitrogen from coal also provided the chemical by-products used to manufacture 
trinitroluene (T.N.T.) explosives.  Nitric acid, derived from ammonia, forms the starting 
point of all military explosives and propellants.  “Germany's production of explosives and 
propellants”, a postwar American study concluded, “was thus enmeshed with the chemical 
and oil industries when the war began and became more so as war continued”.56  Coal-
derived chemicals such as coal tar, ammonia, and benzene formed the starting point of the 
synthetic organic chemical industry.  This industry employed coal to generate calcium 
carbide, caustic soda, chlorine, ethylene methanol, fixed nitrogen, sodium carbonate, 




formed the foundation of both civilian and military industry.  Chemical manufacturers 
required these substances for such benign products as fertilizer but also for military goods 
such as aircraft Plexiglas, aviation gasoline, explosives and synthetic rubber.57 
Although the components of fertilizer and explosives represent simple chemicals, 
fixed nitrogen gained by the Fischer-Tropsch process was expensive and capital intensive.  
Nitrogen fixation required large quantities of coal and energy and therefore a modern 
transportation network and machine-tool industry to service both the facilities themselves 
and all of the associated elements.  During the 1920s and 1930s, successive German 
governments subsidized nitrogen fixation to guarantee fertilizer for agriculture and nitrates 
for the armaments industry.58  To prepare Germany for the war ahead, Hitler required an 
increase in fixed nitrogen synthesis far above the needs of agriculture.  In 1940, German 
production hit approximately 86 percent of the target levels set by Hitler.  German fixed 
nitrogen synthesis was located at over 13 plants with the principle facilities at Leuna 
Merseburg and Ludwigshafen-Oppau.  These two facilities produced over 500,000 tons of 
nitrogen and 708,000 tons of synthetic fuel per annum.59  Wartime pressures forced a 
further expansion of nitrogen, sulphuric acid, sodium carbonate, caustic soda and chlorine 
production at Ludwigshafen, Schkopau and Leverkusen and the creation of additional 
plants in the Harz, Upper Silesia and on the Upper Danube.  These “emergency” plants 
however failed to keep pace with the insatiable demand for synthetic petroleum and fixed-
nitrogen.  Explosives output actually fell from 80,000 tons per month in 1939 to 75,800 
tons per month in 1943.  The expanding needs of the war more importantly outpaced any 
and all efforts at keeping pace with the enemy. 
The common interpretation of prewar German mobilization, while valid to a certain 
degree, deflects attention away from the remarkably limited Nazi emphasis on the direct 
output of weapons systems.  This dissertation already highlighted the total civilian and 
military German dependency on synthetically derived commodities and that civilian usages 
absorbed 85 percent of fixed-nitrogen prewar output.  Attributing a purely militaristic 
purpose to nitrogen-fixation ignores the historical context and the importance of the 
compound in feeding the population.  The typical Nazi definition of a dual-use facility such 
as a synthetic oil installation as exclusively military in nature did not however make it so.  
Wartime pressures refocused concentration on the military sector and deprived the farmer’s 
of sufficient fertilizer to maintain harvest levels and the condition of their fields.  The near 
famine conditions in Germany during 1946-1947, explored in later chapters, demonstrated 




at least over the short term—to compensate for these wartime developments.  The undue 
focus on the military aspects of fixed-nitrogen—and all other elements of the German 
economy for that matter—denied the importance of dual-use commodities for the health of 
the society.  Only foreign trade could substitute for the German synthetic industries in the 
post-1945 world and avert mass deprivation and starvation.  Unfavourable postwar market 
conditions however characterized the German reality after Auschwitz and therefore 
underscored the continuing importance of an autarkic approach.  
Overy’s argument however also helps cloud our understanding of American and 
German military preparations during this period.  Historians have traditionally fixed Nazi 
expenditures on civilian industries to Hitler’s militaristic foreign policy while on the other 
hand arguing that the United States remained disarmed and militarily weak throughout this 
period.  Harold J. Clem for example points out that the 1930s depression hit all aspects of 
American society which in turn led to an erosion of overall military capabilities in the 
armed forces and military industries.60  Eisenhower, in commenting on American 
preparedness for war, summarized this argument more clearly in 1940. 
we were left with no munitions industry at all.  Thus the people and their statesmen 
washed their hands of war.  Only the professionals—the army, the navy—continued to 
practice an art that the people were confident would never again be employed in their 
time.  In the dreary cubicles of the Army Industrial College, a handful of officers wrote 
dull but solid papers on how plants making adding machines, automatic lead pencils, 
cash registers, boats, pipe organs and lawn mowers could be turned to revolvers, 
ammunition components, bomb fuses, pontoon bridges, saddle frames, and shrapnel.  
Doggedly, the War Department allocated M-Day assignments which some vice-
president, busy with other duties, filed away and forgot.61 
 
The enormous American armaments output beginning after the outbreak of war largely 
discredits this hypothesis.  The capacities remained.  Hitler’s odious political and military 
philosophies should not distort the fact that civilian capacities in both Germany and the 
United States translated into direct military potential in times of war.  This basic fact proved 
Hitler’s ultimate undoing. 
The brief examinations of the American and German rearmament drives 
demonstrates the intricate relationship between civilian industrial capacities and military 
production.  Industrialists of both countries, whether presiding over tableware, automotive, 
or steel and synthetic raw materials processing or manufacturing, required only a brief 
period of time to retool and churn out armaments.  An important reality emerges from this 
analysis.  The wartime armaments industry depended greatly on the civilian infrastructures 




that of Nazi Germany—so obviously impacted the course and nature of the war that it 
seems unreasonable to deny any logical correlation between tableware and raw military 
power.  The German example most importantly demonstrated how the basic requirements 
of the civilian sector also formed the core of military industry.  From a particular 
perspective, coal-mining represented the starting point of the German war effort.  With this 
in mind, industrial disarmament strategies that do not account for the complexity of modern 
industrial systems appear quite frail.  Allied specialists nevertheless seemed ill-equipped at 
judging and evaluating the nature of German industry during the war years. 
1.4 Misperceptions of Prewar German Mobilization 
Allied intelligence officers generally misunderstood the course of Nazi mobilization 
and more importantly the structure of German industry.  Exaggeration characterized prewar 
British estimates of German weapons production.  Two weapons systems, tanks and 
airplanes, illustrate this intelligence failure.  The War Office believed that the tanks in 
Hitler’s armoury in 1939 numbered 5,000.  They overestimated the true total by 1,800—
hardly an insignificant sum.62  Of that total, military intelligence set the number of medium 
tanks at 1400 even though only 300 existed.63  Churchill and the Foreign Office 
furthermore estimated that their future enemy mustered 2,643 fighters and bombers in 1938 
although contemporary research places the figure at 1,669.64  These inflated numbers reveal 
a warped contemporary perception of German industrial capacity and more importantly 
priorities. 
American and British policymakers generally believed that the German military 
industrial system operated at peak levels prior to the outbreak of war.  “The entire economic 
life of the German nation”, the American military attaché in Berlin informed Washington in 
June 1937, “is being organized on a war economy basis”.65  Churchill in particular jumped 
on the general belief of rampant German weapons production to convince the British 
government to react in kind.66  The British aeronautical industry, already one of the largest 
in the world in the 1920s and 1930s,67 received concentrated state financial support and 
further production by companies such as Bristol, Rolls-Royce, Hawker, Vickers and Fairey 
at least equalled German production levels.68  German military stockpiles in 1939 
ultimately appeared minuscule when balanced against the armouries of Britain, France and 
the Soviet Union. 
The size and potential capacities of German industry clouded the judgement of 
contemporary analysts.  The gargantuan dimensions of major German cartels, for example, 




Aktiengesellschaft (I.G. Farben) cartel formed in 1925 with the headquarters located in 
Frankfurt.  The organization consisted of over 379 German and 400 foreign firms.  The 
cartel’s primary German members included BASF, Farben Fabriken Bayer, Farbwerke 
Hoechst, Agfa, Chemische Fabriken vorm. Weilerter Meer, and Chemische Fabrik 
Griesheim-Elektron—all major organizations in their own right.  The cartel originally 
formed in response to the loss of markets after the Bolshevik seizure of power in what 
became the Soviet Union after 1917.69  The large size of the cartel necessarily meant the 
production of a wide range of chemical compounds, pharmaceuticals, pesticides, and 
synthetic substances. 
But British military intelligence initially underestimated the importance of critical 
raw materials such as oil, aluminium and fixed nitrogen on German timetables and assumed 
that production levels peaked during the 1930s owing to a lack of sufficient industrial 
capacities.  The shortages in weapons systems that manifested themselves by 1941, the 
intelligence officers believed, indicated that German production had hit full capacity and 
more importantly that these shortages weakened the German ability to expand production 
and also to resupply and reequip military formations blooded in combat.  Allied military 
planners believed that German industry could only sustain a military organization involved 
in “small and localized wars” and then only by shifting production from the civilian sector 
at the expense of the population.70  Hitler, according to Allied conceptions, gambled that 
ferocious thrusts employing the bulk of the German military would quickly overwhelm 
enemy opposition and therefore avoid the strains of a prolonged conflict that the industrial 
facilities could not sustain.  After achieving victory in a limited conflict, the German 
military industrial system absorbed the foreign industrial facilities and raw materials from 
the conquered regions and reequipped the military in preparation for the next war.  British 
policymakers believed that Britain could outlast Germany in a protracted conflict precisely 
because excessive German rearmament siphoned industrial strength from the civilian sector 
and limited further expansion.71  British military planners argued in February 1939 that this 
superior economic resiliency would ultimately lead to Nazi defeat.72  They were right, but 
for the wrong reasons. 
In recognition of the British experience in fighting Germany from 1939 onwards, 
the United States entered the war as a junior partner in military matters ranging from 
tactical fighting methods to intelligence.  A bulk of the information collected by the British 
cryptanalysts at Bletchley Park, the scientists who broke the complex codes of the German 




The American War Department, as latecomers, became aware of the Ultra breakthrough in 
mid-1943 and thereafter continued to play a marginal role in deciphering German 
communications until three detachments were sent to support the British efforts at Bletchley 
Park.74  A high degree of British influence persisted.  Throughout the war, Eisenhower 
placed a British G-2 intelligence formation under his command to make use of the British 
code breaking.  This reliance on foreign interpretations of the data collected and the relative 
weaknesses of American military intelligence during the war raised eyebrows in the War 
Department itself.  Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson lamented in late 1943 that “our two 
intelligence services are pretty bum”.75  General Hoyt Vandenberg also believed that the 
United States intelligence services operated far below the standards set by friends and 
foes.76 
American intelligence officers, like their British counterparts, concentrated on 
locating German military formations for tactical and operational analysis.  The Military 
Intelligence Training Center (M.I.T.C.) at Camp Ritchie, Maryland trained a host of 
specialists such as photo interpreters and linguists to help find the enemy.  While over 
19,000 students received training at the camp during the war, American officers in Europe 
still complained that the specialists exhibited a “lack of basic military training” and acted as 
a “kind of reference service for data rather than for professional judgments”.77  Even in the 
British armed forces, this new generation of intelligence officers represented an expedient.  
Noel Annan, equipped with a degree in history, set to work examining the German railway 
network even though he informed his recruiting officer that his experience was limited to 
information concerning the American railways that his father had provided.78  In general, 
American intelligence efforts remained poor throughout the war and they did not even 
establish a mechanism for setting intelligence priorities until May 1945.79 
Not only did Allied intelligence falsely interpret the capacities of German industry, 
the specialists could not gauge the significant organizational changes taking place in 
Germany.  Jeffrey Fear’s examination of the Messerschmitt A.G. in southern Germany 
demonstrates the decentralized nature of German manufacturing.  The production of aircraft 
by the company relied heavily on converted textile and light machinery firms employing 
less than 100 persons.  Over 130 firms shipped hulls, seats and radar sets to the assembly 
points.  Messerschmitt itself represented the “organisatorischen Gehirn” or organizational 
brain that coordinated the flow of components to assembly areas that did not contain 
specialized equipment and could be moved to heavily forested areas to avoid detection by 




Strategic bombing doctrine, as described in the next chapter, in a rare case of 
stubborn Allied ideological blindness argued throughout the war that strategic bombing 
could unravel the tightly strung German economy with a few attacks on vital targets.81  
While this concept held true for a small number of commodities such as synthetic oil 
refining, the planners failed to understand that a high degree of unused capacity 
characterized production and whose destruction meant relatively little to the overall war 
effort.  This tendency to focus on panacea targets even influenced a debate in the 
historiography concerning whether political interference with Swedish iron ore shipments 
to Germany could have seriously impaired the enemy’s war effort.  Sven-Olof Olsson 
however demonstrated that Swedish reliance on German coal shipments for their own 
purposes, part of the tightly knit European economic system, undermined the possibility of 
such an undertaking.82 
Hitler’s verbal declarations helped generate a significant fear amongst the 
democratic elites that German rearmament would create a military machine of monstrous 
proportions and seriously threaten European national interests and security.  As early as 17 
May 1933, the newly elected chancellor openly challenged the world community by 
insisting on German rearmament.  A series of anti-disarmament proclamations induced the 
American Consul General George S. Messersmith to issue the State Department with a 
stern warning that the Nazis would rearm at all costs and without any heed to international 
opinions.83  A host of American officials that included the Commercial Attaché Douglas 
Miller and Secretary of State Cordell Hull listened to Hitler and believed strongly in the 
likelihood of war within a few years.84  Hitler’s unwavering focus on a remilitarization 
program convinced the British Defence Requirements Sub-Committee to conclude in 1934 
that Germany represented the most significant threat to British security.85  Paris responded 
only a short while later and decided to extend conscript service to two years in mid-March 
1935 as a precautionary measure.86  The western democracies after 1935 appealed for 
German moderation but understood the need for vigilance. 
Hitler’s propaganda, while helping to convince others that the Nazi government 
poured the lion’s share of state revenues into direct weapons production after 1933, 
achieved more than the dictator bargained for.  Immediately after the outbreak of war in 
1939, Hitler summarized the remilitarization efforts and declared to the world that “I have 
now worked on the construction of the German armed forces for over six years.  In this time 
over 90 billion [Reichsmarks] were employed for the building of our armed forces.  It is 




military of 1914”.87  This perspective, one not based on the hard evidence of armaments 
output, infiltrated the German military itself long before Hitler’s assurances after throwing 
the dice and invading Poland.  A speech by Generalstabchef des Heeres Franz Halder to the 
Wehrmachtsakademie in early 1939 demonstrated the new confidence of the armed 
forces—a group who until 1933 had used wooden boxes to test theories concerning military 
motorization.  The speech, describing the tactical and strategic calculations concerning a 
war against Poland, trumpeted the superior training and equipment of the military.  Halder 
even believed that the form of “limited mobilisation” adopted, bolstered by “absolute 
superiority in the air”, might convince the western powers to avoid a war with Germany 
altogether.88 
This latter perspective was totally off the mark.  Historians demonstrate that the 
inflated intelligence estimates of German aerial strength for example influenced the British 
and French government’s decision to appease Hitler until their own armaments production 
bridged an illusory gap.89  But the production figures of the 1930s repudiate the arguments 
of historians such as Mark A. Stoler that Britain and France suffered from serious 
quantitative deficiencies in relation to the German army.90  The statistics instead support 
David Edgerton’s contention that Britain by itself retained economic parity with Germany 
during the interwar period and that France in fact maintained military superiority.91  It was 
simply hard for the democratic leaders to accept the truth of Hitler’s propaganda.  
“American and British planners”, Edward C. Mann writes, “assumed that Hitler would not 
have started the largest war in history without first fully mobilizing his economy to fight 
it...This was fortunate for the Allied cause and contributed substantially to the defeat of 
Nazi Germany, but it does not change the fact that Allied wartime planning was based on 
more than one false assumption”.92 
A brief look at the troops and core weapons systems massed along the Rhine in 
1940 dispels any notion of significant German quantitative superiority prior to the battle for 
France and the Low Countries.  The rough table of statistics listed here, while 
acknowledging the difficulty experienced by historians in assessing the exact numbers and 
naturally qualitative differences,93 demonstrates that the western Allies at least 
approximated the German totals.  Propaganda did not correspond with reality.  The form of 
Nazi remilitarization chosen by the elites could not negate severe economic limitations.  
Only in airpower did the German military obtain a slight advantage in numbers and 
quality—and this statistic depends on a degree of manipulation in terms of organization, 




Table 2: Battle of France 1940: Relative Strength of Major Combatants94 
 Germany France Britain Allied* 
Divisions 143 114 15 152 
Artillery 7,500 10,700 1,280 13,974 
Airplanes 3,500 3,000 1,850 4,850 
Armour 2,493 3,254 640 3,894 
*The number of divisions and artillery pieces includes forces from Belgium and Holland. 
 
The Nazis nevertheless appeared jubilant in the months prior to war when 
addressing economic issues.  Göring congratulated a group of aircraft industrialists on 8 
July 1938 and announced that the Luftwaffe “was already superior in quality and quantity 
to the English”.95  This period proved the high point of any quantitative success in military 
industrial performance in the eventual war with Britain.  Hitler’s reoccupation of the 
Rhineland on 7 March 1936 had pushed the Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain to boost 
investment in aircraft production.  The reorganization of British investment strategies that 
followed, coming over a year after Hitler’s announcement of his decision to build a new air 
force, succeeded in outpacing the German factories by a considerable margin as early as 
1940.  British aircraft production closed the albeit narrow margin extremely quickly and 
built 4,223 more machines than Germany already in 1940.  This strong performance was 
surprising for two reasons.  Not only did the British initiate aerial rearmament later than 
Germany, but the interwar civilian aeronautics industries lagged far behind the United 
States and Hitler’s Reich in terms of production and capacities.96  Certain British specialists 
such as the bombing survey group concluded after the war: 
However totalitarian may have been the political and military aspects of German life, 
the fact is that the German war economy and the organisation of production in 
Germany, were less totalitarian than either their British or American counterparts.  
Indeed, the failure of the Germans to exploit their potential industrial resources is to 
many the most surprising fact that has come to light since the end of the European war.  
Almost to the end...German war production still possessed great reserves of capacity.97 
 
The traditional assessment of the 1930s German rearmament phase, and indeed the 
history of the war itself, continues to stress that Hitler’s Nazi system failed to feed the 
military system with sufficient raw materials.  These shortages and not a lack of potential 
industrial capacity of course still placed German industry in a state of “permanent crisis” 
during the 1930s and especially during the war.  Hypothetically, deep cuts in consumer 
goods production over these years could only have freed industrial capacities and resources 
for the war industries.  The Nazi failure to adopt such a policy and only start to move in this 




offered a comment of relative interest after the outbreak of war.  “We probably have 
nothing to lose, only to win”, the dictator accepted, “Our economic situation, owing to our 
limitations, is such that we can only persevere for a few years.  Göring can confirm this.  
There is nothing more we can do. We must act”.98  The dictator’s conclusion must of 
course be tempered by the common understanding that nearly every fibre of his being 
longed to command German troops and push them into battle.  This desire for war, by 
conditioning the Nazi assessments of other powers, probably generated the worst 
interpretations of intelligence data ever undertaken.  Hitler launched a war for which he was 
simply not prepared. 
1.5 The Failure of German Industry in War 
It is necessary to emphasize the poor performance of German military industries 
during the war and account for the failure to sufficiently mobilize the civilian sector.  
German industry clearly failed to produce the necessary weapons systems in sufficient 
quantity to defeat the alliance arrayed against Nazism.99  The needs of war initiated a series 
of improvements, but industrialists—endowed with significant capacities and a strong 
political commitment—could not keep pace with other states.  The growth rates in specific 
branches of production such as armour demonstrate the poor performance of the German 
war industry in relation to their enemies.  Considering that the Soviet Union lost over half 
of their industrial base to the German assault of 1941, yet produced more weapons than the 
invaders in that year alone, Overy for example strongly argues that the German state 
suffered from significant systemic problems.  The industrialists could barely feed the 
Wehrmacht the weapons systems required to replace losses let alone create new 
formations.100  A woefully inefficient armaments procurement system obviously failed to 
maximize existing capacities or use them properly.101  This observation demands a certain 
degree of attention owing to the large relative size of the prewar German industrial base and 
the fact that Nazi expansion absorbed considerable foreign capacities.102 
The International Military Tribunal offered a simple explanation after the end of 
hostilities.  Their view approximates that of Overy.  A definite lethargic attention to direct 
military output in their opinion characterized the early years of the war.  The Nazi 
government intended to create a large military machine.  Hitler directed Göring on 14 
October 1938 to “organize a gigantic armament program, which would make insignificant 
all previous achievements”.103  The dictator emphasized such offensive weapons systems as 
heavy tanks.  But this chapter demonstrated that the number of “medium” or “heavy” tanks 




French industry and only enough to equip a single armoured division.  Production of the 
Panzer IV (all variants) rose from 45 in 1939 to 6,625 in 1944.104  Such statistics hardly 
attest to an early devotion to armaments production.  And, in any case, other historians have 
determined that the war actually witnessed periods of throttled German production.  Hitler 
even ordered reductions in armaments production in September 1941 in the midst of the 
invasion of the Soviet Union.105  The relative ease of the early military operations blinded 
Hitler to the truth.  A memorandum dated 9 October 1939 illustrated the dictator’s vanity. 
The warlike equipment of the German people is at present larger in quantity and better 
in quality for a greater number of German divisions than in the year 1914.  The 
weapons themselves, taking a substantial cross-section, are more modern than is the 
case of any other country in the world at this time. They have just proved their 
supreme war worthiness in their victorious campaign…There is no evidence available 
to show that any country in the world disposes of a better total ammunition stock than 
the Reich…The A[nti-] A[ircraft] artillery is not equalled by any country in the 
world.106 
 
Arrogance seemed triumphant in Berlin.  This arrogance lay behind a series of “managerial 
mistakes”.107 
The nature of the war changed dramatically in 1943.  Fighting in the confined 
spaces of Stalingrad cost the lives of 150,000 Axis soldiers and the Soviet military took 
108,000 prisoners.108  The Axis defence of Tunisia resulted in 200,000 battle casualties and 
275,000 men fell into captivity.109  In May 1944, the German navy lost 41 U-boats and 
Admiral Karl Dönitz ordered the withdrawal of the underwater fleet from the North 
Atlantic.110  The military situation of course appeared grim even prior to the shock of 
military defeats in Russia, Africa and in the U-boat war.  An outspoken pessimist, 
Reichsminister Fritz Todt informed Hitler late in 1941 after returning from a tour of the 
Russian front that “[g]iven the arms and industrial supremacy of the Anglo-Saxon power, 
we can no longer militarily win this war”.  Hitler responded with surprising resignation and 
seemed to ignore the former engineer’s conclusion.111  But the dictator could not as easily 
shrug off the events of 1943.  The defeats in three theatres forced Nazi officials to rethink 
their policy of limited devotion to the war effort.112 
Albert Speer took charge of armaments production from Todt in February 1942.  
The latter minister died in a plane crash in that month.  Hitler’s architect capitalized on a 
series of administrative measures already introduced by the unlucky administrator.  The 
deceased Todt, a former favourite in Hitler’s entourage, had helped initiate a series of 
changes that ordered the production of standardized and less complicated weapons 




beginning of 1943, Hitler for example ordered that the civilian population now be 
mobilized for German industry.114  Joseph Goebbels furthermore demanded greater 
exploitation of the conquered areas in conjunction with Hitler’s call for greater armaments 
output in Germany at the Berliner Sportpalast on 18 February 1943.115    Nazi officials now 
spoke of “total war”.  The new atmosphere of urgency assisted Speer.  He pressed latent 
civilian capacities into the service of the military after 1942 and emphasized the utilization 
of existing capacities.116  Speer most importantly continued the work of Todt and 
minimized the interference of military allocation specialists in weapons production and 
brought private industry into the decision-making process.117  Speer’s concept of “Lenkung 
und Leitung”, the fusion of technician with industrialist, dramatically improved the 
Wehrmacht’s allocation system.  He established a more rational setting of priorities in 
discussions with Hitler and helped determine how production bottlenecks impacted the 
various branches of the military—a better fusion of industrial productivity with military 
realities.  This policy for example achieved astounding success in boosting the production 
of fighter aircraft at the expense of the bomber fleets.  
Speer was certainly not free of error.  Under pressure from Hitler to increase tank 
production for the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, Göring attempted to downgrade 
the importance of rocket development to free up resources.  After considerable prodding by 
the scientists Walter Dornberger and Wernher von Braun, Speer intervened prior to 
replacing Todt and secured Hitler’s support for the rocket program.  The extensive 
resources wasted in this program reflected a poor choice.  The total explosive force of all 
the V-1s and V-2s thrown against London during the war did not succeed in damaging the 
infrastructure of the city to a greater degree than a single Allied bomber raid against cities 
such as Dresden in February 1945.118  Worse still, the brutal employment of slave labour to 
manufacture the weapons in underground facilities in the Harz mountains killed 
approximately 20,000 people or more than double the total of British civilians who perished 
because of the program.119  This waste reflected the Nazi proclivity to throw away lives in 
pursuit of a futile military gamble. 
 War production, regardless of some poor decisions, boomed.120  Hitler’s architect 
later questioned why the Allied bombers did not resolutely strike critical industrial facilities 
during the reorganization phase and prohibit the expansion of armaments output.121  The 
percentage of German industry involved in weapons production soared from 22 percent in 
1942 to a maximum level of 40 percent in 1944.122  Largely unhindered by strategic 




of 1940 to 1,854 (all types) in the month of December 1944 alone.123  The achievement was 
in fact greater than these statistics suggest.  Later tank models weighed two to three times 
that of earlier designs and the engines were far more sophisticated and powerful.  The 
“Panthers” and “Tigers” required more steel, energy and labour than the prewar designs.  
The output levels of 1944 failed to support the prewar argument that overexertion during 
the 1930s stretched the tightly wound German war economy to the breaking point.  The 
Allied military industrial complex nevertheless surpassed German production by a factor of 
between three and four even after the proclamation of “total war”.124  Speer’s mobilization 
of industry was simply too late to compensate for the growing casualty lists reported by the 
military. 
Speer correctly criticized the “taught string” theory.125  Hitler’s architect handed 
over reports to American investigators after 1945 that emphasized the under-utilization of 
industrial capacities for military purposes during the war.  Examinations of steel production, 
viewed by Speer as a primary component of armaments manufacturing, revealed that the 
armaments industry only utilized 37.5 percent of the total output of 31.2 million tons in 
1942.126  The Reichsminister instituted a host of bureaucratic changes that streamlined the 
procurement process, concentrated production on critical weapons systems and cut into 
civilian production.127  Speer’s redirecting of steel away from the civilian sector raised the 
percentage to 52 percent during 1943.128  But civilian demand and other factors still 
consumed much of the steel produced.129  The fivefold increase in armaments production 
between 1941 and 1944 must be viewed in this context. 
While the investigation of wartime German industrial accomplishments represents 
an issue of secondary importance to the investigation of postwar demilitarization, the 
explanations of industrial failure help point out a problem faced by contemporary observers 
in 1945.  How much did the needs of war absorb civilian capacities?  Overy’s work attacks 
the hypothesis that low demand for military goods kept production down until the 
emergence of Speer in 1942.  Hitler, according to this view, planned for total war in the 
largest sense and that industrialists initiated a full mobilization of strength—in terms of 
dual-use capacities—prior to the outbreak of war in 1939.  German industry, seen in this 
way, responded to Hitler’s demands by utilizing a high degree of civilian productive 
capacities or increasing dual-use capacities in order to support even higher levels of 
mobilization at a later date.  The problem then is specifically defining why virtually every 




Factors other than low early military output plagued the German military industrial 
system.  Overy and others blame the Nazi subordination of efficiency to ideology and the 
reluctance of industrialists to embrace modern mass production methods for the low 
productivity.  Hitler’s government for example granted German companies preferential 
status in terms of resource allocation and slashed the production levels of foreign owned 
industry.  These restrictions forced the German Ford Company after 1936 to import rubber 
and nonferrous metals from the United States in order to continue manufacturing for the 
civilian market.  Ideological considerations also needlessly complicated production by the 
Opel subsidiary of General Motors.130  Werner Abelshauser even demonstrates that Nazi 
concentration on fighting social unrest and an excessive attention to job creation limited 
remilitarization efforts.131  Rolf-Dieter Müller like Overy confronts the German 
procurement system.  Müller argues that Wehrmacht bureaucratic confusion kept 
production levels low until Speer rationalized the military industrial system after 1943.132  
The military simply failed to effectively guide war production.  Too many firms developed 
far too many weapons systems for far too many potential scenarios.  The confusing and 
varied designs and the large number of companies involved competed for raw materials in 
short supply.  This lack of concentration reduced industrial output in critical systems.133  
Others speculate that the severe German labour shortage brought by conscription inhibited 
production.  Even the horrific employment of slave labour could not compensate for the 
scarcity of skilled workers.  Müller hypothesizes that labour shortages inhibited industry far 
more seriously than the strategic bombing campaign.134 
 These factors—raw material and labour shortages, a poor procurement system and 
twisted ideology, or even the strategic bombing campaign (taken up in the next chapter)—
should not deflect attention away from the fact that Nazi-Germany did not sufficiently 
mobilize the civilian sector until far too late in the war and that the forces arrayed against 
Germany reduced the potential effectiveness of such measures anyway.  Hitler’s regime 
had built up civilian capacities during the 1930s in order to respond to this type of scenario.  
Here the system operated as planned.  The shift upwards in output evident after 1942 
demonstrated the success of these measures.  Hitler’s war had however spun out of his 
control and the same ease of civilian-military convertibility that allowed for tens of 
thousands of new German tanks and planes characterized the mobilization efforts of the 







This chapter emphasized that the Nazi authorities failed to sufficiently or effectively 
utilize existing productive capacities for the war effort.  The Nazi and German military elite 
did exhibit a clear understanding that military and civilian industry complemented each 
other and that the production of armaments depended first and foremost on the same 
factories and more importantly machine-tools that produced automobiles or cutlery or 
textiles.  But severe structural problems dogged the translation of a sound understanding of 
this relationship.  Irregardless of whether Hitler planned for a series of short wars or a big 
short war, and setting aside the debate over how Speer increased armaments production 
after 1943, the failure to mobilize more than 40 percent of overall industrial capacity stands 
out as a dominant explanation of German wartime failure.  This hypothesis demonstrates 
the importance of administrative control in military mobilization strategies.  The effective 
employment of industrial capacities, from the automotive giants to the cutlery 
manufacturers, could under certain circumstances outweigh theoretical manufacturing 
ability. 
 For the purposes of this dissertation, it is also necessary to stress that the Allied 
governments generally misunderstood the nature of the German failure.  This 
misinterpretation becomes more evident in later chapters.  The American Secretary of 
Legation Harrison Lewis for example argued in January 1945 that the German industrial 
“success” in continuing the war effort related to the massive centralization and control 
machinery of the Nazi regime.  Lewis even concluded that the elimination of the Nazi 
political system alone offered immediate demilitarization.135  While this comment reflects 
the importance of political controls in regards to disarmament strategies, it simply did not 
take the realities of the regime into account.  The Nazi system, as explained in the 
historiography, inhibited the war effort to a considerable degree. 
Part of the Allied misunderstanding stemmed from Nazi propaganda and 
intelligence mistakes—an interrelated phenomenon.  Allied policymakers, as this 
dissertation takes up in subsequent chapters, perceived of Nazi Germany as an armed camp 
with a bulk if not all of the industries geared exclusively towards armaments production.  
This perspective helped encourage the belief that demilitarization schemes had to uproot the 
entire industrial landscape in order to ensure peace.  Because of the importance of synthetic 
oil and fixed-nitrogen to the German war machine, for example, Allied policymakers were 
conditioned to view these facilities as exclusively military in nature.  Initial conceptions 




strategic bombing campaign, analysed in the next chapter, demonstrated the weaknesses of 
a strategy that aimed at reducing or destroying the broad expanse of a modern industrial 
state’s means of production.  The understanding that modern warfare depended on all 
elements of the industrial base determined that Allied demilitarization strategies in 
Germany looked at far more than just armament assembly facilities.  The destroying of 
Germany’s will and ability to resist, the essence of demilitarization, took on a uniquely 




Strategic Bombing and Industrial Demilitarization 
 
In preparing for battle I have always found that plans are useless, but planning is 
indispensable. 
 




The strategic bombing campaign against Germany during World War Two targeted 
the broad expanse of the military industrial system concentrated in urban centres.  The 
belief that airpower could achieve the Clausewitzian aim of warfare, and “render the enemy 
powerless” through material and psychological disarmament, defined the strategy.1  This 
chapter demonstrates that the armed forces of the democratic powers emphasized industrial 
demilitarization as an end attainable through military action.  Several interrelated questions 
concerning strategic bombing emerge.  Did the air offensive succeed in disarming the 
enemy as later claimed by the pundits?  Was the substantial human cost morally acceptable 
considering the results achieved?  Did the visible and apparent destruction of cities and 
infrastructure impact perceptions of the future American occupation?  Answering these 
questions presents a particular problem.  The United States Strategic Bombing Survey 
(U.S.S.B.S.) demonstrates that politics and the need to rationalize the existence of the 
American air arm helped distort the evidence collected after 1945.  Flawed conclusions, 
derived from institutional influences and the pockmarked landscape, distorted how 
policymakers and the occupation authorities viewed priorities in the immediate postwar.  
The immense visible destruction of Germany’s cities influenced a specific postwar 
American fear of economic collapse.  This fear, growing more acute in later years, 
questioned the logic of a hard peace and industrial dismantling for practical and 
humanitarian reasons. 
2.2 Strategic Bombing Origins and the Demilitarization Panacea 
Military theorists utilized the experience of aerial bombing in the First World War 
to formulate a unique doctrine based on the bomber during the 1920s and 1930s.  The 
immense doctrinal, organizational and technical challenge of strategic bombing required the 
long-term development of this weapon system during the interwar period.2  The statistical 
data of the first bombing campaign conducted by German dirigibles and cumbersome 




and injured another 2,886 over the course of the entire war.3  These totals represented a 
small percentage of the British infantry losses on the first day of the Somme offensive in 
1916.  The statistics collected by the airpower enthusiasts revealed that strategic bombing 
failed to impact the outcome of the First World War. 
Conveniently averting their eyes from this failure, the strategists nevertheless 
claimed that bombers could pound an enemy state into submission.  Selective interpretation 
of the data convinced men such as Gianni Caproni, Giulio Douhet, Billy Mitchell and Hugh 
Trenchard that bombs dropped from the sky revolutionized warfare.4  Instead of focusing 
their attention on the German failure, the pundits concentrated on the British difficulties at 
coordinating a successful defence, the physical destruction and especially bombing’s 
negative effects on public morale.5  From the data they selected, the airpower advocates 
developed a revolutionary military doctrine espousing the bombing of urban strategic 
targets far beyond the frontlines.6  The Smuts Committee Report of 1917 relied on fanciful 
extrapolation and pessimistically theorized that “the day may not be far off when aerial 
operations, with their devastation of enemy lands and destruction of the industrial and 
populace centres on a vast scale, may become the principal operations of war, to which the 
older forms of military operations may become secondary and subordinate”.7 
The relentless promotion of strategic bombing during the interwar period by Hugh 
Trenchard and Billy Mitchell in particular convinced the general public and politicians of 
the bomber’s invincibility, amplified fears of the horrible nature of a future air war, and 
most importantly rationalized expenditure and investment on a weapon of mass destruction.  
Whitehall understandably reduced military expenditures after 1918 and forced the fledgling 
Royal Air Force to battle against the other established services for funds and for survival as 
a separate organization.8  A convincing argument was needed to elicit the required cash 
flow.  The sponsors of strategic bombing dogmatically claimed that the new weapon could 
completely and cost-effectively destroy an enemy’s capacity to wage war by targeting the 
opposing military industrial system in its totality.  However, partly to avoid complicated 
issues, the theorists failed to go beyond wild claims and certainly did not generate a clear 
operational policy.9  Trenchard defensively pointed out in an August 1919 memorandum 
that the wartime air forces did not “evolve” sufficiently to demonstrate the true “value of 
independent aerial operations”.10  His unproven faith in the effectiveness of bombers 
against the enemy’s military industrial infrastructure never wavered.  Nor did the hard facts 
influence his interpretation of wartime experience.11  Trenchard worked hard to establish a 




military strength in the colonies.  The use of “air control” against the technologically 
inferior challengers of British colonial policy around the globe offered a cheap and safe 
alternative to the deployment of ground forces and helped justify the existence and 
independence of airpower.12  “Air control” meant killing people.  In terms of a campaign 
against a real adversary with a modern industrial infrastructure, Trenchard simply targeted 
everything within range.13 
Bombing remained a general and nebulous concept.  British airpower advocates 
embraced the idea of bombing urban targets in pursuit of decisive victory without defining 
specific targets.  The British Air Staff still believed that strategic bombing guaranteed a 
“swift” decision in modern warfare and could prevent a drawn out struggle, reduce 
casualties and save lives.14 Scot Robertson asserts that the Air Staff planners employed the 
abstractions such as “Germany” instead of “a ‘real’ target such as a factory or even a 
city”.15  Interwar strategic bombing concepts did not surpass the dogmatic belief that 
bombers could independently bring an enemy to its knees by striking the urban military-
civilian industrial infrastructure.16  The Air Staff failed to prove their case prior to 1939 and 
in fact neglected to fully analyse the operational and technical aspects of any future strategic 
bombing offensive altogether.17  The untested strategic bombing hypothesis instead 
functioned to generate political and popular support for an independent strategic bombing 
branch in the military. 
American theorists such as Billy Mitchell refined the argument that airpower 
operating outside normal battlefield boundaries could inflict extensive damage on the 
infrastructure or “nerve centers” of an enemy at minimal cost to the attacking forces.18  
Mitchell proposed attacking city centers to “neutralize” and “destroy” an enemy’s military 
capacity to make war.  He believed that civilian and military industrial production 
represented a linked phenomenon and that a strike against civilian targets “would deprive 
armies, air forces, and navies even, of their means of maintenance”.19  “The hostile main 
army in the field”, Mitchell wrote, “is a false objective, and the real objectives are the vital 
centers”.20 The theorist speculated that gas bombs or high explosives thrown onto a city 
center would throw industrial production into disarray and force an enemy to sue for 
peace.21  The bombing strategists responded to the wartime experience in the trenches by 
rejecting direct military confrontation and substituting traditional targets with civilian or 
non-military ones.  Mitchell nevertheless, like his British colleagues, expounded the 




Mitchell however understood that the new doctrine required an equally 
revolutionary change in moral perceptions and values.  He advocated the creation of a “new 
set of rules for the conduct of war”.22  Mitchell turned to the American public and 
attempted to stimulate enthusiasm for the strategic bombing doctrine through “numerous 
speaking tours, articles and books”.23  This open emphasis on the destructive potential of 
strategic bombing against urban targets ignited public opinion in Europe and the United 
States and nourished a new fear.24  British Air Commodore L.E.O. Charlton prophesied in a 
publication intended for civilian readers that a future air war would shatter modern 
industrial infrastructures and result in “undisciplined flight”, “semi-starvation”, and 
lawlessness”.25  The gloomy forecasts heightened a new sense of insecurity.  The British 
public in particular believed that “defensive security was lost with the development of the 
airplane and that England existed thereafter in grave jeopardy”.26  Letters to the editors of 
newspapers demonstrated this concern.27  Malcolm Smith points out that “the idea of aerial 
bombardment was almost as haunting an aspect of contemporary culture as nuclear 
weaponry was to become later”.28 
This wave of fear encouraged politicians to search for methods of controlling aerial 
armaments.29  The Geneva Peace Conference (1932-34) set out to place serious restrictions 
on national military power by banning various weapons systems including aircraft and 
therefore fulfilling Article VIII of the Versailles Treaty and limiting armaments to the 
“lowest point consistent with national safety”.30  The conference, while reaffirming the ban 
on chemical and biological warfare, failed to surpass “pious platitudes regarding the 
goodness of disarmament” owing to a general lack of political will among the 
participants.31  Developments in Germany and Japan in the early 1930s furthermore helped 
erode the political resolve to control bomber technology.  After his rise to political power in 
1933, Hitler instructed the German delegation in Geneva to undermine armament control 
initiatives to remove a possible impediment to remilitarization.  The Japanese delegation 
simply withdrew altogether after the barbarous behaviour of their military in China aroused 
fiery world criticism.  The conference adjourned permanently in June 1934 and the 
European states instead jettisoned arms control and initiated extensive rearmament 
programs in an atmosphere of fear brought on by the advent of Hitler and the new weapons 
technologies.32 
  Democratic leaders and military officials furthermore questioned the merits of 
controlling a weapon of such promise.  George C. Marshall and other prominent military 




originally followed public opinion and questioned strategic bombing principles on moral 
grounds.34  The president however privately hypothesized that a powerful offensive 
bombing force might deter Hitler from aggressive moves in Europe.35  Roosevelt, 
employing a standard democratic tactic, publicly continued to stress airpower’s defensive 
ability at spoiling any invasion of the United States.36  He nevertheless responded to the 
efforts of the air pundits and helped promote strategic bombing as a military alternative that 
“would cost less money, would mean comparatively fewer casualties, and would be more 
likely to succeed than a traditional war by land or sea”.37  The manufacturing of military 
and civilian aircraft could also stimulate the economy and, Roosevelt argued, generate 
prosperity.38  The president therefore accepted the unproven theories of the bombing 
pundits and became an “extraordinarily strong advocate of strategic bombing” despite the 
interwar moral outrage.39  His comments also underscored a belief in the symbiotic 
relationship of civilian and military industries. 
The American armaments industry busily designed a new generation of bombers 
for the democratic arsenal.  Proficient engineers handed the military the tools deemed 
necessary for the prosecution of war against a broad range of quasi-military targets.  A 
prototype of the Boeing B-17 heavy four-engine bomber flew on 28 July 1935.  The much 
larger B-29 quickly followed.40  When Roosevelt ordered the extensive increase of the air 
force to 10,000 aircraft and a production capacity of a further 10,000 per annum in 
November 1938, American industrialists set the preparatory work in motion.  Roosevelt’s 
order also pleased General Henry H. Arnold.  The chief of the Army Air Corps announced 
that the president had granted strategic bombing its Magna Carta.41  Roosevelt’s 
administration sanctioned the strategic bombing doctrine and, although slow at the outset, 
released industrial capacities to build the infrastructure that would darken the skies over 
Germany and Japan. 
 The strategic air forces still required a succinct doctrine beyond the notion of 
bombing everything in sight.  The American Air Corps Tactical School established the 
principles of strategic bombing in the 1930s that later formed the heart of wartime bombing 
policy.  The prewar theorists hypothesized that unescorted bombers could “penetrate air 
defenses” without suffering “unacceptable losses” and “deliver bombs with adequate 
accuracy” to destroy “vital targets” and “undermine the enemy's capability and will to 
fight”.42  The Air War Plans Division later refined this concept.  Working on the 
assumption of destroying critical industrial installations, the organization believed that 




raw material processing and associated facilities—would paralyze the German war 
economy in a mere six months.43  Factory workers that survived the bombing would sit idle 
without the raw materials necessary for production.  The enemy war effort would collapse 
under the weight of high explosives.  These theorists therefore strayed somewhat from the 
earlier conceptions of industrial demilitarization and instead advocated the pursuit of a type 
of intermediate economic paralysis. American theorists nevertheless agreed that the 
effective application of airpower would overwhelm and defeat the enemy. 
British thinkers paved the road to victory somewhat differently.  The deceptively 
simple task of dumping explosives onto enemy targets and neutralizing or destroying the 
capacity to wage war provoked intense debate within the Royal Air Force and British 
military.  Ground force commanders and the more tactically minded thought in traditional 
terms and promoted air strikes against the transportation network in the immediate vicinity 
of the front in order to cripple the German capacity to deploy reserves of infantry and tanks 
and react to the changing conditions of the battlefield.44  In search of a cost-effective 
solution, Bomber Command on the other hand preferred to set its sights directly on the 
heart of the military industrial system concentrated in the foundries and coke ovens of the 
Ruhr.  Steel defined this region.  Bomber Command predicted in 1938 that the destruction 
of 19 power plants and 26 coking plants would “bring German war-making capacity to a 
standstill in a fortnight”.45  British strategic bombing advocates hypothesized that the 
disruption of German steel manufacturing and not the disruption of finished products would 
alone defeat the enemy without the need to engage in a slogging and slow infantry 
campaign. 
Arthur Harris contemplated another target built on the concept of taking the war 
directly to the enemy.  “It was believed”, for example, “that city attacks offered a means of 
destroying German civilian morale.  It was believed that if the morale of industrial workers 
could be affected, or if laborers could be diverted from the factories to other purposes, such 
as caring for their families, repairing damage to their homes…war production would 
suffer”.46  For Harris, subsequently joined by Bomber Command and their American 
counterparts, the neutralization of war-making ability appeared a straightforward exercise 
of flying over the armed formations of the enemy and accurately hurling high explosives 
onto the productive elements of cities and not just sensitive industrial targets such as 
factories.  The armed forces had however not yet formulated an established doctrine that 
clearly specific industrial facilities to be attacked by the bomber crews.  The search for 




inexorably towards the concept of bombing cities as the “center of gravity”.47  Striking at 
cities with sufficient numbers of aircraft and tons of explosives promised to unravel the 
entire German war effort and the ground forces could “seek victory directly and 
immediately”.48 
Identifying German industry as the most lucrative military target represented a 
crude and rudimentary observation.  Determining whether the strategic bombers should 
strike the workers, the industrial supply system, or manufacturing itself constituted the real 
issue for the planners.  The theorists, owing to their own calculations and not just realities in 
Germany, confronted a bewildering number of potential targets.  Instead of considering the 
difficulties that might arise in attempting to destroy a vast number of industrial components 
and hundreds of cities dispersed over thousands of kilometres, a task of Herculean 
proportions even without consideration of German defensive measures, the air advocates 
clung to the hopelessly simple utopian prewar dogma that the destruction of panacea targets 
would seriously impact armaments production and lead to victory.49  This theory did not 
account for the fact that the full complement of the enemy’s military forces survived intact 
or that the enemy could repair the damage or find alternative solutions such as the 
relocation and dispersal of production.  These diverse approaches therefore could by 
definition only create bottlenecks in industrial production and disrupt the output of specific 
weapons systems through the destruction of transport and communications, petroleum 
production facilities, raw material processing plants, factories, assembly plants, or by 
lowering morale.50  The prewar theories, predicated on the idea of reducing the factories to 
ashes, evolved into something more complex.  The pundits on the one hand eventually 
proposed the temporary disarmament of the enemy rather than the outright and complete 
destruction of all military industrial capabilities.  On the other hand, the early demand for 
the total incineration of the cities suggested that every element of the modern industrial 
system—including the human element—might actually burn away in the fires of war.  
Churchill in 1940 proclaimed his intention of turning Germany into a desert.51  The latter 
argument, only the crystallization of prewar thought, elevated genocide to the ranks of 
military policy even prior to the first shots fired by the Wehrmacht in World War Two. 
2.3 Bombing Operations in Wartime 
American military planners refined their strategic bombing policy in December 
1942 to prepare for the combined Allied air assault on Germany.  The experience gained by 
the British aircrews during the initial year of the war, namely that enemy fighters and flak 




through and impact American doctrine.  The Committee of Operations Analysts estimated 
the forces and length of time necessary for strategic bombing to accomplish the significant 
weakening of the German state prior to an invasion of Europe.  Civilian economists joined 
the military officers on the committee.  These civilians represented a wide body of 
specialists including representatives from financial firms, a professor of military history, 
and members of the Board of Economic Warfare and the Office of Strategical Services.  
The committee therefore maintained strong connections to industrial firms, Roosevelt’s 
administration, and with the experienced British officers.  The committee also drew on 
information from civilian engineering and construction specialists who had worked in 
Germany prior to the war.  The bombing policy derived by the committee dismissed the 
general failure of Bomber Command to shatter German industry and clung to the prewar 
vision of striking a swift deathblow to the enemy’s war effort through attacks on still 
undefined segments of the economy.52 
The American military rejected the British conclusion that certain operational 
frictions interfered with the ability of the bomber crews to strike and destroy individual 
targets such as factories throughout the war.  The United States Strategic Air Forces, 
commanded by Lt. General Carl Spaatz, advocated the direct daytime bombing of the 
military industrial “complex” instead of switching to the area bombing of civilian centers at 
night like the British.53  The principle American air force planners, Orvil A. Anderson, 
Haywood S. Hansell, Hoyt S. Vandenberg and Laurence S. Kuter, believed that the 
bombers should strike a large variety of military and industrial targets such as the airbases 
and aircraft production facilities to wear the recuperative powers of the enemy’s industry in 
order to remove the primary obstacles to the bombing of more general industrial targets 
such as ball-bearing plant..  In August 1941, after investigating the effects of bombing using 
aerial reconnaissance, the Butt Report demonstrated to the British parliament that even 
under ideal conditions only one third of the bombs struck within eight kilometres of the 
target.54  Most bombs fell onto residential zones whether intended or not.  British officers 
pointed out that equipment malfunctions, false intelligence and adverse weather conditions 
interfered with operations.  Summarizing the impact of weather on Allied bombing raids, 
Haywood Hansell pointed out that “weather was actually a greater hazard and obstacle than 
the German Air Force”.55  Even diversions to support the ground forces in the invasion of 
France, and continual changes by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in target priorities 
hampered Allied efforts.  The technology of the period furthermore simply did not permit 




under the most ideal of conditions.  Stewart Halsey Ross aptly concludes that the fog of war 
basically eliminated the positive benefits of contemporary technology and that a “'no see, 
no hit' paradigm governed all of U.S. bombing operations during World War II and put the 
indelible lie to the concept of precision bombing”.56  The destruction of even large 
industrial facilities proved difficult under the most ideal of conditions. 
The German military furthermore offered considerable opposition.  The bombers 
battled their way into the designated target area against stiff fighter and flak opposition.  In 
October 1943 alone, the Luftwaffe inflicted a 12-16 percent loss rate on the American 
crews.  The commander of the American 8th Air Force considered these losses so high that 
he suspended deep bombing raids into Germany for four months.57  German 
countermeasures forced the Allies to direct bombing missions against Luftwaffe airbases 
and the military industrial factories that sustained the fighter pilots.58  This decision 
recognized the need to tackle the enemy’s military defences first.  The vigorous application 
of the P-51 Mustang, a long-range fighter escort, to protect the heavy bomber streams 
eventually forced German fighter pilots onto the defensive and through attrition removed 
the threat from the skies.59  American application of a new weapon in a traditional military 
manner bled the fighter squadrons of the Luftwaffe.60  After the destruction of the 
Luftwaffe and the success of Overlord in defeating the enemy on the ground in Normandy, 
Allied airpower turned its full attention to the destruction and paralysis of the German 
military industrial “complex” in September 1944.61  Prior to the virtual elimination of the 
Luftwaffe as a cohesive fighting force, German countermeasures had reduced the tonnage 
falling on industrial targets by shooting down bombers and dispersing the bombs dropped 
by the aircraft that succeeded in breaking though. 
The strategists, partly under the direction of the scientist Solly Zuckerman, 
subsequently turned to the destruction of “Germany's electric power and transportation 
systems, oil and petroleum resources, and the undermining of morale by attacks against 
civilian concentrations”.62  A British directive dated 9 June 1941 had already established 
the killing of civilians as a top priority.63  A four-month bombardment of the vast 
communications system ensued.  The plan to paralyse the German state in its entirety, 
considering that most targets such as railway centres were found in the densely populated 
cities and that the widely strewn bombing patterns resulted in extensive collateral damage, 
amounted to the same policy as “moral bombing”.64  No substantial difference other than in 
intension existed between the area bombing of cities and a strategic concentration on 




understood the importance of civilian morale in industrial production and supported the 
area bombing of cities provided intelligence could establish that the “inhabitants were 
known to be low in morale”.65  The bombing of transportation targets such as marshalling 
yards in cities implied that “widespread bomb spillover” would accumulate collateral 
damage and civilian deaths.66  This switch in focus implied that strategists now targeted the 
vast industrial support structure and not just armament assembly points. 
The success of this bombing strategy only marginally depended on accurate 
estimates of German production levels and more importantly locating potential targets and 
estimating damage.  As stated in the previous chapter, Allied intelligence during the war 
proved especially skilled in gaining information vital for traditional military operations such 
as observing troop movements.  The British in particular traced the wildly shifting positions 
of German divisions, air fleets and submarines to establish a more or less accurate order of 
battle.67  The intelligence personnel achieved important results pertaining to the naval 
struggle against German submarines and gaining a clear understanding of German military 
strength in France prior to the invasion in June 1944.  The accurate appreciation of bombing 
results on industrial output proved another matter altogether. 
Part of the reason for the difficulties in wartime industrial damage assessment 
rested with the complexity of modern economic systems.  In an analysis of the “fog of 
war”, Barry D. Watts acknowledges the work of economist Friedrich von Hayek and 
asserts that the modern economic system encompasses too much information concerning all 
the myriad elements required for it to function.68  Watts asserts that the “task of gathering 
this information, let alone making sense of it, is beyond any designing intelligence” without 
the ordering principle of the market.69  Only the market, according to Watts, can accurately 
judge the success of resource allocation and industrial production.  No intentional program 
of production can account for all of the variables associated with market success.  Nor is it 
therefore possible to equip a central authority with the full extent of the information needed 
in order for them to “deliberately” control the market.70  German weapons output, the 
wartime equivalent of the “market”, proved a difficult subject to analyse from the skies. 
Output did not detract.  Precision and area bombing failed to paralyse German 
industrial production between 1940 and 1943 despite the sacrifice of Allied aircrews.  The 
bombers only destroyed approximately 5 percent of produced weapons.  Rationalization 
and German countermeasures greatly expanded output so that strategic bombing only 
lowered the output of an expanding base.71  The search for more efficient and less costly 




against German industry and towards the concentration on wider targets.  Roosevelt and 
Winston Churchill realized the need to coordinate strategic planning.  Meeting with the 
Combined Chiefs of Staff at Casablanca, the two leaders of democracy established a 
general bombing directive.  Repeating the worn prewar strategic bombing doctrine, 
Roosevelt and Churchill directed the air forces to destroy the “German military, industrial 
and economic system”.  To bring Germany to its knees, Roosevelt and Churchill updated 
strategic bombing doctrine and ordered the air forces to bomb Germany around the clock 
and impact “the morale of the German people to a point where the capacity for armed 
resistance is fatally weakened”.72  Terror bombing and the deliberate targeting of civilians 
received official sanction.  These leaders responded to the problems surfacing in bombing 
doctrine by calling for ever greater bomb loads to be dropped on an increasingly wider 
range of targets. 
The military set to work formulating an operational plan to realize the Casablanca 
directive.  Approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 20 April 1943 and the Combined Chiefs 
of Staff at the Trident Conference in Washington on 18 May 1943, “Pointblank”, code 
name for the combined bomber offensive of World War II, incorporated the Casablanca 
demand for the destruction of the German military industrial infrastructure, but added that 
these bombing operations would soften the enemy to “permit initiation of final combined 
operations on the Continent” and not single-handedly lead to the demise of Germany.73  
The army planners accepted the necessity of wrestling control from the Wehrmacht on the 
ground.  The airmen on the other hand retained their belief that bombs alone could defeat 
Germany. 
In operations aimed at neutralizing the German air force, the Allies nearly found a 
“panacea” target.  In attacking the synthetic petroleum production facilities and refineries 
on a broad level after May 1944, the bombers deprived the entire German military 
apparatus of the ability to move.  The lack of petrol grounded aircraft and immobilized 
armour.  By August 1944, German aviation fuel production capabilities fell by 98 percent, 
and during the Battle of the Bulge in December the “German military was in such dire 
straits from a lack of fuel that it had to depend on the seizure of Allied fuel dumps in order 
to give the Ardennes offensive any chance of succeeding”.74  Serious shortages of pilots 
and fuel furthermore removed the benefits gained from increased industrial production.  
Despite desperate attempts to increase German frontline fighter strength through 
concentrated production and the movement of aircraft from the eastern front, German 




American bombers quadrupled from 300 bombers and 200 escort fighters to 1,000 bombers 
and 900 escort fighters.75  The lack of fuel and pilot shortages forced the Luftwaffe to 
reduce training standards in order to compensate. 76  The quality of German pilots suffered 
considerably and the Allied fighters pulled them from the skies of Germany in increasing 
numbers.  The systematic bombing of German cities followed. 
2.4 The United States Strategic Bombing Survey and Industrial Disruption 
What did this extensive effort accomplish?  Originally asked by the American Air 
Force to determine the contribution of airpower to the Allied victory in Normandy in 
autumn 1944, George Ball instead proposed a broad study of strategic bombing’s role in 
defeating Germany.  Ball’s project aimed at a methodical analysis of strategic bombing’s 
role by scrutinizing the damage inflicted on industry through “on the ground” inspection.  
The proposal attracted the enthusiastic support of airpower advocates and Roosevelt 
sanctioned the undertaking in November 1944.  The U.S.S.B.S. formed in Washington to 
establish the methodology for the project.  Franklin D’Olier, the organization’s chairman, 
typified the civilian composition of the organization.  D’Olier worked as chairman of the 
board for the Prudential Insurance Company prior to his transfer to the government.  
Composed of several directorates, each examining a specific bombing target such as 
transportation, aviation, weaponry, cities, civilian morale and the economy, the groups 
operated independently of the American Air Force to amass and study the required data 
without allowing the military to unduly influence the results. 
The analysts experienced substantial difficulties in interpreting the large body of 
information collected.  The data did not convey a simple message.  The principal writers of 
the survey, John K. Galbraith, George Ball, and Paul Nitze, stridently argued the results of 
five years of bombing.  The debate concerned whether strategic airpower decisively 
neutralized or destroyed the enemy’s industrial capacities.  The debate that surfaced in 1945 
rages on to this day.  Noble Frankland asserts that the development of a uniform system of 
measurement represents the core problem.  He points out that despite the exhaustive 
bombing surveys and years of historical analysis the specialists “lacked essential standards 
for judging accomplishments, a deeply comprehensive data base for making quantitative 
evaluations, and the techniques for exploiting comprehensive data if it had been available”.  
Historians furthermore “fall back upon the slippery facts of experiential history and…base 
many of their judgments upon the intensely personal experiences and views of the 
participants in the conflict”.77  Historical analysis of strategic bombing since Charles 




on the deficiencies in policy and strategy and employ raw productive data or the damage to 
infrastructure as the standards by which to judge the operation.78  Contemporary remarks 
concerning German cities, for example, stressed destruction and one British officer 
remarked in October 1944 that Germans would require hundreds of years to fix the 
damage.79  Certain statistics also present the barbarity of the Allied operation.  Jörg 
Friedrich points out that the bombs killed an average of 127 Germans per day in 1944.  
During the final months of the war, when the aircrews dropped 370,000 tons of bombs in 
72,880 sorties, this figure rose to 1,023 per day.80  
Despite the importance of the “on the ground” analysis by the survey crews, 
historical treatment of the results itself has tended to be quite limited.  Gian Peri Gentile 
points out that David MacIsacc wrote the first major book length study of the survey in 
1976.81  Gentile concludes from the lack of historical attention that the survey generally 
appeals to scholars in part because of the “malleable” nature of the conclusions that have 
“readily adapted itself to the wide range of arguments found in this amalgam of postwar 
writings”.82  Current interpretations point out that the survey suffered from a conflict that 
raged between the airpower supporters such as Nitze and those who viewed strategic 
bombing as a failure such as Galbraith.  Gentile’s recent investigation of the survey 
demonstrates how the preconceived notions of strategic bombing influenced the results.  
Airpower supporters drew on warped conclusions derived from the survey to encourage the 
continued autonomy of the Air Force and more importantly justify the continued 
expenditure of huge resources on airpower in the postwar.  
The survey teams strove to address the empirical weaknesses in the wartime 
appreciation of the levels of destruction in Germany.  The data collected by Allied bomber 
crews and photoreconnaissance flying over Germany in wartime proved incomplete and 
unreliable.83  The photos brought back by the pilots effectively illustrated the “admittedly 
ghastly consequences” of the bombing.84  But reconnaissance could only determine the 
approximate number of bombs which had struck the target and only roughly indicate the 
damage to rolling stock or machine-tools.  Even though the Allies operated a sophisticated 
system of photoreconnaissance, the Air Intelligence estimates of German aircraft 
production, for example, exhibited a wide margin of error.  Estimates of the monthly 
German production of aircraft during the first half of 1941 overestimated production by 
695, while the estimates of the first half of 1944 underestimated production by 941 
aircraft.85  Postwar analysis in Germany after the end of hostilities promised to solve this 




The experts sifted through the rubble and inspected the damage at close range.  This 
task appeared deceptively simple.  Specialist teams combed the burned out factories and 
assessed the residual industrial capacities.  However, the rubble failed to reveal the 
accomplishments of strategic bombing.  When Galbraith investigated a heavily bombed 
factory on the east bank of the Rhine in 1945, he quickly surmised that “little could be 
learned through inspection alone”.86  In order to establish the levels of destruction inflicted 
on the German economy, the U.S.S.B.S. required German cooperation and the handing 
over of accurate and comprehensive production data.  Judgements concerning the 
effectiveness of airpower furthermore required a clear understanding of German industry 
prior to the bombing of targets in addition to how the authorities reorganized and repaired 
production after each raid. 
Satisfactory assessment of military industrial targets by the specialists proved “hard 
enough to discover afterwards [even] with the aid of the German sources”.87  Dispassionate 
German participation in verifying industrial production data proved harder to find than 
expected.  German industrialists distrusted Allied intelligence and the general interference 
in their businesses and only grudgingly handed over information related to their firms.  A 
long tradition of muted defiance characterized German industrialists.  A large number of 
firms, described by Neil Gregor, resisted Nazi demands for full mobilization during 
wartime in order to protect their business interests.88  Daimler-Benz for example pushed 
hard to protect a large core of skilled workers from conscription into the military 
establishment during the war.  The company furthermore attempted to maintain civilian 
production capacities by resisting the conversion of civilian production lines and the 
diversion of resources to the military sector in order to, they hoped, cash in on postwar 
demand.89  Daimler-Benz focused on transport production in anticipation of postwar 
demand.  Industrial policies of conservation explain part of the reason why German 
industry survived the war with less damage than assumed by contemporary analysts.90  The 
reluctance to collaborate with the victors in 1945 moreover indicated a continued 
unwillingness to grant power to outside interests. 
German industrialists quite plainly feared arrest and prosecution.  These men 
understood that the postwar survival of heavy industry in particular depended on cutting the 
links to the Nazi past in order to “recapture a moral legitimacy and to reconstruct a positive 
professional identity”.91  The industrialist Alfried Krupp chose to erase his firm’s sordid 
links to Hitler through the destruction of evidence.  He ordered the burning and burial of 




conferences” prior to Allied military penetration into the Ruhr in 1945.92  Overall, 
industrialists tended to influence the Allied occupation authorities using far less defiant 
means.  Some cooperated openly with Allied officials and offered mountains of documents 
in addition to hours of interviews.93  The industrialists later established a document 
clearinghouse in Nuremberg that assisted the Allies but also aimed at assisting and 
rehabilitating industrialists facing trial.94  This soft approach hoped to weaken Allied 
resolve at prosecuting business leaders and reduce resistance to the survival of a legitimate 
German heavy industry.  
The U.S.S.B.S. personnel and the occupation forces themselves required active 
German participation for accurate economic assessments.  The authorities therefore granted 
German industrial organizations a wide degree of latitude in establishing reconstruction 
priorities partly because they relied on German sources to determine wartime production 
levels and postwar capabilities.  The United States Forces, European Theater (U.S.F.E.T.), 
the headquarters located in Frankfurt, originally abolished German economic chambers, 
groups and regional agencies as a means to gain control over the economy.  But the War 
Department “transferred” the functions and personnel of banned business organizations 
such as the statistical groups to the regional government offices located throughout the 
occupied zone.95  The American military government for example recruited the former 
head of the German Raw Materials and Planning Department of the Speer Ministry Hans 
Kebel to prepare a statistical analysis of the wartime production levels of fixed nitrogen, 
buna, explosives, coal and steel.96  The Germans obviously assisted the development of a 
pro-industry ethos that penetrated most analyses of the industrial system. 
This cooperation led to other problems for Galbraith, Ball and Nitze.  Their prize 
witness for the investigation of strategic bombing, the Reich’s Minister of Armament 
Affairs and Munitions Albert Speer, realized immediately after the war ended that he and 
other top officials faced lengthy trials and harsh punishment for complicity in the 
horrendous Nazi war crimes.  Speer, as evidence recently uncovered indicates, had 
originally proposed that companies utilize concentration camp inmates for slave labour in 
autumn 1942.  Even though the industrialists initially baulked at Speer’s suggestion, hostile 
to the involvement of the regime in their affairs, the total of slave labourers from the camps 
rose from 32,000 in the spring of 1944 to 600,000 at the end of the year.  Working in 
conjunction with the general Ausländereinsatz that impressed 7.8 million people into the 




feed Germany and contributed to the growth and output of the military industrial 
complex.97 The Ausländereinsatz provided one-quarter of all labourers in Germany. 
Speer openly acknowledged his guilt in an obvious attempt at influencing Allied 
opinion.  This tactic deflected attention away from his collusion with Hitler and amounted 
to a mask of contrition.  He also formulated a crude defence that emphasized a brief attempt 
at drawing attention to the horrific conditions faced by slave labourers toiling in the 
underground factories.98  Speer appeared compliant and at least put up a façade of 
cooperation whereby he told his interrogators what he believed they wanted to hear.  
Hitler’s architect refrained from the bizarre attempts of others to prove their innocence.  
Alfried Krupp for example mobilized witnesses for his trial to substantiate his claim that 
less than half of Krupp workers engaged in munitions production after Josef Goebbels 
declared total war in 1943.99  Speer, despite outward appearances, nevertheless shared the 
industrialist agenda.  Even before the war ended, Speer sifted through the documents of his 
ministry in Berlin and deposited them in the safety of a Hamburg bank vault.100  During his 
initial discussions with Galbraith, Ball and Nitze, Speer conveniently produced the 
documents necessary to underline his personal interpretation of the German war effort.  He 
even manipulated the production statistics to solidify his arguments.101 
Speer explained to the survey team that the Allies generally misunderstood their 
enemy’s war economy.  American and British intelligence, as examined earlier, viewed the 
German war economy as a “taught string” stretched to the limit by the remilitarization 
efforts of the 1930s.102  This interpretation argued that the economy required further 
territorial expansion to acquire foreign industrial resources and raw materials for the 
prosecution of war.  “The entire economic life of the German nation”, the American 
military attaché in Berlin had informed Washington in June 1937, “is being organized on a 
war economy basis”.103  The “Blitzkrieg economics” thesis argued that an insufficient depth 
in industrial plant limited overall military and civilian capacities.  Extensive military 
production furthermore seriously reduced he output of civilian commodities and wore out 
existing machine-tools and equipment.  Limited to fighting “small and localized wars”,104 
Hitler gambled that ferocious thrusts would quickly overwhelm enemy opposition and 
avoid straining the economy.  Allied intelligence therefore theorized that strategic bombing 
could unravel the tightly strung German economy with a relatively small number of attacks 
at vital points.105  This hypothesis represented the major premise of Allied strategic 




Evidence collected by the U.S.S.B.S. teams, based heavily on Speer’s documents, 
invalidated the “Blitzkrieg economics” thesis.  Speer explained that the delinquent nature of 
Nazi officials, motivated by an insatiable greed for power and wealth, fractured the German 
“Machtbereich” into competing regions that hindered the realization of a rational 
production system.  He more importantly introduced the argument that Hitler’s devotion to 
civilian morale retarded industrial growth through his refusal to sanction harsh reductions in 
peacetime production and sufficiently mobilize civilian industry for the war effort.106  
Corruption and political calculations, the architect argued, paralysed the German military 
industrial system.  As previously stated, Speer argued that he reversed these trends and 
increased armaments production through rationalization schemes and the mobilization of 
unused capacities.  Speer’s arguments implied that German industry was far less 
“militarized” than expected—an argument that emphasized the possibilities of 
reconversion. 
German officers and industrialists also pressed the point that strategic bombing 
defeated the German state in a decisive manner.  The reliance on interviews with these men 
underscored the effectiveness of strategic bombing in strangling industrial production and 
destroying capacities.  Based on these interviews, Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate in 
fact argue that airpower accomplished its mission over Germany.107  As true of several Nazi 
leaders and military officers including Hermann Göring, Karl Dönitz, and Alfred Jodl, 
Speer in particular credited strategic bombing with significant or primary responsibility for 
the defeat of the German war machine.108  Strategic bombing, in the architect’s opinion, 
paralysed industrial production despite his rationalization schemes and countermeasures.  
Speer wrote that “Pointblank” decisively reduced the military’s ability to react to changing 
battlefield conditions by stopping the flow of petrol to the front and also by reducing critical 
railway nodes to a twisted mass of steel.109  He furthermore pointed out that the concerted 
attacks on synthetic fuel production and transportation targets created industrial bottlenecks 
that “meant the end of German armaments production”.110  “Since the coal could no longer 
be driven into unoccupied Germany”, Speer wrote in his memoirs, “The supplies of the 
Reichsbahn rapidily shrank, the gasworks were threatened with inaction, the oil and 
Magarine works faced a dead stop, and even the coke supply for hospitals became 
insufficient”.111 
Speer correctly pinpointed the successful elements of the strategic bombing 
campaign, but leapt to a conclusion that conflicted with his otherwise astute observations.  




capacities.  Speer nevertheless asserted that the machine-tools and equipment of the 
factories lay in ruins.  Galbraith in particular entertained grave doubts concerning this 
theory—one that downsized the level of industrial involvement in Hitler’s war and 
maintained that these predominantly civilian capacities no longer existed.  The numbers did 
not add up.  Galbraith lamented that his organization established the first Gross National 
Product (G.N.P.) figures “ever” for Germany.112  The overall inaccuracies of the data 
supplied even led the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department to conclude on 2 July 
1945 that the “German situation cannot be properly studied”.113  The reports issued by the 
responsible American organizations such as the Economic Control Agency (E.C.A.) in 
Germany therefore represented only “best appraisals” of industrial capacities in an 
environment hardly conducive to a high standard of objectivity. 
The estimates by the War Department paralleled Galbraith’s conclusions.  
Shortages of raw materials and not the destruction of plant paralysed industry and therefore 
the Nazi war effort.  The War Department’s “Summary Report of Economic Conditions in 
Germany” specified that the difficulties in raw material allocation, the destruction to the 
transportation network, agricultural shortages, the lack of price controls, housing and skilled 
labour shortages hamstringed German industry.114  The report indirectly specified that the 
industrial equipment remained intact and even suggested that “factories can be quickly 
repaired where damaged”.  The report nevertheless concluded that industry “is functioning 
only on the most limited scale” and requested that the occupation authorities immediately 
set to work on addressing the ailments afflicting the German economy in order to initiate 
the “revival of a minimum civilian economy”.115  The deflection of attention away from 
industrial equipment onto economic performance tended to convey the impression of an 
utterly destroyed industrial infrastructure.  Galbraith questioned the objectivity of the 
military observers for this reason.  Even though Roosevelt originally intended that the study 
group compile findings independently of the Air Force, a logical attempt at avoiding the 
infusion of bias, Galbraith found that airpower enthusiasts such as Rensis Likert, 
supervising the analysis of wartime German civilian morale, permeated the ranks of those 
studying the postwar German economy.116 
A lengthy look at the U.S.S.B.S. conclusions is warranted.  The final report, 
completed in September 1945, testified that airpower’s contribution to the Allied war effort 
was “decisive” and had resulted in the “virtual collapse” of the German economy.117  The 
authors however concentrated on a host of wartime operations and bombing results that 




survey trumpeted airpower’s role in overwhelming the Luftwaffe and therefore removing 
the threat of German interdiction against Allied ground and naval forces.  The air forces, in 
the survey’s opinion, more importantly eliminated the U-boat menace in the Atlantic and 
tactically assisted ground forces in the drive from Normandy into Germany.118  These three 
contributions demonstrated how airpower assisted the traditional naval and army branches 
of the military in achieving final victory.  But these claims did not harmonize with the 
bombing strategy.  Strategic bombing as a concept aimed at independently forcing a 
German defeat by reducing the enemy’s military industrial system to rubble.  The bombing 
pundits loathed and resisted these secondary “tactical” operations throughout the war.   
The authors employed a similar stratagem of deflection in the assessments of 
industrial targets.  The U.S.S.B.S. reports on initial inspection substantiated Speer’s claims.  
The authors pointed out that the bombing of oil installations and the transportation network 
paralyzed industrial production.  “The attack on transportation beginning in September 
1944”, the U.S.S.B.S. report concluded, “was the most important single cause of 
Germany’s ultimate economic collapse”.119  This assertion incorporated Speer’s line of 
argumentation and his evidence.  Historical analysis of the German industrial breakdown in 
1945 largely substantiates this position.120  Friedrich’s frank writing, while he stingingly 
condemns the Anglo-American military planners for pursuing a clearly immoral form of 
warfare that unnecessarily killed hundreds of thousands of civilians, portrays the extensive 
destruction brought to the urban infrastructure.121  The bombing campaign, in Air Marshall 
John Slessor’s opinion, forced the German military onto the defensive and diverted 
resources away from their own strategic bombing program and into countermeasures such 
as flak and fighters.122  As the German military struggled to cope with the “third front” in 
the skies over Germany, shipments of artillery and tanks to the traditional fronts could not 
keep pace with the unhindered production of the Allies.  The historical assessments contend 
that strategic bombing destroyed approximately 20 percent of German war production 
during the last sixteen months of the war.123  By pounding the German urban infrastructure 
with high explosives, the combined bomber offensive impeded the movement of troops to 
the front and created bottlenecks in resources and raw materials sorely needed in the 
factories.124  Overy concludes that the actual German production targets of tanks, aircraft 
and trucks was reduced by 35 per cent, 31 per cent and 42 per cent respectively during 
1944.125 
Scholars cannot doubt that strategic bombing ultimately helped choke production.  




that the highest production levels were achieved during the final months of 1943 and that 
production steadily declined after the Allied victory in Normandy in 1944.126  The influence 
of airpower on this development is however difficult to determine.  A wide variety of 
factors combined to inhibit industrial production.  On the domestic front, Rolf-Dieter 
Müller points out that the severe German labour shortage brought by conscription inhibited 
manufacturing more seriously than the bombing campaign.127  Rolf Wagenführ points out 
that the rapidly shrinking size of the German Reich affected the allocation of critical 
resources and again reduced output.128  Ludolf Herbst even argues that industrialists 
realized that defeat was unavoidable after 1943 and sabotaged production by reverting to 
civilian production and increasing capacities to prepare for the inevitable reparations and 
the need to rebuild during the postwar period.129  The U.S.S.B.S. team furthermore 
demonstrated that the high production levels of 1944 depended on the extreme exploitation 
of the occupied territories.130  The systematic plundering of Germany’s occupied territories 
helped stock the shelves of industry with the raw materials required for the production of a 
wide range of commodities such as military steel alloys.131  The occupied territories 
furnished the war industry with significant contributions in most areas other than 
armaments.  But foreign industry only manufactured 5 percent of the armaments wielded 
by the German military during the war.132  Nor did the horrific use of slave labour alleviate 
production problems owing to the desperate need for skilled workers to handle the 
industrial equipment.  The gradual retreat of the Wehrmacht from these areas removed 
German access to foreign industrial facilities.  It should furthermore be mentioned that the 
Nazi willingness to sacrifice German soldiers in hopeless military clashes potentially 
slowed the Allied advance to a far more significant degree than even Speer’s industrial 
achievements.133  Still, all of these arguments, while offering persuasive explanations of 
Germany’s industrial defeat, in fact constrain the plausibility that bombing removed 
industrial capacities in the Reich. 
2.5 The Impact of Strategic Bombing on Industrial Capacities 
Galbraith’s Economic Division revealed the failure of strategic bombing to destroy 
the German means of production.  This group’s analysis stressed the inability of airpower to 
substantially affect the upward swing in war production in 1944.  Galbraith’s work 
demonstrated that bombing reduced overall industrial production—and not just that of 
specific sectors—by the nearly trivial amount of five percent prior to the major escalations 
after the summer of 1944.134  Not until the change of focus from outright attacks on 




importantly the transportation network, did airpower seriously influence the manufacturing 
process itself.  As stated, this change in strategy precipitated bottlenecks that interrupted and 
complicated production.  The Economic Division’s report mocked airpower’s stated 
purpose of destroying factories and the means of production.  The report ironically pointed 
out that strategic bombing forced industrialists and planners to reorganize production and 
“might have helped streamline, rather than injure, the German economy”.135  Galbraith 
looked at the quantitative evidence and summed up the overall effectiveness of airpower 
during the war.  The balance sheets indicated that the “aircraft, manpower, and bombs used 
in the campaign had cost the American economy far more in output than they had cost 
Germany.  However, our economy being much larger, we could afford it”.136 
Industrial capacities did not fall for a number of reasons.  The German authorities 
swiftly repaired damaged installations such as aircraft assembly facilities considered 
destroyed by the Allied assessment teams during wartime.137  Field Marshall Erhard Milch 
explained the effects of an American raid on an aircraft assembly plant:  
During the winter of 1943, on a day when the temperature was a freezing eight degrees 
Centigrade, a large scale American bombing raid was carried out against a Junkers 
aircraft factory in central Germany which had been producing fifty Ju-88s per month.  
All buildings, including the factory heating installation, were totally destroyed.  The 
aircraft, although in part totally destroyed, were to a large extent still repairable, but 
most of the factory equipment was inoperative.  When I landed at the factory 
approximately 30 minutes after the attack had taken place, I found one third of the 
work force engaged in extinguishing the fires, one third engaged in removing the 
debris, and the last third repairing the damaged aircraft.  The entire sight was 
catastrophic and I asked the assembled workers how long, in their estimation, it would 
take until all the damage had been repaired.  Their answer was: at the latest within a 
month!  Actually on the tenth day of the following month the factory delivered the 50 
aircraft scheduled for delivery during the previous month (when the attack had 
occurred); the 50 aircraft scheduled for delivery during the current month were also 
delivered before the end of that month.138 
 
The bombs gutted buildings but failed to destroy the machine-tools and equipment that 
represented the backbone of the military industrial complex.139  The evidence suggested 
that industrial capacities actually expanded during the war despite the extensive bombing.  
After Speer rationalized the German war economy in 1943, and focused on the prosecution 
of total war, productivity increased at a greater rate than that of the United States.140  
Industrial productivity grew by 25 percent between 1943 and 1944 alone.  Comparative 
statistics concerning individual weapons systems obscure the importance of the German 
achievement for the postwar period.  While the Allies outproduced Nazi-Germany by a 
ratio of three to one in tanks and aircraft and six to one in artillery pieces,141 leading to 




potential as reflected in machine-tool numbers remained high.  Considering the American 
advantages of unfettered access to raw materials, an industry unscathed by bombing, and a 
sufficiently large workforce, the increases in German industrial output appeared nearly 
astonishing.  That is, of course, unless historians recognize the impact of 1930s investment 
in civilian production. 
Machine-tools represented a vital ingredient of the manufacturing process in the 
military industrial system of the early 20th Century.  The American Office of Production 
Management began to explore industrial mobilization issues closely in early 1941.  Merrill 
C. Meigs, in his capacity as chair of the Joint Aircraft Committee, “found that the most 
serious shortage confounding defence production was the scarcity of machine tools”.142  
British rearmament during the 1930s suffered from severe shortages in machine-tools and 
the nagging choice of diverting civilian resources at the expense of the general standard of 
living.143  Henry H. Fowler, in commenting on the relationship of machine-tools to war 
mobilization, stressed that “anybody that's ever been in World War II in our business, or in 
the Korean War, has gotten machine tools engraved on their hearts”.144  Postwar American 
analyses of the German armaments industry stressed that the machine-tool industry “played 
the decisive role” in converting peacetime industry for the wartime manufacturing of 
weapons by all the belligerents.145  The war efforts of all the major belligerents demanded a 
large stock of specialized and general-purpose machine-tools diverted from civilian 
production.  While hardly the only component of the armaments industry, the organizers of 
wartime production held machine-tools in high regard. 
German industry began the war with a significant number of machine-tools and 
represented the world’s largest exporter.  Overall industrial capacities expanded by 20 
percent after Nazi remilitarization began in earnest in 1936.146  During the early war years 
up until 1942, German industry “retained enough capacity to continue to produce peacetime 
machinery, and to maintain and even increase military exports”.147  This large reservoir 
potentially offered the strategic bombers an abundance of potential targets.  The number of 
“war-winning” targets in fact increased along with the growing intensity of the conflict.  
The armaments producers increasingly diverted machine-tools from civilian usages and the 
military industrial system mobilized between 70 to 80 percent of total stocks by the end of 
the conflict.148  Webster and Frankland however argue that the German dispersal of 
industry and the vital machine-tools throughout Europe complicated bombing efforts.149  
These tools also survived the heaviest raids.  Aerial strikes in 1944 only damaged 




German industry was equipped with an estimated 1,281,000 machine-tools in 1938.  The 
western Allies uncovered 2,216,000 in their respective zones of occupation at war’s end.150  
Wartime production and imports from Switzerland expanded overall stocks considerably 
and German industry did not suffer from shortages of general purpose tools throughout the 
war.151  The basic productive capacity of Germany, as indicated by machine-tool potential, 
remained unaffected throughout the war.  The Allied bombers could not locate and destroy 
those facilities imperative to their enemy’s war effort for the simple reason that so many 
existed.  The rationalization strategy adopted by Daimler-Benz for example balanced 
optimal short-term efficiency with the retention of long-term flexibility of capacity. The 
dispersal program assisted the protection of machines and tools for the postwar period.152 
 The considerable levels of prewar and wartime industrial investment meant that 
industrial capacity rocketed to a level far higher than in 1939.  Most of this capacity offered 
significant practical advantages for the recovery of the civilian aspects of the German 
economy owing primarily to the nature of German machine-tools.  While the Allies 
manufactured specialized equipment in accordance with a more rational armaments 
production policy, German industry relied heavily on general equipment that needed highly 
skilled labourers to work them.  Specialized tools represented only 8 percent of the entire 
stock.153  While German industrialists retained greater flexibility and a potential for swift 
retooling of production priorities, the reliance on skilled labour helped slow down 
production.  But this choice more importantly blurred the distinction between military and 
civilian industrial targets since the civilian automobile industry required the same 
equipment that produced tanks.  This lack of clarity, demonstrated in later chapters, helped 
hinder subsequent Allied attempts at strictly delineating the military and civilian sectors and 
the large capacities also meant that postwar recovery remained largely a matter of resource 
allocation.154 
While the industries of the minor European powers suffered from severe shortages 
of this vital industrial component,155 the major belligerents witnessed a significant increase 
in machine-tool stocks during the war.  Whereas British industry counted 450,000 machine-
tools in 1938, that figure doubled to 800,000 in 1945.156  The Federation of British Industry 
pointed out that the extensive wartime expansion in industry had created a significant 
surplus of approximately 30 percent.157  The statistics gathered by the Strategic Bombing 
Survey already listed indicated a more pronounced surplus in Germany.  The large volume 
of machine-tools in Europe, in addition to providing the starting-point of reconstruction, 




postwar civilian economy did not require such large numbers of machine-tools.  Instead of 
seeking material reparations from Germany in the form of machine-tools, British 
industrialist pushed for technical data as compensation.158  In any case, the breadth of 
German industrial capacities, when measured in terms of the machines needed for 
production, survived the war intact.159  A large percentage of these tools had little or no 
relevance for the civilian economy and therefore represented a substantial enlargement of 
prewar manufacturing potential. 
Airpower could not obstruct this process.  Since western Germany and the Ruhr 
represented the primary industrial targets of the strategic bombing campaign, a few select 
examples of particular bombing raids illustrate the ability of airpower to affect productive 
output without lowering capacities.  The British aircrews launched an attack on the Möhne 
and Eder dams near Essen in 1943 in order to deprive factories of electricity and wreak 
general havoc.  The operation aimed at closing down the German economy.  On 16 May 
1943 sixteen Lancasters commanded by Wing Commander Guy Gibson departed the safety 
of their bases in southern England and threw the weight and skill of Bomber Command 
against the enemy.  Skipping specially constructed bombs over the water and manmade 
obstacles directly into the face of the dams, the aircrews succeeded in breaching the walls 
and flooded the lower valley with 202 million cubic metres of water.  The rushing water 
destroyed several villages, drowned a significant number of livestock and killed 750 forced 
labourers and 550 German civilians.160  The official history of the raid records that the 
operation was “one of the most illustrious episodes in the history of the Air Force”.161  But 
the assault did not dramatically impact manufacturing output.  Nor could it have.  The dams 
predominantly functioned to service the regional agricultural sector.162  Special teams 
organized by Speer rebuilt the infrastructural damage within months.  The German 
authorities employed 20,000 labourers to rebuild the dams by the end of September.163  
These precision attacks, while disastrous for the civilian population, did not result in 
airborne demilitarization.  The official historians Webster and Frankland record that 
“neither the special bomb nor the resulting floods were of any great importance”.164 
Nor could the weight of bombs thrown against civilians in the densely populated 
Ruhr remove productive capacities.  The air planners responded to the apparent economic 
resilience of Germany by increasing the bomb tonnage.  “Effective additional damage 
could only be done to the already devastated cities…by an enormous expenditure of 
bombs,” Harris argued, “as much as four or five thousand tons in a single attack and 




hammer blows could by definition only kill civilians and the British planners relegated 
industrial targets to a secondary objective.  Harris explained that “it must be 
emphasized...that in no instance, except in Essen, were we aiming specifically at any one 
factory...the destruction of factories, which was nevertheless on an enormous scale, could 
be regarded as a bonus.  The aiming points were usually right in the centre of the town...it 
was this densely built-up center which was most susceptible to area attack with incendiary 
bombs”.166  The air marshal, as emphasized by the U.S.S.B.S. statistics, considered the 
destruction of factory buildings—the outer shell protecting machines and workers from the 
elements—as tantamount to industrial demilitarization.  The tendency to extrapolate from 
the pictures of burning cities that the bombing raids incinerated factories rationalized the 
cold expenditure of high explosives and incendiaries on destroying houses and killing 
civilians. 
The Anglo-American air forces, either willingly or not, turned the bulk of their 
bombers against the civilian population.  This failure reflected the devotion of the strategic 
bombing pundits to the bombing of cities as a “panacea target” and not fixing the sights on 
armaments installations.  Raids against crucial military industrial centres, surprisingly few 
in relation to city attacks, largely failed to bring decisive results.  A few successful raids 
demonstrated airpower’s potential.  The bombing of the Krupp Gustahlfabrik, responsible 
for 20 million metric tons of shells and heavy artillery per year, indicated that substantial 
successes were possible.  The 16,152 tons expended on the target effectively shut down 
production during the final months of the conflict.  Other Krupp targets confirmed another 
story.  Sorties against the Krupp facilities such as the Borbeck munitions plant, the 
Grusonwerk in Magdeburg, and the Friedrich-Alfred Hütte in Rheinhausen, illustrated the 
poor effect of strategic bombing on industrial capacities and even output.  The solitary 
strike on Borbeck during the war, estimated by the Allies to have 75,000 tons of machinery, 
was considered by military officers to have “affected” the plant’s production.  The 
U.S.S.B.S. teams found otherwise.  A mere 1,465 tons of explosives hurled against the 
Magdeburg facilities achieved “negligible” effects.  Only a meagre 100 tons fell on the 
Krupp Rheinhausen plant that the Allies considered “the most highly integrated steel plant 
in the Krupp combine” and “more important than any single Krupp plant in the Essen area”.  
The small number of bombs did not slow production and German steel-making capacities 
remained.167 
The failure to target other important dual-use sectors such as the aluminium 




The strategic bombing forces only dropped an astoundingly small amount of explosives on 
these two sectors despite the potential for significant bottlenecks and a dramatic impact on 
armaments production.168  The military planners avoided bombing factories belonging to 
Swiss firms such as the Aluminium GmbH in Rheinfeldern Baden.  This firm alone 
produced one-fifth of total German domestic output.169  The electrical power grid, despite 
the growing strain of increased armaments production and the immense cost involved, 
actually increased total capacities by 6 percent over the course of the war.  German industry 
and the railroads consumed 90 percent of the total electricity generated during the war and 
reserve capacity remained tight.170  The growth rate nevertheless did not keep pace with the 
requirements of the military industrial sector and theoretically offered a tantalizing target 
for the strategic bombers.  The U.S.S.B.S. survey group concluded in the postwar that “the 
destruction of power generating and switching installations would have had a catastrophic 
effect on Germany's war production”.171  The bombers nevertheless ignored these factories 
and instead poured the weight of their firepower onto residential areas.172  The strategists 
later lamented their failure to target Germany’s five principle power stations.173 
Speer argued that the anti-friction bearing production facilities represented the most 
important and sensitive area of German military production.174  The ball-bearing industry 
was heavily concentrated in the area of Schweinfurt and chosen by the 8th Air Force as a 
suitable target during the summer of 1943.  On 17 August 200 American bombers struck 
hard.  September production fell to 35 percent of the pre-bombing total.  Another attack in 
October seemed, from the perspective of the military, to have dealt a serious blow.175  The 
B-17s dumped approximately 12,000 tons of bombs, or one-half of one percent of the 
wartime total, onto the factories.  But heavy losses forced the military to suspend the 
operation until the introduction of the P-51 Mustang fighter helped shield the bomber 
streams from Luftwaffe opposition.  Speer argued that a continued concentration on ball-
bearing facilities in early 1944, which he claims slowed the production of tanks in the 
months following the attack, might have broken the back of the German army that 
summer.176  However, the bombers did not return to precision attacks against these plants 
and the industry recovered quickly.  The U.S.S.B.S. report therefore offered another biting 
criticism of the bombing operation.  “From examination of the records and personalities in 
the ball-bearing industry”, the report concluded, “there is no evidence that the attacks on the 
ball-bearing industry had any measurable effect on essential war production”.177 
The bombing of chemical installations achieved similarly weak results.  As 




after April 1944.  These raids, dropping a total of 57,519 tons of explosives, represented the 
only such attacks against the entire chemical industry in Germany.  The sorties also aimed 
exclusively at choking off the oil supply.  Over 92 percent of these bombs fell on 
installations considered vital synthetic petroleum production centres.  The “attacks on the 
vital German chemical industry”, the teams concluded, “were purely incidental to the 
attacks on oil production”.  However, since fixed nitrogen and oil synthesis was largely 
located at the same facilities, oil being derived from the same process, German production 
remained heavily concentrated.  The facilities at Leuna Merseburg and Ludwigshafen-
Oppau represented the two principle Allied targets in a series of raids.  These two 
installations were responsible for over 50 percent of German fixed nitrogen synthesis.  
Similarly, 89 percent of methanol production occurred in plants attacked as part of the oil 
offensive.178  Bombing damage restricted nitrogen output and therefore that of oil.  
Synthesis of nitrogen at these plants fell to 20,000 tons by December 1944.  By January 
1944 “even nitrogen allocations to munitions had dropped to 20 percent of the production 
available early in 1944”.179  The need for explosives in particular influenced economic 
patterns.  The amount of fixed nitrogen used for agricultural purposes fell from 54 percent 
of total output in 1943 to zero by the end of the war.  German chemical firms scrambled to 
form the raw material needed to place weapons in the hands of the frontline troops.  The 
situation deteriorated to the extent that manufacturers filled shells with mixtures of 
explosives and non-explosive rock salt extender.  The German military ultimately ran out of 
ammunition.180 
However, did the decline in production result from the destruction of capital 
equipment or did it reflect the dislocative effects brought by the collapse of the German 
transportation system?  The survey pointed out that the bombing did hinder the completion 
of certain new facilities.  Strategic bombing disrupted the creation of new nitrogen facilities 
in Silesia such as Auschwitz II, Heydebreck II and Koenigshuette II.  However, the Silesian 
industrial region fell to the advancing Soviet military and owing to postwar policy played 
no role in the German economy after 1945.  The survey, because of disrupted output and 
other losses, concluded that the “attack on the synthetic oil plants was also found to have 
cost Germany its synthetic nitrogen and methanol supply and a considerable part of its 
rubber supply”.181  The continued suppression of these facilities also played a greater role 
than outright destruction.  Work crews armed with cutting torches, reinforcing plates and 
welding tools consistently repaired the damage and forced the bombers to return.182  The 




There exists no simple method of verifying fixed nitrogen capacities—or other 
sectors for that matter—other than by examining the rebound of fixed nitrogen processing 
in western Germany after 1945.  This task seems dogged by a host of issues.  Industrialists 
that wanted to reorganize their production facilities in the immediate postwar period 
experienced a variety of obstacles.  Production suffered from severe shortages in basic 
commodities such as coal—the basis of more than just the chemicals and steel industries.  
For this reason, chemical plants could only initiate the synthetic production of fertilizer on a 
small scale in the immediate months following German defeat.183  However, levels of 
output do not necessarily indicate capacities.  Other factors restricted economic 
performance to varying degrees.  The imprisonment and trial of technocrats responsible for 
organizing nitrogen production might have played role.  Christian Schneider and Ernst 
Buergin, two industrial specialists that managed I.G. Farben’s nitrogen production during 
the war, received minimal sentences or none at all for their efforts in managing Hitler’s war 
industries.184  Historians cannot however attribute the drop in productivity exclusively to 
strategic bombing.  The phenomenal growth in western German output, described in 
ensuing chapters, illustrates that certain U.S.S.B.S. authors mistakenly concluded from the 
1945 fall in output that capacities burned away in the bombing. 
Table 3: German Munitions Output185 
 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 
Airplanes (Nos.) 10,250 11,030 14,700 25,220 37,950 
Guns (Nos.) - - 1,378,900 2,063,100 2,639,200 
Infantry Munistions  
(Million Cartridges) - - 1,336 3,102 4,384 
Light Flak (Nos.) - - 12,000 15,400 28,400 
Munitions (Tons) 865,000 540,000 1,270,000 2,558,000 3,350,000 
Tanks (Nos.) 1,643 3,790 6,180 12,063 19,002 
 
The bomber offensive did not even significantly affect the production of armaments 
until the Allied armies flooded into Germany.  Owing mainly to the Allied failure to target 
especially sensitive sectors of the German military industrial system, as pointed out, the 
production of select armaments actually increased dramatically.186  The Allied inspection 
teams also discovered that German factories maintained larger stocks of materials than their 
British counterparts during the end phase of the conflict.187  This strategy, undertaken to 
limit the impact of bombing on transportation targets and therefore enable production under 




“encourage” a decisive result.  The stocks survived even when the railway nodes did not.  
The strategic bombing planners could only focus on a select range of targets and by 
definition could not reduce the entire infrastructure to a heap of rubble.  Noble Frankland 
points out that this “indeed is one of the rare occasions when a general historical assertion 
can be substantially proved by statistical evidence”.188  These statistics cast doubt on any 
truly significant wartime elimination of industrial capacities other than by the physical 
seizure of factories. 
2.6 Urban Bombing and the Misunderstanding of the “Wasteland” 
A general view that the strategic bombing campaign would seriously affect the 
future administration of occupied Germany took hold in late 1944.  These concerns 
intensified as German cities and their inhabitants “reaped the whirlwind” in 1945.189  
Dresden symbolized that change.  The combined forces of Bomber Command and the 8th 
Air Force struck Dresden for the third time during the war in mid-February 1945.  In 
keeping with strategic bombing doctrine, the three-day air bombardment of the city aimed 
at more than lowering German fighting resolve.  Certain accounts of the military operation 
discount any “outstanding” military industrial potential.190  Allied planners nevertheless 
took aim at Dresden—like other cities—in order to pulverize a host of dual-use facilities 
such as optical goods manufacturing.191  The air forces assembled a massive armada.  The 
combined Anglo-American force of 1,299 bombers was dispatched from the safety of bases 
in Britain and the aircrews smacked 3,906.9 tons of explosives onto the target.  The 
concentrated effort unleashed a firestorm that swept through the city and destroyed 85 
percent of the city, including slaughterhouses and utilities, and killed approximately 25,000 
people.   
Table 4: Allied Aerial Bombardments of the Seven Largest German Cities192 
City Population (1939) American Tonnage British Tonnage Total Tonnage 
Berlin 4,339,000 22,090.3 45,517 67,607.3 
Hamburg 1,129,000 17,104.6 22,583 39,687.6 
Munich 841,000 11,471.4 7,858 27,110.9 
Cologne 772,000 10,211.2 34,712 44,923.2 
Leipzig 707,000 5,410.4 6,206 11,616.4 
Essen 667,000 1,518.0 36,420 37,938.0 
Dresden 642,000 4,441.2 2,659.3 7,100.5 
 
The bombing tonnage thrown against Dresden in one raid, a city that 




entire American wartime effort against the German chemicals industry.  When seen in 
conjunction with other city raids, such as Berlin, Hamburg or Munich, the surprising 
emphasis on destroying the periphery of the German armaments industry or the city centres 
becomes apparent.  Scores of other cities shared a similar fate to that of Dresden.  Berlin, 
Hamburg, Munich, Cologne, Leipzig and Essen joined the list of the largest urban centres 
obliterated by airpower.  The list of additional cities and villages attacked is far too large to 
list here.  These “smaller” operations however proved equally remorseless.  A raid on the 
small city of Pforzheim in February 1945, for example, dropped 1,554 tons and killed 
approximately 20,000 of the original 65,000 inhabitants.193 
 But the Dresden operation induced a response among the western Allies that 
differed from that of other cities.  The bombing of this Saxon city in mid-February 1945 
motivated Churchill for example to question the validity of further strategic bombing 
operations.  The prime minister informed the British Chief of Air Staff Charles Portal on 28 
March 1945 that the destruction of Dresden “remains a serious query against the conduct of 
Allied bombing”.194  The prime minister, while in agreement with Harris throughout the 
war in that he “wanted German cities pulverised”, expressed doubts concerning the 
continuation of the terror campaign in a minute to the Chiefs of Staff and argued that the 
“moment has come when the question of bombing German cities simply for the sake of 
increasing the terror, though under other pretexts, should be revised…The destruction of 
Dresden remains a serious query against the conduct of Allied bombing”.195  Churchill 
might have had his eyes fixed on more than just the morality of air offensive.  On 1 April 
1945 he demanded a review of strategic bombing to analyse the doctrine “from the point of 
view of our own interests”.196  While Churchill’s doubts did not alter the course of the 
bombing campaign, and the systematic destruction of German cities continued unabated 
until the cessation of hostilities, his concerns foreshadowed a mindset that characterized 
postwar observations of Germany. 
Dresden fomented a similar response among Americans. The press seized on the 
bombing of the Saxon city and presented the public with a depiction of a merciless 
campaign of terror against the German people.  This press offensive forced the War 
Department onto the defensive and the air commanders scrambled to justify the operation to 
the Government and the public.  The U.S.S.A.F. headquarters in Europe cabled Washington 
and reiterated the standard doctrine that, while doctrine did not tolerate the bombing of 
civilian targets, the city had been destroyed in accordance with the policy of reducing 




bombing methods accepted in the 1930s and refined during the war.  This position 
coincided with the impression of high-ranking British officers such as Harris and Arthur 
Tedder who defended the destruction of Dresden with the view that these attacks “will 
hamper movement of reinforcements from other fronts”.197 
Here lies the ethical dilemma for scholars attempting to explain the bombing 
inferno.  Certain historians, while acknowledging the distasteful aspects of the bombing, 
somewhat simplistically argue that the evil nature of Nazi Germany justified all efforts at 
destroying that state’s ability to wage war.198  Jörg Friedrich on the other hand condemns 
the bombing of German cities as an act of equivalent moral abandon to that of the Nazi use 
of slave labour.  Friedrich points out that the Allied demoralization policy did not make any 
distinctions and actually targeted foreign labourers inside the industrial regions and not just 
the “enemy”.  The slave labourers “bildete einen Großteil des Industrieproletariats, welches 
Churchill und Harris als Demoralisierungs-objekt im Visier hatten”.199  However, Friedrich 
and the proponents of what might be termed the “blank check” school fail to come to grips 
with the impact of the long historical development of the bombing doctrine on the military 
and political decision-making process.  This doctrine predated both the war and the rise of 
Hitler.  John Terraine offers a less spectacular but more plausible explanation.  He explains 
that the “intense desire to bring the whole business to an end as quickly as possible” 
strengthened Allied resolve to bomb Germany into submission.200  This simple notion, built 
on a brutal prewar doctrine, pervaded prewar and wartime intensions. 
Without unduly entering the moral debate concerning strategic bombing doctrine, it 
is wise to recall that the airpower advocates viewed urban centers as a legitimate target long 
before 1939.  These pundits consistently demanded the obliteration of the opposing 
economic infrastructure, ranging from the human worker to the physical sinews of 
industrial power, in pursuit of decisive victory.  The final months of the war offered the 
strategic bombing forces nearly perfect conditions for proving their theories.  Bomber 
Command and the 8th Air Force repeatedly struck their targets without opposition from 
enemy fighters or an increasingly disorganized and blooded ground defence.  The sorties 
increased to the highest levels during the war.  During the four months of operations in 
1945, Bomber Command alone dropped over 181,000 tons of bombs, or one-fifth of the 
aggregate for the whole war, on their targets.  Doctrine at this point doomed the men and 
women on the ground to a fight for survival.  The conceptual fusion of civilian and military 
industrial sectors into a single apparatus more than legitimized the destruction of cathedrals 




facilities.  Only 0.7 percent of the 1945 total fell on industrial installations and the bulk of 
the bombs struck the cities—the so-called transportation targets—instead.201  The 
distinctions between combatant and non-combatant, the distinction between military and 
civilian, vanished prior to and during the war.  “The Bombing Survey concluded that all 
evidence indicates that the destruction of power generating and switching installations 
would have had a catastrophic effect on Germany's war production. The survey might have 
added that it would have had a catastrophic effect on Germany's civilian economy and 
social structure as well”.202  That last sentence, written by one of the architects of the 
bombing effort after 1945, was indicative of the return to more civilized concerns in the 
postwar.  The distinction between civilian and military could not as easily be ignored during 
the peacetime occupation of Germany.  The outcome of aerial demilitarization, in targeting 
the entirety of the urban infrastructure, therefore affected postwar calculations whether 
acknowledged by the planners or not. 
The charred ruins of cities spanning Hitler’s Reich, from Kiel to Munich and from 
Aachen to Königsberg, encouraged the promotion of a conclusion that did not square with 
Galbraith’s results.  Emphasis lay on the morale amongst average Germans.  Even prior to 
the end of the conflict, American propagandists aimed at breaking the will to resist by 
stressing in pamphlets dropped from the sky that “the progressive destruction of industries” 
would mean the “indefinite postponement of all hopes of German economic recovery”.203  
For the most part, as argued in the U.S.S.B.S. final report, about 85 percent of civilians did 
regard the war as lost by July 1944.204  Civilians could not know that the rubble heaps of 
houses and piles of civilian dead did not affect the armaments industry.  The survivors 
continued to work and the worsening morale did not affect production or productive 
capacities.  How could it have?  A bewildered Harris concluded in the postwar that “morale 
bombing was completely ineffective against so well organized a police state as 
Germany”.205  No totalitarian state, no matter how ruthless and disciplined, can produce 
armaments without a functioning military industrial system.  Hitler understood this point 
precisely.  In his last official speech to his subjects on 8 November 1943, the dictator spoke 
of the negligible impact on industry.  “It does not in the least prevent our weapons 
production”, he explained, “from continually increasing”.206  Harris and the U.S.S.B.S. 
teams—other than that of Galbraith—continued to measure bombing effectiveness in terms 
of armaments output even long after railway nodes and houses became the primary targets. 
The physical damage to European and particularly German urban centres, 




slaughter” and cultivated the impression that the “economic infrastructure of Europe had 
ceased to exist”.207  The bombers struck the cities so often that the only appreciable result 
was, to use a phrase later uttered by Churchill in connection with nuclear warfare, to make 
the rubble bounce.  Millions of homeless people wandered through this rubble—estimated 
at over 400 million cubic metres in Germany alone.208  Whole cities such as Goch, Julich or 
Xanten vanished.  Almost every German city suffered some form of destruction.  Only one-
third of the houses in Cologne, Dresden, Kassel and Dortmund still stood when the 
bombing stopped.  The high explosives had destroyed over 40 percent of all housing in 
Germany.209  Most of the bridges lay in ruin, one-third of the railway network was twisted 
and impassable, thousands of sunken barges and ships obstructed rivers and ports.  The 
infrastructure appeared in tatters.210 
A week after VE-Day, a Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force 
(S.H.A.E.F.) officer, Colonel Joe Starnes, initiated a fact-finding mission in Germany.  
Starnes travelled two thousand miles across Germany to discuss postwar conditions with 
the “spearhead Military Government units”.  Destitution characterized the wide expanse.  
He reported that “[m]ore than 20 million Germans are homeless or without adequate 
shelter.  The average basic ration is less than 1,000 calories.  The ability to wage war in this 
generation has been destroyed'“.211  This conclusion speaks volumes about the perceived 
results of strategic bombing and the nature of fighting in the world war.  The destroyed 
houses developed into a tool to measure military capacities. 
 Most contemporary Allied and German experts agreed with Starnes and viewed the 
future of German industry with considerable pessimism.  Carl Goerdeler, executed for his 
role in the July 1944 uprising against Hitler, contended in July 1943 after witnessing the 
results of bombing raids in western Germany that reconstruction would occupy “many 
generations”.212  Allied military personnel, policymakers and the press generally agreed.  
War correspondent Leonard Mosley described Hanover as “a wound in the earth rather than 
a city”.213  William Shirer, visiting Nuremberg at the end of the war as an American foreign 
correspondent, recorded in his diary that “It is gone! The lovely medieval town behind the 
moat is utterly destroyed.  It is a vast heap of rubble, beyond description, and beyond hope 
of rebuilding.  As the prosaic U.S. army puts it, Nuremberg is '91 percent dead.'  The old 
town, I should say, the old Nuremberg of Duerer and Hans Sachs and the Meistersingers is 
99 percent 'dead'“.214  Churchill, in particular, continually referred to the destruction of 
Europe during the postwar.  As late as 1947, despite considerable efforts at reconstruction, 




ground of pestilence and hate”.215  Financial experts in the British Zone alleged in 
November 1945 that wartime destruction returned the German economy “back to the 
beginnings of industrialisation”.216  Another British officer described the cities as 
“Pompeiis petrified by the volcano of modern war”.217  Various calculations determined 
that Germans alone required sixteen years to clear the rubble of Berlin. 218  Colonel John W. 
Wheeler from the American Corps of Engineers convinced Secretary of State Edward R. 
Stettinius on 9 April 1945 that Allied strategic bombing had completely destroyed the Ruhr 
industrial heartland.219  Not even Galbraith was immune.  On entering Germany, he 
recorded that “[n]ot until one got to Cologne, Hamburg, Frankfurt or Berlin did one see 
cities in which every building was an empty, roofless shell.  For me they remained an 
utterly sickening sight”.220 
The flood of eyewitness accounts in Germany intentionally or unintentionally 
reinforced the interpretation of strategic bombing as a decisive weapon.  American 
politicians experienced the destruction firsthand.  Harry S. Truman, having witnessed the 
carnage of World War I as an artillery officer in the trenches of France and influenced by 
the cultural memories of the South’s demise in the American Civil War, proclaimed during 
a short drive from Potsdam to Berlin in July 1945, that “I never saw such destruction!”.221  
A young John F. Kennedy accompanied Navy Secretary James Forrestal in a visit to 
postwar Germany in the summer of 1945.  The future president, influenced by the Navy’s 
negative interpretation of strategic bombing’s results, summarized in his diary prior to the 
visit that “the bombing of Germany was not effective”.  He soon changed his mind.  
Kennedy strolled through Berlin and afterwards recorded the typical impressions that 
conflicted with the sterile statistics collected concerning German industry.  “The 
devastation is complete”, he wrote, “Unter den Linden and the streets are relatively clear, 
but there is not a single building which is not gutted.  On some of the streets the stench—
sweet and sickish from dead bodies—is overwhelming”.222 
American reactions to the strategic bombing campaign, from the President 
downwards, therefore focused on the visible destruction of cities and supported the 
viewpoint of airpower enthusiasts that not much remained of German industry.  Not only 
did the Air Force strive to cultivate this general appreciation of airpower’s role in 
destroying industrial equipment, but the generals also paradoxically used this argument to 
sanitize their careers by virtue of the fictitious conclusion.  The need to defeat Nazism 




reputational pressures” intertwined and warped perspectives concerning the fate of German 
industry.223 
Others looked on the apparent success of the bombing campaign as a justification of 
precision bombing.  The 1950 Royal Air Force (R.A.F.) War Manual claimed that aerial 
bombing was “the determining factor in modern war.  The three services today are wholly 
interdependent and must be modelled in a pattern which is primarily determined by the air 
factor”.224  The “basic weapon” of air power remained the bomber.  British air strategists 
now viewed strategic bombing as the “twentieth-century successors to the Royal Navy, 
with the implication that the RAF's role was to preserve British power and autonomy”.225  
The prewar process continued on both sides of the Atlantic.  High-ranking American 
military personnel even failed to grasp that the bombing of transportation targets and not 
direct attacks on industry paralyzed the enemy’s industry and military.  As part of ten 
“fundamental principles of air power”, Henry Harley Arnold argued that “we must carry 
our strategic precision bombing to key targets, deep in the enemy territory, such as airplane 
factories, oil refineries, steel mills, aluminum plants, submarine pens, Navy yards, etc”.226  
The airpower pundits primarily employed this conclusion to rationalize the further 
expansion of the strategic bombing forces in the postwar.  This form of argumentation 
seemed self-serving in nature.  The American military faced significant restructuring during 
the early postwar period.  The jostling for reduced resources and influence during 
demobilization required that the air power pundits justify continued expenditures on the 
expensive bombers. 
Paul Nitze, the normally analytical and pragmatic Wall Street banker, gave 
evidence of anomalous thinking in judging the success of strategic bombing by coming to 
the rescue of the bomber.  Nitze had collected considerable experience in wartime 
economic matters on the Board of Economic Warfare and in the Foreign Economic 
Administration during most of the war prior to becoming director of the U.S.S.B.S. in 
autumn 1944.  An avid supporter of conventional bombing, he understood that the 
expansion of a nuclear force would minimize reliance on orthodox methods.  Nuclear 
weapons, the quintessential fulfillment of saturation bombing, threatened to eliminate the 
need for mass bombers.  Nitze attempted to shield the Air Force by downplaying the 
devastating effects of nuclear weapons.  The weapons dropped by two solitary aircraft on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki had the theoretical equivalent explosive power of hundreds of 
fully laden bombers.  Despite the apocalyptic destruction of the two Japanese cities, 




reached by Galbraith in Germany.  Residual infrastructure, Nitze pointed out, survived the 
nuclear blast.  City officials for example were able to organize the relatively swift recovery 
of railway transportation owing to the survival of the track lines.227  This conclusion, from 
the perspective of Nitze, indicated that nuclear weapons could not completely eliminate all 
aspects of an economic infrastructure.  Conventional precision bombing was needed to 
bolster the deterrent effect of the new weapon.228 
This illogical argument was built on the largely correct assumption that 
conventional airpower could paralyse the industrial infrastructure of a state without recourse 
to total annihilation.  The U.S.S.B.S., later bolstered by a large number of postwar memoirs, 
concluded that “even without the atomic bombing attacks, air supremacy over Japan could 
have exerted sufficient pressure to bring about unconditional surrender and obviate the need 
for invasion”.229  Part of the reason for this viewpoint stemmed from the Navy’s 
accusations of Air Force immorality—itself an argument aiming at undermining political 
support for a rival branch of the military.  In reflecting on the ultimate strategic weapon of 
mass destruction and the employment of nuclear weapons against Japan, Admiral William 
Leahy, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1945 and a close personal friend of Truman, 
wrote in his 1950 memoir “It is my opinion that the use of this barbarous weapon at 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan.  The 
Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender”.230  None of the parties involved 
seemed to understand that the conventional raids against Tokyo or Dresden did not 
markedly differ from nuclear immolation.  The technology of the period limited the results 
of precision bombing strikes and in fact did not markedly differ from a nuclear blast.  The 
air pundits nonetheless returned to the prewar tactic of trumpeting the ability of the bomber 
to demilitarize an opposing state through the destruction of industrial facilities. 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter began with a look at the development of strategic bombing doctrine 
and stressed that a major problem rested in an inability to find an accurate distinction 
between civilian and military industries.  The pursuit of victory from the air depended, a 
host of theorists originally proclaimed, on severely reducing the enemy’s capacity to 
produce armaments.  The course of the war, as depicted by those granted the authority to 
judge the bombing offensive, illustrated that the bomber operated as a blunt weapon against 
specific military industrial targets such as machine-tools.  For a host of reasons such as the 
intricacy of modern industrial systems and German industrial resiliency, the Anglo-Saxon 




That the air war ultimately reduced productive output was a consequence of the shift in 
emphasis against dual-use synthetic oil installations and urban targets such as railway 
nodes.  The U.S.S.B.S. conclusions do not focus on the difficult issue of destroyed or 
damaged machine-tools.  Galbraith’s analyses had shown that the war years witnessed a 
significant increase in this area.  The results instead focused on the number of “factory 
workers” killed, the severe reduction in gasoline output and the shrinking of German 
railway volume by 75 percent.231 
The U.S.S.B.S. interpretation of the enemy’s industrial breakdown ultimately took 
the destruction of machine-tools and industrial equipment for granted even though no 
evidence suggested that this was the case.  Scholars seem drawn to this inconsistency.  
“Germany was a surrealist tableau of disasters”, Douglas Botting explains, “a land of ruins 
peopled by ghosts, without government, order or purpose, without industry, 
communications or the proper means of existence.  It was a nation that…had sunk to a level 
unknown in the western world for a hundred years”.232  Botting’s literary remarks 
demonstrate a speculative link between the bombed and burning houses and a 
disappearance of industry.  Certain historians seem constrained to adhere to this postwar 
observation.233  Terraine argued in a more sophisticated manner that the bombing of 
transportation targets “constituted a haemorrhage which drained the life-blood of German 
industry and armed forces alike” and that “the bomber offensive did huge damage to the 
German war machine”.234  Overy credits the bombing effort with having sharply limited the 
expansion of Germany's wartime production.235  Alfred E. Hurley and Robert C. Ehrhart 
even extrapolated that “enemy planes enjoying control of the sky over one's head can be as 
disastrous to one's country as its occupation by physical invasion”.236  These interpretations 
seem bound to the final U.S.S.B.S. assessments that the bomber could single-handedly get 
through to the target and pulverize the opposing nation into submission.237 
 This chapter demonstrated that the sinews of the German dual-use 
industrial system survived the war largely intact.  Analysing what remained of the enemy’s 
industrial infrastructure after the extensive bombing campaign signified an important step in 
establishing the contours of an occupation policy.  The efforts of the U.S.S.B.S. study 
groups represented much more than an academic analysis of air power’s effectiveness in 
defeating Nazism.  The successful administration of the zones of occupation, the 
composition of a rational reparations concept and the transformation of postwar Germany 
into a demilitarized and democratic state required precise knowledge of all aspects of 




levels of destruction foreshadowed the subsequent difficulties experienced by all parties 
involved in the administration of postwar Germany.  A lack of clarity characterized these 
policy attitudes.  Nowhere was this confusion more evident than in viewpoints expressed 
concerning the urban landscape.  A broad and unfortunately incorrect assumption that 
industrial strength burned away in the fires of war accompanied the urgent need to rebuild 
Europe.  The first calls for a moderation of Allied postwar policy, explored in subsequent 
chapters, occurred in connection with the observation that the victors required German 
industry, but that much of the enemy’s manufacturing system lay in ruins.238 
CHAPTER 3  
 
The Origins of Industrial Demilitarization 
 
Germany is not to be occupied for the purpose of liberation but as a defeated enemy 
nation. 
 




In a host of policy papers and open declarations, outlined in this chapter, 
Washington and Moscow agreed to dismantle and destroy the entire German military 
industrial complex to help facilitate European economic recovery and permanently end the 
perceived German menace to international stability.  This confluence of general economic 
and security objectives in Germany appeared to offer the unique opportunity of founding a 
new peaceful and thriving international system based on a radical reorganization of German 
society.  Washington however failed to formulate a specific program of demilitarization 
despite the apparent clarity of the policy priorities in postwar Germany.  This chapter 
demonstrates how the historiography interprets the will to change German society to 
include a workable and functioning industrial demilitarization policy.  Considerable 
concerns that the strategic bombing might invalidate wartime conceptual formulations 
surfaced during the planning phase of the occupation.  The War and State Departments 
responded by watering down a more pungent definition of industrial demilitarization.  The 
initial stage of industrial demilitarization planning only offered the barest and most 
simplistic of concepts. 
3.2 Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Policies and the German Future 
Roosevelt only agreed to list the basic outline of a postwar policy concerning 
Germany built largely on unconditional surrender.  Various core ideas concerning the future 
of a defeated Germany nevertheless reverberated throughout Washington and rang clearer 
near war’s end.  Two basic currents of thought ran though the heads of policymakers.  The 
victors would first of all address the immediate problems of punishing war criminals and 
destroying all armaments to help assure the death of Nazism and enforce the complete 
surrender of the enemy’s military forces.  The occupying troops would secondly wipe out 
the spiritual and physical elements of militarism through comprehensive occupation and the 




directions, the concrete form, would wait for the cessation of hostilities and the tightening 
grip of Allied authority over the defeated population. 
Historians generally contend that pragmatism characterized Roosevelt’s 
conceptions of a world emerging from war.  The debate concerning the ideological or 
pragmatic nature of the president’s thinking should not mask his determination to defeat 
Nazism at all costs.2  Military priorities took precedence over postwar political 
considerations.  Roosevelt, who dominated American policy formulation until his death in 
1945,3 believed that only the strength of American arms in conjunction with the Allies 
could overcome Hitler.  The president proclaimed to the American people on 3 January 
1940, a year prior to the entry of the United States in the war against Germany and the 
ensuing furious mobilization of industrial strength, that the United States would act as a 
“potent and active factor in seeking the reestablishment of world peace”.4  Roosevelt longed 
to actively participate in the struggle and understandably placed a premium on military 
strategy and effectiveness at the expense of certain postwar matters.  The president left the 
fighting to the professionals and only seldom intervened in military decisions for political 
reasons.5  “We must not relax our pressure on the enemy by taking time out to define every 
boundary and settle every political controversy in every part of the world”, he instructed the 
American people during the summer of 1943, the “all-important thing now is to get on with 
the war and to win it”.6  The president’s clear focus on victory undoubtedly pleased the 
generals. 
Roosevelt’s effort to forge an effective American military changed the substance of 
the nation.  The president’s keen interest in military preparations and advocacy of the need 
for armed muscle in international relations illustrated a shift away from pacifistic 
withdrawal to an active role built on more traditional concepts.  In 1939, in preparation for 
the war ahead, Roosevelt ordered the military service chiefs to bypass the normal chain of 
command and report directly to the White House.7  A new structure emerged.  The coming 
war took precedence over civilian matters normally left to the State Department and the 
military gained a permanent voice in foreign and military policy.  Roosevelt militarized 
policy formulation and execution.  The president’s administrative style, according to 
Hogan, cemented a system that “institutionalized the National Military Establishment as a 
major rival to the State Department in the field of foreign policy”.8 
The president nevertheless adapted the Wilsonian utopian vision and offered the 
world the hope of a brighter future even before the fires of war engulfed the United States.  




of Wales” near Newfoundland during the summer of 1941.  In an eight-point declaration 
devoted to the establishment of a new world order, the two leaders broadcast a global 
crusade against Nazi injustice and the eventual replacement of tyranny with the guaranteed 
rights of national independence, territorial integrity and the unhindered access to raw 
materials.9  Cordell Hull later announced by radio in 1944 that the charter represented “an 
expression of fundamental objectives toward which we and our Allies are directing our 
policies.  It lays down the common principles upon which rest the hope of liberty, economic 
opportunity, peace and security through international cooperation”.10  The non-Axis world 
responded enthusiastically.  The new United Nations, meeting in January 1942, accepted 
the charter (and the defeat of Germany) as the basis of a postwar order.11  Roosevelt 
cultivated the outward appearance of an anti-imperialist throughout the war and instructed 
Congress in 1945 that he would help tear down the traditional systems of “unilateral action, 
the exclusive alliances, the spheres of influence, the balances of power, and all the other 
expedients that have been tried for centuries – and have always failed”.12 
The evidence suggests that Roosevelt composed the charter for largely 
propagandistic purposes in order to mask his plan of militarily dominating the global 
community after war’s end.  The president suggested to Churchill in August 1941 that the 
democratic Anglo-Saxon powers should “police” the postwar world.13  This concept lay 
behind the eventual decision to form a Security Council in the United Nations composed of 
a small number of militarily strong or large states ready to pull together and smash all 
opposition to the “general will” of the global community.  But the new council, in 
determining the direction of policy through a veto and in establishing the foundations of the 
new world administrative body, by definition violated the anti-imperialist and anti-
traditional proclamations of the president.  Roosevelt clung to a new militarized course. 
  Another policy decision influenced the decision to police the globe.  The documents 
illustrate that a vague conception of a disarmed Germany also predated the American 
descent into war.  Roosevelt stressed that a new and peaceful international order depended 
on the “disarmament of aggressors” and not a guarantee of self-determination.14  Early 
thinking advanced the general concept of neutralizing and eliminating all aspects of Axis 
military and political strength.  State policy therefore fused with military exigencies and 
aimed at rendering the enemy powerless.  Historians generally assert that the charter itself 
laid the foundation of a plan for waging war against Germany.15  This policy injected a 
military maxim deep into postwar political considerations.  The Anglo-Saxon agreement 




changes through the eradication of military strength and control from without.  The future 
peace settlement, seen in these terms, therefore continued the war against Germany for an 
unspecified period after hostilities subsided and the guns fell silent. 
Roosevelt’s postwar policy, contrary to traditional viewpoints, addressed the 
question of Germany in a clear and comprehensive manner.  These conceptions did not 
significantly depart from those of other powers.  French thinking for example pursued a 
foreign policy designed to maximize the French leadership position in Europe unrivalled by 
a Germany to be kept weak and divided.16  Roosevelt’s military utilitarianism only 
superficially masked a strong belief that world peace required the permanent elimination of 
German power.  “Our objective in handling Germany is simple”, Roosevelt declared in the 
final days of the war, “it is to secure the peace of the rest of the world now and in the 
future”.17  Peace demanded a restructuring of German society to permanently remove the 
sinews of strength that had permitted it to challenge the other great powers. 
Roosevelt’s primitive policy, in a manner similar to the strategic bombing theory of 
decisively disarming the enemy, discarded all of the complexities of the modern era and 
reduced a complex problem to a simple matter of total destruction.  Political and military 
calculations merged.  The wartime annihilation of the German military and industrial 
system promised victory and the establishment of a new order.  The razing of German cities 
guaranteed victory and peace for all time.  Unconditional surrender, seen from this 
perspective, underlined the reality that Roosevelt sought a radical solution based on total 
victory.  The president informed the head of the Polish exile government that “We do not 
intend to finish this war by an armistice or treaty.  Germany must surrender 
unconditionally”.18 
Considering Roosevelt’s support of strategic bombing during wartime, it is hardly 
surprising that the president backed a range of hard actions against the German population 
after war’s end.  Deliberations with Soviet representatives and with Josef Stalin himself 
demonstrate how Roosevelt contradicted his own rejection of traditional politics and instead 
illustrate the ease with which he sacrificed whole populations in order to cement the 
wartime alliance system.  The dominant interpretation that Roosevelt traded land for peace, 
while generally persuasive, requires minor adaptation.  The president’s commitment to the 
basic principal that the world’s nations be “masters of their destiny” did not form the basis 
of inter-Allied deliberations concerning German postwar boundaries and national 
sovereignty.19  Roosevelt recognized the importance of traditional great power policy 




as a basis for a future German postwar policy or a general postwar settlement.21  Western 
sanctioning of massive territorial adjustments in favour of the Soviet Union, their own 
wartime military operations, and the defence of colonialism, however, indicate the 
propaganda nature of the Atlantic Charter and the complexity of U.S. propaganda in 
general.  The American executive considered it easier to convince its domestic population 
and foreigners of the rightness of a chosen foreign policy path using humanistic virtues than 
hope for the acceptance of that policy on the naked logic of self interest. 
Roosevelt, as explained later in the chapter, did not necessarily advocate the 
destruction of the German population.  The president focused on the sinews of power.  
“[T]hat peace can come to the world only by the total elimination of German and Japanese 
war power”, he stated at a press conference on 24 January 1943, “means the unconditional 
surrender by Germany, Italy and Japan…It does not mean the destruction of the populations 
of Germany, Italy or Japan”.22 
A workable postwar order, from Roosevelt’s perspective, demanded Soviet 
compliance.23  Roosevelt seemed unwilling to consider a reconstruction of non-Soviet 
European strength.  Whitehall strongly supported the reconstruction of Poland and France 
as a measure to enhance continental European power and control Germany.  Roosevelt 
opposed the British plan on the grounds of practicality and handed Stalin an enlarged 
empire spanning Europe and Asia.  A host of nations and states paid a heavy price for 
Soviet cooperation.  Roosevelt ignored the human tragedies accompanying Stalin's attacks 
on Poland, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Rumania and thrust out a helping hand 
to the Soviet Union immediately after the German invasion eastwards in June 1941.24  In 
exchange for a vague promise to enter the war against Japan after the end of hostilities in 
Europe at Yalta,25 leading to the Soviet invasion of Japanese territory on 8 August 1945, 
Roosevelt and Churchill granted Stalin control over Manchuria, much of Mongolia, and the 
Japanese Kuril Islands and southern Sakhalin.26  Stalin's grip on Kurdistan, Azerbeijan, 
Gilan, Mazanderan, Gorgan and Khorasan in the Middle East simultaneously tightened.  
The British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden remarked coolly that Roosevelt “seemed to see 
himself disposing of the fate of many lands, allied no less than enemy.  He did all this with 
so much grace that it was difficult to dissent.  Yet it was too like a conjurer, skilfully 
juggling with balls of dynamite, whose nature he failed to understand”.27  The large 
increase of Soviet power met with Roosevelt’s approval. 
Roosevelt refused to jeopardize the wartime Grand Alliance and work towards the 




Roosevelt argued in a clear rejection of the Atlantic Charter, “is that such steps as are 
practicable should be taken to insure against the Balkans getting us into a future 
international war”.28  In order to cultivate the amiable relations with the Soviet Union 
deemed of  paramount importance for lasting peace, Byrnes as late as 1946 justified the 
imposition of “governments friendly to the Soviet Union in eastern and central Europe” and 
beyond.29  By trading land for the solidity of the alliance in order to assure the war’s 
outcome, Roosevelt’s pragmatism indicated a distasteful acceptance of traditional power 
politics even though historians generally describe American policy as “anti-imperial”.30  
The wartime president tolerated the wide extension of Stalin’s empire during the war.  He 
believed that cooperation with the leaders of the Soviet Union remained a vital future 
prerequisite for postwar peace and stability.31  Roosevelt therefore introduced a new 
European states system.  Two states outside of the traditional European order, the Soviet 
Union and the United States, would dominate Europe and maintain the peace. 
3.3 The Hard Soviet Peace and German Pastoralization 
Stalin unquestionably shared Roosevelt’s emphasis on postwar security.  The 
horrors of Hitler’s war underlined the needs for absolute national security to avert a 
repetition of such a cataclysmic event.  The German military occupied roughly 1,926,000 
square kilometres of Soviet territory during the course of the war.  85 million people or 50 
percent of the population lived in the region, the heartland of the Soviet Union, prior to the 
invasion.  More than 20 million Soviet soldiers and civilians fell repelling Nazism.  The 
Soviet cities and countryside burned. 
In 1941, reeling under the pressure of German arms and receiving reports of 
atrocities in the occupied areas, the dictator acknowledged the radical nature of the war.  
“Well, if the Germans want a war of extermination”, he informed a group of Soviet leaders 
on 6 November 1941, “they will get it”.32  This hard perspective, a fusion of hard justice 
and national security concerns, influenced how the dictator viewed the future of German 
industrial facilities.  Stalin’s focus concentrated on removing another German threat to 
Soviet security by demanding an unprecedented shift in global trade and industrial patterns.  
Reparations, the central component or engine of Stalin’s postwar system, would weaken 
Germany and reinvigorate the Soviet Union.  Other roads to security, such as the erection of 
a global partnership or a European alliance system, mattered less.  The dictator only mutely 
acknowledged the president’s support of international organizations and the concept of 
collective security.  Stalin’s hopes for peace rested almost exclusively on the pillars of 




exaggerated sense of insecurity and fear,33 clearly diverged with western democratic 
policies. 
Crude Soviet calculations derived from simplistic observations of the interwar 
period hypothesized that the German state could potentially threaten the world in another 
generation.34  Previous chapters have demonstrated that a far higher percentage of German 
industrial potential survived the war intact than that dreamed possible by most western 
politicians.  The United States Strategic Bombing Survey reports did not however influence 
Moscow.  The Soviet perspective derived from the notion of a chronic German thirst for 
world domination.  Stalin stated in the final days of war that only the “naïve” could believe 
in lasting peace with Germany.  “It is common knowledge”, he professed, “that the German 
rulers are already making preparations for another war”.35  Only the removal of industrial 
potential and therefore military capacity, an obvious answer to the inveterate German 
challenge, promised peace.  Stalin therefore gravitated quickly towards the postwar model 
of demilitarization through deindustrialization. 
He even tinkered with permanent military occupation.36  The placement of Soviet 
troops on foreign soil or the extension of empire represented an important plank of Stalin’s 
postwar security system.  The conflict with Germany demonstrated the failure of a closed 
Soviet economic and political system to thwart foreign aggression.  While he expressed a 
subdued willingness to deepen wartime alliances, and a marginal interest in the United 
Nations, Stalin single-mindedly established a defensive ring or system of puppet buffer 
states on his borders.37  This strength by definition entailed the significant reduction of 
German power attributes as well as those of other neighbour states.  Stalin extended Soviet 
power outwards into the vacuums left behind by the retreating Wehrmacht and significantly 
increased the dimensions of the communist empire.38  Stalin clearly sacrificed any pretence 
of acknowledging public opinion, hardly a surprise considering the nature of the Soviet 
Union, and he sanctioned the communist domination of vast spaces on the fringes of his 
empire.  Stalin seemed convinced that Soviet security required the propulsion of his state to 
the status of dominant regional power in Europe.  While these activities did not indicate an 
aggressive push for world domination,39 an issue hotly debated in the western democracies 
later in the decade, the geographical extension of Soviet power in Europe indicated that 
Stalin discarded any pretence at erecting a postwar balance on the continent. How can the 
demand for dominion over eastern and central Europe be interpreted differently?  The 




This revolutionary change in Soviet European policy entailed severe ramifications 
for the German future.  A major downturn in German production capacities or even 
permanent control did not, Stalin believed, secure the Soviet position.  Betraying the heavy 
influence of Marxist theory and the importance of physical modes of production, Stalin 
targeted the totality of German industrial muscle.  The dictator clarified his interpretation of 
demilitarization at Teheran in December 1943 by defining economic disarmament as the 
dismantling of the entire industrial system including clock works and even furniture 
production.  Stalin accorded the latter examples with a military function since and correctly 
pointed out that they “can be converted into aircraft plants or bomb-fuse factories”.40  With 
this policy direction in mind, the assertion that Soviet policymakers followed the example 
of their western counterparts, in that they concerned themselves with control machinery and 
borders, rings hollow.  Stalin established a distinct argument concerning reparations that 
fused the future of German industrial facilities to Soviet national security.41  This argument, 
that virtually every element of the economy could be employed in raising armies, advocated 
the erasure of broad sweeps of industrial capacity if not in total. 
This definition of military industrial power conforms with that applied by Stalin to 
the Soviet Union itself in 1941 and 1942.  In order to deprive the enemy of an intact 
industrial and urban infrastructure, Stalin willingly plunged millions of his own citizens into 
destitution for the security of his empire.  “In case of a forced retreat of Red Army units”, 
Stalin instructed in July 1941, “all rolling stock must be evacuated; not a single engine, a 
single railway car, a single pound of grain or gallon of fuel must be left for the enemy. The 
collective farmers must drive off all their cattle and turn over their grain to the safekeeping 
of the state authorities for transportation to the rear. All valuable property, including non-
ferrous metals, grain and fuel that cannot be withdrawn, must be destroyed without fail.”42  
Soviet soldiers and workers, for example, dismantled and shipped the machine-tools and 
equipment of 550 large industrial installations and “thousands of small factories” from the 
Ukraine to safer regions in 1941.  The troops also planted explosives and detonated 
infrastructure such as bridges, warehouses and hydroelectric dams.43  The movement of 
industrial equipment in particular enabled the Soviet authorities to secure four-fifths of the 
aircraft industry and 61.7 percent of the tanks planned for 1941 rolling off the assembly 
lines despite German interference.44  It is safe to assume that the bulk of the Soviet military 
industrial complex that mattered, the machines and the buildings, escaped the clutches of 




infrastructure left behind, underlines his wide definition of industrial power and the 
proclivity to think in grand and equally cold-blooded terms. 
But Stalin crafted his words to deflect attention from his plans for a Carthaginian 
peace.  The dictator like his allies focused on economic but also cultural disarmament.45  
Various public statements downplayed the complete destruction of German industry or 
even of military potential.  Time magazine provided the American people with a glimpse of 
Stalin’s postwar goals in 1943.  “Our aim”, Stalin suggested, “is not to destroy all armed 
force in Germany, because any intelligent man will understand that this is as impossible in 
the case of Germany as in the case of Russia. It would be unreasonable on the part of the 
victor to do so. To destroy Hitler’s army is possible and necessary”.46  The dictator even on 
occasion criticized the merits of political demilitarization and questioned whether a totally 
pacified German population helped strengthen Soviet national security.  Stalin stated on 6 
November 1942 that the eradication of all organized military power was “neither possible 
nor in the best interests of the victor”.47  German military formations under foreign control 
did not necessarily displease the dictator.  German industrial potential grabbed his interest. 
Some scholars theorize that Stalin appeared undecided on certain postwar issues 
such as the general treatment of German prisoners of war and the civilian population.  
Soviet policy in their estimation exhibited a fluidity and imprecision similar to that of the 
western Allies.48  Pennacchio’s research points out the dictator viewed the political and 
economic future of Germany as an unimportant issue until the Berlin Blockade of 1948 
convinced him to establish the contours of a future state.49  Wilfried Loth, Stefan 
Creuzberger, Kurt Arlt and Norman M. Naimark generally support this argument and note 
that Stalin failed to exercise strict control over the actions of the Soviet Military 
Administration in Germany (S.V.A.G.).50  They therefore acted in a disconcerted manner 
until the dictator took them by the hand.  The lack of a precise Soviet commitment to a 
concrete and uniform occupation policy, it is hypothesized, reflected a general lack of 
interest in formulating a consistent policy with the other occupation powers.  The Soviet 
occupation authorities therefore fluctuated between punitive policies aiming at punishing all 
of German society and ideologically motivated ones aiming at bringing those occupied into 
the communist fold. 
But German industry remained the constant focus of Stalin’s drive for security.  
Policy fluctuations on a minor scale did not impact the overall demand to extract enormous 
reparations of all types for Soviet rehabilitation and power enhancement.  There exists no 




chapters—unless scholars can stomach the conclusion that the Red Army befell eastern 
Germany entirely fortified by a mandate of vengeance.  Stalin’s pronouncements 
concerning the future security of his empire add sinister meaning to the activities of 
millions of his soldiers.  These activities, whether haphazard or not, underlined a real, 
logical and frightening policy.  Reparations operated as the principle means of rebuilding 
the Soviet Union and removing the German threat.51  Stalin undoubtedly, as British officials 
pointed out in the summer of 1945, established reparations as an “overriding principle” of 
Soviet policy.52 
Reparations also represented a clear method of direct military enhancement during 
the immediate postwar.  Scholastic explanations generally emphasize that the priorities of 
civilian reconstruction motivated the ruthless Soviet collection of reparations and drove the 
requests for more.  Recently published Soviet documents however reveal another 
dimension.  In conversations with Stalin in April and May 1946, meetings attended by 
Molototv and prominent Yugoslavian authorities, Tito requested “some machinery from 
Germany as reparations for the reconstruction of certain military factories”.53  Leonid 
Gibianskii points out that the Soviet military authorities in eastern Germany attempted to 
satisfy Yugoslavian “requests to the Soviet government for captured factories, workshops, 
and materials for the production of ammunition”.54  Stalin agreed with the use of German 
industry to expand and dramatically improve the military industrial systems of other 
communist client states as well as his own. 
Two important realities emphasize this point.  Unlike all other European states 
including Germany, the prewar and wartime Soviet economy devoted the greatest 
percentage of total industrial capacities to direct armaments production for the longest 
duration.  Preparations for war consumed 26.4 percent of state expenditures during the final 
years of the 5 Year Plan and this total soared to 43.4 percent during the final year of peace.  
But war preparations strained the domestic machine-tool industry to the limit.  The further 
concentration on armaments during the war bled the civilian sector of remaining capacities.  
Washington did provide Stalin with 44,600 machine-tools through the Lend-Lease 
arrangements, but this act of calculated generosity probably did not replace those damaged 
or seized by the Germans.  Official Soviet statistics record that the war damaged or 
destroyed approximately 32,000 industrial facilities.55  Irrespective of these losses–
considerable as they were, but impossible to verify in terms of numbers of machine-tools or 
comment on their size or modernity–a simple return to prewar conditions could not remedy 




sense of the word, never applied to the Soviet Union.  German reparations promised to 
solve the problems stemming from the colossal rearmament of the 1930s. 
But how could the removal of German productive capacities assist Soviet civilian 
recovery unless either the western powers accepted either that German machine-tools 
maintained an interchangeable quality or that they willingly accepted a considerable boost 
in Soviet military power?  Assuming the predominant western differentiation between 
military and civilian sectors, an hypothesis never shared by Hitler or Stalin, the provision of 
German military industrial capacities could only increase Soviet military strength during the 
disarmament phase.  Stalin’s concept of pastoralization resolved the problems of German 
military power, but from the western perspective could only benefit the Soviet civilian 
sector by removing the greater part of German industrial facilities from Germany. 
The historiography generally skips over the shift in power ratios implied in the 
transplantation of German military industrial facilities.  Later chapters test Stalin’s basic 
hypothesis that the movement of industry in general automatically benefited the postwar 
civilian Soviet economy.  For the moment it seems clear that the dictator thought beyond 
the creation of sufficient industrial strength to thwart another German invasion.  Soviet 
dependency on lend-lease during the war clearly identified the weakness of Soviet industry 
in relation to the United States.  Stalin also clearly understood that the American military 
industrial complex emerged from the war with abilities “vastly superior to those of the rest 
of the world combined”.56  Reparations seen from this perspective offered the possibility of 
closing the gap and regaining military industrial parity with his wartime ally.57 
Certain historians dismiss the cold and calculating nature of Stalin.  Geoffrey 
Roberts, an issue examined later in greater detail, suggests that Stalin ultimately aimed at 
the political stabilization and the economic recovery of Europe as whole.58  Others 
acknowledge Stalin’s hunger for power, but argue that the dictator’s search for parity with 
his neighbours demanded solid and lasting good relations with the United States.  In the 
opinion of Walter LaFeber, pointing to the dictator’s statesmanlike qualities and 
questioning standard arguments of his paranoia, Stalin realistically understood that a global 
power balance required a strong Soviet Union.59  The development of greater Soviet 
military industrial strength to match that of the United States required raw materials and 
particularly industrial resources.  Reparations represented the means to this end.  Stalin 
theoretically viewed the extraction of reparations as an “important stage in the development 
of a possible armed conflict with the American colossus”.60  But Stalin’s interpretation of 




for the purpose of enhancing the Soviet position against the United States, demonstrate an 
important postwar reality.  Stalin, unlike the western democracies, aimed at returning to his 
militant prewar plans of power enhancement.   
3.4 The Liberal-Capitalist Nature of Early American Occupation Policy 
Roosevelt held firmly to his belief that “political decisions should wait upon 
military victory” and gave evidence of a “general aversion to planning ahead” for the 
postwar.61  Planning by the State Department nevertheless progressed in straightforward 
fashion built on the assumption that the victorious powers would remain in Germany for a 
short period of time and swiftly transform that state according to a liberal-democratic 
agenda that stressed a limited measure of economic restructuring.  The president, despite his 
personal feelings and inclination towards a harsh peace, generally agreed.62  The president’s 
pragmatism and neglect to control the experts until September 1944 permitted the 
development of a basic outline that dealt with such issues as future boundaries, the 
occupation and control machinery, and at least a crude understanding of industrial 
demilitarization.63  Roosevelt’s unwillingness to bind his administration to the State 
Department’s preliminary work however hindered the creation of a clear statement of 
direction or program.  The military planners in particular lamented this development.  
“There is hardly another matter that rests fresher in the memories of officers prominently 
connected with planning the occupation”, the military concluded in hindsight, “than the 
uncertainties besetting their work on the side of political policy”.64  The American 
occupation forces carried vague plans in their pockets as they marched into a defeated 
Germany.   
The American foreign policy experts, working from a liberal-capitalist agenda, 
opposed large reparations according to their historical assessment of the interwar period.  
Reparations, in their estimation, had represented a destabilizing factor in Germany society 
that had swelled the ranks of extremist parties on left and right.  The Council on Foreign 
Relations more importantly argued that reparations might do greater harm than good to the 
postwar European economy.  These advocates of minor reparations influenced the men of 
the State Department.  Hull in 1943 advocated the seizure of produced goods and not the 
dismantling of factories or the movement of capital equipment.65  Even considerable Soviet 
pressure for massive reparations through dismantling, voiced vociferously at meetings 





Matters appeared much clearer prior to September 1944.  The American British and 
Russian delegates engaged in preliminary discussions concerning the basic contours of a 
future Germany and decided to establish a commission to generate recommendations.  
They authorized the European Advisory Commission (E.A.C.), set up at the next meeting in 
London, with formally establishing the “general” and “specific” directives for the future 
Allied Control Council (A.C.C.) in Berlin.  These initial efforts concentrated on a host of 
broad issues such as the terms of surrender, establishing the control machinery for the 
Allied military administration, and the zones of occupation.  State Department planning 
generally accepted the idea that international priorities determined that the occupying forces 
would only extract minimal industrial reparations from Germany.67  The State Department, 
while viewing heavy reparations and even dismantling as a dangerous policy, expressed an 
interest in industrial reconversion.  The primary task in the economic arena was the return 
of the German economy to the purposes of peace.68  Industrial demilitarization was not 
discussed in any detail. 
The preliminary work of the State Department met with stiff opposition from the 
War Department.  The military strongly opposed the investigation of industrial matters, as 
well as other matters dealing with the occupation, prior to Germany’s defeat.  The military 
generally rejected the work of the E.A.C. from the outset.  E. Allan Lightner, Junior 
Assistant Chief of the Central European Affairs Division of the Department of State, 
lamented that the “Civil Affairs Division of the War Department in Washington was so 
completely against the whole proposition that they rather successfully managed to sabotage 
the operation.  Their tactic was to slow everything down – to drag their feet in order to 
hinder progress in resolving many of the very difficult things that had to be worked out”.69 
The War Department for logical reasons could not understand how their State 
Department colleagues proposed to formulate an occupation policy without the ability to 
account for the state of the economy on the ground after defeat.  An effective postwar 
military administration of Germany, these men logically surmised, depended for example 
on how much territory fell to the Soviet advance.70  As previous chapters described, the 
experts also believed that all planning had to address the effectiveness of strategic bombing.  
Determinations of Germany’s future—particularly the hope of employing industrial 
production or even the facilities for European recovery—seemed highly academic and 
unrealistic while Allied bombers pounded German cities to dust in the last year of the war.  
The stated goal of the Allied air forces clashed with the calculations and basis of reparations 




destroy the German capacity to wage war.  The military recognized the future hardships 
facing the German population and even sought to limit the extent of their involvement in 
the occupation.71  The subordination of political issues to military matters in this case 
rationalized Roosevelt’s tendency to push future considerations aside.72 
The disarmament of Germany, as demanded by the president in the Atlantic 
Charter, continued to represent a primary postwar goal.  The strategy of obfuscation 
however meant that few analyses of industrial demilitarization existed prior to 1945 other 
than those generated by the military.  The State Department in fact recoiled at the Soviet 
conception of drastically lowering the German standard of living through widespread 
deindustrialization and the seizure of industrial and capital equipment.73  Roosevelt 
personally advanced the notion of a minor downward shift in productivity through the 
inclusion of some capital equipment as reparations and emphasized the eradication of some 
industrial sectors.  In line with Roosevelt’s fascination with air power, the president 
advocated the complete elimination of military and civilian aircraft industries and the 
erection of a permanent system of inspections to ensure compliance.74  Roosevelt hinted 
that the negation of German airpower alone would destroy any real residual military 
capabilities.  But the president by and large accepted the continued existence of a major 
industrial role for Germany.75 
A concrete industrial disarmament program—one that listed factories, industrial 
sectors or machine-tools—therefore failed to surface.  Only a short list of extremely general 
targets emerged.    The concept of industrial demilitarization hardly existed beyond that of 
rhetoric.  Roosevelt, in accordance with his basic concurrence with the State Department’s 
direction, informed the American people on 24 December 1943 that a normal and peaceful 
German industrial system would survive disarmament.76  Washington leaned towards the 
argument that a civilian industrial system cleansed of all military potential could in fact 
exist. 
Henry Stimson proposed an alternative to Roosevelt's approach that also recognized 
the serious implications of the strategic bombing campaign against Germany.  The 
experienced head of the War Department, in his seventies at war’s end, recognized that 
wartime destruction demanded swift action by the victorious powers in order to feed the 
various national populations and create the economic basis for general stability.  Stimson 
bluntly informed Roosevelt in autumn 1943 that “Central Europe after the War has got to 
eat”.77  The elder statesman later added that politicians could not simply ignore the role of 




economic systems.78  A deindustrialization program, Stimson believed, would precipitate a 
general fall into chaos by lengthening the reconstruction process and ultimately threaten to 
derail American policy in Europe.79  The minister, in contrast to the president, argued that a 
rational postwar policy required the output of German industry.  Extensive reparations and 
restructuring did not fit well into this international perspective. 
The War Department, without the authorization or the inclination, failed to study 
industrial demilitarization.  The military did however establish provisional plans aimed at 
guiding the American forces into the occupation by late 1944.  Supreme Headquarters 
Allied Expeditionary Force (S.H.A.E.F.) issued the basic form of “Operation Eclipse” on 
10 November 1944 and clarified certain procedures such as the disarmament and treatment 
of German soldiers.  The 18 memoranda that followed retained this operational focus and 
handled the most pressing of issues that required an immediate response by the military.  
The War Department eventually condensed the work of the civil affairs specialists into two 
handbooks for use by the men on the ground in Germany.80 
These instructions did not tackle the issue of industrial demilitarization.  S.H.A.E.F. 
on the other hand instructed American forces to locate and safeguard industrial facilities and 
only dispose of direct war materials such as guns and tanks during the initial phase.81  Other 
issues appeared more pressing.  “Operation Eclipse” instructed the American Third Army 
to terminate all enemy troop movements outside of Germany and erect control points to 
minimize the flow of civilians into the American zone of occupation.82  Military 
Government Law 161, first promulgated in March 1945, ordered the military to further 
clamp down on border traffic to prevent the escape of suspected war criminals.83  These 
directives stressed administrative and civil-military matters aimed at gaining control over 
the occupied regions for security reasons. 
S.H.A.E.F. feared the job ahead.  The first concrete occupation policy proposal 
from the military appeared on 28 April 1944 and illustrated a host of problems.  Combined 
Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S.) 551 or the “Directive for Military Government in Germany Prior to 
Defeat or Surrender” took account of strategic bombing policy and stressed the future 
difficulties of presiding over a ruined industrial infrastructure.  The Combined Chiefs firmly 
believed in the efficacy of strategic bombing.84  During the final months of the war, the 
Anglo-Saxon air fleets as part of operation “Pointblank” intensified their efforts and aimed 
at the “progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial, and 
economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point 




conditions seemed counterproductive to study any of the larger issues such as developing a 
formula for the demilitarization of industry.  S.H.A.E.F. therefore focused on forestalling 
the economic catastrophe believed inevitable after strategic bombing pounded Germany 
into submission.  C.C.S. 551 demanded that western military forces keep agriculture and 
industry operating “to prevent a breakdown in the economy”.86  The occupation handbook 
that emerged from these deliberations stressed German economic rehabilitation for the sake 
of efficiency. 
A closer look at the War Department’s conceptions helps underline the liberal-
capitalist tendencies blowing through Washington prior to September 1944.  Secretary of 
War Henry L. Stimson directed the American Historical Association (A.H.A.) to prepare a 
series of pamphlets and a host of manuals that addressed “significant current problems for 
the War Department's educational program”.  These materials, that handled a range of 
topics including the postwar occupation and administration of Germany, aimed at 
generating discussion among the officers and men of the Army.  The Historical Service 
Board that formed on 2 September 1943 originally included ten civilians drawn from 
various academic disciplines and assisted by outside specialists.  These men and women, 
whose number grew during the final months of the war, aimed at deepening the depth of 
historical knowledge in the military in order to address “some two dozen questions resulting 
from a sampling of soldier interest in camps in the United States and abroad”.  The Board 
aimed at composing approximately 20 simple and coherent pamphlets to help form and 
influence the views of American soldiers.  The project met with various teething troubles at 
the outset.  Administrative difficulties and the problem of allocating sufficient funds for the 
project induced Theordore C. Blegen, Dean at the University of Minnesota and the director 
of the project, to resign in August 1944.  The members nevertheless continued their work 
and generated 44 pamphlets and a long list of manuals that appeared in the hundreds of 
thousands during 1945.87  The wide exposure granted by the Army offers the historian a 
good look at a policy that ran counter to those expressed by Roosevelt and Stalin and more 
importantly helped form the military’s perspective concerning the treatment of postwar 
Germany. 
A uniquely moderate postwar framework emerged.  The group of scholars argued 
that the pursuit of postwar peace required a host of measures specific to the defeated state 
and also generally applicable to the rest of the globe.  The A.H.A. examined earlier methods 
of war prevention based on the standard models of collective defence and disarmament.  




idealistic road to peace.  The global reduction of armaments had ranked high on a post-1918 
list of peace building measures that included the renunciation of war, the creation of 
“machinery” for nations to settle disputes in a peaceful manner, economic sanctions against 
aggressors, and questioned the merits of an international armed force able to intervene in 
state conflicts.  Answering why these grand plans failed seemed obvious.  “So long as there 
are some countries disposed to aggression”, the pamphlets however pessimistically 
concluded, “it seems certain that they [potential aggressors] would no more keep promises 
to limit their armaments than they would keep promises not to go to war – unless some 
means can be found to force them to do so. So long as agreements for reducing armaments 
are not enforced, they serve only to put peaceable and treaty-keeping nations at the mercy 
of aggressor states which have secretly or openly rearmed in disregard of those 
agreements”.88  These methods had failed to control, among others, a German state that 
possessed considerable industrial strength and the will to use industry for purposes of 
territorial expansion. 
 Considering the obvious failure of the post-Versailles world to keep the peace, most 
obvious in the German case, the future enhancement of national security required that the 
victorious powers pursue more than taking guns out of soldier’s hands and binding 
Germany’s neighbours to defensive arrangements.  “The most obvious way to make sure 
that Germany never again starts a world conflict”, pamphlet number 26 chided, “is to see 
that Germany is stripped of arms”.89  This policy, acknowledged as based on the 
assumption of an incurable German thirst for military adventures, however required lasting 
enforcement and supervision.  The A.H.A. pamphlets explained with sarcastic overtones 
that the failure to enforce disarmament after 1918 obviously permitted Hitler’s grasp at 
world power.90  But permanent supervision or occupation seemed an unrealistic or lasting 
security measure since it depended on lasting and resolute international cooperation to 
enforce it.  The interwar period demonstrated the unwillingness of the League of Nations 
and the principally the western European powers to intervene in Germany at an early date.  
Planning for the future is of course always a murky business.  But the A.H.A. theorized that 
there “would sooner or later be opposition to it [occupation] among the United Nations 
themselves, as there was before; some of them would want to bring their occupying troops 
back home, or to be able to sell to Germany goods that could be used for military 
purposes”.91  Here Washington seemed the primary target.  The group pointed out that this 




average American.92  Peace required another solution beyond the model of disarmament 
and collective defence originally proposed at Versailles. 
The A.H.A. focused in on what they termed the “complete disarmament of 
Germany” or what contemporaries subsequently coined demilitarization.  The group 
recognized that the idea of wide demilitarization through the restructuring of German 
industry fired the interest of policymakers.  “One of the surest ways”, the pamphlets pointed 
out, “of making it impossible for her to start another war, is to prevent her from rebuilding 
her industries on any large scale; for military power depends on industrial power.  If she 
again becomes the foremost country on the European continent in the number, size, 
equipment, and output of her plants, she will also surpass all her neighbors in the means of 
waging war”.93  Alterations to the basic power relationship in Europe through the 
significant reduction of industrial capacity represented an enticing solution. 
But the academics questioned a serious flaw in industrial demilitarization and in the 
process offered a contradiction of their own.  The A.H.A. speculated, and earlier chapters 
demonstrated general contemporary agreement, that strategic bombing had destroyed or 
severely damaged most German cities and the industrial infrastructure.  The Germans 
according to this hypothesis relied on Allied charity for survival.  The education manuals 
clearly argued that a complex relationship existed between industry and population density.  
The development of artificial fertilizers and the creation of a new generation of agricultural 
machinery such as “steel plows, drills, harrows, steam plows, tractors, thrashing machines, 
self-binders, [and] hay loaders” precipitated a European population explosion after 1850.94  
The industrial revolution, the A.H.A. pointed out, bound human welfare to industry.  
Strategic bombing’s success threatened German society with mass starvation unless the 
general infrastructure could be rebuilt.  The group recognized the immediate “need to build 
shelter for the millions of homeless people, to reconstruct towns and streets, [and] to 
provide at least a minimum of food.”95  They speculated that the occupation forces would 
confront a horde of over 20 million “bombed out” Germans “forced to live in shanties and 
to get their food from public kitchens”.96  The basic demands for food and shelter required 
that certain sectors of “industry may be rebuilt and allowed to produce for peace.”97 
 The A.H.A. like Stalin however hinted that the delineation of civilian from military 
industries represented a mammoth task.  Education manual 205 stated the problem 
succinctly. 
[T]he increased use of machines created a demand for machines to make machines.  




machine can be assembled, the parts have to be made, and many machines are 
necessary to make the parts.  Every new machine creates a need for other machines to 
make it, other tools to keep it in order.  Thus machines breed machines and industries 
breed industries, so that much of modern industry is devoted, not to making things 
people consume directly, but to making the machines that make machines that make 
the things they consume.  The story of modern industry is like the story of the “house 
that Jack built”.98 
 
The hypothesis of strategic bombing’s success implied that either the Germans themselves 
tackle reconstruction or the Allies bind themselves to the expensive prospects of sustaining 
millions of people.  The A.H.A. hinted that a combination of the two appeared the surest 
path to the successful postwar administration.  Such a policy, if undertaken, would “boost 
morale” and demonstrate that “some conquerors obey laws and do not reduce nations to 
slavery.”99  The A.H.A. furthermore asked how Germany could provide meaningful 
reparations without the ability to provide useful products, generate currency and especially 
if all efforts aimed at sustaining life. 
 Despite the apparent belief that a significant proportion of industrial capacity 
burned away in the fires of war, the prewar position of Germany as the preeminent 
European industrial power paradoxically seized the A.H.A.’s attention.  “Germany”, they 
rather straightforwardly pointed out, “lies in the center of Europe”.100  The group tied the 
future of European recovery and general stability to Germany’s fate.  The 
acknowledgement of modern industrial complexities such as global interdependency 
dominated their thinking.  “The application of power-driven machinery to manufactures 
and to transportation is drawing the whole world together in a complicated network of 
exchanges which makes the people of each country more and more dependent on the 
people of every other country”.101  General European recovery required German production 
and equally the German market.  The A.H.A. therefore promoted the argument that the 
defeated nation be “permitted and assisted to recover her power of production as much and 
as fast as possible”.102  The wide destruction of industrial facilities, while theoretically 
possible, did not take future considerations or modern complexities into account. 
The A.H.A. illuminated another path to peace.  The group stressed reeducation and 
democratization as the surest method of eradicating Nazism and militarism.  The ruined 
cities, the pamphlets prophesied, already demonstrated the bankruptcy of Hitler’s political 
values of racial superiority and the average person would, it was argued, quickly turn away 
from a belief system that had lost its “glitter”.103  “Never again can any German, present or 
future,” they argued, “have an excuse for thinking Germany was not beaten or is 




leaders and democracies decadent”.104  The A.H.A. unfortunately and paradoxically, 
considering the attention granted modern societal developments, offered a bizarre 
replacement.  A German return to the pre-1870 era fired their imaginations.  Perhaps 
reflecting nostalgically on the influence that German professors once exerted on the 
American university system prior to the advent of Bismarck and unification,105 the scholars 
played up the earlier literary and musical traditions of Goethe and Beethoven.  These men 
characterized a society not yet contaminated by the negative fusion of capitalism with 
militarism.  The pamphlets bemoaned the impact of rapid industrial change after 1870.  The 
new class of industrialists worked hand in hand with the old feudal order and created a 
“strong contender in the struggle for world markets” based on “imperialistic expansion”.106  
It seemed easier for the A.H.A. to blame the societal groups normally associated with 
traditional power politics such as businessmen and instead define politically benign artists 
as the better and obviously less threatening Germans.107  A return to an older cultural 
tradition, a romantic and atavistic notion, promised to kill the Nazi virus and resuscitate the 
kind of Germany they admired.  Changing the philosophical makeup of Germany and not 
the sweeping eradication of industrial infrastructure seemed a safer and method of 
converting the defeated country into a “peaceful, law-abiding, and cooperative member of 
the community of nations”.108 
This conclusion placed a premium of importance on spiritual factors.  The creation 
of a peaceful Germany, the A.H.A. believed, could be achieved if “either one of two things 
happened: (1) that Germany was made incapable of starting another war, (2) [or] that the 
minds of Germans were so changed that they would not wish to start another and would not 
permit their government to lead them into one”.109  The group emphasized a change in 
mentality over significant material alterations to infrastructure.  This group of American 
civilians presented their military with a startling alternative to Stalin or Roosevelt’s model 
of postwar German society.  The A.H.A. moved away from military deindustrialization and 
advocated a security system based on a change of values or societal norms mixed with 
traditional disarmament.  The group sensed the “conflict” between economic recovery and 
national security and offered a balanced alternative that stressed the prevention of direct 
armaments production without removing civilian industries.110 
3.5 The Morgenthau Plan: An Attempt at Policy Clarification 
Another viewpoint, one that ground State and War Department planning to a halt, 
emerged during the summer of 1944 from an unlikely source.  Even though foreign policy 




future of Germany.  Liberal New Dealers such as Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, 
Jr., Assistant Treasury Secretary Harry Dexter White, and Robert Lovett hoped to build a 
new European order on a harsh treatment of Germany.  These men advocated occupation, 
denazification, dismemberment and complete industrial demilitarization or pastoralization 
as the means towards a new peaceful European order. 
The head of the Treasury Department flew to France to inspect the situation on the 
ground in Normandy in the summer months of 1944.  The Anglo-Saxon ground forces had 
finally smashed German resistance, but only after sustaining considerable losses.  
Morgenthau leafed through the papers generated by the State and War Departments during 
the voyage.  S.H.A.E.F.’s “Handbook for Military Government in Germany” repulsed him.  
The policy papers generally indicated a modest approach that proclaimed the retention of a 
self-supporting Germany with a relatively high standard of living.  Morgenthau informed 
Roosevelt that he considered the lenient approach “pretty bad” and requested that Stimson 
withdraw the handbook immediately.111  Prompted by Morgenthau, the president seriously 
questioned the direction taken by his administration.  Roosevelt rebuked Stimson and Hull 
and ordered the handbook to be withdrawn.112 
The president, emerging from his indifference to postwar policy, exhibited distain 
for the overall “lack of severity”. Roosevelt now rejected the notion of German 
rehabilitation and emphasized his idea that “every person in Germany should realize that 
this time Germany is a defeated nation”.113  Defeat now meant more than laying down arms 
and returning to civilian life.  In order to impress defeat on the entire German population, 
Roosevelt tinkered with policies ranging from castration of the male population to the 
complete destruction of Ruhr industry.114  Roosevelt ordered Hull and Stimson to switch 
gears and “develop harsher attitudes towards Germany or be bypassed in the formulation of 
that policy”.115   The president, who for the moment gravitated towards a hard peace, 
supported the “liberal New Dealer” position. 
Explanations of Roosevelt’s reaction and response invariably and quite reasonably 
point to Nazi atrocities and the exertions of the war itself as the prime factors motivating the 
call for retribution.116  This viewpoint was derived from an undeniably logical basis.  Hull 
straightforwardly hypothesized that Morgenthau hated Germans and that this emotion 
derived from the Nazi persecution of the Jews during the 1930s and the war.  German 
antisemitism, Hull wrote, motivated Morgenthau to bypass the State Department and 
promote a harsh peace as the basis of any postwar treatment of Germany.117  This hatred 




that extrapolated from the savage fighting on the eastern front and in Normandy that the 
inherently aggressive and militaristic tendencies of the German race demanded an extreme 
response.  Roosevelt, fortified by an anti-German predisposition, toyed with castration for 
the simple reason that he believed all Germans and not just some had participated in a 
collective lawless conspiracy against humanity. “We have got to be tough with Germany”, 
Roosevelt claimed, “and I mean the German people, not just the Nazis.  You either have to 
castrate the German people or you have to treat them in such a manner so they can’t go on 
reproducing people who want to continue the way they have in the past”.119 
Propaganda assisted the genesis of such beliefs.  Thomas Howell demonstrates that 
prewar and wartime American propaganda helped form a particularly negative image of 
Germans among the general public.  While specific German actions during the war 
understandably cultivated feelings of hatred to all things German, the American Writers’ 
War Board nevertheless surpassed the straightforward presentation of fact and worked 
energetically to influence popular opinion and stimulate hatred.120  Such policies appear 
common in modern conflicts.. Despite the efforts and beliefs of some individuals and 
organizations, such as the author of “Germany Must Perish”,121 the propaganda failed to 
cultivate the extremely violent responsiveness characteristic of Josef Goebbels’ propaganda 
ministry.122  Roosevelt as pointed out originally supported the retention of a large industrial 
base in Germany and rejected genocide and enslavement.  The president’s newly found 
vehemence can be understood as a reaction to the savage fighting in Normandy and, 
demonstrated later in this chapter, was shortlived in character. 
The emotions of hatred and revenge nevertheless influenced policy.  “The Treasury 
Plan for the Treatment of Germany”, composed by White and Morgenthau in the final days 
of summer in 1944, attempted to answer the nagging problems surrounding the best path to 
lasting European peace and security.  The plan aimed at completely eliminating all German 
military potential.  Morgenthau adopted Stalin’s materialist position concerning dual-use 
industries and pointed out that disarmament and re-education, the War Department’s 
methods, left residual military capacities in Germany.  Complete deindustrialization, 
symbolized by the razing of all Ruhr industries and the flooding of coal mines corrected the 
deficiencies of previous planning.  The Morgenthau Plan focused on coal and the Ruhr as 
central components of German industry requiring restructuring.123  While hardly a weapon, 
Germany’s primary natural resource was viewed as the backbone of all German industry 
and in particular the chemical, synthetic oil, and steel industries.124  John Maynard Keynes, 




truly on coal and iron than on blood and iron”.125  Coal and heavy industry represented a 
symbiotically related phenomenon.  Morgenthau explained that the “complete 
demilitarization of Germany in the shortest possible period after surrender” would render 
that state powerless.  In addition to the disarmament of the German military, the 
neutralization of all military hardware, and the destruction of all the military branches of 
industry, Morgenthau advocated the further elimination of all other industrial sectors 
directly or indirectly linked to military potential.126 
The Morgenthau Plan solved some of the problems plaguing the State Department.  
The complete extirpation of all military industrial potential removed the need to observe 
future developments in Germany.  Better still, the transformation of Germany also 
promised to move the center of European heavy industry from the Ruhr back to Britain and 
erase what some believed a regrettable historical development dating back to the turn of the 
century.  British industry could, Morgenthau believed, fill the vacuum left by Germany.127  
Britain could subsequently fill German shoes and assist European economic recovery.  The 
Morgenthau Plan therefore accorded with the wish of avoiding a cumbersome reparations 
policy.  Dismantling solved the potential security risk of maintaining German industrial 
capacities to pay reparations from current production.  A new occupation and reparations 
format emerged that emphasized the transplantation of what industries remained, territorial 
changes and “forced German labour outside Germany”.128  Virtual pastoralization, from the 
perspective of many contemporary observers, already appeared an accomplished fact.  If 
the air enthusiasts were correct in their computations, the strategic air forces would reduce 
the Ruhr to rubble and a focus on German reconstruction represented an expensive and 
time-consuming task. 
Certain historians such as Mausbach argue that Morgenthau advocated industrial 
restructuring and not pastoralization.129  The shift away from heavy industry would, they 
point out, have freed all the raw materials, investment, and labour bound to armament 
production and associate industries.  Starting fresh would place all emphasis on the civilian 
sector and therefore yield a positive “peace dividend”.130  The plan, in the opinion of these 
historians, was designed primarily to protect Europe from another war with Germany and 
not to act as a policy of vengeance on the basis of a Carthaginian peace.131  Orthodox 
interpretations, seen from this perspective, lend too much weight to Morgenthau`s crude 
comments. 
It seems however exceptionally difficult to accept Mausbach’s contention that 




understanding of industrial restructuring as a security enhancing method seems fair 
enough.132  The proposal to end heavy industrial production in Germany implied 
consequences that Mausbach appears unwilling to confront.  Critics of Morgenthau point 
out that broad deindustrialization would have led to the deaths of over 10 million people.133  
Contemporaries thought in a similar manner. 
Stimson pointed out a significant moral flaw in the Treasury proposal.  He declared 
that he was “unalterably opposed to such a program” since the destruction of the Ruhr 
industrial basin would deprive Europe of German production and therefore hinder 
rehabilitation.134  In conversations with Morgenthau, Stimson informed the major 
American proponent of a hard peace that the elimination of heavy industry would force 
mass migration or starvation on Germany.  The State Department backed up Stimson’s 
fears with statistical data.  Analyses by various experts theorized that agricultural imports 
sustained approximately 30 million people.  Heavy industrial exports provided the trade 
goods and ultimately the financial means required to feed this population.135  Morgenthau, 
his eyes fixed firmly on Auschwitz, retorted that such policies were not nearly as bad as 
sending Germans to the gas chambers.136  This statement unmasked Morgenthau’s real 
intentions.  The logical consequences of Treasury policy surpassed industrial 
demilitarization and betrayed a sinister devotion to vengeance on a collosal scale. 
Postwar investigations of German agriculture by the American occupation forces, 
an issue taken up in greater detail in subsequent chapters, added another dimension to the 
problem of food allocation.  German and European farms required German metallurgical, 
chemical and electronic heavy industries for more than just tractors or trucks.  German 
farmers in particular required massive amounts of nitrogen, potash, and phosphoric 
fertilizer in order to generate high crop yields.  A significant dependency on synthetic 
fertilizer production using fixed nitrogen refined from the air developed.  Morgenthau’s 
demand for a return back to the pre-industrial era through a reversion to an agricultural 
economy, assuming the removal of the supporting infrastructure such as the dismantling of 
fertilizer processing plants, did not account for modern farming techniques or inter-
European trade relationships and dependencies.  German crop yields between 1944 and 
1946 fell to half of previous levels owing primarily to fixed nitrogen shortages.  Other 
European countries, dependent on Germany for fertilizer, suffered a similar fate.  The 
aversion of a starvation crisis in Germany and Europe depended on the continuation of the 




component.  Seen in this way, Germans and other Europeans depended on steel and 
machine-tools in order to eat. 
Morgenthau’s policies literally condemned millions throughout Europe to death.  
The policy therefore represented the worst conceivable method of establishing a stable 
postwar order.  The plan’s only redeeming quality, if such a word is applicable under the 
circumstances, rested with the permanent neutralization of a German military capability 
through the wholesale elimination of all dual-use commodities.  But this issue, and not the 
complexities of the European economy, dominated the thoughts of Allied policymakers in 
the second half of 1944. 
Morgenthau, despite the protests of Stimson and the State Department, managed to 
secure Roosevelt’s approval for a shift in policy.  A policy paper entitled “Program to 
Prevent Germany from Starting a World War III” followed on the heels of this change in 
heart.  The program characteristically focused on the issues of national security and the 
belief that a swift resolution to the problem of German power was required in the postwar.  
“It should be the aim of the Allied forces”, the paper declared, “to accomplish the complete 
demilitarization of Germany in the shortest possible period of time after surrender.  This 
means completely disarming the German Army and people (including the removal or 
destruction of all war materials), the total destruction of the whole German armament 
industry, and the removal or destruction of other key industries which are basic to military 
strength”.137  Morgenthau had firmly provided military industrial disarmament with a 
degree of precision. 
At the Quebec Conference in September 1944, Morgenthau and Roosevelt tried to 
convince a reluctant Churchill to accept the need to destroy the Ruhr industrial region.  The 
prime minister and his government did not approach the postwar occupation with an 
appetite for drastic measures.  Churchill, in line with his allies, strongly advocated 
disarmament and a degree of military deindustrialization.  The prime minister informed the 
British parliament after the Yalta discussions on 27 February 1945 that the “Allies are 
resolved that Germany shall be disarmed, that Nazism and militarism in Germany shall be 
destroyed, that war criminals shall be justly and swiftly punished, and that all German 
industry capable of military production shall be eliminated or controlled”.138  But the 
control and not elimination of industrial capacities figured predominantly in Churchill’s 
conceptions of the German future.139  The British Foreign Office, owing to a host of factors 
including the influence that the economist John Maynard Keynes exerted on appraisals of 




that postwar policies “strike a balance between the value of our restrictive economic 
measures from the point of view of security and the importance of the contribution which 
German industry could make to the rehabilitation of Europe and to world prosperity.140 
Morgenthau however needed Churchill’s support.  Previous inter-Allied 
negotiations had determined that the British army would occupy the Ruhr area.  Even 
though Churchill feared that a drastic policy of deindustrialization would destabilize the 
British zone, a virtual bribe of $6.5 billion by the Treasury in financial assistance proved 
hard to resist.141  The prime minister changed gears and focussed in on the short list of 
advantages.  Compliance would improve Allied relations and hopefully convince 
Washington to refrain from turning off the Lend-Lease tap at war’s end.  German 
deindustrialization also presented British industry with growth and expansion opportunities 
by removing the principle European competitor.  These inducements swung Churchill over 
to Morgenthau’s side for a short period of time.  The priorities of reconstruction and the fear 
that a destitute German population in the heart of Europe moderated the prime minister’s 
shift towards a policy of predicating British economic resurgence on the demise of German 
heavy industry.  Churchill nevertheless initialled the Morgenthau memorandum on 15 
September 1944 even though he followed Roosevelt’s lead and argued that the victors wait 
“until all the facts and forces that will be potent at the moment [the postwar] are 
revealed”.142 
The communiqué that resulted from these discussions seemed to herald a Treasury 
Department victory.  It “sounded almost as harsh as the Morgenthau plan”.143  The 
document ordered that the occupation authorities “close down” Ruhr factories and that 
Germany be converted into a country “primarily agricultural and pastoral in character”.144  
The emphasis on pastoralization indicated that the leaders now somewhat hastily struck 
dual-use commodities off the list of acceptable German industries.  The historiography 
tends to downplay this decision.  Mausbach, as indicated, offers the view that drastic 
dismantling did not in itself represent pastoralization since some form of civilian industry 
would survive.  But these historians skirt the immense structural dilemma of defining 
military and civilian industries.  The Quebec communiqué remedied this academic 
problem.  Morgenthau’s influence concerning the definition of dual-use industries 
continued to plague Washington’s attempt to balance economic and national security 
concerns long after his political demise. 
Morgenthau's influence waned during the final days of 1944 and especially during 




unchallenged bombing campaign induced Stimson and particularly Hull to raise their 
voices against the Treasury Department.  Under pressure from Hull, who again pointed out 
that the deindustrialization of Germany would probably lead to mass starvation and millions 
of deaths, Roosevelt returned to his old maxim and declared that “I dislike making detailed 
plans for a country which we do not yet occupy”.145  Worse still, the details of the 
Morgenthau Plan were leaked to the press and appeared in the Wall Street Journal on 23 
September 1944.  An intense public outcry convinced Roosevelt to place some distance 
between himself and Morgenthau.  It was an election year.  By mid-October Roosevelt 
returned to the core of the alternative State and War Department approach.  The new course 
did not substantially alter the president’s views towards Germans.  Roosevelt informed 
Stalin in discussions at Yalta that he still entertained intense feelings of revenge.146  But 
public opinion and the determined opposition of Morgenthau’s opponents forced the 
president’s hand. 
The new perspective on dual-use industries now however penetrated through to the 
State Department.  Hull, who perceived of excessive industrial dismantling “as striking at 
all of Europe”,147 exhibited some sympathy with Morgenthau’s concentration on national 
security.  The pacification of Germany, Hull believed after the Morgenthau interlude, 
required the significant downsizing of industrial capacities and the institution of lasting 
controls.148  In other words, the State Department rejected the complete elimination of dual-
use industries, but now tended to favour the dismantling of certain percentages over 
conversion.  The State Department did not however offer a concrete program or formula 
relating to German industry.  Only a basic consensus that the priorities of industrial 
demilitarization required some dismantling emerged.149 
3.6 Directive J.C.S. 1067: The “Technical” Compromise 
The two State Department memoranda helped calm the suspicions of the opposition 
that the foreign policy experts sought a lenient peace with Germany.  These papers offered 
a straightforward summation of American occupation aims that, in appealing to men like 
Morgenthau, bridged the chasm between the State and Treasury departments and 
subsequently formed the basis of a new document that “gave the military government staffs 
their long-awaited basic statement of policy for the posthostilities period”.150  Composed 
during the rise and decline of Morgenthau’s influence in Washington, the “Directive to 
Commander in Chief of United States Forces of Occupation Regarding the Military 
Government of Germany” or Directive J.C.S. 1067 retained the bulk of the Treasury’s 




write as if the State Department conceded victory to Morgenthau.  E. Allan Lightner for 
example asserts that the “Morgenthau plan philosophy was strongly reflected in the basic 
military directive, JCS-l067”.152  The evidence however demonstrates that the State and 
War departments only grudgingly changed directions for the sake of unanimity or, as in the 
case of the military, to soothe the worriers of their organization. 
The various revisions of the original document, beginning in summer 1944 and 
extending until Washington finally accepted the modified version on 10 May 1945, 
technically witnessed the erosion of the lenient approach found in the A.H.A. documents 
and within the State Department.  The disparate group – that included the State, Treasury 
and War departments along with the American E.A.C. delegation and others – fought for 
the dominance of their respective positions over a considerable of time.  The Informal 
Policy Committee on Germany, authorized by the president to coordinate efforts and 
hammer out a policy for the occupation forces, stumbled primarily over the matter of 
German civilian industries. 
The State Department detested the level of deindustrialization advocated by 
Morgenthau’s staff, yet realized on the basis of military developments in March 1945 that 
the dwindling fortunes of Hitler’s Reich emphasized the need for swift clarification of 
occupation matters.  James C. Dunn, Leon Henderson and James W. Riddleberger had 
presented Roosevelt with their first attempt at compromise in the hope of convincing the 
president to bind the economic recovery of Europe to Germany and thereby preserve a large 
German civilian industrial base.153  This concept, owing to the chaos of European 
economies, too obviously doomed administrative support for a grand experiment in 
industrial restructuring.  Pressed for time and willing to compromise, The State Department 
had sought an alternative approach.  The men of the department superficially altered 
directions and for the first time unanimously lent support to the industrial pacification so 
strongly supported by the president.  The trick worked.  The rewritten policy paper, issued a 
little over a week later, found Morgenthau’s favour and the president stamped it with 
approval.  The paper lent technical support to industrial demilitarization and accepted the 
need to eliminate all elements necessary for the production of armaments.154  The strict 
delineation between civilian and military industries, a questionable undertaking by State 
Department standards, deflected attention away from the complex problem of dual-use 
industries for the moment.  Morgenthau’s victory appeared imminent. 
The other dominant supporters of leniency also reversed direction.  The War 




Morgenthau’s hands.  The growing belief that strategic bombing had utterly ruined the 
German economy generated a real fear that reconstruction priorities would overwhelm the 
troops.  The idea that Morgenthau’s conceptions might actually simplify the management 
of the defeated population emerged.155  The support of wide deindustrialization seemed 
academic in the chaos gripping Germany.156  A hard deindustrialization policy transferred 
any future accusations of mismanagement.  The War Department’s “conversion”, like that 
of the State Department, represented a strategic move based on extrapolations from the 
military position in Germany that glossed over certain complexities that, once the 
Wehrmacht surrendered, could be subsequently addressed.  Earlier versions of the J.C.S. 
occupation handbooks and general conceptions had always identified both support and 
opposition for Morgenthau.  Assistant Secretary for the Army John J. McCloy now 
however cleaned up the handbook and presented a version that, like the State Department 
memoranda, appeared to side exclusively with the Treasury position.  One important 
element, like that found in Directive J.C.S. 1067, seriously countered the Treasury program 
of deindustrialization.  Carolyn Eisenberg calls McCloy’s product “a set of documents with 
draconian prohibitions and clever escape hatches”.157  Morgenthau rejoiced too early. 
A particular strategy of sorts permeated throughout the early postwar history of the 
occupation.  Directive J.C.S. 1067, issued to Generals Dwight D. Eisenhower and Lucius 
D. Clay, recognized the War Department’s fear that a successful bombing campaign had 
ripped Germany apart.  “It should be brought home to the Germans that Germany’s ruthless 
warfare and fanatical Nazi resistance have destroyed the German economy and made chaos 
and suffering inevitable and that the Germans cannot escape responsibility for what they 
have brought on themselves”.158  The emphasis on responsibility and defeat accorded with 
Roosevelt’s wish to clearly impress the reality of defeat on the enemy.  This declaration 
also absolved the bomber crews of any misgivings concerning the severity of strategic 
bombing and bluntly specified that the occupation forces were not responsible for the 
hardships facing the German population. 
Directive J.C.S. 1067 seemed the fulfillment of the hardliner approach.  In order to 
“prevent Germany’s ever becoming a threat to the peace”, the primary objective of the 
occupation, the directive stipulated the eradication of National Socialism and militarism, the 
punishment of war criminals, industrial disarmament and democratization.  The Americans 
handed all Germans the bitter cup of defeat.  The directive specified that the occupation 
authorities organize a “firm” occupation that prohibited “all fraternization” with the 




Responsibility for the outbreak of war required that all of Germany join in repairing the 
European continent’s damaged cities and infrastructure through reparations and restitution.  
It also appeared as if the Americans had jettisoned the idea of German industrial recovery.  
Directive J.C.S. 1067 established a crude guideline for the envisioned industrial 
demilitarization policy and demanded that the military authorities “prevent any higher 
standard of living than in neighbouring nations”.159  The document even forbade economic 
assistance aiming at the “maintenance or the strengthening of the German economy”. 
The directive however contained an important and hardly hidden escape clause that 
surprisingly did not elicit a groan from Morgenthau.  The document permitted operations 
aiming to “protect the safety and meet the needs of the occupying forces and assure the 
production and maintenance of goods and services required to prevent starvation or such 
disease and unrest as would endanger these forces”.160  This provision technically implied 
that the American occupation forces could suspend the translation of most elements of the 
directive under particular circumstances.  The military of course correctly surmised that 
catastrophic conditions existed in Germany.  Far from reflecting the victory of the 
Morgenthau faction or even continued uncertainty regarding the future of German industry, 
Directive J.C.S. 1067 established broad industrial disarmament as an important plank of the 
American program only if certain conditions applied. 
The document therefore reflected major differences of opinion in Washington and a 
degree of continued uncertainty rather than a clear agenda.  Directive J.C.S. 1067 did 
however establish broad disarmament as a central element of American and Allied postwar 
policy in Germany.  That concept incorporated much more than the destruction of the 
produced goods and industrial equipment of an armaments industry.   
Washington emphasized the need to re-educate German society and turn the 
defeated population from militarism.  The policymakers, according to the hypothesis that a 
cultural proclivity towards war affected the population,161 sanctioned a cleansing of 
museums and textbooks and banned military music and parades.162  The American civil 
affairs detachments later conducted searches of homes throughout Germany in order to 
accomplish a “thorough disarmament of the civilian population”.  These groups forced the 
German population to hand over all firearms, cameras, radios and even pigeons.163  
Washington furthermore believed that the officer corps exerted tremendous influence on the 
population and an American military government study of August 1945 toyed with the idea 
of exiling all officers to a penal colony.164  The victors ultimately decided to quarantine all 




these courses of action, the cultural re-education of an entire nation, would “de-Prussianize” 
the German people and allow for the modelling of the postwar population according to the 
American conception of southern Germans—a people considered “far more easy-going, 
more intellectual and artistic, more humane and tolerant, less aggressive”.166 
The directive itself however failed to provide a satisfactory or rational definition of 
dual-use military industries.  Directive J.C.S. 1067 instead emphasized the worries of the 
War Department.  The Psychological Warfare Division prophesied in 1944 that the level of 
material destruction in Germany brought about by strategic bombing alone would cause the 
“progressive destruction of industries to a point involving indefinite postponement of all 
hopes of German economic recovery”.167  Dismantling under these conditions demanded 
detailed study of the residual economy in order to remove military industrial capacities 
without doing greater harm and interfering with the military’s obligation to prevent “disease 
and unrest”.168   
The inability to solve this nagging problem led German Lucius Clay, the officer 
ordered to take charge of the American occupation zone and execute Directive J.C.S. 1067, 
to believe that wartime destruction of German industry invalidated the Treasury’s 
conception of dismantling and therefore that the directive was unworkable.169  Clay 
remarked that the “Carthaginian peace” envisioned by Morgenthau simply did not coincide 
with the “realities of the financial and economic conditions which confronted us”.170  The 
military stood firmly behind Clay’s opposition.  Considering the preliminary work of the 
War Department and the input of the A.H.A., this development was hardly surprising.  
Eisenhower generally disliked the document and instead demanded a more pronounced 
focus on economic rehabilitation in the postwar.171  American officers wanted no part of a 
policy which would subject the conquered to protracted destitution and lead to future 
generations branding them as carpetbaggers or worse. 
Clay however decided that undue attention to bureaucratic detail endangered the 
overall American enterprise in Germany.  Dissent by the military only promised to rip 
Washington into warring factions.  He therefore devised an effective if undemocratic 
solution.  Clay terminated the debate by informing the War Department at the end of 1945 
that the policymakers did not need to rewrite Directive J.C.S. 1067.172  The general simply 
accepted that the restoration of a functioning economic structure took precedence over other 
issues and “began to slowly wipe out JCS-1067” using “gradual changes in its provision” 




Clay found the nebulous and imprecise nature of the document to his liking.174  His 
independent and confident administrative style decried undue collaboration with non-
military policymakers.  The largely contradictory elements of Directive J.C.S. 1067 gave 
Clay a powerful tool to blunt outside interference in the affairs of his organization.  Not 
even the State Department exerted an early influence on Clay.  Nor did Washington 
generally seem interested.  “As I look back I find it amazing that I did not visit the State 
Department or talk with any of its officials”, Clay pointed out in later years, “No one at that 
time advised me of the role of the State Department in occupation matters or of its 
relationship to military government, and I am inclined to believe that no one had thought it 
out”.175  The “disease and disorder” caveat granted Clay wide latitude in managing all 
aspects of the occupation including the precise meaning of industrial demilitarization and 
even the schedule of dismantling if these policies appeared to negatively impact the 
recuperative power of the German economy. 
3.7 The Yalta Shock: The Masked Incongruity of Allied Positions 
Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin met at Yalta in the southern Soviet Union between 
4 and 11 February 1945 to discuss, among other issues, the fate of Germany.176  A jovial 
mood, fortified by vodka and three wagons of caviar, characterized the conference.  In the 
former home of Czar Nicholas II the three men aimed at rebuilding the nations destroyed 
and plundered by Germany, hammering out a workable system of joint occupation control 
and establishing the contours of the defeated state.  The Allies furthermore reaffirmed their 
desire to bring order and economic prosperity to Europe through the complete 
demobilization of the Wehrmacht and carry out the dismantling of the German military 
industrial complex.177  The future victors solidified their “inflexible purpose to destroy 
German militarism and Nazism and to ensure that Germany will never again be able to 
disturb the peace of the world”.178  German society would pay for the suffering the Nazis 
inflicted on Europe.  The three governments however entertained different paths to the 
same end. 
The State Department had prepared a brief prior to the Yalta meetings to inform 
Roosevelt of the two methods developed by the factions in Washington concerning how to 
extract reparations from Germany.  These approaches depended on, the brief once again 
pointed out, how much residual industrial capacity the enemy state retained after defeat.  
The first model, reflecting Morgenthau’s stance, called for the comprehensive dismantling 
of what remained of the German industrial system.  The Treasury’s approach settled 




instead advocated leaving much of that system intact after surgically removing the military 
industrial sector and subsequently seizing and distributing finished goods from current 
production as reparations.  The foreign affairs specialists offered a weighty and 
considerable argument to strengthen their standpoint.  The brief hinted that the western 
Allies could not control the Soviet appetite for reparations.  Since a Germany without 
industry could not sustain the population, the impoverished enemy would ultimately rely on 
financial assistance from the United States.  Washington would, according to this logic, 
once again carry the burden of reparations and thereby actually subsidize and assist Stalin’s 
recovery efforts in a manner similar to the post-1918 period.  The latter argument appealed 
to Roosevelt’s notion of making the Germans pay for wartime damages without throwing 
the defeated nation into abject poverty or on the mercy of the United States.179  Roosevelt, 
who seemed increasingly willing to jettison Morgenthau’s approach, greeted the briefing 
paper with a degree of approval. 
Stalin and the Soviet diplomats presented a straightforward and simple list of 
demands that fused national security matters with German territorial and economic 
reparations.  Ivan Maisky, Soviet Ambassador in London until 1943 and then Deputy 
Commissar for Foreign Affairs,180 explained that Moscow desired the dismantling and 
transfer of industrial equipment and machine-tools and the shipment of produced goods for 
a period of 10 years.  Maisky targeted the core elements of heavy industry and explained 
that only 20 percent should remain of the steel, machine-tool, metal fabrication and 
electrical industries.  The Soviet diplomat furthermore requested the cessation of all 
synthetic fuel production and not just that of obvious dual-use commodities such as civilian 
aircraft.  Without presenting any real evidence or taking account of historical factors, 
Maisky theorized that a residual 20 percent of heavy industry was sufficient to supply the 
needs of the German economy.  Not only would the industrial residue supply Europe with 
reparations, but Maisky agreed that the victors internationalize those factories allowed to 
operate in Germany.181 
The Soviet proposal, in a manner similar to Morgenthau, completely and 
thoroughly terminated a German power presence in Europe.  The crude statistics, however, 
should not obscure the fact that the Soviet solution – an issue explained in greater detail in 
subsequent chapters – neither took economic realities nor the welfare of the German 
population into account.  Maisky a few days later hypothesized that wartime events reduced 
the German G.N.P. by approximately 30 percent and that the surviving industries could 




not yet established that a far greater percentage of industrial infrastructure had survived the 
strategic bombing campaign.  But Maisky’s proposal did not take inter-European trade 
patterns into account.  Nor did he recognize that other states depended on the facilities that 
Moscow aimed to relocate.  Maisky might have soothed the Anglo-Saxon diplomats with 
an assurance that the Soviet Union wished to supply Europe with goods manufactured by 
the dismantled factories.  The Soviet position however emphasized that domestic 
requirements outweighed those of other states in importance.  Nor did Maisky explain how 
the Germans would feed themselves.  Churchill in particular fumed at the possibility that 
German starvation force western governments to subsidize foodstuff shipments owing to 
Soviet policy.183  Moscow’s position continued to ignore the future welfare of Germany 
and the European economy. 
The State Department searched for a compromise.  The diplomats analysed the 
Soviet position and found general agreement with the reduction of industrial capacities 
through the dismantling of facilities linked to armaments manufacturing along with the 
extraction of reparations from current production.184  The diplomats applauded the focus on 
military facilities that dominated their own analyses after the Morgenthau interlude.  The 
State Department willingly sought to integrate the Soviet position and create a policy 
acceptable by the three governments.  But Stettinius viewed the brewing problems over 
reparations with alarm and attempted to bridge the British and Soviet differences by arguing 
for extremely swift industrial conversion and the shipment of both dismantled factories and 
produced goods as reparations.185   
But the American and Soviet diplomats, hotly opposed by Foreign Minister 
Anthony Eden, in particular debated the issue from the largest perspective possible and 
discussed the establishment of an overall sum or value to be seized from Germany.  Both 
Stettinius and Maisky agreed to tentatively set a sum of 20 billion dollars in reparations of 
which the Soviet Union would receive 50 percent.186  British opposition and an American-
Soviet dispute over the precise meaning of reparations dogged the discussions.  The 
delegates, unable to bind themselves to a strict proclamation of this principle, created the 
Commission for the Compensation of Damages to establish a proper figure at a later date.  
The problem was thrust aside.187  Even though the three parties did not reach a definitive 
resolution of the total amount or nature of reparations, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin 
agreed to entrench the concept that Germany would compensate the designated states for 
the damages incurred during the war.188  Industrial demilitarization furthermore remained a 




reparations and the concrete forms of dismantling and the seizure of produced goods.  A 
more precise handling of industrial demilitarization was taken up during the summer and is 
addressed in the next chapter. 
The president’s dissatisfaction with the whole reparations enterprise intensified.189  
The Yalta discussions indicated that Roosevelt swung over to the State Department 
position.  The president bemoaned the severity of Stalin’s stance on Germany and 
interjected that his government neither wished to subsidize Allied actions nor did they seek 
reparations.  The war’s impact on the Crimea, a principle factor influencing Stalin’s request 
to hold a conference in Yalta, did however tug at Roosevelt’s cognitive processes.  The 
president accepted Stalin’s claims but added that Washington would observe whether the 
collection of industrial reparations would plunge Germany into chaos.  He further hinted 
that Moscow’s demand for forced labour and factories and London’s claim on all German 
foreign markets made starvation in the occupied country a strong possibility.190  The 
policymakers decided that the Soviet military could impress those Germans found guilty as 
war criminals or attached to the various branches of the Nazi party, such as the Gestapo, the 
S.S. or S.A., into punitive labour service.  The ailing president appeared caught between the 
desire to punish Germany and trying to salvage some form of humane treatment of the 
occupied population. 
The Allies at Yalta did however agree on the principle of territorial changes and the 
establishment of zonal boundaries.  “By the time of the Yalta Conference”, Gerhard Schultz 
points out, “little new decisionmaking was required to bring about the dismemberment of 
Germany”.  The three powers generally accepted the disappearance of east Prussia and the 
division of Germany into three zones of occupation.191  The movement of the German-
Polish border westward to approximately the Oder-Neiße region, while deemed 
commensurate with German power reduction and Soviet security interests, changed power 
ratios in Europe and conflicted with a major policy issue.  This transformation of central 
Europe masked the Soviet absorption of eastern Poland to create a buffer region between 
western Europe and the Soviet Union.  Soviet annexation of eastern Prussia granted Soviet 
access to a warm water port in the Baltic.  But the Yalta accord projected the Soviet sphere 
of influence deep into central and southern Europe at the expense of more than just 
Germany. 
Roosevelt and the State Department supported Stalin’s territorial adjustments.  John 
Snell wrote in 1956 that the wartime increase in Soviet military power forced western 




accompli.192  Attraction to this argument remains strong.  Warren F. Kimball argues that 
wartime events sealed eastern Europe’s fate and that the adoption of a strong anti-Soviet 
stance by Roosevelt only promised deeper Soviet penetration.193  But this argument fails to 
recognize that Anglo-American policy, uneven and murky as it was, accepted the need for 
significant alterations to Germany’s borders with Poland and a general increase in the size 
of the Soviet Union.194  “The peace of Europe”, another head of the State Department 
reiterated in 1946, “depends upon the existence of friendly relations between the Soviet 
Union and its European neighbors”.195  Peace in this context meant granting Stalin a few 
concessions that conflicted with the spirit of the Atlantic Charter and the “restoration of 
sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of 
them by the aggressor nations”.196  But while Yalta clarified the general direction of Allied 
policy,197 the exact dimensions of the eastern German borders remained undefined and a 
point of dispute.  The western powers rejected the Soviet plan for Poland to absorb the 
entire Neiße region.  The Anglo-Saxon diplomats feared that excessive territorial losses 
would concentrate too many displaced Germans in a state already straining to provide 
sufficient foodstuffs.198 
The president’s concern with military issues, now growingly focused on gaining 
Soviet entry into the war against Japan, still dominated over postwar national security 
issues.  Roosevelt also appeared to dismiss the potential dangers of Soviet acquisition of 
German military technology.  The agreement concerning the zones of occupation for 
example conceded the German underground rocket factory in Nordhausen in the Harz 
Mountains to the Soviet military.199  Soviet absorption of this technology did help create a 
level playing field in military terms.  But the Japanese surprise attack at Pearl Harbor in 
1941 had underlined the new insecurity faced by the American population owing to modern 
technological developments.  The German rocket program only added to a growing list of 
military technologies that under a certain set of circumstances could threaten the United 
States or its allies.  In a climate heavily influenced by the militarizing effect of total war, the 
inability of the Roosevelt administration to control the proliferation of weapons technology 
frightened conservative critics long accustomed to viewing international relations through 
the lens of geopolitical and military power realities.200 
Other aspects of the Yalta agreements demonstrated an equally chilling lack of 
foresight.  While the Allies could agree on the need for significant changes to the structure 
of the German state, the exact contours remained an issue of contention.  Allied policy 




Jumping over policy hurdles by establishing committees to study the issues for subsequent 
resolution downplayed policy differences and helped to solidify the alliance.202  The Yalta 
agreement appeared to inaugurate a workable and unified occupation of Germany that 
could ameliorate the power interests of Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union.  But 
since the State and War Departments logically surmised that the policy depended on 
correctly understanding the impact of war on German industry and society, the agreement 
on territorial adjustments or a tentative reparations bill appeared to thinly disguise an 
important difference.  Washington unlike Moscow concerned itself with the survival of the 
German population and more importantly from the American perspective the health of the 
European economy. 
The priorities of demilitarization and the need to employ German resources for 
European reconstruction masked the underlying differences in policy.  The Yalta agreement 
prescribed that the individual powers could independently administer their respective zone 
of control if disagreements regarding the joint administration of Germany in the A.C.C. 
reduced that organization to impotence.203  The Allies implemented the E.A.C. assumption 
that the occupying powers did not intend the destruction of Germany and made unity of 
action the cornerstone of effective administration.  The administration of Germany, as 
defined by the E.A.C. and A.C.C., required a united administration to develop a functioning 
demilitarization and reparations system.  This system never materialized.  In spite of the 
A.C.C. meetings and policy papers, the A.C.C. failed to govern Germany as a single body.  
The French delegation, for example, vetoed most A.C.C. policies for the simple reason that 
the official French position rejected the unified administration of Germany.204  De Gaulle 
and later Georges Bidault adopted the position of weakening Germany through extensive 
border alterations.  The French position advocated the detachment of the Rhineland and 
Ruhr, defacto annexation of the Saar, and permanently controlling the industrial production 
of the Ruhr.205 
 The partition of Germany into zones of occupation administered by a foreign power 
with different occupation priorities made nonsense of effective E.A.C. administration of 
Germany.206  “The military governors in each of the four zones of occupation governed 
their own zones with few ACC directives”.207  The E.A.C. therefore only generated three 
basic papers including the terms of surrender, the zonal boundaries, and the control 
machinery agreements.  The failure of the Advisory Commission doomed effective A.C.C. 




what was agreed on paper, but what the powers perceived to be in their own national 
interest”.208 
Criticism of Roosevelt’s posture at Yalta quickly surfaced.  Conservatives 
concluded that “American diplomatic blunders during the war had resulted in a massive and 
unnecessary extension of Soviet power”.209  William C. Bullitt condemned the direction 
taken at Yalta as early as February 1945.  He pointed out that the decisions reached 
endangered the “Atlantic doctrine”.210  These critics accused Roosevelt of substituting one 
dictatorship with another, filling the Nazi power vacuum with another equally inhumane 
political system, and having made “total military victory a substitute for any carefully 
designed international political objectives”.211  The price of peace was seen as too high.  
These analysts raised the ubiquitous point that the restructuring of Germany’s eastern 
borders would lead to starvation and worse still “reduce the amount of deliveries which 
might otherwise have been exacted from Germany”.212  The critics questioned the entire 
rationale behind the industrial reorganization of Germany.  The selfish Soviet concentration 
on domestic well-being and Roosevelt’s willingness to placate Stalin forced the 
conservatives to consider alternatives to dismantling. 
But while the right shifted back towards an occupation policy of moderation, 
industrial demilitarization remained at the front of State Department policy.  The State 
Department’s “Draft Directive for the Treatment of Germany” that appeared in March 1945 
stressed the immediate demobilization of enemy forces and provided a short list of 
industrial control measures.  A subsequent paper composed the same month repeated the 
department’s dedication to the principle of complete industrial demilitarization.  This paper 
incorporated much of the language and tone characteristic of Morgenthau.213  Problems 
with this approach surfaced after Roosevelt’s death on 12 April 1945 and the demise of 
Hitler’s Reich a month later. 
3.8 Conclusion 
The hardliners remained steadfast.  The advocates of a harsh peace continued to 
promote the negative treatment of postwar German society despite considerable efforts by 
the military and foreign affairs specialists at pointing out serious dangers in industrial 
demilitarization as a workable concept.  Allied postwar demilitarization conceptions 
defined power in the concrete, measurable and predictable terms of state resources.  This 
traditional definition of power evaluated a state’s clear cut and quantifiable resources such 
as population, territory, natural resources, economic size, military forces and political 




components of overall economic power.  Additional factors such as scientific and technical 
leadership qualities came into play.215  The Allied governments stated openly during the 
war years that demilitarization represented a significant aspect of a new European order 
with the Anglo-Saxon states at the centre of power.  But realistic appraisals suggested that 
strict industrial demilitarization would impoverish German society and make the population 
“dependent on everything from soda ash to police protection”.216  An effective military 
administration of Germany depended on the defeated state’s economic and industrial 
system to provide the basic commodities needed by millions to survive.  The ongoing 
debate between national security priorities and effective administration suffered from the 
wholly unsatisfactory definition of military industry echoing throughout Washington in 
1945.  The seemingly simple task of destroying or dismantling armament production 
facilities conveyed the impression that a strict division between civilian and military realms 
in fact existed and utterly rejected the dilemma of dual-use technologies.  The hardliners 
furthermore failed to assess the physical destruction of Germany in 1945 and how the 
ruinous state of the urban infrastructure threatened to complicate every aspect of the 
occupation.  The broad nature of modern capitalist economies and the dependency of 
armaments production on domestic civilian industrial strength determined that 
demilitarization represented an enormous task that technically required the extirpation of 
the enemy’s entire industrial apparatus. 
Industrial demilitarization offered to solve a specific power problem in central 
Europe.  But other more pressing issues appeared to challenge the strict focus on security 
issues.  Policymakers feared the return to the chaos and instability of the 1930s.  A stable 
and growing global economy became the prerequisite for a secure new order.  Washington 
hoped that economic success would curb revolutionary desires.217  The Roosevelt 
administration had already discarded the failed concept of isolationism and embraced a 
policy of “multilateralism” predicated on the hope that common interests would bind other 
nations to the United States.218  The deindustrialization of Germany did not square well 
with any reconstruction policy.  The American elite found a protracted and costly 
occupation of Germany as anathema to their capitalist mindset.  American soldiers were 
needed domestically in the factories and generally in the economy.  The domestic economy 
had to revert to a civilian orientation.  Such moves necessarily meant a deterioration of 
American military strength as a visible manifestation.  Demobilization also determined that 
the demilitarization of Germany had to be swift affair.  
CHAPTER 4 
 
The Collapse of Dismantling as a Method 
 
I never give them hell. I just tell the truth and they think it's hell. 
 




Considering the importance historians attach to the eventual collision between 
capitalism and communism, as a dominant factor in leading to the decision by Washington 
and Moscow to reverse their policies and rearm Germany, this chapter departs from the 
investigation of industrial demilitarization to address the new president’s views of Josef 
Stalin and the Soviet Union.  The evidence strongly suggests that Harry S. Truman, the 
well-read but non-intellectual man from Missouri, cultivated a strongly negative view of his 
theoretical ally.  While difficult to estimate with precision, the president’s reservations 
concerning future relations with the communist state grew out of a general disliking of the 
Russian dictatorship that predated 1945.  Nor did the postwar actions of the Red Army offer 
any reason to change these beliefs.  This chapter demonstrates how excesses by the Soviet 
military helped generate the real fear outlined in the previous chapter that the American 
taxpayer would eventually shoulder the financial responsibilities for a German state reeling 
under the brutal exaction of revenge by Stalin’s military.  Moscow in many ways helped 
create or at least worsened the conditions of “disease and unrest” that the American military 
held as virtually inevitable.  Far from being unsympathetic to the enemy, the predominantly 
conservative ethos of the Truman administration led to the acceptance of the bulk of the 
concepts worked out by the State and War Departments during the final months of the war.  
This chapter demonstrates that Washington grew dissatisfied with Stalin’s singular focus on 
Soviet recovery.  American policy in the months between the Yalta and Potsdam 
conferences gravitated towards the necessity of a European-wide reconstruction program 
that for economic and moral reasons took the defeated enemy nation into account. 
4.2 The Revisionist Portrayal of Harry S. Truman 
Franklin D. Roosevelt did not explain his worldview or future designs for Europe 
and Germany to his vice-president.  The two men only met on two occasions outside of 
cabinet meetings on 8 and 19 March 1945 and never discussed “anything of consequence”.1  
Truman seemed ill-prepared to continue Roosevelt’s close relationship with Stalin.2  The 




dictator.  The Soviet Union, Truman frankly admitted, was characterized by “clubs, pistols 
and concentration camps”.3  This negative observation was symbolic of a conservative shift 
in American politics after Roosevelt’s death.  The right questioned Roosevelt’s warm 
relationship with Stalin.4  The shift did not necessarily imply a complete rejection of 
Roosevelt’s policy of cooperation.5  But Truman faced the daunting task of interpreting the 
direction of policy within a cabinet fractured by the former president’s insistence on 
awaiting the defeat of Germany prior to concrete policy formulation.  And time was against 
Truman.  The relatively quick defeat of Nazi military forces after his rise to the presidency 
left Washington in sore need of detailed planning.6 
Truman turned his full attention to the matters at hand.  But he needed more 
information.  On 13 April 1945, after only a few hours at his new post, the enthusiastic 
president requested that Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius formulate a full diplomatic 
report on the progress of the war and the coming peace.  Truman had limited experience 
with his own secretary of state and other key advisors.7  Considering the complexity of the 
war, a reality only exasperated by the knowledge of a terrible weapon of mass destruction, 
he required time to collect and digest the relevant information prior to putting his own 
personal stamp on policy.  Roosevelt’s old guard seemed reluctant.  Truman complained 
that the various departments of his administration only very slowly revealed important 
information concerning vital matters such as national security.  Secretary of War Henry 
Stimson, symptomatic of the level of confusion caused by the death of Roosevelt and 
perhaps even the ascendancy of Truman, waited 12 days to reveal the existence of the 
Manhattan Project to the new president.8    The president’s decision-making difficulties 
only increased with the end of the fighting in Europe and Asia.  The reversion to a state of 
peace extinguished the considerable powers that Roosevelt had enjoyed in wartime.9  The 
men of his administration took on even greater importance. 
Although not in the traditional of a purge, Truman over the course of a year 
radically altered the composition of the cabinet bequeathed to him.  He sacked or nudged 
many of Roosevelt’s most prominent supporters out of office and out of range.  This list 
included the Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, the Secretary of Commerce 
Henry A. Wallace, the Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes and Stettinius.  Only the 
Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, the man who coined the phrase “the Russians are 
coming” prior to his tragic suicide in 1949, remained after the dust settled.  Truman, having 
served as an artillery officer in World War One, surrounded himself with advisors drawn 




Lucius D. Clay were granted wide latitude in conducting the occupations of Japan and 
Germany.  General Walter Bedell Smith, Dwight D. Eisenhower's Chief of Staff during the 
war, was appointed United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union.  General Albert Coady 
Wedemeyer was sent on a special mission in China.  General George C. Marshall, the most 
prominent military figure in the cabinet, would later assume the responsibilities of secretary 
of state.  The cabinet exhibited a similar pattern.  The non-military figures—a list that 
included Clinton P. Anderson (Agriculture), James Byrnes (State) Tom C. Clark (Justice), 
Robert E. Hannegan (Post Office), William Averell Harriman (Commerce), Julius A. Krug 
(Interior), Lewis B. Schwellenbach (Labor) and Frederick M. Vinson (Treasury)—retained 
strong business links. 
 The new composition of the executive partially indicated the growing influence of 
the military in policy formulation set in motion by Roosevelt.  But the action also illustrated 
Truman’s general disliking for some of the men who surrounded Roosevelt.  Truman 
accepted the resignation of Morgenthau on 5 July 1945 after refusing the secretary’s plea to 
join the American delegation heading for Potsdam in order to decide the fate of the 
enemy.10  Morgenthau, as pointed out in the previous chapter, ostensibly aimed at salvaging 
some of the substance of his plan for Germany.  The native of Missouri did not take kindly 
to Morgenthau’s extreme mindset.  Truman later explained that “Morgenthau didn't know 
shit from apple butter”.11  The president also replaced Roosevelt's reparations negotiator 
Isador Lubin with Edwin Pauley.  This conservative oil entrepreneur brushed off both 
Soviet claims for $10 billion in reparations and earlier State Department estimates that 
Germany could in fact support the transfer of $12-14 billion.  Pauley brought a degree of 
business acumen to the negotiating table and he understood the irrationality of agreeing to 
reparations percentages without establishing a better understanding of conditions in postwar 
Germany.  As American representative in the Reparations Commission, he proceeded to 
block all Soviet efforts at fixing a specific amount and played for time.12 
For Carolyn Woods Eisenberg, these new policymakers based their postwar policy 
on “a conception of national security that took the expansion of West European free trade as 
an absolute requirement for the United States”.13  Anti-communist conservatives and Ivy 
League corporate elites in the War and State Departments rejected Roosevelt and the 
Treasury Department notion of a strong postwar working relationship with Stalin primarily 
to safeguard the highly entwined American and western European industrial interests.14  
These conservatives had furthermore unkindly greeted the wartime alliance with Stalin.  




stated after the German defeat at Stalingrad in 1943 that “Now that the tide had turned, it 
was in our interest to let Germany and Russia bleed each other white”.15  Truman argued a 
similar point in 1941.  Kenneth Strong, Dwight D. Eisenhower's intelligence chief, told 
Noel Annan that Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (S.H.A.E.F.) generals 
actually discussed a harsh anti-Soviet postwar policy.  “[W]hen the Germans are finished”, 
Strong repeated, “we shall push the Russians back to their pre-war frontiers”.16  British 
officers actually intensified this debate after war’s end by pushing the idea of protecting a 
western German region from penetration by the Soviet military..  In July 1945, the British 
Chiefs of Staff recommended that “if Russia turned hostile Britain would have to 
incorporate as large a part of Germany within the Western sphere”.17  These considerations 
were built on a negative view of Stalin and the future of the wartime alliance. 
Bitter debate concerning the primary individuals and executive agencies responsible 
for the formulation of American policy in Germany characterizes the historiography.  
Revisionists assert that this small clique of American banking and business elites formed 
foreign policy to comply with their selfish interests and that the public “followed, not 
shaped, American policy”.18  The revisionists press the claim of contemporary opponents of 
Truman’s foreign policy that the administration acted without popular support.19  Spurious 
comments by Dean Acheson, a prominent figure in the Truman administration seem to 
confirm the revisionist stance concerning elitist disdain for public influence in foreign 
policy.  “If you truly had a democracy and did what the people wanted”, Acheson remarked 
in 1952, “you'd go wrong every time”.20  American presidents and the executive branch, in 
the opinion of the revisionist historiography, dominated foreign policy formulation and 
limited mass democratic participation.  The elites after May 1945, seen from the revisionist 
perspective, attempted to “mobilize” public opinion to support a foreign policy driven by 
economic concerns.  This policy threatened to destabilize the concept of peaceful 
coexistence with Stalin. 
A negative appraisal of the conservative attitude towards Germany drives the 
revisionist critique of the Truman administration.  The revisionists portray the conservatives 
as disciples of the Machiavellian Prince.  According to Eisenberg, the American concern 
with capitalism helped perpetuate conservative and anti-communist tendencies in Germany.  
The apparent fear of altering the German economic order at the expense of western 
European recovery permitted the more odious elements of German society to remain in a 
position of power.  A “virulent anticommunism” within Washington, along with the 




and economic reform.21  But other studies of the American extraction of intellectual 
information and industrial equipment from Germany indicate that the Truman 
administration did not find reparations incompatible with economic recovery.  As later 
chapters testify, Washington employed the need for industrial demilitarization to excuse the 
extraction of all kinds of items that only remotely harboured a military use.  The view 
explained in the previous chapter, namely that the Truman administration tied European 
reconstruction to German heavy industry and that this concept represented the “linchpin” of 
Washington’s European policy does not imply either that German reparations were 
minimal in nature or that a concern for the prewar elite dominated all facets of policy.22 
Noam Chomsky furthermore asserts that scholars misconstrue the nature and 
importance of postwar national security demands on postwar American and Soviet Policy.  
In true revisionist fashion, Chomsky argues that American planners and elected officials 
understood the relative military weakness of the Soviet position, and focused on the 
potential spread of communism beyond the confines of the Soviet sphere and the challenge 
to American power that this represented.  The revisionists claim that the chimera of an 
expansionist Soviet leadership, either by political or military means, mobilized American 
client governments and the domestic populations to willingly accept a decidedly 
conservative and capitalist policy direction.  Stalin, in Chomsky’s opinion, followed in a 
similar vein.  The dictator dismissed the probability of postwar military confrontation with 
the United States and proceeded to demonize the capitalist democracies to unite the Soviet 
masses behind him.  Both sides employed a simplified and stereotypical image of the other 
to cultivate a climate of fear for policy ends.  This tacit agreement became the basis for the 
Cold War division of the globe.23 
But the War and State Department’s “soft” approach to postwar Germany, as 
pointed out in the previous chapter, predated the death of Roosevelt.  Any incongruence or 
fluctuations of this policy, after the straightforward presentation of reality as perceived in 
1944 and 1945, were political or emotional in nature.  The Morgenthau interlude clearly 
represented an emotive response to the horrors of war.  Political wrangling also curved the 
direction of policy.  That is, both War and State Departments emerged from the war locked 
in a struggle over policy formulation and implementation.  Establishing military 
requirements according to military necessity, the extension of military calculations into 
foreign policy, brought the soldiers into conflict with the diplomats.24  The logical grounds 
for adopting a “soft” approach remained.  And the benefits of using German industrial 




exerted a tremendous magnetic pull on Washington long before the guns fell silent.  
Truman gravitated towards the policy for the same utilitarian reasons.   
 He therefore applied considerable pressure to convince Congress and the American 
public of the need to rebuild Europe and a democratic and demilitarized Germany as the 
“linchpin” of American postwar policy.25  The revisionists imply that the American public, 
largely in favour of amicable relations with “Uncle Joe” as Stalin was affectionately called 
by the press, had to be cajoled into accepting the conservative position.  The revisionists 
lament the failure of the various committees of Congress, such as the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations, to significantly influence foreign policy formulation.  The wartime 
national security priorities and subsequent freeze of Soviet relations, they argue, 
concentrated decision-making power into Truman’s hands and limited the impact of 
Congress on foreign affairs.26  Partly for these reasons, the Truman administration 
succeeded.  In this instance of intense propaganda, the government convinced 72 percent of 
Americans of the need to rebuild Germany by January 1947.27  The American media 
fulfilled an important political function in helping to form domestic acceptance of the “new 
course” in German policy.28  
 The revisionist position concerning policy formation by a small elite core of 
capitalists however fails to account for the democratization of foreign policy during the 20th 
Century and the effect of public involvement in professional foreign policy formulation.  
Technological advances in communications permitted ever greater public involvement in 
foreign policy decisions and to a certain extent infringed on the power of the State 
Department.  This involvement exhibited a tendency of moralizing and emotionalizing 
world events and judging foreign policy responses against the crude schema of right and 
wrong.  This process of simplification forced elected officials to enter the foreign affairs 
arena and limit the influence of the professionals.  The attempt to gain domestic political 
capital from foreign affairs by the politicians weakened the older forms of negotiation for 
the maximization of state interests.29  The progressive weakening of technical diplomacy by 
the elected executives in order to thwart public criticism and survive in office led in part to 
certain policy fluctuations regarding Germany. 
During the 1990s, historians reassessed the nature of Allied military government in 
Germany from a perspective other than the inter-Allied conflicts concerning reparations and 
the future composition of the German political system.30  A concentration on Allied cultural 
projects, foreign exchanges, and non-governmental organizations pointed to an active 




fashion, demonstrates that the policies of the western Allies strengthened the resolve of 
Germans in their respective zones of control to accept democratic capitalism and reject both 
the old conservative right along with the radical right.32  This trend attacks the standard 
revisionist argument that a strongly anti-communist and highly conservative American 
policy promoted the retention of old political elites in Germany and therefore squandered 
the opportunity for effective democratization or led to a breakdown in relations with Stalin.  
American policy in Germany, as emphasized in the last chapter, tried to balance a policy of 
restructuring with economic and political realities. 
4.3 Truman’s Views Concerning the Soviet Union and Germany 
Truman met with Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov in Washington on 
23 April 1945 only eleven days after assuming the presidency.  The meeting followed 
Stalin’s refusal to send the Soviet Foreign Minister to attend the upcoming San Francisco 
conference.  The assembly aimed at the creation of a replacement for the failed League of 
Nations.  Not only did Stalin seem uninterested in the new global organization, an 
important postwar aim of the Roosevelt administration, the dictator appeared willing to 
provoke Washington.  Stalin accused the Anglo-Saxon powers of breaching the provisions 
of the grand alliance, the determination to impose unconditional surrender on the enemy, by 
accepting the surrender of the German forces in Italy constituted a breach of the grand 
alliance.33  Washington and London on the other hand opposed the Soviet reorganization of 
the Lublin government of Poland and the creation of a virtual puppet state under the 
hammer and sickle.  British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden had encouraged Truman to 
discuss the Soviet failure to abide by the Yalta accord concerning Poland.  Stettinius 
reported to Truman that Soviet actions in Poland were indicative of a “firm and 
uncompromising position on nearly every major question”.34  Truman lashed out at 
Molotov.35  The president cut short Molotov’s feeble attempt to defend the Soviet position 
with a reference to Polish wartime activities against the Red Army.  While Truman “desired 
the friendship of the Soviet government”, he angrily continued that “it could only be on the 
basis of mutual observation of agreements”.36  The president left the room after the brief 
barrage of Molotov.37 
Truman’s rough handling of Molotov was probably intended to encourage some 
sort of a quick resolution to the Polish problem.  The action by itself did not reflect a 
rejection of Roosevelt’s policy of cooperation.38  Charles E. Bohlen, an American diplomat, 
in fact speculated that Roosevelt’s reaction the Soviet absorption of Poland would have 




Poland however elicited a sharp reply from Stalin.  But an escalation of the war of words 
over Poland did not seem in the interests of either great power.  “In the ensuing weeks”, 
George F. Kennan later explained, “Truman somewhat softened his words, if not his 
attitudes, in his communications with the Kremlin”.40  Truman backed away from his desire 
to immediately suspend lend-lease shipments to the Soviet Union after considerable protest 
by communist negotiators.41  The president also pressured an unwilling Winston Churchill 
to accept the withdrawal of western military forces to the borders agreed at Yalta.42  The 
Truman administration in any case backed down and subsequently recognized the Soviet 
puppet government in Warsaw after a few minor concessions.43  The president generally 
seemed willing to keep the relationship with Stalin on civil terms. 
Soviet newspapers nevertheless adopted an extremely critical view of Washington 
during this period.  Kennan, stationed in Moscow, sent his department a summary of an 
April 1945 “Pravda” article that demonstrated “dangerous connections” between German 
and American industrialists.  The article mentioned that American businesses in 1943 still 
held onto enemy property valued at $1.29 billion and concluded that “capital investments 
were larger in Germany than in any other country except Canada” prior to the war.  The 
article chastised American business for nourishing their cartel arrangements with German 
industry during the war, especially between I.G. Farben and Du Pont, and helping enemy 
industrialists to disguise their holdings by buying plant and patents.44  This article and 
others did not represent wild speculation.  The knowledge that American and German 
businesses worked with another during the interwar emerged openly in 1945.  A 
subcommittee of Congress published a large document that emphasized how German 
industrialists learned modern mass production in the United States.  The transfer of 
industrial knowledge, in the opinion of the report, “accidentally played an important role in 
the technical arming of Germany”.45  This development was only possible because of an 
intricate relationship that characterized the dealings of many firms.46  Considering the tough 
debates in Washington concerning the most logical course of European reconstruction, and 
the importance attributed to German industry, the Soviet hypothesis that American 
capitalists nourished an idea of restoring the substance of the defeated state’s industry was 
not wide off the mark. 
But Moscow adopted the crude line of argumentation later taken up by the 
revisionists.  Washington’s early concentration on German recovery, termed a selfish policy 
geared towards domestic economic stability built on a platform of global expansion, 




principle problem faced by American policymakers concerning a Germany widely believed 
as destroyed by aerial bombing.  Restricted by geopolitical considerations, the revisionists 
gravitate towards the idea that American business elites hoped to employ residual German 
industrial muscle in a manner anathema to Stalin.  This perspective follows the Stalinist 
mindset—explored at a later date—that a functioning postwar world depended on the 
disappearance of German industry. 
The negative discolouration of American policy contains unsavoury morale 
implications.  Tom Bower for example writes that the western German state, fortified by 
American dollars, later dismissed the reparations issue altogether and gave “nothing in 
return”.48  The revisionists therefore imply that Washington ultimately dismissed the 
morale imperative of reparations by sanctioning the reconstruction of German business.  
This dissertation does not take a stand on this issue owing to the difficulties in tabulating the 
monetary value of morality.  It should instead be noted that the objections of revisionists 
seem to rest with the postwar reconstruction of western German heavy industry itself.  This 
argument defies rational analysis.  If American and German business elites maintained a 
close relationship, and this argument appears strong, the intertwined arrangement naturally 
promoted a “softer” approach to Germany in order to shield American holdings from 
reparations seizures and to protect trade patterns.  It is simply hard to imagine 
overwhelming American elitist support for the Soviet postwar conceptions that ignored 
decades of historical development and a particular business ethos. 
The words of “Pravda” indicated trouble ahead.  A new mentality in Washington 
also influenced a particularly negative response.  The president’s minor concessions could 
not mask a growing distrust of Soviet intentions or the “deeply undermined” nature of the 
grand alliance.49  Even though a framework of cooperation still characterized Truman’s 
policy in the summer of 1945,50 the president reevaluated American foreign policy during 
these months and generally did not like what he read.  The Yalta agreements, from 
Truman’s perspective, revealed how seriously American and Soviet perceptions of the 
postwar world diverged.  He dismissed the Yalta accords as imprecise.51  Washington’s 
growing awareness of strains in the alliance furthermore continued according to the 
tradition established by Roosevelt and observed international relations from a military 
perspective.52  Some historians concerned with the militarization of American foreign 
policy after 1945 blame Truman’s proclivity towards a military perspective as a primary 
reason for the disappearance of Roosevelt’s policy of cooperation.53  The continuation of 




normalcy.  But the militarization of policy perspectives remained after the guns fell silent.  
The requirements of national security, in Daniel Yergin’s opinion, represented the 
“commanding idea” of American foreign policy in the postwar period.54  Washington 
subjected all international problems and disputes to a military calculus that gauged the 
American ability to respond militarily.  The expanded interests of the United States in 1945, 
in any case, required an exponential increase in direct military power to permit the effective 
global projection of power.55   
This perspective however fails to adequately acknowledge the impact of the 
Japanese military strike against the American fleet in Pearl Harbor in December 1941.56  
The Japanese assault demonstrated American vulnerability in the face of modern military 
technology.  A strong industrial and economic system and significant oceanic barriers no 
longer guaranteed the safety of the United States.57  American policymakers had 
traditionally resisted the erosion of sovereignty implied by international negotiations and 
arrangements.  The shock of Pearl Harbor helped convince the staunch proponents of 
isolationism such as Senator Arthur Vandenberg of the limits of unilateral policy.  
Vandenberg changed direction to support multilateral negotiations in the United Nations 
after victory.58  A new geopolitical framework arose out of the destruction of the war.  
American policymakers developed a new multilateral approach that retained some of the 
earlier conceptions.59  As Kennan put it, a “country which in 1900 had no thought that its 
prosperity and way of life could in any way be threatened by the outside world had arrived 
by 1950 at a point where it seemed to be able to think of little else but this danger”.60 
The postwar continuation of isolationist tendencies within the United States only 
marginally interfered with the Truman administration’s foreign policy aims and military 
priorities.  Overemphasizing Congress and the public’s fervour to start postwar 
reconstruction, however, should not be confused with prewar isolationism.  A significant 
demand for demobilization and a desire to forestall expensive reconstruction contributions 
to foreign states or equally expensive defensive expenditures characterized the postwar 
variant.  The experience of the war of course eroded the prewar basis of isolationism.  The 
barbarity of the Nazis spawned the idea that the democratic states should prevent tyrants 
and their states from acts of infamy.  Technological developments such as the rocket and 
the atomic bomb added to the dangers of surprise attack experienced at Pearl Harbor.  Most 
importantly for the entire fabric of American society, wartime military industrial needs 
reinforced the growing dependency of modern society on resource allocation and the 




The notion of military preparedness gripped Washington.  Policymakers now 
understood national security in general terms encompassing the various elements relating to 
productive capacity.  Raw materials, industrial infrastructure, skilled manpower and 
military bases constituted the ingredients of state power.  Truman, Forrestal, and Marshall 
therefore pushed hard after 1945 for the adoption of conscription in order to balance 
military capabilities with national security interests.62  In an appeal to Congress on 6 
September 1945, the president requested an extension of wartime selective service for men 
between 18 and 25 for a period of two years and announced his desire to institute a 
universal training program.63  Even though Congress ultimately rejected compulsory 
military service as “un-American”, Truman’s vehement stand on extending the draft into 
peacetime demonstrated how a new perspective impacted traditional American values.64  
“The most fundamental strategic interest of the United States”, Melvyn Leffler argues, “was 
to prevent any potential adversary or coalition of adversaries from mobilizing the resources 
and economic military potential of Europe for war-making purposes”.65  This argument 
implicitly specified that no other state could be allowed to attain military power equivalent 
to that of the United States and their allies. 
The return to postwar normalcy entailed by demobilization by definition threatened 
to weaken the level of military strength considered an important and necessary element of 
the new multilateral postwar global system.  But American military planners could not 
easily translate the dominant national security conceptions based on increased peacetime 
strength into an “actual” defensive program during the early postwar period.  The American 
military demobilized relatively swiftly and the number of soldiers fell from 12 million in 
June 1945 to 1.5 million in June 1947.66  These developments worried military planners 
now accustomed to defining their requirements in global terms and they kept a close eye on 
international political and economic affairs.  Derived from wartime experience, the Truman 
administration could only compensate for the decreasing number of soldiers in the 
American ground forces by relying on the great strength of the United States—the 
industrial system.  Truman relied on the overwhelming economic strength of the United 
States instead of bulging military muscle.67 
American economic interests mattered.  With the world’s largest intact economic 
infrastructure, fortified by the extremely coercive firepower of the American nuclear 
arsenal, Greg Herkin implies that Truman disregarded Soviet aversion to the march of 
capitalism.68  But the Truman administration defined their vision of a reconstituted postwar 




compensate for steadily decreasing troop strength.  Washington linked the military and 
economic security of the United States to the ascendancy of capitalism.  “As long as we can 
outproduce the world, can control the sea and can strike inland with the atomic bomb,” 
argued Forrestal, “we can assume certain risks otherwise unacceptable in an effort to restore 
world trade, to restore the balance of power—military power—and to eliminate some of the 
conditions which breed war”.69  The democratic capitalist conversion of Germany into a 
trade partner of the United States represented a condition of this policy.  But such 
ideological considerations did not represent the only argument.  Eisenberg points out how 
Clay worked closely with the American industrialists and bankers in the Economics 
Division of the military government in Germany such as Division Director William Draper 
of Dillon, Read & Co., Graeme Howard of General Motors, Frederick Devereux of I.T.T. 
and Rufus Wysor of Republic Steel.  Clay agreed with these industrialists that only the 
support and resurrection of the German business elite could help revive Germany.70  The 
Truman administration not only attempted to create a world order conducive to American 
political and economic interests in search of security.71  A large group of Americans 
actually believed in the superiority of their system. 
Scholastic attention to the postwar sometimes asserts that the capitalist mindset 
espoused that the Truman administration attempted to avoid a domestic economic recession 
by gaining access to international markets.72  But what markets?  Americans looked on the 
developed economies of Europe and Asia and observed only smouldering ruins.  The 
American economy, despite the tremendous strides made in wartime military output, could 
not return these states to economic health alone.  The American economy first of all 
suffered a series of setbacks during the immediate postwar period.  The reorganization of a 
civilian-driven economy represented a particular problem.  Congress, the military and the 
captains of industry fought during the war over critical resources and manpower.73  The 
Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, established by Roosevelt on 27 May 1943 
and directed by James Byrnes with the close support of Clay, worked particularly hard to 
balance attempts by industrialists to husband their workers and the needs of the generals for 
more soldiers.74  American military production “peaked” in 1943 and slowly receded in a 
climate of shortages.75  The impending victory in Europe changed matters significantly.  
Congress demanded that Washington end the wartime subsidization of the military 
industrial complex to bring the budget in order during 1945.  Truman sanctioned the 
slashing of expenditures on military hardware and orders for new weapons of all types.  The 




1947.76  This reduction in state funding precipitated a fall in overall productivity as civilian 
industries reorganized to satiate the voracious world hunger for industrial goods. 
The American public in particular grew restless.  Domestic industries could not 
work fast enough for the general populace.  Shortages in housing, automobiles, sugar and 
coffee turned the postwar American population increasingly against the Truman 
administration.77  The Democrats suffered heavily in the 1946 congressional elections 
owing to the popular dissatisfaction with the speed of reconversion.  A series of debilitating 
strikes furthermore paralysed production as workers clamoured for higher pay.  Over 
800,000 steel workers walked off the job in 1946 in the “largest strikes” in American 
history.78  Coal miners put down their tools and joined the strikes on 19 November 1946.  
Shortages in a wide range of component parts shut down the production of automobiles and 
trucks at Ford and Chrysler plants.79  Approximately 4.6 million American workers sat idle 
during 1946 resulting in the loss of 116 million man-days of work.  Serious global coal 
shortages, worsened by these strikes, led the British government to complain to the 
secretary of state.  London pointed out that the strikes had an “extremely serious impact” on 
the economies of Europe.80  Washington had great difficulties in coming to grips with the 
problem.  Truman even threatened to draft the steel workers as a desperate act of 
coercion.81 
The difficult state of the global economy, subsequently worsened by domestic 
American developments, helped turn Truman’s gaze towards Germany.  The president 
immediately accepted the War and State Department’s wartime position after taking office 
that the reestablishment of a politically and economically stable Europe required a 
reconstructed German industrial system.82  The Secretary of War Henry Stimson informed 
Truman on 16 May 1945 that “The eighty million Germans and Austrians in central Europe 
today necessarily swing the balance of that continent”.83  The central problem, according to 
Stimson, represented “how to render Germany harmless as a potential aggressor, and at the 
same time enable her to play her part in the necessary rehabilitation of Europe”.84  This 
dilemma would characterize postwar deliberations.   
Prior to meeting with Churchill and Stalin at Potsdam to discuss the fate of the 
defeated nation, Truman stated that he desired “all the bargaining power–all the cards in my 
hands, and the plan on Germany is one of them”.85  But Truman accepted the belief that the 
economic recovery of Europe depended on the revival of heavy industry in Germany 
centred on the extraction of coal.  In one of the president’s first directives to the American 




yields of approximately 25 million tons by April 1946.86  The statistics demonstrate that 
German companies set to work fulfilling this demand in the postwar and they mined 152 
million tons (nearly 100 percent of the prewar western German average) alone during 1948 
and much more in subsequent years.87  Truman’s bold instruction indicated more than 
attention to mining levels in Germany.  His policy depended on the joint administration of 
Germany owing to the fact that the American zone contained few resources and was largely 
devoid of coal.  The revival of the civilian industry in Germany therefore represented the 
“essential objective of American foreign policy ever since the summer of 1945”.88 
The overriding importance attached by Washington to the economic recovery of 
Germany technically impacted all other conceptions of occupation.  Did Washington 
however see a connection between heavy industrial revival and military capabilities?  In 
regards to the bulk of evidence suggesting Washington’s support of economic recovery, 
Arnold A. Offner in fact speculates that “Truman had no interest in a unified, neutral, or 
demilitarized Germany”.89  The evidence however demonstrates that the president did not 
view general reconstruction and the demilitarization of industry as conflicting principles in 
1945.  The premium placed on reconstruction did not influence the American seizure of 
technology, certain industrial facilities or scientific research.  Truman issued executive 
Order 9604 on 25 August 1945 and sanctioned the American seizure of “all information 
concerning scientific, industrial and technological processes, inventions, methods, devices, 
improvements and advances heretofore or hereafter obtained by any department or agency 
of this Government in enemy countries regardless of its origins, or in liberated areas, if such 
information if of enemy origin or has been acquired or appropriated by the enemy”.90  
Other methods of industrial demilitarization, as later chapters emphasize, were needed to 
create conditions of peace—methods that integrated economic recovery. 
Nor did Washington necessarily promote a rigidly conservative capitalist state.  
Daniel E. Rogers demonstrates that American denazification conceptions did not stoke the 
fires of antisocialism in pursuit of a conservative capitalist ascendancy.  Policymakers 
simply hoped to avoid the political instability of Weimar.  The occupation authorities 
discouraged splinter and special interest organizations from drawing support from the major 
German political parties.  Washington discouraged the political activities of the vehemently 
socialist antifascist or “Antifa” committees, but also targeted the refugee single-issue 
organizations of a more conservative leaning.  The spectre of communist totalitarianism 
nevertheless remained.  The growing Cold War tensions led to a reclassification of the 




Rebecca A. Boehling laments the American decision to block the “Antifas” from the 
avenues of power, and argues that such a policy hindered the democratization process.92  It 
is however difficult to understand why Washington should have sanctioned organizations 
that flirted dangerously with a dictatorial format that the western Allies were trying to 
uproot. 
The denazification of industry followed a similar pattern.  Washington originally 
focused on the big names to avoid a “gutting of German industry during its crucial period of 
reconstruction”.93  The Allies arrested industrial magnates such as Alfried Krupp von 
Bohlen und Halbach and Friedrich Flick.  Complicity represented a banality.  Business 
leaders could not blind Washington from the truth of industrialist involvement in Hitler’s 
war.  The American occupation authorities, as examined earlier, were well aware of at least 
tacit German industrial complicity in Hitler’s rise to power and the atrocities that followed.  
Military government analysis of the largest German banking institution, the Deutsche Bank, 
illustrated the deep links between financial sector and the criminal activities in the occupied 
areas.94  The Deutsche Bank controlled 28 percent of AEG, 38 percent of IG Farben, 49 
percent of DEMAG and 53 percent of Mannesmann-Röhrenwerken.  These firms, the 
control of which increasingly concentrated into fewer and fewer hands as the war 
progressed, were either directly involved in the extermination of European Jews or 
employed large numbers of slave labourers.95  But the trials did not form a part of any 
viable deindustrialization conception. 
Historians emphasize how these men concentrated on various public relations 
schemes in the immediate postwar in order to cleanse themselves of the association with 
Nazism.  The industrialists mobilized considerable resources at the Nuremberg trials.  
German heavy industry banded together to streamline the collection of documents intended 
to “serve both the immediate needs of the legal defense and aid future historians and 
attorneys in their pursuit of accurate information relating to industry during the Third 
Reich”.96  Industrialists pursued a revision of history primarily for domestic German 
consumption in order to deflect Marxist criticism of capitalism among the working classes 
and safeguard their positions as elites.  Extensive pressure was brought down on the 
occupation authorities during the trial period that lasted from the original incarceration after 
May 1945 to the release of convicted and imprisoned industrialists by the High 





Scholastic criticism of the conservative nature of the Truman administration should 
not obscure the fact that the concept of German industrial recovery predated or perhaps 
even spawned the conflicts with Stalin.  Subsequent sections reinforce Stalin’s negative 
reaction to the American support of the principle of German industrial survival.  But the 
historical record clearly demonstrates that Washington’s newly entrenched conservatism 
did not diminish the desire to demilitarize industry or punish prominent Nazis.  The 
conservatives, in echoing the preliminary work of the State and War departments, only 
questioned the means and not the end of controlling dual-use facilities.  These men believed 
that the fate of the postwar global economy depended on a strong German heavy industry 
that produced a wide range of goods for the civilian economy.  Stalin, for a host of reasons, 
appeared determined to jeopardize relations with Truman’s government—and the health of 
the postwar world—in pursuit of a Carthaginian peace that could not even benefit the 
Soviet Union.  While historians can successfully argue that support for traditional elites in 
Germany by the conservatives in Washington represented an outcome of Cold War 
tensions with the Soviet Union, this viewpoint does not hold true for the economic and 
industrial survival of Germany. 
4.4 The Blanket Soviet Seizure of Reparations 
As pointed out, American-Soviet relations started to sour in the aftermath of the 
Yalta Conference.  The inability to hammer out a workable system of control in Germany 
based on reparations in particular revealed the future problems of gaining Soviet interest in 
establishing a rational postwar order.  The months after Yalta also revealed how seriously 
American and Soviet perceptions of the postwar diverged.  Lend-lease issues and the 
entrenchment of Soviet military control in eastern Europe, while problematic, did not 
however doom the alliance.  Nor did the appointment of Truman, an outspoken critic of 
Stalin and his brutal brand of communism, initially divide the world into warring camps.  
Stalin’s inability to agree with the logic of western conceptions concerning Germany 
represented another matter. 
While Stalin left most other matters of occupation policy such as the final treatment 
of prisoners of war and civilians ill-defined and open to wide speculation,98 Soviet 
authorities immediately carried out the dictator’s policy of seizing reparations in Germany.  
The evidence clearly demonstrates that Soviet policy did not concern itself with the impact 
of reparations on industrial capacities or the matter of a functioning economy until the 
Berlin Blockade of 1948 made the division of Germany a permanent reality.99  The 




stages of the war and the months following defeat only appeared haphazard and lacking in 
direction.  Until political necessity impacted opinion, the Soviet authorities removed large 
percentages of salvageable industrial equipment from the factories they physically 
occupied.  The statistics support the interpretation of Stalin’s policies as akin to 
pastoralization. 
Polish investigations of German industry in the annexed territories revealed that the 
war and Soviet looting destroyed and removed 96 percent of industrial equipment and 
virtually everything else of even dubious value including bathtubs and radiators.100  A host 
of sources corroborate this conclusion.  The Soviet military authorities, according to initial 
American estimates, dismantled 95 percent of Berlin’s industrial machinery before the 
western Allies marched their troops into the ravaged city.  Brigadier Frank Howley, who 
commanded the first detachment of Americans to enter Berlin in July and helped form the 
first impressions of Soviet activities, recalled that  
They had dismantled the refrigeration plant at the abattoir, torn stoves and pipes out of 
restaurant kitchens, stripped machinery from mills and factories and were completing 
the theft of the American Singer Sewing Machine plant when we arrived.  Over in the 
British sector, they had taken out generating equipment from the only modern plant in 
the city.  Much of the looted equipment was of dubious use or had been wrecked 
through ignorance.101 
 
The equipment left behind by the Soviet military in Berlin was wither too heavy, such as 
the presses of the Borsig plant, or buried under heaps of rubble.102  A prominent American 
politician described the Soviet reparations policy during a visit to Germany in the summer 
of 1945.  “The Russians moved in with such violence at the beginning”, he wrote, 
“stripping factories and raping women” and “What they didn't take, they destroyed”.103  
This unbalanced policy of revenge symbolized Soviet activities in the minds of 
policymakers. 
It is nearly impossible for historians to place a figure on Soviet seizures.  The 
frontline troops pillaged shops and homes.  Special Soviet “trophy battalions” travelled 
throughout the occupied territories in pursuit of machinery and equipment of all categories 
and shipped them east.  Since the Soviet authorities did not record the original reparations 
seized by the advancing troops, and only initiated accounting after 2 August 1945, the total 
sum of goods seized from the eastern zone cannot be known with any precision.104  The 
lack of a Soviet equivalent to the American Bombing Survey furthermore distorts any 
assessment of immediate reparations seizures or even the values recorded.  Historians 




bombing and combat operations intact.  Norman M. Naimark speculates that seizures prior 
to 2 August 1945 exceeded the $10 billion in reparations demanded by Stalin.105  Certain 
inconsistencies also emerged in the American reporting of Soviet activities in Berlin.  
Subsequent American observations in Berlin recorded the continued operation of certain 
facilities vital to the economy of the city such as power plants and chemical industries.  
Historical research, built on the conclusions reached by Naimark, however indicates that the 
Soviet authorities removed about one-third of the productive capacity, 80 pecent of the 
machine-tools, and 60 percent of light and specialized industrial products.106  These 
seizures significantly lowered the recuperative powers of eastern Germany and the region’s 
potential to provide reparations from current production.  The loss of the Silesian and Berlin 
production centres—subsequent chapters demonstrate that the loss was not nearly as 
catastrophic in the latter case—also impacted Germany’s ability to trade manufactured 
goods for raw materials and other necessary imports.  The American interpretation of these 
events, seen from Howley’s perspective, reinforced the notion already discussed in the State 
Department that Stalin supported a reparations policy devoid of any sense of fairness or 
economic logic. 
The historiography that assesses the success of Stalin’s reparations program in 
stimulating the Soviet economy yields a disappointing answer.  Despite the promise Stalin 
attached to reparations, the “poorly executed” and chaotic program of stripping industry did 
not yield the results hoped for by Stalin.  Most of the equipment seized remained unused 
and sat idle still packed in creates years after 1945.107  But the inability to effectively utilize 
German machine-tools and industrial equipment did not still Stalin’s appetite for more.  
Dismantling steadily increased throughout 1945 and 1946.  Charles F. Pennacchio 
concludes that Moscow eliminated the eastern German ability to rebuild without 
considerable foreign assistance.108  The Soviet reparations policy ultimately represented a 
catastrophic mistake that failed to benefit any of the parties involved. 
The next chapter addresses the issue of how much loot the Americans seized after 
victory.  For the moment it is worthwhile to record that the historiography draws certain 
similarities between the communist and democratic occupation practices.  The work of 
John Gimbel and others focuses on the western reparations policy to advance the argument 
that the nature of the occupation in the western zones did not differ as markedly as 
traditionally believed.  American soldiers did in fact behave like their Soviet counterparts 
and “went into German farmhouses and took carpets from floors, pictures from walls, wine 




yards”.109  “The occupation of Germany by the Western Powers was like a new Raj”, 
Douglas Botting explains, “colonial, exploitive, but in part paternalistic and well-
intentioned.  Like most colonial rule it suffered from indecisive, out-of-touch direction from 
the home government, and its effectiveness – or lack of it – depended in large measure on 
the quality of the men on the ground, which was sometimes suspect”.110  But the theft of 
chickens, wine and artwork did not markedly alter the productive capacities of industry and 
the largely revisionist argument seems trivial. 
4.5 Reparations at Potsdam and Reactions to Soviet Moral Abandon 
A determined Truman sailed for Europe in mid-1945 with the intention of battling 
Stalin and achieving a policy victory at Potsdam.111  The president later claimed in his 
memoirs that he understood the “Russians were planning world conquest”.112  “Win, lose, 
or draw”, Truman wrote his wife, “and we must win”.113  The revision of the Yalta accords 
stood high on the agenda.  Truman entertained the idea of confronting Stalin’s deep 
penetration into central Europe and Asia.114  But German industrial survival represented the 
dominant issue.  During the voyage, Truman made the vital decision to downgrade the 
importance of German reparations.  He emphasized a rational and efficient administration 
of Germany.  Truman took the position established by the Allied Commission on 
Reparations in Moscow in July 1945 that the victors should extract reparations 
commensurate with maintaining a “means of livelihood for the German people”.115  
Truman wrote Stimson that the United States refused to play the role of Santa Claus and 
rebuild the world without accruing any result other than a “nose thumbing”.116  Truman 
directed his Secretary of State James Brynes to complicate the discussion of German 
reparations by refusing Soviet access to Ruhr industry and the president rejected the already 
substantially reduced Soviet demand for an additional $4 billion in industrial reparations.117  
Bolstered by Truman’s view of Stalin and the Soviet Union as essentially hostile to western 
interests, the American delegation went to Potsdam convinced that a functioning 
quadripartite administration of the whole of occupied Germany could not succeed, but they 
seemed determined to put on a good show. 
The detonation of the world’s first atomic device at Alamogordo on 16 July 
fortified Truman’s resolve to battle Stalin.  Alonzo L. Hamby and Robert A. Pollard 
suggest that the president and his secretary of state originally postponed the Potsdam 
conference until the American scientists completed the construction of the world’s first 
nuclear weapon in order to strengthen the American bargaining position.118  But the dictator 




Andreyevitch Gromyko that “Washington and London are hoping we won't be able to 
develop the bomb ourselves for some time.  And meanwhile, using America's 
monopoly…they want to force us to accept their plans on questions affecting Europe and 
the world.  Well, that's not going to happen”.119 
Moscow, indicative of Stalin’s remark, adopted a recalcitrant position.  The high 
degree of espionage in the United States after 1945 underscores the uncooperative nature of 
the regime.  A series of relatively recent explorations of this issue even appear to legitimize 
the virulent American anti-communist “reaction” symbolized by McCarthyism.120  John 
Lewis Gaddis rejects his older postrevisionist position and offers a simpler explanation for 
the outbreak of the Cold War.  In concentrating on why Stalin chose a path of confrontation 
with the west, he argues that the totalitarian Soviet system offered Stalin “more chances to 
surmount the internal restraints on his policy than were available to his democratic 
counterparts”.121  The Soviet lack of checks and balances simplified matters for Stalin. His 
brutal handling of dissent within the Soviet Union moreover indicated the dictator’s distaste 
for debate and underlined his desire to dominate all aspects of state policy.122  Despite the 
opportunity for policy modification to accommodate American interests, Stalin’s nature of 
distrust prevented the adoption of a cooperative stance.  For Gaddis, the dictator’s 
acceptance of the ideological demand for world revolution meant that “as long as Stalin was 
running the Soviet Union a Cold War was unavoidable”.123  Gaddis’ work symbolizes the 
revival of older traditionalist interpretations that stress the impact of Stalin’s paranoid 
demand for national security on relations with Washington. 
Immediately prior to the initial session of the Potsdam Conference on 17 July 1945, 
Truman drove with Byrnes and Admiral William D. Leahy through Berlin for the first time.  
The president, travelling a motorcade, examined the city under the hot summer sun.  The 
visible results of strategic bombing shocked the president.  Observing the “extremely 
disturbing” twisted and charred ruins of the shops and houses with his own eyes, the 
president concluded that the war had brought Germany “absolute ruin” and that he had 
never seen “such destruction”.  Truman understood that the Nazi regime bore responsibility 
for the destruction of the cities.  The president accepted the hard truth that the German 
population had “brought it on themselves”.124  But the direct observation of daily hardship 
gradually transformed perceptions of Germany.  Truman, as true of many prominent figures 
of the occupation forces, had not experienced the horrors of the front.  Petra Goedde 
theorizes that the large proportion of women and children in the devastated cities, a 




languishing in prisoner of war camps, cultivated a “feminized” impression of German 
society that stimulated the nature human desire to protect.125  The Soviet military’s mass 
acceptance of rape and slaughter as a legitimate form of behaviour demonstrates that this 
theory, if considered plausible, was limited to western society.  But the duality in Truman’s 
thinking was reflected in overall policy.  Washington still aimed at the pacification of 
German society through a sweeping cultural revolution aimed at political reeducation and 
the “long-range protection against a recurrence of aggression”.126  Bringing democracy to 
Germany operated as a major principle. 
The point must be emphasized that western leaders generally understood that the 
economic dislocation caused by the war required a reparations policy that entailed a certain 
degree of suffering.  Eisenhower addressed the German public in August 1945 and stated 
that the 
coming months are going to be a hard test for you.  You will have to be tough—there 
is no alternative.  Every sign indicates a severe shortage of food, fuel, housing and 
transport.  So the townspeople will have to go into the country and help to bring in the 
harvest.  There will be no coal for heating homes this winter.  So you will have to go 
into the woods and cut down your own firewood.  A third priority is living 
accommodation.  Damaged property must be repaired to offer as much protection from 
the winter as possible.  So you will have to collect scrap material and gather deadwood 
in the forests.  These are all your problems.  Their solution depends entirely on your 
own endeavors.127 
 
But few members of the Truman administration countenanced the wild Soviet rape, murder 
and plunder of the eastern populations.  Eisenhower did not appear to take even his own 
words seriously.  At a United States Forces European Theater G-5 Civil Affairs Section  
conference on 19 July 1946 the military leader emphasized the need to assist in preparations 
for the coming winter and ordered the military to assist German farmers with the provision 
of trucks and drivers.128 
Truman, Stalin and Churchill—replaced by Clement R. Atlee whose Labour party 
ousted the wartime Conservatives in a surprising landslide electoral victory during the 
Potsdam conference—met at Schloß Cecilienhof in Potsdam between 17 July and 2 August 
1945 to compose the directives for the occupation and administration of Germany based on 
the assumptions previously reached at Yalta.  The document which emerged from the 
discussions proclaimed the resolve of Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union to 
eradicate Nazism and reform the German state politically, militarily and industrially “to 
assure that Germany never again will threaten her neighbors or the peace of the world”.  




Germany’s victims for the horrors visited on them.  The conference established the Council 
of Foreign Ministers (C.F.M.) to handle various aspects of the German problem in central 
Europe such as the treatment of Germany’s allies during the war and establish a final peace 
treaty.  The victors more importantly sanctioned the formation of the Allied Control 
Council (A.C.C.) composed of American, British, French and Soviet representatives in 
Berlin to carry out the general policies outlined in the Potsdam protocol.129 
These policies underlined a clear but imprecise commitment to “complete” 
industrial demilitarization and the reduction of overall productive capacity.  The protocol 
authorized the destruction of “all specialized facilities” for the production of armaments and 
forbade the production of “aircraft and all arms, ammunition and implements of war”.  
Determining the meaning of “implements of war”, a particularly difficult theme during this 
period, proved the difficult issue.  The protocol defined the dual-use elements of industry as 
including the “production of metals, chemicals, machinery, and other items” necessary for 
armaments.  This definition implied that every aspect of modern industry from basic 
chemical compounds and metals to the capital equipment needed to shape and form raw 
materials into consumer products, such as aluminium, nitrogen fixation and machine-tools, 
constituted a basic military potential.  The American delegation, in line with State and War 
Department papers, emphasized that the occupation authorities should place “primary 
emphasis” on the “development of agriculture” and “peaceful domestic industries”.  The 
reconstruction of German coal-mining and the transportation network played an important 
first step in reorganizing the German state to subsist without external assistance.  According 
to the American position, the money generated by coal exports, for example, should “in the 
first place…pay for imports into Germany”.130  But the use of such a general definition 
influenced a demand that the occupation authorities control whatever residual industrial 
capacity the A.C.C. subsequently deemed necessary for an industry the policymakers hoped 
would emphasize “agricultural and peaceful domestic industries”.  The agreement ordered 
the completion of industrial dismantling and reconversion of a period of two years.131 
The Potsdam protocol complicated matters further.  The agreement stipulated that 
Germany retain sufficient productive capacity to “meet the needs of the occupying forces 
and displaced persons in Germany” and maintain a living standard that did not exceed the 
average of all European countries excluding Britain and the Soviet Union.  The heavy 
demands placed on German industry by the Potsdam protocol in the immediate postwar 
generated intricate problems for the occupation authorities.  The seemingly straightforward 




Albania obscured the implicit importance that American policy and the Potsdam protocol 
placed on the continued survival of German heavy industry.  Not only did the agreement 
demand that German industry provide reparations from production and exports for essential 
raw materials, the protocol recognized the need to increase coal production and agricultural 
output, and repair housing, transport and essential utilities.  The protocol furthermore 
suggested that the decision to transfer millions of Germans from eastern Europe and the 
lands annexed by Poland and the Soviet Union “would increase the burden already resting 
on the occupying authorities” and by implication that the transfers would impact the 
calculation of a sufficient German industrial level.132  Clay in fact viewed the Potsdam 
Agreement as a mandate to rebuild the German economy.133 
The inner contradictions of industrial demilitarization and the removal of German 
industrial dominance in Europe seem trivial in relation to the serious inter-allied differences 
over reparations that the Potsdam protocol attempted to mask by proclaiming the decision 
to administer Germany as a single economic unit.  “When one strips away the verbiage and 
reads the internal documents carefully, when one looks at what was actually done and the 
sort of thinking that real policy was based on”, Marc Trachtenberg argues, “it is clear that 
the Americans at Potsdam had indeed essentially given up on the idea that Germany could 
be run on a four power basis”.134  Considering the extent to which the Soviet military gutted 
eastern Germany, Stalin’s support of the principle of a functioning German economy—
after having removed over 80 percent of industry in that region according to his own 
perceived needs—must be read with extreme reservation. 
The evidence suggests that the Truman administration knowingly distanced itself 
from Soviet reparations policy altogether.  Stalin’s intentions regarding the Ruhr industrial 
region also worried Truman.135  The president and Byrnes hoped to enhance American 
control over western German industry and minimize Stalin’s interference by establishing a 
fixed sum as the basis of reparations.136  The secretary of state presented Stalin with a 
generous offer aimed at eliciting Soviet support for the restriction of reparations policy by 
each occupying power to their respective zone of control.  Byrnes offered a quarter of 
western German surplus industrial capacity as reparations and to pay for basic commodities 
such as food for the population.137  Byrnes sweetened the offer by officially sanctioning the 
Soviet Carthaginian peace in the east.  The Truman administration accepted the annexation 
of one-quarter of Germany by Poland and the Soviet Union, fixing the new border at the 
Oder-Neiße river, and the expropriation of all German assets in eastern Europe including 




Agreement sanctioned the “...transfer to Germany of German populations, or elements 
thereof, remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary...in an orderly and humane 
manner”.139  Truman furthermore offered to finance necessary imports to all four zones, as 
determined by the Control Council, and on 29 July 1945 assigned the procurement 
responsibilities to the War Department.140  Stalin accepted the offer even though, as argued 
by David Holloway, he speculated that Truman aimed at withholding reparations from 
western Germany.141 
Revisionist historians argue that Truman’s strategy seriously weakened the 
foundations of the Potsdam Agreement.  Washington’s insistence on sole British 
administration of the Ruhr and the concrete offer of 25 percent of excess industrial 
capacities insulated the region from Soviet interference.  But the strategy also hindered the 
formulation of a common economic policy and therefore established the contours of later 
German division.142  Truman’s tough stance, the revisionists point out, demonstrated an 
unwillingness to accept full German responsibility for the destruction Hitler’s armies 
wreaked on Soviet soil.143  The visible strains in the wartime alliance apparent at Potsdam, 
they argue, doomed the administration of Germany as a single economic unit. 
The revisionist and all similar postrevisionist accounts, in typical fashion, fail to 
understand that Truman’s administration, basing their policies on the articulations of the 
State and War departments and observations of the Soviet zone, could no longer see how to 
balance Soviet reparations claims with a humanitarian and sound economic policy.  These 
accounts also fail to acknowledge British opposition to reparations from current production.  
The chief British authorities on German reparations, Donald McDougall and Viscount 
Cherwell, protested that the use of industrial production as reparations would interfere with 
British recovery by maintaining a strong German presence in potential British markets.  
Cherwell complained to Churchill that the reparations policy only promised to increase 
German industrial dominance and “export her export markets”.144  Churchill and his 
successor Atlee chose to adopt the American position of extracting reparations from 
production.  Both American and British governments advocated a system of reparations 
that “should be judged by its effect on their own economic interests and on general 
economic conditions in Europe, as well as in Germany itself”.145  London feared with 
reason that the severe reductions in the German industrial base advances at Potsdam would 
force a difficult economic burden on western states and significantly slow reconstruction. 
As hinted in this chapter, American knowledge of Soviet brutality in the occupied 




Agreement sanctioned the transfer of Germany’s eastern territories to the victims of 
Nazism.146  But the Truman administration viewed the movement of populations with a 
degree of reservation.  Soviet implementation of this decision first of all indicated neither 
any regard for human decency or, as stated, the potential for harnassing German industrial 
resources for European purposes.  A callous trivialization of ethnic cleansing and 
murderous revenge characterized Soviet policy.  “When one man dies it is a tragedy”, Stalin 
told Churchill at Tehran, “When thousands die it’s statistics”.147  The Czechoslovak 
“organized transfer” of between two and three million Sudetenland Germans resulted in 
relatively few casualties and demonstrated a degree of humanity.  The situation in eastern 
Germany proved another matter.  With Stalin’s consent, Soviet and Polish soldiers raped, 
tortured and murdered millions of men, women and children in yet another display of the 
dictator’s moral bankruptcy.148 
Academic approaches sometimes fail to address the American response to the 
Soviet treatment of the German population.  Wilfried Loth, for example, extrapolates from 
Stalin’s proposal for a temporally limited occupation of Germany that he championed the 
establishment of democracy and a generally conciliatory administration.149  Loth 
downplays the impact of looting and raping on western military governments largely by 
justifying the Soviet murder of “tens of thousands of innocent Germans” as a reaction to 
Nazi barbarity in eastern Europe.150  Even though this explanation of the expulsions helps 
explain the genesis of the order to rape and kill,151 scholars must investigate the policy’s 
impact on democratic leaders.152  The Truman administration could not ignore the rape and 
pillaging of eastern Germany for several reasons.  The wasteful elimination of industrial 
equipment and the annexation of agricultural land first of all deprived Germany and 
therefore Europe of the tools and food required for economic recovery.153  The Soviet 
actions more importantly convinced millions to flee westwards.  Over 1.5 million men, 
women and children alone crossed into the western zones between October 1945 and June 
1946.154  The mass exodus after 1945 complicated an already precarious situation.  Millions 
of “bombed out” Germans, prisoners of war and foreign slave labourers competed for 
dwindling stocks of food alone.  The American military authorities diverted whole 
divisions, such as the 29th Infantry Division, to provide the foreign victims of Nazism with 
thousands of army rations.155  The flood of millions of German expellees into the western 
zones only compounded the problem.  The New York Times on 23 October 1946 described 
the deportations as a “crime against humanity” and on 13 November 1946 as “the most 




Soviet actions seemed for contemporaries anything but civilized or an understandable 
outcome of the war. 
The Soviet occupation authorities responded to the exodus in 1946 by closing 
interzonal traffic and demanding that the western Allies in turn close their borders to fleeing 
civilians.157  The action predated the construction of the Berlin Wall by over 15 years.  
“This will cost us a million roubles a day”, a political commissar prophesied, “Political 
roubles”.158  Soviet reports of the eastern German mindset during the occupation specified 
that the population “hate[d] the communists”.159  The policy of reconstructing the Soviet 
Union at German expense “froze East Germany in a state of wartime destruction” and 
“alienated” the surviving population.160  The flight of potential workers, probably of 
greatest concern to the Soviet authorities, reduced the total number available for slave 
labour in the Soviet Union and also for producing reparations at the few industrial facilities 
that remained intact.  Fears of losing reparations forced an escalation in the draconian 
measures adopted.  On 21 October 1946, the Soviet military government moved 180,000 
industrial specialists, skilled workers and their families to the Soviet Union.  The freeze on 
interzonal movement and the uprooting of labour further negatively impacted eastern 
German productive capabilities.161 
The extension of authoritarian domination over eastern Germany permitted the 
large-scale rape and plundering of the occupied territories and more importantly helped 
ease Stalin’s “paranoid” fear of German industrial revival.162  But this policy of terror 
required the erection of a large control apparatus.  The Soviet administration persecuted all 
potential political opponents and rigged elections to convey an image of solidarity with the 
Soviet administration.  Another of Loth’s arguments, namely that Stalin granted his puppet 
Walter Ulbricht control over internal affairs and in fact became a “prisoner of Ulbricht”,163 
conveys the false image that a rational process of socialization was undertaken.164  The 
eastern German communists or Socialist Unity Party (S.E.D.) clearly represented nothing 
more than a political pawn.165  A host of rigged elections culminated in the laughable 99.72 
percent victory of the S.E.D. in October 1950.166  Large armed German internal security 
forces were recruited from these politically reliable factions to help enforce compliance.167  
The Soviets initiated work on future German military forces in 1946 and progressively 
militarized the Soviet zone long before the official sanctioning of East Germany in October 
1949.168  Stalin supported a plan for the creation of a 10,000-strong military formation as 
early as July 1948.169  The arming of Germans broke with A.C.C. regulations that 




supervision or control of political activities of persons within Germany”.170  These forces 
acted more as a supplement to Soviet civil-military requirements than as the creation of an 
eastern German force capable of real military action against Soviet opponents.  This control 
system furthermore absorbed resources and denuded industry of potential labour. 
From 1945 onwards, Stalin's declarations of support for a united and neutral 
German state conflicted with the actions of the Soviet military government.  The 
establishment of political puppets and a regime of terror did not reflect the demands made 
at Potsdam for stability, order and most importantly unity.  Stalin plainly advanced security 
interests of the Soviet Union above the softer aspects of communist ideology and proceeded 
to systematically destroy the zone he occupied.  Ideology failed to motivate Stalin 
throughout the immediate postwar even though the political climate of Europe offered a 
unique chance for communist political success.171  The immediate subjugation of eastern 
and central Europe, spanning a host of countries including Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
Germany, Hungary, Romania and Poland, helped erode the credibility of Soviet 
pronouncements concerning inter-Allied cooperation.  The “Soviets' actions in their zone of 
occupation”, Naimark points out, “were simultaneously the causes and results of 
deteriorating Allied relations”.172  Stalin’s brutal construction of a ring of socialist buffer 
states around the Soviet Union, an indication of the primacy of national security fears, 
ultimately alienated the subject populations along with western Allies.  The “tragedy of 
Soviet diplomacy”, Joseph M. Siracusa asserts, “was their decision to extend communism 
on the bayonet of the Red Army”.173  Soviet policy destabilized eastern Germany and the 
regime “lay in far greater economic ruin than its Western half”.174 
Since the overall policy of domestic prosperity built on European recovery 
motivated American policymakers, and a reformed German industrial structure figured 
prominently in those calculations, reckless Soviet dismantling and general policies of terror 
threatened the core of American policy.  This dissertation therefore takes issue with the 
claim that a moderate and rational Soviet reparations policy characterized policy and that 
Moscow’s actions did not negatively impact relations with the Truman administration.  
Recent scholarship in Soviet and former East German archives addresses Soviet excesses in 
eastern Germany and generally refutes the revisionist standpoint.  These analyses 
emphasize the old traditional assumption that American policy in Germany reacted to 
Soviet policy.175  An issue taken up in greater detail in subsequent chapters, Kennan had 
originally scrutinized Stalin’s motives in the countries conquered by the Soviet military and 




aimed at permanently dominating central and eastern Europe.176  The older wartime 
contingency thesis, that international stability required “normalized” American-Soviet 
relations should not unduly influence a belief that Truman viewed the Soviet Union as 
either an important potential market for American industrial production or that Soviet 
industry was capable and willing to assist in the plans for European reconstruction.  
American policymakers, influenced from many quarters, understood that Stalin’s firm grip 
on the conquered territories and especially eastern Germany bound these economies to the 
Soviet Union. 
Kennan in particular blamed Soviet atrocities for the reduction in American 
willingness to cooperate with Stalin.  “From the time when it became undeniably evident 
that the Soviet authorities were determined to treat the European peoples overrun by the 
Red Army in a manner wholly un-reconcilable with American hopes”, Kennan argued, 
“these unreal expectations could no longer be maintained”.177  In reflecting on the Soviet, 
Polish and Czech annexations and expulsion of the indigenous German population, the 
Council of Foreign Affairs recorded that  
the arrival of these hordes of penniless refugees greatly complicated the economic and 
social problems facing the occupation authorities in Germany.  Under a decision taken 
by the Allied Control Council in November 1945, 2,750,000 were to be settled in the 
Soviet zone, 1,500,000 in the British, 3,000,000 in the American, and 150,000 in the 
French.  This influx meant more mouths to feed.  It meant greater population 
pressure.178 
 
General John Hilldring in fact advised Special Assistant to the Administrator Foreign 
Economic Administration Henry H. Fowler on his way to the Potsdam conference to throw 
out the assumption of running the German economy on a quadripartite basis.  “The 
Russians are going to run their zone the way they want to run it”, he stated, “and they're 
going to take everything that's moveable back [to the Soviet Union]”.179  Truman agreed 
with this notion.  He accepted Churchill’s criticism that the population transfers in eastern 
Europe “took the form of throwing the Germans into the American and British zones to be 
fed”.180  Coupled with the failure to ship raw materials required in the western zones, a 
precondition of reparations shipments, Soviet policy in Germany appeared at least equally 
intransigent.  Viewed from Washington, Stalin seemed determined to extract the maximum 
reparations from Germany irregardless of the impact on the democracies. 
American policymakers in any case derided the importance of Soviet industrial 
potential itself for recovery purposes.  The Soviet Union clearly maintained a first-rate 




economic infrastructure.  The widely accepted opinion that Stalin desired German 
reparations to “rebuild the shattered Soviet economy” therefore requires clarification.181  
Leffler points out that Wehrmacht’s policies and the wartime fighting destroyed over 1,700 
cities and villages, 31,000 industrial enterprises and nearly ruined Soviet agriculture 
through systematic exploitation.182  These statistics, in a manner similar to the strategic 
bombing campaign of Germany do not necessarily indicate a precipitous loss of 
manufacturing capacity.  The impressive record of Soviet armaments production alone 
questions this interpretation.  Soviet countermeasures either rescued or securely built 
industrial facilities far beyond German reach and Stalin’s military industrial complex 
outperformed their opponents in nearly every category during the war.183  While the 
German occupiers seized raw materials and agricultural produce and enslaved millions of 
eastern Europeans for the benefit of their war economy,184 the overall strength of Soviet 
manufacturing capacities, as represented by the output figures, remained high. 
Washington furthermore believed that reconstruction and armaments production 
absorbed the full industrial capacities of the Soviet Union after 1945.185  Analysts 
hypothesized in 1945 that Soviet per capita wealth rested at $150 while their American 
counterparts generated $1000.186  Modern evaluations of the postwar Soviet economy 
question even these numbers.  Peter Gatrell and Robert Lewis hypothesize, owing to the 
lack of credible Soviet studies, that the published statistics were “pure fiction” and the 
potential growth rates were probably much lower than even American analysts 
speculated.187  In any case, western politicians and specialists generally believed that the 
Soviet Union required between 15 and 20 years for reconstruction and more importantly 
modernization.  While Stalin explained to Republican Senator Harold Stassen in May 1947 
that the capitalist and communist systems could “coexist” and “cooperate” such as during 
the war,188 calculating the economic benefits of such an association for the United States 
demonstrated that Stalin in fact offered relatively little other than words.  In reflecting on 
the dictator’s efforts at modernizing the Soviet economy, Kennan convincingly argued that 
the undue concentration on the metallurgical and machine-tool industries, vital for the 
successful war effort against Hitler, helped distort the reality that the Soviet Union did not 
present “real evidences of material power and prosperity”.189  While the official Soviet 
production figures exhibited monstrous gains in commodities such as steel, leading some 
economists to speculate that Soviet industry produced 18.5 pecent of world manufacturing 
in 1938 and again in 1946,190 these strides should not obscure the underdeveloped state of 




German reparations offered Stalin far more than a policy road towards a 
reconstructed state.  Charles F. Pennacchio clearly demonstrates that the Kremlin viewed 
reparations as a method of transforming the Soviet Union in terms of technological 
development and manufacturing practice.191  Contemporary American analysts even 
suggested that the dictator aimed primarily at employing reparations to free the Soviet 
military industrial complex of the need to reconvert.  The movement of German industrial 
facilities, backed by the gigantic raw materials reservoir of the Soviet Union, could have 
increased output while leaving Soviet enterprises free from the confusion brought by 
developing new factory assembly lines.  Wilfried Loth’s condemnation of western 
governments for “giving in to diffuse anxieties” and displaying a “fundamental mistrust of 
Soviet intentions in Germany” after 1945 appears difficult to comprehend in the face of this 
evidence.192  Stalin’s self-absorbed policies, whether by employing reparations to 
modernize or to maintain a massive military machine, did not take the real worries of other 
states into account. 
Truman’s vision of postwar prosperity—shared by the State and War 
departments—sought a major German industrial contribution and rejected Stalin’s scheme 
of shifting the European productive heartland to the east.  The fate of the German expellees 
only assisted the determination to keep a close eye on occupation policy.  As early as 
January 1945, Bidault pressed the point that changes in the German border structure and 
resulting influx of German refugees would force the termination of industrial 
demilitarization as evident in the deindustrialization conceptions.193  The calculations 
concerning a suitable standard of living, and indirectly the fate of dual-use industries, 
depended on the impact of the Potsdam decision to shrink the German state.  Dramatic 
increases in the western German population by implication demanded ever larger food 
imports that could only be supported by greater industrial output or by expensive American 
subsidies.194  Considering the apprehensions of American policymakers concerning an 
effect quadripartite administration of Germany, historians should treat the decision at 
Potsdam to decrease German industry to the average level of other European countries with 
suspicion and not as a logical, coherent and practical policy. 
The Potsdam conference seemed intended to maintain some sort of postwar 
unanimity.  While the protocol established the general guidelines for the German 
occupation, such as authorizing the disarmament and demilitarization of industry, the 
conference did not define the components of a modern military industrial infrastructure or 




of particular items or the processing of certain raw materials appeared a crude method that 
did not take industrial realities into account.  Early Allied unanimity on this issue should not 
obscure the difficulties of working out a practical definition of military industrial power.  
This dilemma, explored in the next chapter, surfaced immediately.  The French delegation 
disagreed with the need to establish a coordinated occupation.  At the second meeting of the 
Control Council on 10 August 1945, the military governors set to work establishing the 
control machinery and then moved to discussing the Potsdam Agreement.  The French 
governor General Pierre Joseph Koenig torpedoed the negotiations and exclaimed that he 
would “reserve his position” concerning the agreement.195  The French military 
government, annoyed by the tripartite decision to conduct the Potsdam Conference without 
them, rejected the concept of a centrally coordinated German economy and proceeded to 
sabotage the Control Council from within.  Difficulties with the French representatives only 
added another dimension to the growing frustration of effective quadripartite 
administration. 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter introduced the argument that the Truman administration worried prior 
to Potsdam that Soviet behaviour in central Europe promised to destabilize their zone of 
occupation by flooding southern Germany with a mass of destitute civilians requiring food 
and shelter.  These practical concerns emphasized that the ideological clash between 
capitalism and communism, so often an important element of the historiography, assumes 
unreal characteristics.  Historians dealing with Washington’s response to the consolidation 
of communism in eastern Europe neglect the hard realities of Soviet behaviour.  Vague and 
conclusions therefore permeate the literature.  David Joravsky for example laments the 
traditionalist label of communism during this period as “totalitarian”.  He points out instead 
that the interpretation of Marx’s “utopian vision” by contemporaries largely resulted in 
“politically impotent sects”.196  These communists, he believes, “yearned to overtake and 
surpass the West in a journey through efficiently organized violence to democratic peace 
and prosperity”.197  Whatever nobility these ideological conceptions might have had, the 
cold realities do not shield Stalin’s regime from the classification as immensely brutal and 
decidedly totalitarian.  The results of the dictator’s policies hardly distinguished themselves 
from those of Hitler.  Noble ideological pronouncements should not deflect our attention 
from understanding how Washington viewed Moscow.  Soviet actions seemed to portend a 




The evil exhibited by Stalin’s military forces in Europe or the general Soviet 
disregard for American policy aims, some historians assert, should not however be used to 
justify or excuse American policy.  Mark L. Kleinman points out that the new 
historiography of Soviet atrocities claims that the “revisionist critiques of domestic anti-
communism have been rendered illegitimate”.  Washington is seen as responding to 
extremely aggressive and real behaviour that only reinforced ideological bias.  Kleinman 
derides “comparisons of the relative ‘brutality’ of the United States and Soviet Union” as a 
“pointless undertaking”.  He points out that revisionism originally addressed American 
policy weaknesses in order to establish that “American actions often diverged sharply from 
the high-minded and idealistic rhetoric in which they were clothed”.198  In a sense similar to 
that of the Soviet Union, American actions are judged to have eroded the noble declarations 
of postwar policy in pursuit of same national security sought by Stalin.  Lea Brilmayer in 
fact condemns the realist conclusion that the anarchic clash of national interests pervades 
international relations, and argues that the moral legitimacy of United States international 
politics should be judged in a similar manner to that of domestic politics.199  That is, 
Brilmayer suggests the highly theoretical possibility of a benign international hegemon 
operating on “principled” and moral political concepts instead of oppressing other states for 
policy ends.200  But Washington after May 1945 did not countenance or pursue a brutal 
policy of revenge.  Policymakers instead devoted considerable energy towards the 
formulation of a sound policy that incorporated widely divergent interests such as European 
reconstruction.  America in 1945 appeared more akin to the “principled hegemon” than a 
cold contender for global supremacy. 
This chapter hinted that some historians accuse the American and British occupiers 
of having adopted similar tactics to those of the Soviet Union.  This interpretation is 
explored in the next chapter to a greater degree.  Noel Annan, a mid-level British 
occupation official, termed himself a “satrap” in “Britain’s new colony”.  He explains how 
the British occupation suffered from the contradiction of applying the postwar principles of 
a hard peace on Germany while the overall image of that state improved at the expense of 
the Soviet Union.  The British, in Annan’s opinion, nevertheless treated the Germans like 
an “intelligent tribe of Bedouins”.  The Americans, for him, conducted the most “humane” 
occupation.201  Annan nevertheless argues that Soviet actions in Germany concerning 
reparations and mass repression resulted in a split between the Allies during 1946.202  
Irregardless of how Soviet activities are portrayed through analysis of the documents, 




for hegemonic power, could not perceive of Soviet actions as conducive to a stable postwar 
world.  The implications of Stalin’s tremendous acts of brutality eroded the willingness to 
work alongside the dictator.  These actions reinforced the belief that Stalin only sought the 
general enhancement of his power position in Europe.  Vojtech Mastny’s argument that 
Stalin strove for absolute domestic security is therefore of relevance.203  Stalin’s actions 
harmed the American position.  Ideological motivations counted far less than observations 
of real behaviour. 
This behaviour impacted how Truman and his administration viewed policies in 
Germany.  Early policy proposals in 1944 and at the outset of 1945 reinforced the notion 
that wartime damages, particularly the strategic bombing campaign, questioned the 
dimensions of future occupation policy.  The prostrate nation, reeling under the hammer 
blows of strategic bombing and then a barbarous Soviet military, conveyed the fear of a 
postwar collapse rather than a future contender.  Considering the poor strategic, 
technological and productive position of Germany after 1945, all theoretical conceptions of 
a future revanchist war relied on an extremely unrealistic set of hypotheticals.  A large shift 
in the nature of combat for example meant “change in the fundamental relationship 
between offence and defence, space and time, fire and manoeuvre”.204  While nuclear 
weapons did not render conventional armaments obsolete, they radically altered the global 
geopolitical scene and shifted immense power into American hands.  The crushing fate that 
befell eastern Germany after 1945 only helped alter the viewpoint that postwar Germany 
represented a real security threat, play on American sympathies and underline the view that 
the Soviet Union sought a European economic collapse.  
CHAPTER 5  
 
The Early Stages of Industrial Demilitarization 
 
Farming looks mighty easy when your plow is a pencil, and you're 
a thousand miles from the corn field. 
 




This Chapter examines the postwar refinement of the policy of industrial 
demilitarization, the problems encountered in establishing the reduced levels of German 
industry, and why Lucius D. Clay’s occupation administration rejected the work of the 
specialists and diplomats who urged an extreme program of restructuring.  These theorists 
failed to articulate a policy that accorded with plain economic realities in Germany.  This 
chapter demonstrates that the prevailing historical interpretation of Clay and the Harry S. 
Truman administration forcefully demanding a unified economic administration of all four 
zones only partly explains Clay’s decision to freeze dismantling.  Another structural flaw in 
the postwar administrative structure resulted in widespread suffering in Germany.  The 
defeated state’s economy simply required the industrial sectors considered targets for 
dismantling in order to provide the basic means of feeding, clothing and housing the 
population. 
5.2 The Contradictions of Demilitarization Policy 
On 28 September 1944, almost a month after the crushing defeat of enemy ground 
forces in Normandy and with Anglo-American expectations of imminent victory, Franklin 
D. Roosevelt directed Leo T. Crowley’s Foreign Economic Administration (F.E.A.) to 
study postwar issues.  Executive Order 9380 had created the F.E.A. on 25 September 1943 
to “unify and consolidate governmental activities relating to foreign economic affairs”.  Leo 
T. Crowley had taken charge of the new organization.  The various units of the F.E.A. had 
absorbed the Office of Lend-Lease Administration, the Office of Foreign Relief and 
Rehabilitation Operations, the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, the 
Office of Economic Warfare and the War Food Administration and the Commodity Credit 
Corporation.1 
This organization played a special role in formulating Germany’s future.  Roosevelt 
ordered the F.E.A. to determine “what should be done after the surrender of Germany to 





Branch, created on 30 December 1944 and placed under the control of the F.E.A., the 
responsibility for assisting the creation of an industrial deindustrialization program for 
Germany.  Under the direction of Henry H. Fowler, who previously worked as the General 
Counsel for the Office of Production Management and the War Production Board and the 
Mission on Economic Affairs in London, the organization formulated a unique policy for 
German industry that sought the neutralization of the German capacity to wage war.  This 
quest required study.  An FEA historian wrote in 1946 that  
Two plans suggested themselves as means for preparing against German post-war 
economic and cultural aggression. First, data should be gathered from all available 
sources to discover the nature of German penetration and the methods by which it 
operated. Second, plans should be made to uncover German assets not only in this 
country but in other countries as well, and a program should be outlined for persuading 
the Allies and the neutral countries to assist in instrumenting a system of control of 
German assets.3 
 
The neutralization of the German war machine demanded a detailed understanding of 
societal and industrial military potential. 
The inquiry focused on the expanse of the military industrial system from 
straightforward military industries such as armaments assembly facilities to scientific 
research installations and standard dual-use branches such as synthetic raw material 
processing and even agriculture.  The inter-departmental approach aimed at conclusive 
results.  The study resulted in 32 separate reports.  The first conclusions appeared during the 
summer of 1945 after the defeat of Nazism.  These studies were predicated on the firm 
understanding that the military industrial complex included component elements not 
traditionally attributed to weapons construction.  The reports generally appraised the nature 
and substance of the military industrial and dual-use system, reviewed why the previous 
attempt to contain German military power after 1918 failed, evaluated how Hitler had 
rearmed after 1933, and most importantly proposed methods of economically and 
industrially disarming the enemy.4  The F.E.A. experts hoped to evaluate the diverse 
findings and condense the conclusions into a single report for issue to the president through 
the channels of the State Department.  “It is expected”, Fowler surmised, that the “T.I.D.C. 
[Technical Industrial Disarmament Committee] reports will be used in formulating a 
precise U.S. program covering the whole field of German economic and industrial 
disarmament for discussion with the Allies”.5 
The work encountered many of the same problems that plagued the Strategic 
Bombing Survey teams.  The investigations relied on generally incomplete information 





Intelligence misunderstood the German war effort.  Worse still, the reports could not 
assimilate the more detailed German sources retrieved in the months after victory and only 
addressed the effects of strategic bombing in a theoretical sense.  The survey group directed 
to investigate the aeronautical industry, owing to a lack of information, even employed the 
United States as the model from which to derive conclusions.  This method helped reinforce 
the close relationship of civilian and military industries in armaments production.  The 
conclusions therefore offered a wider examination of conventional demilitarization than any 
study bound exclusively to a German model.  Knowledge of this intricate relationship led 
the organizations to advance extreme positions that incorporated the substance of 
Morgenthauian conceptions.  “To a degree not equalled in any other major implement of 
war”, the aeronautical survey team argued, “the means for the development, production, 
and operation of military aircraft are common to those required for civilian aircraft”.6  The 
best method of controlling military industrial potential, they extrapolated, called for extreme 
alterations in civilian production patterns. 
The straightforward removal of the assembly factories, from this perspective, did 
not constitute demilitarization.  The focus on the American model reinforced the relative 
ease with which a modern industrial state could implement rearmament through the 
employment of basic machine-tools and secure access to such critical commodities as 
aluminium, magnesium, and—in Germany’s case—synthetic oil and gasoline.  The 
organization therefore interpreted industrial disarmament according to a loose definition 
that ultimately absorbed all aspects of the economy from steel-making to forestry.  “Most of 
the components of aircraft”, the survey team concluded, “can be individually manufactured 
in small plants with general purpose tools and equipment.  The aeronautical survey team 
therefore applauded the idea of a general reduction of civilian industrial capacities such as 
steel output and not just the permanent prohibition of all direct armaments production.7 
These radical changes did not however seem to adequately deal with the problem of 
a resurgent Germany.  “Undercover manufacture of individual components in limited 
quantities”, the experts surmised, “will be practically impossible to prevent”.  To forestall 
any subterfuge, the group focused on the human element and recommended denying 
German society the ability to develop new industrial methods by shutting down university 
research in aeronautical engineering and other fields.  The survey team further hypothesized 
that the destruction of industrial facilities and the cleansing of the universities still left 
skilled technicians and workers with the theoretical ability to build armaments or conduct 





Allied aircraft periodically undertake aerial surveys and that trained officials keep a close 
eye on German scientists long into the postwar.  The group therefore contended that real 
demilitarization required more than the elimination of military command systems, the 
demobilization of the army, the destruction of armaments manufacturing facilities, the 
reduction of dual-use industrial capacities, or even the cleansing of the universities.  The 
elimination of German military potential by the victors demanded long-term observation 
and control to ensure permanent compliance.8 
The Industry Division of the F.E.A. taskforce completed their analysis of the 
machine-tool and equipment industry in May 1945.  The group examined the relationship 
of civilian industrial capacities to mass production, the convertibility of this industry to the 
military priorities of Hitler’s war effort and Nazi production policy during the war.  The 
study group in this case acknowledged the failure of the bomber crews to destroy the 
substance of this sector as demonstrated by the survival of large stockpiles.  The Industry 
Division instead recognized that strategic bombing only paralyzed German weapons 
production by restricting access to raw materials.  The bombs did not reduce overall 
capacities.  The group extrapolated from these results that the blanket destruction of entire 
dual-use industrial branches such as the synthetic manufacturing of oil or even the 
restriction of access to raw materials could not permanently ensure demilitarization.  
Industrialists, provided new sources were found, still maintained the ability to rearm.  The 
war years demonstrated the ease of converting civilian industry to weapons production on 
the back of a machine-tool industry even larger than that of the United States.9  The final 
report even mocked the effectiveness of substantially lowering machine-tool capacities as 
the road to demilitarization and national security.  An advanced industrial state like 
Germany, they believed, could theoretically convert even textile facilities to specialized 
machine-tool production and then turn to weapons production once the equipment was in 
place.10  All aspects of the machine-tool industry, seen in this manner, represented a sort of 
indirect military capability.  The report therefore concluded that German military-industry 
system would continue to maintain potential “unless capacity in every branch of the 
machine industry is fundamentally curtailed and its use is strictly controlled”.11  The 
complexity of the problem once against led directly to the perceived need for control. 
These two reports underlined the need for wide industrial downsizing, restructuring 
and a long occupation to ensure permanent compliance.12  The latter report however 
attacked the Morgenthauian concept echoed in the aeronautical study that espoused the 





of pacifying the industrial system.13  Could a 50 or even 90 percent reduction—
remembering that even the emasculating reduction of 90 percent still left Germany with 50 
percent of Britain’s total prewar stocks14—truly neutralize the potential for subsequent 
growth?  Total elimination offered certainty but at a high cost.  The restriction and control 
of critical commodities offered a more cost-effective method of controlling industry without 
drastically altering traditional industrial patterns.  The Industry Division for example 
recognized that tampering with the machine-tool industry would ruin German society and 
plunge millions into unemployment and destitution.  The analysts specified that machine-
tool production represented “Germany’s most important basic industry” since it directly 
employed 13.7 percent of all industrial workers.15  Other alternatives seemed more humane.  
James E. Cassidy, an American engineer analyzing demilitarization for the War 
Department, informed Assistant Secretary of State William L. Clayton on 26 April 1945 
that controlling the importation of copper and iron would alone seriously restrict the 
German armaments industry.16  Close observation over a protracted period limited the 
possibilities of military revival without destroying German society. 
The aeronautical and industry reports reflected the ongoing debate between the 
dismantling of facilities and an occupation that stressed control.  Dismantling offered the 
most gratifying academic solution to the industrial demilitarization conundrum and the 
most complete answer to national security considerations.  The Business Advisory Council 
for the Department of Commerce concluded in January 1946 that only the relocation of all 
Ruhr industry outside of German borders could both repress the ability to wage war “for at 
least a generation”.  The Council however recognized that the movement of German 
industry, a process requiring years of hard labour to dismantle and reassemble the 
equipment of hundreds of factories, denied the occupation authorities the opportunity of 
utilizing the defeated enemy’s economic potential for European and even German 
reconstruction.  Far from singularly impacting German society, the removal of industry 
threatened to disrupt traditional European trade patterns, slow recovery and add to the 
general misery of the entire continent.  The council did sweeten their conclusions with the 
hypothesis that a complete removal of Ruhr industries would invalidate the need for an 
expensive occupation and potentially benefit the victims of Nazism by removing a major 
competitor.  But economic realities remained a nagging headache.  “Germany’s present 
state of industrialization is not the result of some overnight development brought about by 
the sudden action of some political group”, the council concluded, “but is the outcome of a 





rapid pace for the past 75 years”.17  Industrial demilitarization, whether it espoused the 
radical restructuring or only a significant alteration of the industrial landscape, simply swept 
this complexity aside.  But long-term occupation and minimal dismantling left the industrial 
system intact and did not attain the total security sought by policymakers. 
The council, irrespective of the bombing survey or general humanitarian 
considerations, clung to the wholesale dismantling of Ruhr and associated industries.  The 
group employed the visible destruction of German cities as evidence that the residual 
industrial infrastructure vanished and therefore could not assist recovery efforts.  Renewed 
Ruhr production, they argued, required substantial amounts of “imported capital” and a new 
generation of machine-tools and industrial equipment.  The prohibitive costs of recovery 
invalidated the argument that restructuring would slow the pace of reconstruction outside of 
Germany.  For this reason, the council followed Henry Morgenthau and countenanced the 
dismantling of all residual metallurgical, chemical and electrical industries for shipment to 
Czechoslovakia, France, Holland, Poland, Scandinavia, etc.  German society, denuded of 
Ruhr industries, would primarily provide coal for the transplanted factories and thereby 
accumulate a “sufficient” amount of foreign currency to import manufactured goods from 
the new industrial regions.  This “highly economic” solution presupposed the total 
elimination of dual-use industrial capacities in Germany.  This strategy of industrial 
demilitarization fulfilled the policy demand for increased security brought by a “severe 
change in the activities of the German people”.18  The scheme, in accepting the forced 
unemployment of millions of workers and an equally drastic fall in accumulated wealth, 
essentially supported enforced destitution as the means of achieving real and lasting peace. 
Another F.E.A. study, one that examined the chemical industry or T.I.D.C.-16, 
further demonstrated the difficulty of balancing postwar policy aims.  The analysis suffered 
from the typical and acknowledged lack of “reliable” information concerning production 
levels and domestic consumption.  The report however challenged the utility of 
contemporary industrial demilitarization conceptions.  “Most chemicals that have wartime 
significance”, the authors concluded, “are also essential to the maintenance of a peacetime 
economy”.19  The problem related to efficiently administering the occupation of Germany 
and fulfilling the “ultimate objective” of industrial disarmament.  This conclusion by 
definition entailed that widespread dismantling prohibited the maintenance of a normal 
economic system.  This observation, in a pattern similar to that of other analyses such as the 





A “majority group” surfaced that questioned the practicability of eliminating the 
production of certain chemicals and even the establishment of production quotas.  This 
group agreed with the principle of controlled “bottlenecks”.  They recommended that the 
decrease and control of a single chemical commodity would prevent another future round 
of rearmament.  An annual production of 400,000 metric tons of fixed nitrogen, for 
example, was considered sufficient for the civilian economy.  Capacities above that level, 
the group believed, constituted a form of military industrial potential since manufacturers 
could reallocate fixed nitrogen for the production of explosives.  This form of control 
maintained dual-use facilities at a level only just high enough to sustain the civilian 
economy.  The “majority group” rejected the control of most other chemicals owing to the 
imprecise understanding of peacetime civilian industrial requirements.20  The group took 
account of domestic German requirements in their industrial demilitarization strategy. 
The Chairman of the survey group, Frederick Pope, disagreed with the conclusions 
of the majority of his team.  Pope advocated that the occupation forces dismantle the 
industrial ability to manufacture a list of “military chemicals”, as he called them, which 
included fixed nitrogen, nitric acid, calcium carbide, chlorine, caustic soda, caustic potash, 
soda ash, sulphuric acid, and primary tar distillates.  While the “minority group” that 
huddled around Pope also opposed Allied tinkering with production levels in a general 
climate of postwar uncertainty, the chairman did not believe that the Allies could control the 
production of chemical compounds and commodities over the longer term.  He therefore 
advocated the total dismantling of facilities irregardless of peacetime requirements.21 
John W. Barnet of the State Department and O.C. Ralston of the United States 
Bureau of Mines challenged the ability of industrial demilitarization to shore up national 
defence.  The two men issued a memorandum to Pope that took American development of 
weapons of mass destruction into account.  Barnet and Ralston pointed out that the 
harnessing of nuclear energy for military purposes illustrated that the control of a fixed 
number of conventional chemical industries could not take new technological 
developments into account.  “With the advent of the nuclear bomb”, the two men pointed 
out, “it is clearly apparent that the next war may be fought by radically different methods, 
and that the control of fixed nitrogen cannot be relied upon as the major means of 
preventing the re-emergence of a German war potential in the field of chemicals”.  The 
history of scientific development demonstrated that the emergence of new and unforeseen 
dual-use technologies theoretically represented a greater potential danger to security than 





“screening” of all technological imports and the protracted control of research facilities.22  It 
is interesting to note that the discussions of industrial demilitarization never mentioned 
American possession of nuclear bombs as a potential deterrent to German remilitarization. 
The final product that emerged from the debate exhibited an extreme contradiction.  
The authors acknowledged the need to eliminate the production of “chemical end products 
used exclusively for military purposes” such as “military explosives, propellants, poison 
gases, elemental phosphorus, hydrogen peroxide [and] special ordnance chemicals”.  The 
focus on “end products” glossed over the dilemma of dual-use chemical commodities and 
in the case of fixed nitrogen even offered a mechanism of circumvention.  The study group 
recognized that coal-mining, a high priority in Germany symbolized by Truman’s directive 
in early 1945, required domestic explosives manufacturing to blast the organic compound 
from undergrounds rock faces.  This concession in turn demanded higher fixed nitrogen 
allowances and even the retention of explosives processing plants.  Even though long 
deliberations over peacetime requirements had yielded the conclusion that the entirety of 
chemical industry could be mobilized for war, the report nevertheless targeted a specific list 
that did not take the civilian economy into account.  The report even argued that the 
elimination of the listed chemical facilities should go beyond “the requirements of a 
minimum civilian economy”.  The nearly omnipresent call for a long occupation, basically 
an acknowledgement of the difficulties of balancing civilian and military needs, entered the 
pages of the report.  The T.I.D.C. group ultimately recommended that “No new 
construction of chemical plant, including chemical research institutions and pilot plants, 
should be permitted”.  Realizing the contradiction inherent in semi-dismantling or even the 
control of ideas, the specialists eventually returned to the old argument of vigilant 
inspection by military government.23 
The work of the F.E.A. and in particular the T.I.D.C. reports, highly speculative in 
nature owing to the lack of tangible data, therefore waffled between complete 
dismantlement, the removal of excess civilian capacity or minimal structural change.  Long-
term control represented the only essential point of agreement in these diverse approaches.  
But only the minimalist position took an essential reality of the occupation into account.  As 
analysed elsewhere, the agricultural sector depended on the chemical industries to process 
sufficient fixed nitrogen for fertilizer manufacturing.  Victor Gollancz, the British 
humanitarian who toured Germany in the postwar, appreciated this dependency on 
manufactured fertilizer.  He published a book in 1947 entitled “In Darkest Germany” that 





elimination or even reduction of nitrogen fixation in Germany “would be disastrous in a 
unified and intact Reich” and “sheer lunacy in the Anglo-American trunk for which we are 
admittedly legislating”.24 
This point is taken up later in the chapter.  For now it is necessary to explain that the 
War Department in particular worried that conditions in Germany inhibited industrial 
demilitarization schemes.  Low global fertilizer stocks after 1945 determined that only the 
continued operation of German fixed nitrogen facilities could avert a humanitarian 
disaster.25  The concept of “minimum peacetime requirements”, hard enough to determine 
in postwar Germany, more importantly neglected to incorporate how these residual 
capacities could assist European-wide recovery and especially in surmounting the 
difficulties of four-power administration in Germany.  The American zone of occupation, 
while an important agricultural producer, represented a region largely devoid of fixed 
nitrogen facilities.  An Office of Military Government for Germany (United States) or 
O.M.G.U.S. report demonstrated that a long list of shortages—spare parts, coal, etc.—
reduced the already minimal levels of fixed nitrogen processing to around 2,000 tons per 
month in January 1946.26  Only the building of new facilities within southern Germany or 
the escalation of production in other zones, or imports from the United States could 
alleviate this problem.  The creation of a self-sufficient and pacified German economy, a 
principle that did not take international trade patterns and modern industrial society into 
account, was a mirage. 
The cracks in F.E.A. thinking widened during the months following the war.  On 22 
October 1945 the Chief of the T.I.D.C. Staff Marshall Dodge wrote Clair Wilcox, a 
professor of economics who worked in various capacities for the State Department 
including as Chairman of the Economic Disarmament Committee, and summarized some 
of the difficulties encountered by the analysts.  Disarmament through industrial 
demilitarization remained a “top priority”.  But Dodge cited the work of U.S.G.O.C. 
specialists who “took the position that the details of any disarmament program might have 
to be adapted to the other three economic requisites”—the economic wellbeing of 
Germany, European reconstruction and the domestic prosperity of the United States.27  
Previous chapters emphasized that the State and War departments initially merged national 
security concerns with domestic and international economic policy.  The recommendation 
to reduce German society to the role of coal exporter, the change from a highly developed 
modern industrial state to that of a single-commodity economy, did not square with 





reconstruction to eliminate the potential for postwar disorder.28  For Wilcox’ Economic 
Disarmament Committee, balancing efficiency with security meant the reorganization of 
the export-oriented German economy “on a sound peacetime basis in accordance with 
international standards of a commercial and financial policy as part of the program which 
will eventually decided for the reorientation of the German economy”.29 
The American military, as demonstrated by the concern for economic realities, 
employed an alternative conception of armaments during this period.  Military thinkers 
posited armaments with neutral or amoral qualities after war’s end.  The Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (J.C.S.) argued that “armaments are a consequence and not a cause.  The need for 
them, today as throughout history, arises from the existence of conflicting international 
aims and ideologies and will pass only with the passing of such fundamental reasons for 
conflict between nations”.30  They believed that armaments stimulated peaceful relations 
through enhanced security and that a real commitment to disarmament “represent[ed] a 
grave menace to U.S. security and to the peace of the world”.31  A report issued by the Joint 
Strategic Survey Committee even pointed to “ideological, political, economic and other 
factors” and asserted that disarmament “in itself will neither remove the causes of war nor 
prevent war”.32 
The military therefore viewed postwar Soviet support of general disarmament in the 
Security Council of the United Nations, particularly the discussions concerning nuclear 
energy which began on 16 February 1946, as some sort of ruse.  And the American military 
willingly followed suit.  “Neither in public nor in our own thinking”, Dwight D. 
Eisenhower stated in connection with a J.C.S. paper on the regulation of armaments in 
January 1947, “must we ever fail to support honest proposals for world disarmament”.  He 
continued and specified that the “tone of all our messages and replies must not be negative.  
We must embrace the objective and continuously point out constructive points towards it 
attainment”.33  Eisenhower’s rhetoric further demonstrated the limits of disarmament itself.  
A Soviet proposal to destroy atomic bombs and strategic bombers aimed, he believed, at 
denying the United States the weapon systems on which their security depended.  And a 
loss of security created the destabilizing conditions that led to war.  At a meeting of the 
Secretaries of State, War, and Navy in Washington on 29 January 1947, Eisenhower 
informed the assembled soldiers that “it was easy to say that the atomic bomb was a mass 
destruction weapon and one armed soldier was not”.  “But a mass of soldiers with guns”, he 
continued hinting at Soviet conventional capabilities, “is likewise a weapon of mass 





disarmament by the U.S.” by “strip[ping] us of our present technological, managerial, and 
scientific superiority”.35  These beliefs hardly predisposed American military thinkers 
towards supporting universal industrial demilitarization as a worthwhile end. 
Historians such as Wilfried Mausbach point out that the F.E.A. offered a rational 
dismantling and industrial demilitarization strategy based on national security 
perspectives.36  Since this argument does not evaluate the strains of economic realities on 
policy concerns, pressures that ripped at the fabric of dismantling even during the 
formulation phase, it fails to address the highly theoretical nature of industrial 
demilitarization.  That is, simple calculations that the removal or downsizing of certain 
industrial dual-use capacities would prohibit military production seem highly speculative.  
Scholars cannot rely on a single postwar prescription for demilitarization, such as the final 
F.E.A. report, and neglect to incorporate the alternatives that bounced through Washington.  
The impact on the civilian economy, as demonstrated even within F.E.A. documentation, 
offered a serious argument against employing the crude methods of a command economy 
in reforming German society.  Scholars seem keen to accept the broad macroeconomic 
conclusions offered by the F.E.A. such as the assertion that a coal-driven economy could 
actually sustain the population.  State and War Department studies however illustrated the 
potential for disaster. 
In a general sense, the work of the F.E.A. seemed headed for trouble when the 
F.E.A. transferred its functions and personnel to the State Department on 19 October 1945.  
The various groups had not resolved the contradictions of industrial demilitarization policy 
nor generated a coherent or compelling plan.  The F.E.A., which had taken responsibility 
for the generation of a pacification policy,37 could not even accurately describe which dual-
use industrial branches constituted the primary targets of demilitarization efforts.  Some 
reports called for the elimination of entire industrial branches such as aluminium production 
and fixed nitrogen.  Others emphasized partial dismantling according to a mysterious and 
largely unknowable level of civilian consumption.  Still others discarded dismantling 
altogether and focused on a near-permanent state of occupation.  Economic perspectives 
influenced each of these approaches.  The first approach simply tossed economic matters 
out the window.  The second neglected to specify how German industry could assist global 
reconstruction while operating without export capacities.  Only the third option 
incorporated the economic planks of Truman’s postwar program.  In so doing, the option of 
a long-term occupation paradoxically left Germany with significant dual-use capacities and 





5.3 The Level of Industry Plan and Clay’s Reparations Stop 
State and War Department officials took little notice of the inconsistencies in 
industrial demilitarization policy in the initial difficult months after war’s end.  The Truman 
administration still inwardly and outwardly remained committed to the pacification of 
German industry.  National security concerns dominated the effort to “strike a balance 
between the requirements of economic disarmament and of [German] self-support”.38  
According to Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower fought against J.C.S. 1067 and the 
Morgenthau Plan in the immediate postwar, and demanded the rehabilitation of Germany.39  
Eisenhower’s wartime comment that Germany could be cured by letting them “stew in their 
own juice” did not endure to impact his vision of the defeated state’s future.40  Eisenhower 
and the American military nevertheless supported the general idea of industrial 
demilitarization.  But Secretary of State James F. Byrnes’ determination to support 
demilitarization meant that State Department policy neglected economic issues somewhat 
and appeared fixed on the Allied Control Council’s difficult task of setting the future levels 
of German industry in March 1946. 
While the State Department followed the F.E.A.’s lead and seemed unable to 
establish a clear method of demilitarizing German industry, dissenting voices to the 
operation grew louder.  While the debate concerning dual-use capacities nevertheless raged 
in the State Department, largely between James Riddleberger’s Central European Affairs 
Division and Charles P. Kindleberger’s Division of German Economic Affairs, the list of 
men who joined ranks behind Riddleberger’s rejection of the practicality of extensive 
dismantling grew larger.  Allen Dulles, head of the Council on Foreign Relations’ Western 
European Affairs group, offered an alternative position to dismantling in December 1945.  
He placed primary importance on European reconstruction.  Dulles informed the council on 
3 December 1945 that “Europe as a whole cannot get back to anything like normal 
conditions, not to speak of any prosperity, with a completely disorganized Germany”.  He 
rejected the deindustrialization schemes and agreed that “Germany ought to be put back to 
work for the benefit of Europe and particularly for the benefit of those countries plundered 
by the Nazis”.  The members of the council applauded these conclusions and set out to 
influence the State Department through talks with Dean Acheson, Riddleberger and John 
K. Galbraith.  These men agreed.41 
The lack of a precise American industrial demilitarization plan did not stop the 
Allied Control Council (A.C.C.) in Berlin from attempting to find a quadripartite solution 





implementing the industrial disarmament provisions of the Potsdam Agreement and 
determining the industrial landscape of a pacified Germany.  The tasks as always appeared 
straightforward enough.  The dominating principle guiding the A.C.C. dictated that the 
Allies reduce the capacities which the Nazi regime developed after 1933 in order to 
prosecute war.42  The A.C.C. delegations generally clung to the false interpretation of Nazi 
remilitarization outlined in previous chapters.  They predominantly believed that slashing 
military industrial capacities would remove the capability to wage war.  This simple 
prescription did not remedy the difficult issues of defining which industrial branches 
constituted military or dual-use potential or how much the military authorities should or 
could dismantle without impoverishing Germany and destabilizing the global economy. 
Nor did the victorious powers even agree on the meaning of industrial 
demilitarization.  The specific contingents in the A.C.C. each defined the policy in a 
different manner that interestingly mirrored the debates in the F.E.A.43  London in 
particular worried that industrial restructuring might place too heavy a financial burden on 
taxpayers.  The British delegation insisted at the 45th Special Coordinating Committee 
Meeting concerning the Level of Industry plan on 22 March 1946 that they generally 
disagreed with the Soviet representatives over the principle of revising policy if economic 
developments in Germany eroded the “fundamental hypotheses” on which the Allies 
eventually constructed the plan.44  Moscow advocated the continual lowering of industrial 
capacities until the resolution of the reparations issue.  Reparations surpassed the economic 
survival of the aggressor state in importance.45  Their British counterparts insisted that the 
occupying forces maintain a sufficient German export capacity to avoid burdening the 
respective military governments with subsidizing necessary imports.  The British delegation 
furthermore pushed hard for the adoption of periodic analyses of industry to assess the 
efficacy of the adjustments.  They stressed the inclusion of protective measures advocated 
at Potsdam.  On 27 March 1946, the Soviet delegation agreed to the principle of periodic 
reviews provided the Economic Directorate prepare lists of the German industries in the 
western zones subject to reparations.46  The other members of the committee initially 
agreed to create these lists in accordance with Clay’s proposal of supplying the most 
efficient industrial plant—irregardless of dual-use considerations—for reparations purposes 
and thereafter subjecting the remaining factories to a “normal decrease in efficiency as [the] 
years passed”.47  This strange approach papered over inter-Allied conflict for the moment.  





1067, namely the reliance on inspections, offered the western Allies a legal method of 
scuttling the agreement. 
The directorates of the Control Council established the regulations necessary to 
industrially demilitarize Germany and in a display of confidence stated that “When all these 
measures have been actually carried out, the industrial basis for Germany’s aggressive war 
actions will have been destroyed”.  The council employed the format characteristic of the 
Treasury Department and the F.E.A.  They divided German industry neatly into four 
categories that reflected direct war potential and the need to lower civilian output: 




Plants specially constructed, or principal shops of plants specially constructed for the production of materials, 
specified in Table 1, paragraph “A”, of the Plan for Reparations, namely: 
 
1.   Tanks and special tank equipment 
2.   General armament, except tanks 
3.   Aircraft and special aircraft equipment 
4.   War explosives and shell filling 
5.   Poisonous war substances 
6.   All underground plants 
Category II 
 
Plants specially constructed, or principal shops of plants specially constructed, for the production of war 
materials specified in Table 1, paragraph “A” 2-11, “B” and “C”, of the plan for Reparations, namely: 
 
7.   Sea-going ships (not interpreted to include small fishing vessels) 
8.   Magnesium 
9.   Primary aluminum and aluminum for the purpose of producing aluminum 
10. Beryllium 
11. Vanadium produced from Thomas slags 
12. Radio-active materials 
13. Hydrogen peroxide above 41% strength 
14. Radio-transmitting equipment 
15. Heavy tractors above the limits of capacity determined by the Allied Control Authority 
16. Heavy machine tools of the sizes and types prohibited by the Allied Control Authority 
17. Synthetic gasoline and oil 
18. Synthetic rubber 
19. Ball and taper roller bearings 
10. Synthetic ammonia 
Category III 
 
Plants specially constructed, or principal shops of plants specially constructed for the production of materials 
specified in schedule B to a Control Council Law to be published entitled “Law to Prohibit the Manufacture, 
Import, Export, Transport, and Storage of War Materials”, and other materials included in paragraphs 5, 6, 7, 




Peace-time plants, in which was specially installed the special purpose equipment for the production 
enumerated in Categories I and II or containing shops which were not principal shops, specially constructed for 






The A.C.C. on 3 October 1945 sanctioned an Economic Directorate proposal to create a 
Committee for the Liquidation of Military Potential in Germany that would prepare lists of 
firms that were linked to “armament, aircraft, tanks, ammunition, war and naval craft, war 
instruments and other kinds of military equipment and weapons of war”.49  The Economic 
Directorate had been granted complete authority in the matter.  The directorate was also 
responsible for the development of the industrial demilitarization policy.50  The group was 
ordered to create additional lists “other than those already defined by the Service 
Directorate as war materials, the production and development of which should be 
prohibited, bearing in mind the prevention of revival of war potential in concealed form; 
these items will be those which although outwardly intended for peace-time production, in 
reality will constitute potentiality for war production”.51  Large firms such as I.G. Farben 
fell into a different category and the Control Council seized all of the facilities and assets of 
these companies in order to destroy military industrial capacities and offer a significant part 
of the firm for reparations purposes.52 
Control Council Directive No. 39 however listed the same general problems that 
afflicted the preparation of a workable demilitarization program.  The directive bemoaned 
the “absence of a general plan of liquidation” and “practical measures” for coordinating the 
efforts of the four military governments.  The council hoped that each zone would provide a 
“complete census of that [war] potential…with an account of the liquidation already carried 
out in the zones”.  The council, based on economic and humanitarian developments in 1946 
understood that certain industries such as nitrogen fixation were required in the short term 
and that dismantling in these cases was counterproductive.53  These reservations applied to: 
(a) the necessity for the temporary retention of certain of the plants for the use of the 
Occupation Forces or for other essential requirements such as mining supplies, 
transport maintenance and repairs; (b) that the plants do not belong wholly or partly to 
the nationals of the United Nations, in which event the right to substitute equivalent 
capacity is reserved; (c) that the plants or parts thereof are not subject to restitution; 
[and] (d) the retention in all four zones of the level of capacity to be approved by the 
Economic Directorate.54 
 
Military government officials in Berlin understood the challenging dilemma facing 
the occupation in regards to agriculture.  The Coordinating Committee of the A.C.C. 
discounted the viability of sufficient food imports for fiscal reasons.  Only a significant 
increase in fertilizer manufacturing, they believed, could return German agriculture to 
subsistence levels. 
We appreciate that there is a world shortage of fertilizers.  It should be borne in mind, 





will mean a far greater tonnage and money value of food that must be supplied by the 
four nations to fulfill their military government responsibility.55 
 
The committee specified that the estimated tonnages of nitrogen fixation for 1946 or 
200,000 tons did not meet half of the required 535,000 tons.56  The Coordinating 
Committee therefore requested that the A.C.C. emphasize the allocation of nitrogen 
fertilizer to offset starvation and save the occupation authorities from the greater difficulties 
incurred by a general societal collapse.  The further employment of German fixed nitrogen 
facilities, although the Coordinating Committee mistakenly mentioned war damage as the 
primary reason for the drop in output, was considered unavoidable despite the Level of 
Industry agreement.  The A.C.C. decided to take a drastic action and “agreed not to proceed 
in the valuation of the eight synthetic ammonia plants for the present”.57  This decision also 
impacted a host of other sectors of the chemical industries.  “The sulphuric acid factories, 
the production capacity of which is necessary for the neutralization of synthetic ammonia,” 
the A.C.C. agreed, “will be retained temporarily in Germany until such time as the 
necessary imports [of fertilizer] can be paid for”.  The same held true for calcium carbide 
and caustic soda.58  The decision to restrict the valuation and dismantling process impacted 
other industrial branches.  The Control Council on 3 December 1946 approved an 
Economic Directorate Proposal to permit the German repair and manufacturing of parts and 
equipment required for radio transmission until reevaluation on 31 December 1948.59  In 
other especially sensitive areas, such as hydrogen peroxide, the Economic Directorate 
agreed to place controls on production instead of supporting outright elimination.60 
The understood weaknesses of industrial demilitarization policy did not stall the 
efforts to construct a list of targets.  The negotiators reached “almost complete agreement” 
at the end of March 1946.  The A.C.C. adopted “The Plan for Reparations and the Level of 
Postwar German Economy”, better known as the Level of Industry agreement, on 26 
March 1946.  The plan operated according to five principles that included industrial 
disarmament, reparations, development of peaceful industries, the maintenance of a 
standard of living not above the European average, and overall German economic self-
sufficiency without outside intervention.  The agreement permitted industrial capacities at 
between 50 to 55 percent of the 1938 level or slightly below the levels of the worst years of 
the Great Depression when six million Germans faced the misery of unemployment.  The 
Allied representatives further agreed to base these calculations on a population of 66.5 
million, to treat the four zones as a single economic entity, and to permit a sufficiently 





F.E.A. and specified the elimination of all armaments production and also blatant dual-use 
facilities such as those producing airplanes and ships.  The Allies furthermore forbade the 
production of commodities such as aluminium, magnesium, beryllium, and various 
chemicals such as soda ash.  The agreement also targeted nearly all of Germany’s synthetic 
industries involved in producing petroleum, rubber, ammonia and most importantly fixed 
nitrogen.  The victors also ordered the destruction of heavy machine-tools, ball and taper-
roller bearings, heavy tractors, and even radio transmitting equipment.  Quotas fell on what 
remained.  The council for example only permitted Germany an annual capacity of 7.5 
million tons of steel and the real production of 5.8 million tons.  This quota represented 20.7 
percent of the 28 million tons produced in 1929.61  The agreement pleased F.E.A. hardliners 
and probably lessened Josef Stalin’s anxieties somewhat. 
The document, as evident from the apparent disregard for real export capacities, did 
not take German participation in any European recovery scheme into account.  The figure 
of 5.8 million tons of steel could hardly satiate the Allied requirements of rebuilding 
hundreds of bridges, thousands of kilometres of railway lines, and the marshalling yards.62  
The plan did not therefore reflect the worries concerning a functioning German state 
expressed by the various parties engaged in discussion.63    In many ways, the agreement of 
March 1946 “would have reduced Germany to a condition which the Morgenthau-Group 
had found desirable”.64  The A.C.C. conceptions represented a prescription for disaster and 
not an effective industrial demilitarization strategy.  The negotiations did not even specify 
the real meaning of sweeping macroeconomic statistics like 50 percent of 1938 levels.  
How could the A.C.C. have?  The bombing survey and the T.I.D.C. reports had 
demonstrated that no comprehensive and accurate data even existed. 
The Economic Directorate also exhibited other serious flaws characteristic of 
F.E.A. work.  Control Council Law No. 43 on 20 December 1946 offered the widest 
possible definition of military equipment that reached far back into antiquity.  The council 
did not restrict their formulation to the modern weapons systems that characterized warfare 
in the 20th Century such as artillery, bomber aircraft, machine-guns or tanks.  The earliest 
deliberations had determined that demilitarization included “(a) all arms, ammunition and 
implements of war, and (b) all specialized facilities for their production”.65  The new law 
now outlawed “All military cutting or piercing weapons…such as bayonets, swords, 
daggers and lances”.  The provisions concerning aircraft reached similar heights of 
absurdity and banned  “Aircraft of all types, heavier or lighter than air, with or without 





auxiliary equipment, including aircraft engines and component parts, accessories, and spare 
parts specially designed for aircraft”.66  The banning of balloons, daggers and model aircraft 
in a postwar world characterized by jet aircraft, intercontinental missiles and nuclear bombs 
added an element of comic relief to the serious business of demilitarization. 
All of this led inexorably towards a protracted occupation as seen in educational 
restrictions.67  The military government representatives took aim at both the study of 
particular academic disciplines and the equipment required for research and development.  
Control Council banned academic activities in the fields of applied nuclear physics, applied 
aerodynamics, and chemistry relating to ammonia and synthetic materials.68  These fields 
represented those in which German scientists had achieved great prominence during the 
first half of the 20th Century.  Control Council Directive No. 22 ordered the “complete 
destruction of all Navy, Army and Air Force Research or proving ground stations after 
complete scientific examination”.69  But Control Council Law No. 25, as so often in the 
demilitarization debate, ordered that “Equipment and buildings having a possible peace-
time application may be utilized for that purpose with the permission of Military 
Government”.70  Study and analysis was once again necessary.  Only long-term control 
could ensure the success of this operation. 
The vague Level of Industry calculations furthermore fantastically assumed that the 
occupying powers could run the economy on a unified basis.  The discord that characterized 
four-power control in fact prompted Clay to suspend all reparations deliveries from the 
American zone on 3 May 1946.  Clay simply hated the agreement and was in a position to 
act accordingly.71  The military government nominally acted free of interference from either 
the State or War departments.  “While we are prepared to continue the paper allocation of 
plants for reparations”, Clay reported, “we do not propose to take any further physical 
efforts to carry out the reparations program until major overall questions are resolved and 
we know what area is to compose Germany and whether or not that area will be treated as 
an economic unit”.72  The general therefore struck all industrial installations off the 
reparations lists except for the equipment of 25 armament assembly facilities that 
constituted advance deliveries and were in various degrees of shipment.73  This action 
effectively terminated the flow of reparations between west and east and killed the Paris 
agreement established by the Inter-Allied Reparations Agency located in Brussels to 
allocate the items made available by the occupation authorities in Germany.  This agency, 
that alone targeted 227 naval vessels, 31 aircraft factories and 122 war plants for 





democracies and especially the United States only transferred the equipment of a “small 
group” of factories to the Soviet Union.75 
Clay’s unilateral action illustrated his control over the execution of American policy 
in Germany.  Assistant Chief of the Central European Affairs Division E. Allan Lightner 
believed that Clay “called the tune in just about everything”.76  While the White House 
officially determined the occupation priorities in Germany, acting on the advice of both the 
State and War departments, the perspectives of the men in the zone of operations 
necessarily infringed on the “higher” goals set by the diplomatic and military experts.  This 
principle in particular subordinated all State Department policy to the dictates of military 
government.  Robert J. Murphy, the senior State Department representative in Germany and 
political adviser to Clay, only summarized the activities of the occupation forces and could 
only attempt to persuade his superior to follow policy derived far away in Washington.77  A 
close friendship between Clay and Murphy did grant the State Department some influence 
over O.M.G.U.S. decisions.  The State Department preferred exerting influence through 
Murphy instead of the normal military chain of command.78  Other departments and 
business leaders complained.  At a meeting attended by representatives of the departments 
of Commerce, Agriculture, and State in April 1947, business representatives complained 
that “only information…satisfactory to the Army ordinarily is reported back for use in 
Washington departments other than war”.79  This power granted Clay the flexibility to alter 
policy and prevent, as he saw matters, a harsh implementation of the Potsdam Agreement 
that jeopardized the security of American soldiers in Germany. 
Clay and others worried that the costs of occupation would spiral out of control.80  
The American military government, for example, requested $149 million to help acquire 
food, fertilizers, and petroleum products in 1946 alone.81  The Level of Industry agreement 
worried the general.  The planned dismantling of fixed nitrogen and synthetic fuel facilities 
only threatened to increase German dependency on foreign and especially American 
handouts.  A French military request for 110,000 tons of wheat to keep Germans in their 
zone from starving in January 1946 upset Clay because “the French had confiscated all 
food within reach”.82  The military governor understood that the level of dismantling 
envisioned conflicted with his mandate for providing for a self-sufficient economy to 
prevent an economic collapse that threatened to chain an economic corpse to American 
charity.  The lack of a functioning central authority and a united or realistic economic policy 
determined that the resource-weak American zone could not import sufficient food, coal or 





rise in American occupation costs, but the activities of certain allies threatened to reduce 
Germany to abject poverty once a central indigenous administration was restored. 
While Clay accepted J.C.S. 1067 and the Potsdam protocol as general guides,83 and 
stated that “the Germans will have to suffer the consequences for their war of aggression 
and wholesale slaughter”,84 he stressed the need to reinvigorate the economy and initiate 
reconstruction to prevent disease and unrest.  The general alleged that the punitive aspects 
of JCS 1067 were plainly unworkable and set out to change policy in Germany at an early 
date.85  Clay for example formed the German Landesrat as the chief economic 
organizational unit in the American zone on 17 October 1945.86  This act indicated Clay’s 
commitment to a central economic authority.  He believed that production limitations were 
intended to establish a framework for reparations and to free the light industries from 
excessive control.  Clay however also hinted that the plan assumed that the occupying 
powers would continue to treat Germany as a single economic unit.  “If boundary or other 
changes should be made”, Clay asserted, “the agreed plan would have to be modified as it 
probably would no longer be sound”.87    The production restrictions made little sense in a 
fractured German economy. 
The military governor rejected A.C.C. policy in Germany and in particular baulked 
at the direction taken during the Level of Industry negotiations.88  He opposed policies that 
threatened the economic survival of his zone and Germany as a whole.  Clay did not strictly 
follow A.C.C. policy for this reason.  The military governor permitted the manufacturing of 
ball-bearings in order to stimulate the production of mining equipment “pending the 
recovery of foreign trade to the point where they can be purchased abroad”.89  Clay, in 
accordance with others before him, hypothesized that the Level of Industry agreement alone 
would put four million Germans out of work by 1949.90  The general moreover believed 
that the policymakers based their decisions on conceptions established prior to the 
termination of the war and that the planning therefore suffered from an inadequate 
understanding of the conditions prevailing in Germany.91 
 The visible destruction of German cities impacted Clay in a similar manner to that 
of the president.  Lightner hypothesized that Clay “probably changed his mind as early as 
anyone stationed in the field on the need to get the Germans working, if for no other reason 
than to reduce the cost of subsidizing them”.92  The military governor and his Economic 
Chief General William Draper argued for a broad revival of the interconnected coal and 
steel infrastructure.  Clay even lamented that Roosevelt’s dismissal of the military’s 





“devastating effect on the morale of American officials responsible for disarming 
Germany”.93  The simultaneous implementation of demilitarization and basic humanitarian 
principles proved contradictory.  The general grumbled that the A.C.C. even found it 
difficult to define what kind of democracy Germany needed and that the delegates “spent 
one whole day disagreeing on a definition of democracy” without establishing “any 
common definition”.94 Clay even disregarded European fears of a resurgent Germany and 
seemed unable to sympathize with French and Soviet suspicions that the Truman 
administration aimed at cheating them of reparations.95  The hardline proponents of 
demilitarization, in Lightner’s opinion viewed the task of eliminating military industrial 
potential a simple matter of dismantling factories on a broad level and making Germany 
“economically unable to produce the weapons of war”.96  But Clay, independently 
following the lead of others, did not believe that the occupation authorities could balance 
the political and economic demand for a functioning economy with the highly moral 
position of industrial disarmament or even extensive reparations.  “Clay believed”, Jean 
Edward Smith summarizes, “in German recovery in and of itself…if a democratic Germany 
was America’s aim, and it was certainly Clay’s aim, economic recovery was essential”.97 
The military governor vehemently opposed the restructuring of traditional domestic 
German trade patterns through dismantling and not just “hidden” reparations such as the 
impressment of millions of labourers to toil or languish in French or Soviet mines.98  Clay’s 
“lax” attitude towards restricting German chemical production in particular provoked 
Washington’s allies.  The French government protested early in the occupation that German 
factories continued to produce dyestuffs and pharmaceuticals.  They demanded that these 
dual-use activities stop immediately.  The State and War departments in this case clearly 
supported Clay’s focus on economic recovery over demilitarization matters.  Washington 
strongly opposed the French standpoint and urged Clay “to make no concessions to [the] 
French” in industrial branches the Americans marked as clearly civilian in nature.  The 
State Department experts even speculated that these requests aimed at eliminating German 
competitors and subsequently filling the vacuum with French production.99  This form of 
industrial demilitarization, the imposition of blanket bans on dual-use industrial branches 
needed by the German economy, contradicted the aim of recovery and the establishment of 
a sound administration.  It mattered little that Paris acted in the spirit of the Level of 
Industry agreement or that these industries maintained an extensive dual-use potential.  
Clay had dismissed the work of the F.E.A. for the same reason.  Fowler and his 





attempt at influencing policy on the ground irritated the military governor.  The similarities 
of the F.E.A. results to French and Soviet conceptions and actions irked him even more.  
The general pointed out that Fowler’s efforts could prove “embarrassing” to his own plan at 
stimulating industrial production.  The “aggregate program of the FEA reports”, Clay 
explained in a letter to a former legal counsellor to I.G. Farben and Assistant Secretary of 
War John J. McCloy, “is more extreme than is feasible”.100  The organization’s narrow 
focus on demilitarization simply did not take larger matters into account.  “You couldn't 
have the most productive area of Europe out of production”, Clay elaborated at a later date, 
“and still expect to have prosperity”.101  The State Department indirectly rescued Clay from 
a potentially difficult situation by disbanding and absorbing Fowler’s organization.  The 
confused work of the F.E.A. hardliners did not impact Clay’s stubborn and farsighted 
humanitarian perspective. 
The historical scholarship concerned with the reparations stop generally 
hypothesizes that Clay’s suspension of reparations shipments represented a “tactical 
maneuver” aimed at convincing the French authorities to forgo the attempt at annexing the 
Saar region, end the appeal for Ruhr internationalization, and force the establishment of a 
centralized economic administration of Germany.102  Parisian postwar policy, despite the 
attempts by some scholars to prove otherwise,103 at least approached the severity of 
American and Soviet hardliners.  The French government for example strongly advocated 
and pursued the complete elimination of the German machine-tool industry—a policy that 
the F.E.A. had demonstrated would remove all recuperative powers and plunge millions 
into abject poverty.104  French delegations consistently targeted a broad sweep of industrial 
enterprises such as pharmaceutical, steel, metal-fabricating, and even cement companies.  
The hard French stance against a unified economic policy, under these conditions, 
displeased Clay since they flew in the face of A.C.C. agreements.  He informed Eisenhower 
that a central German authority “should be acceptable to the Russians”, but “will be 
strongly resisted by the French”.105  Clay did in fact originally aim at influencing French 
behaviour and that the suspension of reparations shipments did not necessarily impact 
American-Soviet relations despite the considerable protests by Moscow.106  Clay had 
informed the Soviet occupation authorities as early as October 1945 that he would 
recommend the fusion of the American and Soviet zones if French impediments to 
quadripartite administration continued.107  Clay subsequently changed his opinion 





of an American-British zone.108  The general fought for the erection of a central economic 
authority in as large a region of Germany as possible. 
The Truman administration worked hard to change French perspectives and bring 
them into the American fold.  The State Department, in John Gimbel’s words, “refused 
either to apply sanctions against France or to admit publicly that France was indeed the 
major problem in Germany”.109  The State Department accepted Clay’s conclusion that the 
German economy required a centralized administrative body to coordinate the flow of raw 
materials.  They offered the French government a host of incentives. Promises of 
considerable financial support throughout 1946, a relaxation of opposition against the 
annexation of the Saar region, and most importantly the offer of a comprehensive 
disarmament treaty were intended to mollify and bend opinions.110  These proposals 
indicated that the State Department exhibited a degree of concern for the aspirations of the 
French government in Germany and especially the widespread rejection of a policy of 
German economic reconstruction.111  It is hard to imagine how the actions of the French 
military government could represent the premier problem for American postwar policy in 
Germany considering the ferocity of the Soviet atrocities in the eastern regions. 
 The revisionist and postrevisionist historiography generally hypothesizes that the 
belligerent anti-Soviet stance characterized by the freeze on reparations shipments 
effectively terminated the possibilities of quadripartite control.  The revisionists first of all 
demonstrate that several authoritative American figures such as Byrnes and Clay assumed 
that Stalin’s “position on many matters was not intransigent”.112  Clay’s military 
government, as emphasized by John Backer, seriously attempted to cooperate with his 
Soviet counterparts regarding the complex postwar economic issues.113  Successful 
negotiation with Stalin, these scholars elude, was possible.  Clay even repeatedly used 
reparations from the western zones to lure his Soviet counterparts into negotiations.114  
Other historians such as Backer emphasize that “since [Soviet Foreign Minister 
Vyacheslav] Molotov had offered a reduction of the Soviet [reparations] claim by $2 billion 
at Potsdam, a compromise could be reasonably expected”.115  But the State Department 
used the reparations stoppage, aimed at cudgelling the French government into compliance, 
to beat Moscow instead.  Gimbel’s early work even declared that “State Department 
functionaries shamelessly misled the American public about the reasons for Clay’s 
reparations suspension”.116  Kindleberger’s Economic Division of the State Department, 
Charles S. Maier explains, failed to stand against the increasingly antagonistic anti-Soviet 





Even though Clay did not view Stalin as the principle problem in establishing an 
effective economic administration of Germany, the Soviet discrepancy between 
quadripartite policy and actions, witnessed throughout the occupation, clearly demonstrated 
the dictator’s unwillingness to abide by the normal practices of international relations.  The 
realities of extensive Soviet dismantling and the horrible human rights violations, plainly 
evident to American policymakers and the military government, suggests a different 
explanation.  It is frankly hard to accept that State Department officials or Clay in Germany, 
owing to the flood of reports issued by Robert Murphy concerning the plight of eastern 
Germany, took positive Soviet pronouncements concerning quadripartite administration 
seriously. 
This dissertation demonstrated that the Soviet authorities, based on the actions of 
their military in the spring and summer of 1945, made it clear that Moscow used reparations 
primarily to reduce the German state to industrial impotence while simultaneously creating 
an economic system powerful enough to rival the western democracies.  Any high-level 
American complicity in this policy stripped western Europe of the industry required to 
ensure the rapid economic recovery deemed necessary to avoid a general European 
economic collapse, political unrest, and a return to the prewar crisis of the Great 
Depression.  The State Department, approximating Clay’s worries concerning the economic 
situation in Germany, viewed the Soviet administration’s refusal to export agricultural 
produce to the western zones as a serious breach of the Potsdam protocol and a danger for 
general American policy.  The impossibility of restraining the Soviet military in Germany 
only spurred the anti-communist factions in the State Department to forgo lengthy and 
difficult negotiations with Moscow and instead concentrate on the western zones.118  
American officials, aware that the German economy required coal for all branches of the 
German economy including the agricultural sector, attempted to compensate for Soviet 
intransigence by convincing French authorities to export Saar coal and more basic 
agricultural resources such as grain.  A majority of State Department officials therefore 
generally agreed with Clay’s reparations stop. 
While the Level of Industry agreement of March 1946 superficially attempted to 
“strike a balance between the requirements of economic disarmament and of self-
support”,119 the A.C.C. directive plainly disregarded some of the important conclusions 
reached by the American T.I.D.C. specialists.  These experts, as pointed out, questioned 
whether the defeated state could feed the population without large fixed nitrogen capacities.  





achieving European recovery without German manufactured goods.  Byrnes had addressed 
these fears and announced as early as 12 December 1945 that the United States did not 
“propose to set permanent limits to Germany’s civilian economic prosperity”.120  But the 
Level of Industry calculations hardly represented a policy of “prosperity” let alone 
recovery.  A wider rejection of the levels set after Clay’s halt to reparations.  Various 
officials now claimed an interest in reparations but opposed the use of dismantling in 
pursuit of extensive structural changes.  These men also jettisoned support for reparations 
shipments to eastern Europe.  “Should it develop that capital assets of ordinary peacetime 
utility made available under the Level of Industry [agreement] exceeds the demands of the 
western claimant countries”, Galbraith, Riddleberger and Henry P. Leverich wrote in 
September 1946, “then the United should indicate that it will seek agreement that these 
assets be used for the German economy and not destroyed”.121  These men conveniently 
ignored the fact that the establishment of quotas and percentages for civilian industrial 
production represented an important aspect of dual-use industrial downsizing for 
demilitarization purposes.  The interpretation that the agreement only reflected reparations 
made nonsense of the demilitarization strategies.122 
A summary of the Level of Industry agreement was transmitted by Murphy to the 
Secretary of State on 29 July 1946.  The political advisor described Clay’s support for a 
balanced import-export program and that the military government would revise and raise 
the standard of living and productive levels if the zone could not function without foreign 
handouts.  The report also outlined essential differences between the occupying powers 
concerning the definition of “peaceful industries”.  The Soviet and French military 
governments requested the complete elimination of cement manufacturing in Germany.  
They correctly pointed out that this branch of industry enabled the creation of military 
fortifications and the roads and bridges used to transport soldiers and heavy weapons.  The 
building of the Autobahn by Fritz Todt’s labour brigades, a traditional example of the Nazi 
employment of dual-use commodities such as cement for military purposes, seemed 
imprinted on their memories.  But Clay’s government flatly rejected this strict interpretation 
of a dual-use commodity on the grounds that the cities, houses and civilian infrastructure 
could not otherwise be rebuilt.  The military government ordered that “no producing 
equipment should be removed from this industry”.123  This emphasis on rebuilding the 
transportation network to increase the mobility of the American military and ease the 
movement of raw materials for reconstruction and industrial purposes simply dismissed the 





Washington soon questioned the provisions of the March 1946 agreement in a more 
comprehensive manner.  The A.C.C. had decided to retain controversial dual-use branches 
of industry that included synthetic raw materials processing and even the production of 
explosives.  The need to encourage coal-mining for domestic and foreign purposes had 
helped convince the A.C.C to tolerate the continued production of explosives and 
detonators.  On 30 December 1946 Law No. 43 paradoxically prohibited the manufacturing 
or importation of war materials, but permitted the production of ammunition, detonators 
and explosives for use by industry.  A representative of the Czechoslovakian military 
vociferously attacked the law during negotiations and correctly pointed out that this 
decision plainly violated the Level of Industry agreement.  He feared that even minimal 
explosives capacities further rationalized the retention of ammonia and fixed nitrogen 
synthesis in order to produce ammonium nitrate and other banned compounds.125  These 
worries were brushed aside.  The Control Council, in a manner reminiscent of the F.E.A., 
decided to erect an elaborate system of inspection “to ensure the success” of the new law.  
Four special commissions drawn from each of the four military governments to randomly 
investigate “all plants and industrial installations” involved in explosives manufacturing.126 
The Level of Industry plan, although crude and imprecise, represented the high 
point of the Allied pursuit of industrial demilitarization through a comprehensive program 
of dismantling and general reductions in capacity.  The Level of Industry plan did not 
however accord with Washington’s desire to reconstruct Europe or run the occupation 
according to a principle of self-sufficiency that limited foreign subsidization.  The exclusive 
focus on national security concerns therefore granted the document qualities of fantasy once 
other issues bubbled to the surface.  The steady stream of modifications to the Level of 
Industry agreements significantly reduced the impact on dual-use capacities in western 
Germany.  The quadripartite administration first banned a commodity such as ammonia, 
fixed nitrogen or explosives but rescinded these directives after economic considerations 
were taken into account.  Harold Zink’s assertion that Morgenthauian concepts permeated 
occupation policy and seriously impacted the War Department’s conclusion that Germany 
could not be efficiently managed “without a substantial amount of industrialization” seems 
suspect.127  The wide latitude and autonomy of Clay’s military government determined that 
the general’s personal interpretation of J.C.S. 1067 mattered far more that the theoretical 
underpinnings.128  Even the Division of German Economic Affairs, initially among the 
ranks of the hardliners, eventually altered their stance on economic matters in mid-1946 and 





imagined by the A.C.C.129  The period between the termination of war and the summer of 
1946 represented the period when “much of the dismantling was taking place” and the 
advocates of a German economic restoration were plagued by those “who wanted to carry 
out literally the provisions of J.C.S. l067” and thoroughly demilitarize German industry.130  
Clay in any case tempered the effects. 
5.4 Paperclip, Safehaven and Hidden Reparations 
In a series of programs and projects sanctioned by the Truman administration, the 
American military set out to systematically comb Germany for intellectual assets, 
manufacturing secrets, and skilled personnel.131  Truman sanctioned these efforts after the 
defeat of Japan in late August 1945.  The president stipulated that only Germans untainted 
by Nazism cross the Atlantic.  Executive Order 9604 demonstrated the extremely broad 
nature of American interests in Germany.  The collection of human and material assets by 
definition did not aim at the demilitarization of industry.  The American intelligence teams 
of the Office of Technical Services (O.T.S.) in the Commerce Department and the Field 
Information Agency, Technical (F.I.A.T.) in Europe targeted “all information concerning 
scientific, industrial and technological processes, inventions, methods, devices, 
improvements and advances”.132  But did these latter reparations represent an aspect of the 
industrial demilitarization program? 
The dimensions of the effort to exploit German technical achievements were 
nevertheless staggering.  Hundreds of American scientific and technical experts combed 
Germany to find and transfer primarily intellectual reparations back to the United States.  
The American civilian and military specialists expressed interest in “every aspect of 
German industry and technology” from heavy machinery and machine-tools to textiles, 
pharmaceuticals and electronics in order “to secure the benefit of their training, experience, 
and knowledge”.133  These “reparations” promised to stimulate the postwar American 
economy through the assimilation of new technologies at substantially reduced research and 
development costs.134  American industry and research organizations could even employ 
German scientists “for substantially less money” than their American counterparts.135  
Operation “Paperclip” and the associated programs formed an extensive plan of exploiting 
German technology for the betterment of American industry and were neither conceived 
solely for denying the Soviet Union access to German technology nor as a method of 
controlling German industry.136  These seizures and transfers acted as reparations in the true 





F.I.A.T. on 30 June 1947.  The military governor claimed that he acted to protect German 
industrial interests.137 
The growing tensions with the Soviet Union did however impact certain aspects of 
the program and certainly reduced Washington’s commitment to the denazification 
program.  The Cold War escalation intensified the urgency behind collecting and exploiting 
advanced technologies for the benefit of the American civilian and military industries.  
Policymakers had originally decided on 19 July 1945, in a plan codenamed “Overcast”, to 
reclassify German scientists as civilians and ordered the intelligence teams to help influence 
their emigration to America.138  The War Department's Joint Intelligence Objectives 
Agency (J.I.O.A.) conducted background checks of potential immigrants to investigate 
complicity in Nazi war crimes.  The parties interested in German scientists discarded these 
findings after the summer of 1947 as the pressure for securing technology intensified.  In a 
new J.I.O.A. project entitled “National Interest”, which superseded “Paperclip”, the United 
States targeted scientists all over central and eastern Europe irregardless of political history 
and affiliation.  This program was clearly aimed at limiting Soviet access to technology.139   
The Truman administration no longer barred Germans earlier considered politically 
tainted by an association with Nazism and criminal proceedings against most scientists 
stopped.  Already in June 1945, the American teams rounded up thousands of German 
scientists and their families near Nordhausen.  The military authorities shuttled 
approximately one thousand scientists by train to the safety of Witzenhausen in the 
American zone of occupation.  This group included Wernher von Braun and his team of 
rocket specialists.140  Members of the State Department initially objected to the immigration 
of scientists such as von Braun on the grounds that the continuation of their work in military 
research constituted an infringement of demilitarization and denazification policy.141  
Acheson pointed out that A.C.C. Law No. 25 prohibited the continuation of military 
research projects even if conducted on foreign soil.142  The rocket scientists had also 
willingly accepted the utilization of slave labour under horrific conditions to compensate for 
labour shortages and thereby reach production targets.  They therefore theoretically faced 
stiff prison sentences instead of affluence of the United States.143  American officials, to 
avoid unwanted debate, devised elaborate schemes to camouflage the transfer of politically 
tainted individuals.  In order to circumvent immigration laws, the responsible authorities 
moved the scientists into the United States via Canada and Mexico in an “an extralegal 
manner”.144  Otto Ambros represented an extreme example of flagrant American disregard 





company’s subsidiary at Auschwitz, Ambros was convicted of complicity in slavery and 
mass murder at Nuremburg and sentenced to eight years imprisonment.  Freed after only 
having served a few years of the sentence, Ambros immediately began work as a consultant 
for “Grace, Dow Chemical, and other American companies, as well as the U.S. Army 
Chemical Corps under a consultancy project that was run administratively in Germany by 
H.I.C.O.G. [Office of the US High Commissioner for Germany]”.145 
A veritable wave of highly trained German specialists hit American shores.  The 
chaotic state of Germany in the years following defeat and the enticing American offer of 
comfortable living conditions for both the scientists and their families helped shuttle over 
492 scientists across the Atlantic by 1948.146  Research opportunities in postwar Germany 
appeared nonexistent.  Allied plans for reshaping universities and research in general and—
once again—the destruction of the urban infrastructure generated the belief that scientists 
could emigrate or “work on a rock pile in Germany”.147  It initially appeared as it the 
occupiers would abolish a range of research fields ranging from magnetic tape recorders to 
synthetic fuels in order to negate any industrial advantages and thereby further demilitarize 
the state.148  By 1957, sixty American companies including Lockheed, W. R. Grace and 
Company, C.B.S. Laboratories and Martin Marietta employed a large number of German 
scientists.149  As part of the reparations taken from Germany to compensate the Allies and 
partially assist the demilitarization, the loss of intellectual assets superficially accorded with 
the general policy of industrial restructuring.   
The political conflict with the Soviet Union offered a credible “excuse for riding 
roughshod over American denazification”. 150  But at least a desire to employ morally 
compromised scientists for the general welfare of the American economy existed prior to 
1947.  Postwar assimilation of technology and the employment of scientists demonstrated 
particular benefits completely unrelated to the Soviet Union or policy in Germany.  The 
British government for example chose another course of action.  Instead of enticing or 
coercing German scientists to work on British projects, London “remained entirely 
circumspect about the employment of German personnel” and therefore lost opportunities 
to increase the competitiveness of the economy.151  The British authorities decided, for 
example, that A.G.F.A. colour photography was “commercially uninteresting” and the 
technology was instead taken by Kodak in the United States.152  The concentration on 
political motivation obscures how capitalist avarice impacted policy considerations. 
Other methods were used to protect the firms from the postwar reparations policy.  





war to mitigate the effects of strategic bombing, circumvent the economic blockade of the 
Axis powers, and generally to deal with production bottlenecks.  Several German firms also 
started investing in subsidiary firms positioned in neutral countries after 1943.  This policy 
aimed at moving productive capacity, personnel and especially technology to safer ground 
away from the negative impact of future occupation policy.  Siemens issued instructions to 
their subsidiaries in Switzerland to withhold production and profits and develop stocks of 
manufactured goods for the postwar.153  I.G. Farben “sold” patent rights to neutral dummy 
firms established for the sole purpose of protecting intellectual property.154  Daimler-Benz 
granted neutral firms access to their best technology and manufacturing methods.155  
Deducing the success of this subterfuge and subtracting the losses accrued from technology 
seizures represents a complex undertaking owing to these conditions. 
Considering the extensive American effort expended in finding and securing 
technology, how did this policy impact the German economy, European economic recovery 
and the Allied occupation?  Gimbel argues that “hidden” reparations and booty represented 
a considerable drain on German economic resources and capacities.  “In the short run”, the 
historian writes, “the exploitation programs had a negative effect on the resumption of 
German research and on German economic recovery in general”.156  While American 
intelligence teams operated in a manner similar to their Soviet counterparts, scooping up 
men and data, the evidence strongly suggests that “Paperclip” did not represent a purely 
negative program.  The military government clearly emphasized that the exploitation of 
technology harmed the German economy.  General Clay wrote to the War Department on 
20 October 1946 that the F.I.A.T. investigations were a serious handicap to German 
economic recovery.  He expressed doubts that “German industrial development in 
peacetime industry and research...can be pushed vigorously until some industrial security is 
provided for trade processes which are developed in these industries”.157 
No hard evidence exists that might corroborate Clay’s claim.  “Paperclip” among 
other results cultivated closer ties between German and American industry.  The 
technological sophistication uncovered more importantly helped convince the occupation 
authorities of the need to utilize these resources for European economic rehabilitation.158  
Clay generally demonstrated a certain taste for the strategy of exaggeration.  Clay for 
example continually emphasized throughout his tenure as military governor that the 
American zone represented a minor industrial region.  A quick look at the development of 
modern industries in southern Germany during the interwar seriously undermines this 





industry in his rationalization of reconstruction to save taxpayer’s money.  In any case, the 
argument that “Paperclip” seriously impacted overall capacities would otherwise have had 
minimal credibility. 
Calculating the loss of intellectual property to German firms also represents a 
complex undertaking.  The directors of I.G. Farben complained in 1946 that German 
competitors gained access to intellectual property seized and published by the occupying 
powers.160  This levelling of the playing field, in their point of view, reduced 
competitiveness.  But the American and British practice of publishing intellectual property, 
over five million pages of microfilm by mid-1947, also transferred the secrets from one 
German firm to another.  These types of reparations therefore benefited the German 
economy to a certain extent and make the assessment of damage or loss exceedingly 
difficult. 
American policymakers also understood that considerable German foreign assets 
were transferred to neutral states during the war.161  State and Treasury Department officials 
for example estimated that the Nazis plundered $579 million in gold during the war and 
transferred about $400 million of this total to Switzerland alone.162  The western Allies 
responded and conceived of a plan to deny manufacturers the means of shielding 
themselves from reparations and demilitarization obligations.  The Treasury Department 
clearly linked the retention of financial and technological assets to war potential.  The 
authors of “Safehaven” offered possibly the broadest definition of the dual-use concept 
employed during this period.  The inclusion of all financial assets in the arena of reparations 
particular emphasized the virtual disappearance of any distinctions between civilian and 
military sectors in modern economies.  But the program also heightened fears among the 
occupation authorities that the occupation appeared to disregard the needs of postwar 
Germany.  Brigadier Denham, later economic adviser to the British Military Governor in 
Berlin, stated that “If we impose on Germany a financial constitution which will not work... 
later we shall either have to accept considerable modifications under the pressure of events 
or condemn Germany to the continuation of economic disorders which may endanger law 
and order”.163 
Operation “Safehaven” sought, among other things, “the control of German 
individuals who might contribute to the revival of the German war potential by subversive 
activities in foreign countries after the war”.164  The Allies officially launched the operation 
at the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference at Bretton Woods in July 1944.  





Fund—called on neutral states to acknowledge and account for all assets belonging to 
German citizens.  A.C.C. Law No. 5, issued in November 1945, stipulated that ownership 
of these assets belonged to the victors.  But the matter of finding and distributing financial 
assets was far simpler within Germany itself.  The Allies found concealed gold reserves, in 
particular at the Merkers salt mines, totalling several million dollars.  Some of this gold had 
been taken as war booty from occupied states in order to fund the war effort.  The American 
Foreign Exchange Depository (F.E.D.), a section of O.M.G.U.S., collected and temporarily 
stored $300 million of the valuable substance in Frankfurt and distributed the gold between 
1945 and 1948.165  The Tripartite Gold Commission for the Restitution of Monetary Gold, 
established in September 1946, managed to distribute $380 million in gold.166 
A host of problems, pointed out in a recent surge of interest in this subject, hindered 
efforts.  The fact that a multitude of organizations covering various agencies from different 
countries analysed and collected the German assets confused the situation on the ground.167  
The western Allies encountered the usual problem of establishing the total amount of assets.  
German external assets were roughly estimated at $750 million, but historians cannot 
determine these numbers with any precision.  Ascertaining which of these belonged 
exclusively to German companies and individuals proved extremely complicated.168  The 
dealings with neutral states also slowed the process.  London relied on increased trade with 
neutral states to stimulate the economy.  Policymakers therefore edged away from using 
rough tactics that might sour relations.  The United States, although maintaining greater 
freedom of action and initially pressing hard for compliance, chose to soften their demands 
as the rifts between Washington and Moscow deepened.  Neutral states, for reasons of 
greed and a general unwillingness to bend to the dictates of foreign states, wished to hold 
onto the assets for their own reasons.  Negotiations between the Anglo-Saxon states and the 
neutrals therefore “proceeded slowly and deliberately”.169 This evaluation of the 
success of Operations “Paperclip” and “Safehaven” in demilitarizing German industry, 
while only a secondary goal subordinate to technology acquisition and reparations, 
demonstrates once again that the establishing of value and overall impact of the operations 
is extremely difficult.  These programs certainly failed to institute lasting changes to the 
industrial landscape.  The assets such as patents and foreign subsidiaries were later 
transferred back to German custody as both a ploy to accrue the goodwill of manufacturers 
and strengthen the central European economy.170  The operations seemed more akin to war 
booty than a rational demilitarization or reparations program since the foreign and financial 





5.5 An Imprecise Policy of Industrial Demilitarization in Action 
The failure to provide the soldiers of the four occupying states with a four-power 
industrial demilitarization policy that encompassed a clear delineation of civilian and 
military industries and concrete specifications did not stop the victors from instituting a 
haphazard program of seizures after 1945.  The A.C.C. actually seemed disinterested in 
establishing a systematic approach and requested that the military governments evaluate the 
targeted industrial facilities after they had been earmarked for dismantling. 
After a plant has been allocated to a Government on account of reparations, the country receiving 
this plant will send a mission of experts of agreed size to advise on dismantling, packing and 
shipping.  It is assumed that the valuation of such plants will be made either before or during these 
operations...Before handing over of any equipment from the plant subject to deliveries on account of 
reparations, a complete inventory of the plant and the equipment may be taken by the mission 
consisting of representatives of the country receiving the equipment.171 
 
This course of action recognized the Herculean task of evaluating the value of equipment at 
facilities without the appropriate German documentation, in various stages of 
disorganization and damaged by the strategic bombing campaign.  The records would 
subsequently be collected to determine the value of seizures after the matter.  This policy 
made no allowance for German domestic requirements. 
Allied soldiers armed with blow torches cut machinery down to size and loaded the 
equipment onto freight cars for shipment out of Germany.  This issue is taken up in greater 
detail in chapter eight.  Two early examples from the British zone of occupation however 
demonstrate the disorganized nature of the enterprise, the low relative value of dismantling 
in terms of reparations value, and the general impression of a crude and uneconomical 
policy that was imprinted on the minds of both victor and defeated in Germany.  Certain 
“successes” nevertheless characterized the operations.  British Engineers dismantled the 
Krupp Huttonwerke Borbeck open hearth smelting installations and steel rolling mills for 
shipment to the east.  This metallurgical plant consisted of five units valued at 27,661,445 
RM.  The Soviet authorities integrated the equipment into their industrial infrastructure by 
1948.  This single action reduced dual-use capacities and offered considerable reparations. 
The dismantling crews also aimed their sights at the naval shipyards in Kiel to 
disassemble the enterprises in accordance with the postwar demand to eliminate 
shipbuilding and especially warship capacities.  The Krupp Germaniawerft, one of 33 such 
German facilities, had produced 131 U-boats during the war and the British raised it to the 
ground.  But other armaments producers in Kiel did not suffer a similar fate.  The Deutsche 





“Gneisenau”, resumed the production of merchant ships and locomotives by the end of the 
1940s after the delays brought by industrial reorganization and particularly Allied 
interference.  The British did not even attempt to slow activities at the H.D.W. naval yard 
and the company continued to manufacture civilian vessels throughout the period.  Nor did 
the British teams dismantle the Kriegsmarine support structure.  Companies such as 
Rheinmetall Landsysteme, which had produced many of the torpedoes for Karl Dönitz’ 
wolf packs that sunk 5,758 Allied merchant ships during the war, quickly shifted towards 
the manufacturing of civilian commodities until Cold War realities induced the return to 
armaments in the 1950s and 1960s.172 
The Krupp Gusstahlfabrik or Cast Steel Works in Essen represented the type of 
dual-use facilities whose dismantling was deemed particularly necessary by a large 
proportion of those security-oriented policymakers who wanted to remove latent military 
industrial power.  The British at first blocked the removal of equipment from these gigantic 
installations owing to the need to repair rail transport in Germany.173  It was also necessary 
for the Allied specialists to study the many component elements to determine rational levels 
of destruction and establish lists of equipment available for transfer.  The A.C.C. on 4 
March 1947 ultimately decided that the equipment of 25 “units of allocation” at the Krupp 
Gusstahlfabrik in Essen faced “liquidation”.  This total included equipment from seven 
specific facilities or shops.  These equipment included machines and tools used for the 
production of railway wheels, processed steel components, large containers, steam boilers 
and for repair purposes.174  The greatest prize of all, the Gusstahlfabrik’s 15,000-ton steel 
press was issued to the Inter-Allied Reparations Agency (I.A.R.A.) and then transported to 
Yugoslavia.  “The suffering and losses sustained by the people of Yugoslavia during the 
period of German occupation”, the control authorities informed the Yugoslavian military 
mission in Berlin, “occasion feelings of the deepest sympathy”.175  But this form of 
reparations yielded no returns.  A press of this size, one of the largest in the world, was built 
mainly for equipment needed by a highly advanced economy and therefore represented a 
superfluous addition to Yugoslavian industry.  The machinery sat idle and unused until it 
rusted beyond recognition.176 
The situation in the American zone followed a similar pattern of policy confusion.  
Roughly 1.6 million American soldiers took control of southern Germany in May 1945.  
The headquarters of the 12th Army Group took responsibility for matters of military 
government after 16 May 1945 and divided the region into three commands administered 





manpower needed to conduct an efficient occupation, but poor discipline and boredom set 
in once the guns ceased firing.  Thousands of American G.I.s, partly driven by the notion of 
collective German guilt expressed in the policy of non-fraternization found in their Pocket 
Guides, behaved out of character.  In one incident in early 1946, two American soldiers 
toting light bulbs “requisitioned” from a Deported Persons (D.P.) mess-hall were stopped 
by a German-Jewish member of the newly constituted civilian police detachments.  These 
detachments reflected the desperation of military government in attempting to clamp down 
on misbehaviour.  The ill-tempered and visibly drunk soldiers did not take kindly to being 
interrogated and assaulted the policeman beating him badly.  The two men then returned to 
the mess-hall to demolish all the “furniture, stoves and [remaining] lighting fixtures” in a fit 
of spite.178 
This isolated action, one of thousands filling the weekly summaries of military 
government detachments, represented a general decline in morale.  The situation 
deteriorated so seriously that Army studies emphasized that the German population 
described American soldiers as “men who drink to excess; have no respect for the uniform 
they wear; are prone to rowdyism and to beat civilians with no regard for human rights; and 
benefit themselves through the black market”.179  The clearly illegal sale of military surplus 
to Germans especially unnerved the military authorities.  Soldiers even sold excess 
weapons such as rifles to civilians after the military government issued a new directive 
“forbidding the carrying of more than one weapon” in the autumn of 1945.180  Another 
report, exhibiting overtones of racism, even warned that “the presence of American negro 
troops in the area [Hessen] has slowly assumed the proportions of a security threat” owing 
to a series of rapes and other crimes.181  The end of hostilities helped stimulate the belief 
that the soldier’s work had been completed and this loss of focus negatively impacted the 
occupation. 
The progressive reductions of troop strength during this period, in conjunction with 
poor discipline, impacted the efforts of Clay’s military government in other ways.  The 
infantry and armoured divisions, responsible for their operational areas and representing a 
strategic reserve, were being sent home in ever greater numbers by late 1946.  Both the 3rd 
and 9th Infantry divisions were sent home during the closing months of 1946.  The 1st 
Infantry Division took over the ignoble task of running the prisoner of war camps and 
displaced persons installations.182  The large American army, effectively decimated in 
effectiveness by poor discipline brought about by the desire to return home, absorbed some 





paper strength.  The depletion of manpower in particular literally forced the reliance on 
German assistance for occupation duties. 
Security represented a significant problem for the American authorities.  Armed 
gangs of D.P.s roamed the countryside in search of plunder and revenge in what the 
military called a “crime wave”.  In September 1945 for example six Polish D.P.s armed 
with machine pistols murdered a German farmer and a physician near Giessen in Hessen. A 
manhunt was organized.  Miltary police caught up with the fugitives at the train station in 
Alsfeld.  The Poles opened fire on the Americans and managed to escape.183  This incident 
helped convince military authorities to demand the introduction of larger German security 
forces equipped with guns.  The policy succeeded.  An E-3 report concluded in December 
1945 that the “complete arming of German police” led to a “definite decrease in robberies, 
miscellaneous small crimes and lawlessness”.184 
The influx of refugees from eastern Europe, as demonstrated, caused additional 
problems.  Small American tactical formations acted as border guards but failed to halt or 
control these movements.  Insufficient troop strength prohibited the creation of secure 
borders.185  The military had deployed reorganized rural civilian police forces and 
remodelled the German Grenzpolizei to function on a state level to compensate for 
decreasing numbers of soldiers in a deteriorating situation.  According to Military 
Government’s Directive No. 16, approximately 4,000 uniformed and armed German 
borderguards began operations on 15 March 1946 and gradually took near complete 
responsibility for border control operations from the hands of the military.186  These 
auxiliary forces worked in conjunction with the United States Constabulary, activated on 1 
July 1946, which was formed to deal primarily with the cross border movement of 
civilians.187  United States Forces European Theater headquarters had concluded in June 
1946 that American border guards were ill-suited for the role and that a heavy reliance on 
German police units required more supervision.  The Constabulary was born.188  This 
organization encompassed 30,000 troops organized into three brigades of three regiments.  
A number of specialist formations assisted their efforts such as a light tank company of 17 
M24 tanks, a horse platoon of 30 soldiers and nine L-5 liaison aircraft.  The Constabulary 
created control posts and sent out patrols to offer some depth to the border system.189  
These measures could not hold back the flood of refugees over such a large border region. 
 The lack of clear policy statements and directives impacted the efforts of the 
officers and men who took the job more seriously.  Approximately 250 American European 





of preparing for industrial demilitarization during the early phases of the occupation.  The 
division had originally been composed of three regiments. 
The outstanding peculiarity of ECAD was that only its smallest components, the 
detachments, had an operating civil affairs military government role.  Independently of 
the division, they would be the instruments through which the combat troops would be 
relieved of civil commitments and the primary SHAEF civil affairs objective would be 
attained, namely, ‘to ensure that conditions exist among the civilian population which 
will not interfere with operations, but will promote these operations.’ They would be 
small, self-contained and partially self-sufficient headquarters, which, although not 
designed to govern, would have sufficient authority and possess enough technical 
know-how to revive, instruct, and supervise local governments.  In doing so they 
would accomplish the second SHAEF civil affairs objective, which was to achieve the 
first with maximum economy of military manpower.190 
 
The problem for these men related to defining their reason for being.  Military government 
officials complained that “Most tactical units, troops and commanders alike, do not know 
what military government is or what it is supposed to do”.191  These tactical organizations, 
which spread across the American zone to secure industrial installations among other tasks, 
fell back on the older concepts characteristic of the handbooks rejected by Morgenthau and 
Roosevelt.  These security considerations characterized the efforts of the E.C.A.D. 
The lack of a clarified position did not conflict with the initial goal of husbanding 
industrial resources for recovery or later dismantling.  On 27 August 1945 U.S.E.F.E.T. 
directed Military Government Detachment E-3 to proceed to Rüsselsheim, only a short time 
after the end of hostilities, and “take the Opel Plant into official custody”.192  These 
facilities, originally a subsidiary of General Motors until Hitler nationalized the company in 
the 1930s, produced tanks and trucks for the Wehrmacht during the war.193  The surprised 
soldiers discovered that wartime damages did not seriously impact capabilities.  “[F]inished 
products will be rolling off the production line” they informed headquarters, “in the very 
near future”.  The detachment assisted German work crews in re-establishing “full scale” 
production by the end of September.194  The American 7th Army had ordered the 
production of a large number of trucks in order to alleviate the transportation problems 
brought by the bombing of the railways during the war.  Only the lack of raw materials 
inhibited greater truck output at the Rüsselsheim plant.  The E.C.A.D. detachments 
explained that food shortages lowered worker productivity.  A shortage of coal-based 
energy and basic raw materials hindered the production of critical spare parts.  The trucks 
that did stream off the assembly lines needed gasoline.  E.C.A.D. therefore sponsored the 





processing and oil synthesis facilities.  E-3 in particular helped Gustav Rubeman 
Viernheim, the head of the chemical Bensheim factory, to resume oil refining operations.195 
The need to resurrect the German transportation and communications network also 
lay behind the protection of associated factories.  The Mercedes-Benz factory at 
Untertürkheim returned to production on 20 May 1945 and new designs followed in swift 
succession.196  The same company even created new repair facilities in Waiblingen near 
Stuttgart for the occupation forces in 1945.197  American soldiers first entered the 
Volkswagen facilities in Wolfsburg on 11 April 1945.  The fear that freshly released slave 
labourers might try to exact a degree of revenge and destroy the installations—again only 
marginally damaged during the war—convinced the German management to request the 
presence of armed soldiers on the factory floor.  The military agreed.  The British military, 
which took over responsibilities from the Americans in accordance with the zonal 
boundaries aggrements, acted in a similar manner to the E.C.A.D. detachments.  The British 
even permitted the production of motor vehicles for export purposes and went to great 
lengths to allocate the resources needed by the firm.198  Owing to the earlier observation 
that automotive production represented the industrial backbone of military industrial 
production during the war, the activities of the Anglo-American soldiers saved the core of 
this dual-use industry from destruction in 1945.  Other associated sectors required by these 
factories soon fell under the same protection. 
The process of examining German industrial facilities, determining the amount and 
nature of the equipment and establishing a monetary value proved cumbersome.  The 
structure appeared relatively straightforward.  The Coordinating Committee first approved 
the plants available for destruction or dismantling.  The Reparations, Deliveries, and 
Restitution Directorate (R.D.R.D.) then carried out the process of valuation.  The Economic 
Directorate subsequently allocated the machinery to either the Soviet Union or to the 
I.A.R.A. for issue to western claimants such as Australia, Belgium, India or Yugoslavia.  
But significant delays hampered this process.  A small French team of 15 experts toured 
and apprised the hundreds of installations throughout the western zones.  The Soviet 
delegate on the R.D.R.D. complained on 6 November 1946 that “Valuation work is at 
present the bottleneck on the Reparations Program”.  The British delegate essentially agreed 
with his Soviet counterpart and informed the directorate that valuations of a factory 
sometimes required over seven months.  Unlike the other members of the group, however, 
the Soviet delegate bitterly complained that “this work had practically broken down” and 





optical plants, and especially that of shipyards.  The Soviet delegate stressed that some form 
of final date be set to force swift compliance.199  The British authorities informed the 
Soviets that there were “not enough experts at the disposal of [the] British Military 
Government to carry out this work”.200  The Soviets only visited 37 of 416 plants in the 
British zone. 
5.6 Feeding Workers as a Structural Constraint 
German food stocks dwindled in the months after war’s end.  Wartime neglect, the 
Soviet and Polish annexations of the agricultural heartland, postwar interzonal division and 
the absence of a viable currency for import purposes helped exacerbate the problem.  The 
political decision to cede the Prussian agricultural heartland to Poland and the Soviet Union 
as reparations reduced Germany’s total amount of arable land by one-quarter.201  Germany 
produced only 83 percent of required foodstuffs prior to the war and imported the rest to 
compensate for the deficit.202  What remained in German possession could not feed the 
population under the best of conditions.  The threat of famine in eastern Germany induced 
the Soviet authorities to import bread grains and other foodstuffs.203  Experiencing their 
own difficulties in providing for the civilian population within the Soviet zone, Moscow 
failed to ship foodstuffs and fertilizer to the more heavily industrialized west.204  The 
division of Germany into four zones restricted the trade of foodstuffs and the industrial 
commodities needed for agriculture.  But the famine itself was restricted to the larger 
German urban centres.  The lack of a functioning currency convinced German farmers to 
hoard their produce and await better days.  British troops in North Rhine-Westphalia 
commented that German farmers seemed unaware that a food crisis even existed.205  The 
high level of urbanization in Germany still determined that millions went hungry. 
But the fall in industrial production, brought about by insufficient raw material 
stocks and the Allied policy of suspending production at certain factories in anticipation of 
clear policy directions, represented the primary reason why German farmers found it 
increasingly difficult to purchase fertilizer and basic agricultural equipment.  The decision 
reached at Potsdam to dismantle or significantly reduce entire industrial branches impacted 
the flow of fertilizer, fossil fuels and replacement parts.206  The food shortage that surfaced 
after Potsdam demonstrated the flawed foundation of the subsequent Level of Industry 
agreement and underlined the validity of certain T.I.D.C. counter-deindustrialization 
arguments that tampering with specific elements of the economy could only end in 
catastrophe for policy in Europe.  The dismantling or destruction of the fixed nitrogen 





theoretically threatened Europe with starvation unless the industrialized states could conjure 
up alternatives.  Other European farmers faced similar shortages to their colleagues in 
Germany.  Owing to the banality that Germans required agricultural produce in order to 
live, and Allied industrial demilitarization concepts threatened serious disruptions in 
German and European farming, the Potsdam and Level of Industry agreements forced 
millions of Europeans to face the prospect of starvation. 
Europe plunged into a severe crisis in the winter of 1946-47 that shook the 
foundations of postwar policy.  The harvest of 1946 did not bring in enough food to 
adequately feed the European population.207  Europe’s 60 million displaced persons only 
added to the problem.208  Millions of destitute Germans—expelled from Poland, 
Czechoslovakia and elsewhere—streamed into the occupied zones at a rate a quarter 
million a month and forced significant pressures on existing food stocks.  American 
observers believed that the deteriorating living conditions brought up the spectre of general 
disorder and chaos that might impact European political developments.  William L. 
Clayton, Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs, forecast that the scourge of 
starvation affecting “millions of people in the cities” threatened to “overwhelm Europe”.  
The general crisis that spread outwards from Germany appeared to radicalize the European 
political scene by garnering support for communism in France and Italy.209  Memories of 
the depression still fresh, the Truman administration understood that political and economic 
chaos had assisted the rise of Fascism in the 1930s.  Washington sought economic stability 
in order to minimize these pressures.210 
European farmers needed fertilizer more than words of encouragement.  The State-
War-Navy Coordinating Committee observed that global agriculture after 1945 suffered 
primarily from seriously reduced fertilizer production.  Output continuously fell from the 
prewar level of 2,242,000 to 300,000 tons by 1947.  The committee pointed out that the 
poor state of European fields brought by the transfer of resources to explosives 
manufacturing required output levels that surpassed those of the 1930s by a considerable 
margin.211  The diversion of fixed nitrogen and other raw materials from fertilizer to 
explosives production in Germany cut the harvest in half by 1945 and farmers only 
harvested 35 percent of prewar levels in 1946.212  Dwindling German food stocks reduced 
the average daily ration to considerably less than the official postwar requirement of 1,500 
calories.213  The American occupation authorities generally held the German population 
responsible for the numbing hunger that forced urban residents to pick through the garbage 





1945 that shortages of food, fuel, housing and transport meant a “tough” road ahead.214  But 
this attitude did not account for conditions outside of Germany and European society fared 
only marginally better.215  This situation made a mockery of the official American 
commitment to fight starvation and disease. 
Disease struck the weakened German population.  The future West German 
Chancellor Konrad Adenauer predicted in a letter that millions would die if the occupation 
authorities did not address the problem.216  New tuberculosis cases rose so dramatically in 
the summer of 1947 that 40,000 patients in the Anglo-American zones could not be 
treated.217  Other diseases including diphtheria and typhus took the lives of increasing 
numbers of civilians and especially children.218  How many died as a result of postwar 
chaos?  The wide divergence in statistical analyses of postwar German mortality rates limits 
the investigation of deaths through starvation and disease.219  The American authorities 
reported a mortality rate of 28.5 per 1000 (10.1 per 1000 in the city of New York) between 
August 1945 and October 1946.220  The American awareness of these problems counts 
more than a final tabulation. 
Clay in November 1945 described Berlin as “the world’s largest boarding house, 
with all the population on relief”.221  But occupation authorities originally discouraged the 
efforts of aid organizations to send assistance across the Atlantic and instead stipulated that 
“the shipment from this country of relief supplies for German nationals in Germany is not 
permitted”.222  On initial inspection, officials including Clay at first interpreted the sending 
of aid as contradictory to the J.C.S. 1067 requirement that Germans understand the meaning 
of defeat.223  But the War Department had ordered Clay to terminate all mail between 
Germany and Switzerland, Sweden, Spain, Portugal and Argentina to prevent German 
industrialists from protecting their foreign assets.224  The ban could not stand against 
domestic pressures.  The State Department even resorted to lies to quiet increased domestic 
pressures to allow shipment of assistance packages.  Despite the fact that O.M.G.U.S. had 
managed to repair a substantial portion of the German communications system by 
November 1945, the State Department informed the aid organizations that postwar chaos 
restricted the flow of goods and even mail to Germany.225  Undeterred by the official 
statements, the documentary evidence demonstrates that these organizations managed to 
ship food under the noses of the occupation authorities.  Norman Innes stated in June 1946 
that the Maritime Sales and Service Corporation, an American commercial agency in New 





manufacturers even managed to ship nitrogenous products to the United States, which 
baffled occupation authorities, at the beginning of 1947.227 
The non-governmental shipment of direct food relief predated official actions.  The 
evidence suggests that Clay, far from happy with conditions in Germany, agitated against 
the ban on communications.  The growing hunger crisis convinced Clay to adopt unusual 
methods to change attitudes.  The general began to publicly weigh German children for 
reporters to demonstrate the effects of starvation to the American people.  This act 
represented an appeal for aid that tugged at the hearts of the American public.228  A torrent 
of letters and petitions, that included aid groups who collected charitable donations in 
anticipation of change, overcame inertia.  The State Department accepted the offers of the 
relief organizations by 4 February 1946.  A restricted mail service resumed a month later 
and package post was re-established on 1 June 1946.229 
Congress responded somewhat slower than certain segments of the American 
population and helps explain the administrative lethargy in combating the problem of 
starvation in Germany.  The Society for the Prevention of World War II, consisting of 
several thousand members some of prominent stature such as Henry Morgenthau Jr., 
Sumner Welles, and Albert Einstein and directed by senators such as Elbert D. Thomas and 
Harley M. Kilgore, formed in the immediate postwar to avert a future war by “whittling 
down Germany's war potential in all fields of activity”.  The organization based all of its 
work on the assumption that no distinction between Nazis and the German people existed.  
They adopted a program characteristic of the hardliners and “advocated a postwar platform 
which included such features as the permanent separation of East Prussia, Silesia, the Ruhr, 
the Rhineland, and the Saar from Germany; abolition of all heavy industry; reparations in 
kind; conscription of German labor to rebuild the free nations; and relief for the people of 
Germany only after relief was accomplished for all of the liberated countries”.230 
Senator Thomas, who informed the American public that Germans “proved 
themselves unfit to participate in the community of nations”, argued that no normal German 
civilian economy even existed.  While he supported pastoralization and plainly argued that 
Germany be “reduced to an agricultural nation”, Thomas’ writing indicates a total lack of 
regard for the economic realities pointed out in this dissertation.  The senator emphasized 
that German nitrogen fixation plants produced munitions and not fertilizer for agriculture 
and should therefore be destroyed.231  These politicians of a significant anti-German leaning 
even expressed the callous opinion that the sending of food aid represented “the first move 





Germany”.232  Congress, pressured by lobby groups and a more rational faction that 
included the Republican senators from North Dakota and New York, nevertheless officially 
started shipping food parcels to their former enemy and helped alleviate some of the 
suffering brought by famine in December 1946.233  Senator John Taber in particular helped 
secure a $300 million deficiency appropriation for 1947 and another $600 million for 
1948.234  These substantial sums represented the opposite of what the Society for the 
Prevention of World War III advocated.  Considering Truman’s dismissal of a hard peace, 
and the concentration on German economic rehabilitation, the Society for the Prevention of 
World War III failed to realize their vision. 
But this form of aid represented a temporary solution to a significant dilemma.  The 
shipment of charity, undertaken by the Soviet authorities to accrue political capital, did not 
alter German and European dependency on Ruhr heavy industry for fertilizer unless these 
handouts would become permanent.235  Such a solution conflicted with fiscal frugality.  Nor 
were attempts at alleviating fertilizer deficiencies economically or politically sound.  
American diversions of ammonium nitrate from the domestic armaments industry, for 
example, only represented a fraction of what was needed.236  Fifteen American ordnance 
plants shipped 59,000 metric tons of nitrogen fertilizer to Germany, Austria and Japan in 
1946.237  This short-term solution reflected an understanding of the needs of the occupation, 
but Washington loathed depriving American military industrial facilities of resources when 
the capacities for large-scale production existed in Germany.  The State-War-Navy 
Coordinating Committee pointed out that German agriculture could not return to prewar 
levels without the fertilizer provided by the Haber-Bosch process that relied on fixed 
nitrogen and hydrocarbons to produce ammonia.238 
German industry offered the ideal solution.  But the American authorities in 
Germany had to first identify how much fixed nitrogen capacity survived the war intact.  
The U.S.S.B.S. report entitled “The Strategic Air Attack on the German Chemical 
Industry” had however jettisoned Galbraith’s observations and concluded that the bombing 
campaign and Soviet dismantling had completely destroyed fixed nitrogen capacities in the 
Ruhr and Germany as a whole.239  The report argued that the fall in explosives output in 
early 1945 indicated that the “Allied air attacks directed at Germany's synthetic oil plants 
effectively destroyed Germany's nitrogen production with disastrous results”.240 
The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee argued strongly that this conclusion 
in no way approached the truth.  The yearly industrial output of fixed nitrogen, they pointed 





capacities nevertheless remained high.  Investigations by the British Intelligence Objectives 
Sub-Committee demonstrated that the Ruhr plants alone could return to 400,000 tons 
production per year—the Level of Industry agreement limit—after a few months of basic 
reconstruction.242  Two basic problems lowered volume.  The German authorities had 
moved much of the light equipment into to central Germany in a futile attempt to continue 
the production of explosives.243  The shortage of coal, according to both the committee and 
the European Coal Organization, more importantly shut down the fixed nitrogen 
industry.244  Economic paralysis and resource shortages triggered the fall in output.  Clay 
substantiated these findings.245  The committee speculated that basic repairs could swiftly 
return this industrial sector to prewar levels and that the immediate improvement in coal 
allocation alone would boost monthly production by 8,665 tons.246 
Stimulated by the extreme food shortages in Germany, Senator S. Cooper requested 
clarification of fixed nitrogen capacities in June 1947.  Cooper was puzzled by former 
President Herbert Hoover’s press report that the victors continued to dismantle these 
factories despite the need for fertilizer and the potential for famine.  The Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Economic Affairs C. Tyler Wood responded on 20 June 1947 that the 
newspaper articles stemmed from an interview between Hoover and the Secretary of War 
Patterson.  The former president had misunderstood Patterson’s complaint that the Soviet 
authorities destroyed the fixed nitrogen facilities in eastern Germany.  Wood attempted to 
quiet the Senator.  He insisted that “every effort was being made within the imposed levels 
of industry to restore production of fertilizers” but emphasized that economic paralysis and 
the shortages of raw materials and not dismantling kept production low.247 
Wood, despite his assurances, released a contradictory report concerning the fixed 
nitrogen affair that did summarize the problem.  He argued that only two German facilities 
produced over two-thirds of the country’s overall supply.  These two plants faced 
significant bomber raids, he pointed out, owing to the dual-use nature of nitrogen and the 
importance of the element for synthetic petroleum and explosives.  Wood concluded on the 
basis of evidence provided by the U.S.S.B.S. that bombing had represented a “decisive 
factor in the collapse of the German military effort” and had disrupted and destroyed 
production capabilities.  The largest German plant, he added, was furthermore located in the 
Soviet zone and the second largest in the French zone.  Only a single plant of an older type 
existed in the American zone.  Each of these facilities suffered from a lack of coal, 
hydroelectric power and other essential resources.  Wood nevertheless paradoxically 





at the 1939 level “which is the desirable goal for the present period in the attempt to 
increase the indigenous supply of foodstuffs”.  Wood confusingly added that neither the 
American nor the Soviet authorities had dismantled the nitrogen facilities “even though all 
high-pressure plants were at one time placed in the mandatory removal class under the 
level-of-industry plan”.248  Despite wild fluctuations in the statistics, it is reasonable to 
believe that fixed nitrogen capacities were neither destroyed nor dismantled. 
Bottlenecks and not a lack of equipment therefore hampered efforts at increasing 
crop yields.  Until resumption in the flow of raw materials, economic paralysis turned the 
world’s main exporter of fixed nitrogen into a net importer.249  The European Coal 
Organization emphasized that only the United States could address the global fertilizer 
shortage of 1.3 million metric tons until German fixed nitrogen facilities received sufficient 
coal.250  Clay, in conversations with Peterson on 18 June 1947 concerning the global 
shortages of nitrogen, agreed to the “importance of securing [the] maximum production of 
fertilizer nitrogen in Germany”.  Clay pressured a willing European Coal Organization to 
step up German coal-mining to “permit operations at capacity” levels.251   
Recognizing that the reconstruction of western Europe depended on German 
industry, a report issued on 22 September 1947 by Fritz Baade, who later headed the Institut 
für Weltwirtschaft in Kiel, concerning the German chemical fertilizer industry argued that 
the western German economy required an annual minimum of 450,000 tons of nitrogen for 
domestic purposes and some export.  This number represented 80 percent of 1939 
production for all of Germany and exceeded substantially increased figures in the various 
versions of the Level of Industry agreement figure of 117,000 tons.252  The western German 
economy required a minimum of 300,000 tons of nitrogen, 600,000 tons of potash and 
300,000 tons of phosphoric acid for fertilizer.  On the basis that one ton of coal produced 
enough nitrogen fertilizer for four tons of grain, Baade furthermore argued that the German 
economy under ideal conditions required a minimum of 1.2 million tons of coal for 
agricultural purposes alone.  Phosphoric acid also depended on industrial resources.  Baade 
pointed out that the occupation authorities could either produce maximum levels of steel to 
generate the slag needed for phosphoric acid or they could permit Germany to produce 
sulphuric acid to derive the fertilizer through the processing of phosphate rock.253  
Sulphuric acid, true of most other commodities, represented another banned substance of 
vital importance to industry.  But, the continual stream of refugees into western Germany, 
he argued, only increased the demand for agricultural produce and therefore fertilizer.  





which Baade attributed primarily to coal shortages, the German and European economies 
required either uneconomical or militarily unsound American exports.  To avoid depriving 
American explosives manufacturers of nitrogen or subsidizing German agriculture using 
American taxation dollars, Baade advocated the complete removal of industrial 
restrictions.254 
This viewpoint took hold of the Truman administration by 1947.  Marshall and the 
State Department generally accepted that the nature of postwar Germany required that the 
maintenance of a “highly industrialized society” to support the population.255  Clay had 
placed this argument in the simplest of terms.  “Without food”, he had argued, “we cannot 
produce coal; without coal we cannot support transport and industry; without coal we 
cannot produce the fertilizer necessary to improve future food supply.  Only food can prime 
the pump”.256  The need to prevent a catastrophe in Germany that would cost American 
taxpayers lay partly behind this change in perspective.  Elections in November 1946 
granted the Republican Party control over Congress and conservative fiscal worries about 
the costs of an economic collapse in Germany prompted the Truman administration to send 
Hoover to Germany to investigate the acute shortages of coal and food.257  The former 
president “apparently had a definite notion of the facts he was going to find: the need for 
increased exports and foreign exchange, the necessity for an upward adjustment of the level 
of industry plan, and the exigency for an indefinite deferment of reparations”.258  Hoover 
therefore focused on the suffering of the general population which he attributed to war 
damages and disregarded the state of industry completely. 
The mission aimed at convincing the remaining critics in Washington to accept what 
now amounted to a fused Republican-Democrat agenda for Germany.  In February 1947, 
the former president reaffirmed the conservative position that Germany desperately needed 
increased exports and foreign exchange injections.  Hoover explained that Washington 
generally underestimated the levels of destruction caused by the strategic bombers.  He 
argued that the postwar demand for a downward adjustment in industrial production failed 
to take the bombing campaign into account.  The revolutionary action of 
deindustrialization, he explained, acted as a major irritant inhibiting reconstruction and 
more importantly the pace of general economic recovery.  The unleashing of German 
industry, freed from the burden of reparations, promised to solve the most difficult 
economic problems facing the Truman administration.   
Our determination is to establish such a regime in Germany as will prevent forever 





in vengeance and the punishment of a great mass of Germans not concerned in the 
Nazi conspiracy can now have no misgivings for all of them—in food, warmth and 
shelter—have been sunk to the lowest level known in a hundred years of Western 
history.  If Western Civilization is to survive in Europe, it must also survive in 
Germany.  And it must be built into a cooperative member of that civilization.  That 
indeed is the hope of any lasting peace.259 
 
The Hoover mission represented the most articulate expression of the conservative 
argument against reparations and Allied tinkering with the German industrial future. 
5.7 Conclusion 
As demonstrated in this chapter, the change in American policy was not necessarily 
related to Cold War developments.  The example of nitrogen fixation demonstrated that the 
pursuit of national security objectives in Germany, namely the elimination of military 
potential, conflicted with other equally important goals of the Truman administration.  The 
dismantling of dual-use facilities required for economic recovery and basic survival, a 
logical conclusion derived by the groups tasked with industrial demilitarization, threatened 
to complicate and derail the occupation.  Clay rejected the conclusions of the F.E.A. as 
impossible to square with an effective administration.  His efforts at altering the Truman 
administration’s stance on the dismantling issue, broad segments of the government in 
agreement with a “lenient” German policy prior to the events of the summer months, 
moved Washington in a new direction.  The Truman administration now emphasized the 
wartime destruction of the German urban core and more importantly spoke of 
reconstruction and not just dismantling.  Clay’s stoppage and the new interpretation of the 
Level of Industry agreements stemmed in part from the realization by men on the ground 
that attempts at restructuring German industry promised only extremely negative results 
and outright chaos.  
CHAPTER 6 
 
The Militarization of Policy and Views of German Industry 
 
The buck stops here. 
 




The political events of 1945 and 1946 help explain why the Harry S. Truman 
administration so readily accepted Lucius D. Clay’s decision to cut the flow of reparations 
eastwards.  Disagreements concerning the role of German industry in postwar Europe, 
witnessed in direct negotiations with Josef Stalin at Potsdam and with Soviet 
representatives in the Allied Control Council (A.C.C.) in Berlin, only heightened tensions.  
Washington slowly feared that radical changes to Europe’s economic trade patterns would 
derail the bulk of their postwar policies and even compromise American national security.  
The transfer of German fixed nitrogen production capacities to the Soviet Union, for 
example, appeared in conflict with the general American “fundamental strategic interest...to 
prevent any potential adversary or coalition of adversaries from mobilizing the resources 
and economic military potential of Europe for war-making purposes”.1  The transfer of the 
dual-use industrial facilities needed to bolster European recuperative power helped increase 
Soviet military strength and this perspective helped undermine devotion to fare reparations.  
Revisionist historians in particular lament Clay’s decision to stop the movement of dual-use 
capacities to the east on the grounds that the Soviet Union and other states required German 
dual-use industry for reconstruction. 
This chapter points out that a view emerged during this period that questioned the 
transfer of industrial facilities.  In addition to threatening the European economy with ruin, 
this new perspective held that reparations would in fact dramatically enhance Soviet 
military strength.  Stalin, in the estimation of American policymakers, clearly perceived of 
reparations as the surest means of maintaining military supremacy on the continent.  It must 
however be emphasized that the reparations stop stemmed from Clay’s decision to prevent 
the spread of chaos in Germany and not necessarily to coerce Stalin into accepting 
American demands for resources and quadripartite rule in Germany.  The reparations stop 






6.2 The Joint Intelligence Committee and Washington’s Perceptions of Conflict 
A large slice of the historiography generally asserts that the calmness that 
characterized American perceptions of Soviet aims in 1945 degenerated into fear and 
insecurity during 1946.  The Cold War schools point out that the Truman administration 
discarded the hope of gaining Soviet cooperation for postwar reconstruction in the early 
spring of 1946.  The focus on the potential humanitarian disaster facing Europe after 1945 
in the previous chapter helps explain this change.  Considering the importance attributed to 
reconstruction, as expressed in State and War department plans that strove for global 
stability using the assistance of German industry,2 Soviet intransigence in Germany stands 
out as a major reason for the loss of confidence in quadripartite rule and the end of any 
willingness to cooperate with the dictator.  Soviet policy threatened to derail the entire 
American postwar program of stimulating the repair of the European market using German 
industry to permit the flow of American exports. 
Revisionists often portray the Truman administration as composed of virulent 
capitalist ideologues who “fundamentally distrusted the Soviets because they were 
communists”.3  The revisionists find an ally in the estranged Henry A. Wallace who 
suggested that the United States try to understand the international situation from the Soviet 
perspective.4  This argument fails to grant any sympathy or moral character to American 
policy and does not take the flipside into account—namely that Stalin refused to recognize 
the importance of non-Soviet aims no matter how serious the implications. 
International disputes throughout this period, such as the crises in Turkey or 
Greece, pale in significance when compared to the fiasco emerging in Germany.  The 
potential fall of Greece to communist rebels for example appears as a complete sideshow 
when judged according to economic importance.  These problem areas, as pointed out by 
traditionalists, revisionists and postrevisionists, did complicate matters on the international 
stage.  Joseph M. Jones wrote in 1955 that the crises of early 1946 generally convinced the 
Truman administration of a “pattern of inexorable Soviet pressure”.5  Marc Trachtenberg 
argues that confrontations over Iran and Turkey helped erase Truman’s neutral image of 
Stalin.6  Deborah Larson points out that Stalin’s prediction of another world war in fifteen 
years in a February 1946 speech helped cultivate a negative portrayal of Stalin’s postwar 
policies.7  Terry H. Anderson and Peter G. Boyle hypothesize that Foreign Secretary Ernest 
Bevin, a determined anti-communist member of the Labour Party, first articulated the belief 
of inveterate Soviet expansionism and was able to convince a ripe but initially 




authors downplay the weight of economic and humanitarian factors on American policy 
decisions. 
While this dissertation accepts the importance attributed to this politically-
motivated “revolution” in perceptions of the Soviet Union, these argumentative norms seem 
to downplay the weight of economic factors on American policy decisions.  These authors 
thereby downplay the importance of German industry in postwar calculations.  There exist 
no grounds to believe that an American-Soviet “misunderstanding” over policy aims in 
Germany characterized this debate.  Stalin clearly understood that American policymakers 
tended to support a far less brutal handling of Germany than he preferred.  Truman, already 
negatively influenced by Stalin’s horrible human rights record, did not entertain any 
fantasies that the dictator would accept the need to reintegrate German industry back into 
the European economy.  Washington’s sense of confusion or apparent freeze rested with the 
principles of the occupation and defining workable and humane definitions of industrial 
demilitarization and reparations. 
A series of governmental reports in the immediate postwar certainly helped 
articulate a new concept pressing the inevitability of a Soviet grab for power.  George F. 
Kennan’s “Long Telegram”, the Office of Research and Evaluation’s analysis of Soviet 
foreign and military policy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (J.C.S.) 1696, and the George Elsey 
Report in particular helped convince American policymakers that Soviet ideology and 
Stalin’s military represented a significant threat to American global economic interests.9  
Winston Churchill’s Fulton speech in early 1946 furthermore gave a concrete and concise 
form to these fears.  These papers and Churchill’s speech pointed out that the United States 
could not rely on domestic economic power alone to encourage the construction of an 
international system that anchored the prosperity gained during the war years.  A 
reclassification of the importance or relevance of German industry for the stabilization of 
Europe—already high on the agenda—accompanied the 1946 “revolution”.  The fate of 
Germany fed the feelings of animosity of both communist and democratic worlds.  
Washington responded.  Policymakers demanded a form of proto-containment of Stalin’s 
ambitions.  The need to safeguard the global community, influenced by Washington’s 
militarized approach to geopolitical matters, led directly to the belief that that only military 
muscle could protect critical regions from Soviet political destabilization or outright 
annexation.  This reclassification of the role of German industry emphasized more than the 




pacification of civil unrest.  New demands surfaced that presaged subsequent demands for a 
German military industrial contribution based on dual-use potential. 
Seen in this way, the State and War department’s decision in 1944 to employ 
German industrial capacities as a significant plank of Washington’s postwar program 
conserved the dual-use capacities husbanded by Clay’s military government.  Economic 
factors and even humanitarian concerns, and not an unwillingness to cut out the core of 
German military industry, lay behind this decision.  The failure to generate a rational 
program of dismantling that balanced economic realities with national security concerns, in 
part brought about by the confused doctrines of the strategic bombing pundits and military 
thinkers in general, in addition to the laming inability to agree on a prescription for 
demilitarization, helped conserve the bulk of German dual-use capacities that grabbed the 
attention of political and military observers in the deteriorating global climate of 1946.  This 
chapter demonstrates that military officials on the ground in southern Germany found it 
especially difficult to ignore this industrial potential for the efficiency of their 
administration. 
The incongruence of policy and action could be seen in other ways.  The rapid 
demobilization and deteriorating strength of the American military after 1945, along with 
the conversion of the accompanying military industrial system, theoretically indicated the 
belief that the enormous military organization built by Stalin did not represent a potential 
threat to American interests.  Intelligence experts nevertheless kept a close eye on the 
largest army ever assembled in human history.  The Joint Intelligence Committee (J.I.C.), 
originally formed during the war to supply the chiefs of staff with military industrial reports 
of America’s adversaries, changed focus in the spring of 1945 and began estimating Soviet 
military strength and Stalin’s postwar intentions.  The reports resulting from this inquiry, 
found in the J.I.C. 250 series, demonstrate that a single assumption informed the work of 
the intelligence officers.  Postwar analysts, as witnessed in similar judgements concerning 
the amount of time believed required to rebuild Germany and Europe in general, viewed 
reconstruction as a lengthy process.  This assumption characterized the worldview of the 
Truman administration in a general sense until the initial months of 1947. 
The intelligence committee began to study the Soviet military and political system 
more closely in the spring and summer of 1945.  In November of that year the J.I.C. 
concluded that the Soviet economy could not support a major and protracted war against 
the democratic powers until well after 1950.  Economic realities, they hypothesized, 




be realized by military force.  J.I.C. 250/5 in particular theorized that the Soviet industrial 
infrastructure required at least 15 years for repairing the significant damage inflicted on the 
state between 1941 and 1944.  A new confidence added another dimension to this 
extrapolation.  During the extensive recovery period, the J.I.C. believed that the Soviet 
Union lay at the mercy of strategic bombers equipped with conventional or even nuclear 
armaments.  The Soviet military furthermore suffered from several handicaps.  The 
backward state of the Soviet transportation network restricted the movement of troops and 
raw materials to a relatively low number of routes.  This concentration, according to 
contemporary bombing doctrine, increased the potential effectiveness of air interdiction in a 
program akin to Solly Zuckerman’s “Transportation Plan” against Nazi-Germany.  The 
perceived heavy concentration of Soviet industry in particular regions such as the Urals 
also, on paper at least, reduced the number of strategic strikes necessary to paralyse the 
military industrial network.  The J.I.C. paper lastly argued that the technologically 
backward Soviet aircraft industry could not manufacture fighters and bombers able to 
withstand the shock of an Anglo-American air offensive or strike back against European 
targets.  The military professionals therefore concluded that western military and 
technological superiority, coupled with a longer term Soviet devotion to reconstruction, 
would bind Stalin’s hands.10 
The staunch belief in the decisiveness of the strategic bombing campaign against 
Germany informed this work.  The military planners understood that the number of real and 
potential Soviet infantry and armoured formations represented an irresistible tidal wave.  A 
secondary hypothesis that took this strength into account largely undermined the 
persuasiveness of a reliance on the strategic bomber.  The intelligence specialists speculated 
that the dictator nevertheless aimed at extending the Soviet sphere of influence into those 
states on the immediate periphery of his empire.  If a war between the Soviet Union and the 
western powers erupted, the J.I.C. reasoned that the enormous Soviet military machine 
would overrun western Europe, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, northern China, and Korea in a 
matter of weeks.  It is hard to understand why the J.I.C. under these conditions thought that 
a protracted bombing campaign could over the long term beat back the Red Army.  The 
military calculations by definition demonstrated that the western powers would be exposed 
to lengthy war of attrition following the established patterns of total war.11 
The J.I.C. conclusion that Stalin would not risk war with the United States until 
Soviet industry closed the technological and economic gap between communism and 




emphasized that Adolf Hitler’s war preparations concentrated on developing the civilian 
industrial base to enable a swift changeover to military production.  While recognizing the 
poor state of the Soviet civilian economy, correctly acknowledging the tremendous strains 
of the war years and the near complete militarization of domestic industry, the intelligence 
experts strangely dismissed the fact that the Soviet war industry outperformed a 
theoretically much larger German industrial base—as measured by the number of machine-
tools.  The proposed transfer of a large percentage of this German hardware to the Soviet 
Union, a dominating aspect of Stalin’s reparations policy, could only dramatically increase 
Soviet military- industrial capacities on paper.  Nor did the military experts recognize the 
potential impact of German technology on Soviet armaments systems and particularly 
aircraft designs.  The J.I.C. assumption that the Soviet Union could not close the industrial 
and technological gap within a generation was based more on wishful thinking and 
arrogance than on reality. 
Truman indirectly dismissed the J.I.C. timetable for more personal reasons.  As 
pointed out in earlier chapters, the president abhorred Stalin and the dictator’s values.  The 
president on occasion referred to Stalin as a “son of a bitch”.12  Even though the evidence 
suggests that the Truman administration did not articulate a coherent anti-Soviet policy 
during 1945 and the early months of 1946, other than an obtuse agreement with the general 
J.I.C. supposition that the needs of reconstruction prohibited Stalin from adopting an 
aggressive anti-democratic stance, Truman doubted long term survival of amicable 
relations.  The president distrusted Stalin for reasons that foreshadowed subsequent 
articulations by such men as Churchill, Kennan, Elsey and various military officials.  
Truman believed that diplomatic dialogue with Stalin approximated Neville Chamberlain’s 
1930s appeasement of Hitler since Stalin appeared set on incrementally increasing Soviet 
geopolitical power at the expense of the democracies.13  Truman agreed with conservative 
critics and seriously questioned the morality of the State Department’s attempt at 
negotiating a peace settlement with Stalin while the Soviet military terrorized the 
populations of eastern Europe and Germany.14  On 5 January 1946 the president 
condemned Soviet behaviour in the Baltic States, Germany, Poland and Iran and concluded 
that Stalin only understood the language of “divisions” and the “iron fist”.15  The president 
instinctively reduced Stalin’s political reason for being to a brutal expansion of his personal 
power. 
The Secretary of State James F. Byrnes did not fully share this negative reading of 




formulation had represented one of his first changes to the new cabinet after assuming the 
presidency.16  Byrnes had amassed considerable political experience in Washington and 
elsewhere.  Having “done everything there was to do in government”, Byrnes’ position as 
Director of War Mobilization for the Roosevelt administration meant that, while “not 
steeped in knowledge of industry”, Truman’s secretary of state spent the last 18 months of 
the war studying the intricacies of industrial reconversion.  He therefore appreciated the 
complex relationship between the various segments of an economy such as that of 
agriculture with heavy industry.17  Experience in demobilization obviously represented a 
useful asset in the postwar period.  But Byrnes should have been able to use his knowledge 
to question the timetables for Soviet reconstruction presented by the military. 
A belief in the diplomatic advantages brought by nuclear power informed the 
secretary of states’ opinions.  Byrnes’ proximity to the Manhattan Project had originally 
offered Truman a much needed perspective on nuclear weapons.18  Roosevelt’s practice of 
failing to advise Truman on crucial wartime developments left the new president thirsting 
for information.  But Byrnes’ acquaintance with the nuclear program conditioned his 
opinions of Stalin.  Even though the secretary of state doubted the Soviet dictator’s 
commitment to positive relations with the democracies, Byrnes informed General John J. 
McCloy, the future American High Commissioner for Germany in 1949, in reference to the 
upcoming foreign ministers’ meeting in London scheduled for September 1945 that “the 
Russians were only sensitive to power and all the world, including the Russians, were 
cognizant of the power of this bomb”.19  Byrnes for this reason shared Roosevelt’s view 
that Stalin was not inherently intransigent and believed that the wartime allies could work 
out an agreeable postwar program.20  The secretary of state blamed Vyacheslav Molotov 
and not Stalin for Soviet opposition to smooth quadripartite relations in Germany and 
elsewhere.21  Byrnes’ commitment to demobilization and belief that nuclear weapons could 
control Stalin’s ambitions therefore defined American foreign policy during first months 
after Potsdam.  Byrnes’ belief that the United States could control Stalin, while 
characteristic of others in the Truman administration during the initial year after Potsdam, 
eventually led to a serious quarrel with the president.22 
The opinions of the J.I.C. and State Department, combined with domestic pressures, 
persuaded Truman over the short term to adopt the paradoxical belief that the United States 
could somehow control a potential Soviet military adventure using the coercive potential of 
nuclear weaponry.  The postwar demobilization of the United States therefore went ahead 




“Bring the boys home!”, helped pressure Washington to act.23  The Truman administration 
slashed American military strength and the military formations that defeated Nazism 
evaporated after 1945.  The previous chapter outlined the dimensions of this process.  
Washington reduced the Army from 8 million men or 89 divisions to 591,000 or 10 
divisions by 1950.  Annual military spending fell from $90.9 billion in 1945 to $10.3 billion 
during the second quarter of 1947.24  The successive withdrawal of American ground forces 
from Europe, including the 3rd and 9th infantry divisions by 31 December 1946, left a single 
division to administer the American zone in Germany and provide security at prisoner of 
war and displaced persons installations.25 
Demobilization impacted the American political and military position in Germany 
in two important ways.  The reductions of personnel on the ground first of all lessened the 
grip of military government on the German population.  As mentioned, Lucius D. Clay 
turned to German administrative bodies to enact policy decisions.  But demobilization more 
importantly prevented the creation of an American strategic reserve in Europe.26  Truman, 
owing in part to the reductions and progressive neutralization of conventional military 
power in Europe, agreed with Stimson in October 1945 that the steadily decreasing strength 
of the armed forces threatened the American strategic position all over the world.27  Troop 
comparisons demonstrated American weakness.  Subsequent western intelligence estimates 
placed 16 poorly equipped and dispersed western divisions against between 84 and 175 
Soviet divisions.  This obvious power vacuum did not necessarily overly irritate those 
planners accustomed to believing in the potential of the nuclear bomb.  Until 1947, the 
J.C.S. and State Department continued to believe that Stalin could not wage war against the 
democratic powers and that an early form of nuclear deterrence combined with the 
knowledge of American industrial superiority could dissuade the Kremlin from military 
adventures beyond the Soviet periphery.28  A real military defence of western Europe—
excluding Britain—was unthinkable under these conditions.  The J.I.C. already 
hypothesized early in the postwar that the western powers, even with nuclear bombs, could 
not stem a Soviet invasion.  General Omar N. Bradley informed the Committee on Foreign 
Policy as late as 1 July 1949 that the American occupation forces in Germany could only 
marginally “contribute” to the defence of Europe.29 
6.3 The American “Shift” and the Impact on Demilitarization 
George F. Kennan, charge d'affaires at the American embassy in Moscow, 
composed the “Long Telegram” in direct response to Stalin’s belligerent 9 February 1946 




The dictator lashed out at the free market system in a stunning condemnation of capitalism.  
The “war broke out as an inevitable result of the development of world economic”, he 
surmised, “and political forces on the basis of modern monopoly capitalism”.  But Soviet-
style socialism had proven itself superior to these forces.  Stalin continued and argued that 
he would not “stop” with the achievement of victory and alluded to the continuation of the 
struggle against capitalism in Germany.  The dictator chillingly warned his allies not to 
underestimate the industrial and military power of the Soviet Union.  “The war has 
demonstrated that the Red Army is no ‘colossus with feet of clay’”, he pointed out, “but a 
first-rate Army of our times, possessing quite modern armament, a most experienced 
commanding personnel and high moral and fighting qualities”.30  The speech exhibited 
both a total disregard for the sentiments of his former allies, by pointing to the capitalist 
encirclement of communism, and he plainly argued that industrial recovery and military 
strength went hand in hand.31 
Washington, in the midst of a struggle for a rational economic policy that aimed at 
finding a solution for Europe’s economic woes, did not embrace the prospects of a self-
sufficient Soviet Union returning to an insular position that yielded few produced goods for 
trade purposes.  It mattered little that the Soviet Union maintained high capacities in heavy 
industrial products such as steel if the communist state was unable and unwilling to trade.  
The dictator’s renewed commitment to a centralized plan reflected the past concentration on 
the pursuit of planned economic development that emphasized a singular preoccupation 
with Soviet postwar economic problems.  Stalin’s prewar declarations emphasized “self-
sufficiency”, the requirements of “heavy industry at the expense of consumer goods”, and 
the “independence of our country” based on an “adequate industrial basis for defence”.32  
The dictator merely returned to the verbiage of the past in 1946.  It mattered little to 
Washington that the plan aimed at employing 40 percent of capital investments to repair 
wartime damages.33  It did matter that Moscow built their policy of industrial 
“reconstruction” on “commensurate German suffering”.34 
Kennan appraised Soviet behaviour and issued the document to his superiors at the 
State Department on 22 February 1946.  Kennan hoped to convince Washington to adopt a 
new and “overdue” policy direction.35  The document rejected the wartime concept of 
peaceful coexistence between the capitalist democracies and a totalitarian Soviet Union.  
Kennan addressed three basic issues that included the “historical and ideological 
background of the post-war Soviet perception of international relations, its attainment on 




U[nited] S[tates] foreign policy”.36  The diplomat articulated a new view of Stalin’s 
intentions.  While Kennan accepted the general J.I.C. assumption that Soviet economic 
weakness precluded an outright military attack, he argued that the longstanding Russian and 
Soviet fear of encirclement influenced a traditionally negative and belligerent response to 
neighbouring states.  The Soviet regime, Kennan postulated, would turn a “cold official 
shoulder” to the “principle of economic collaboration among nations” in order to destabilize 
the global community and the “occupied areas in Germany”.  The spread of “anarchy” 
would pave the way for eventual Soviet domination.  In order to stand against this 
“negative” and “destructive” policy, Kennan encouraged Washington to support the 
creation of a “healthy” and “vigorous” populations at home and abroad to contain political 
“Russian expansive tendencies”.  The fusion of domestic and foreign policy, in promoting 
the well-being of civilian populations for political reasons, offered the United States a 
considerable psychological weapon against Stalin.37 
Washington’s policymakers praised Kennan’s telegram and subsequently granted 
the diplomat a “voice” in policy formulation.38  Kennan’s conception of psychological 
containment espoused the erection of a stable international system that would act as a 
“counterforce” to defend the non-communist world against Soviet ideology.39  The 
telegram therefore represented the “founding document” of American containment 
conceptions.40  But the document also represented a democratic response to a clear 
communist threat that Kennan refined from an initial articulation of containment in a 1944 
essay entitled “Russia—Seven Years Later”.41  In this paper, Kennan reacted to the horrible 
cruelties inflicted by the Soviet military on the populations of eastern Europe.  Kennan later 
described the “shock” he experienced to learn that American policymakers such as Byrnes 
attempted to ameliorate divergent democratic and Soviet aims in Germany.  The Soviet 
military, he emphasized, “had shown itself capable of abominable cruelties, little short of 
genocide, in the treatment of large portions of the population from the areas of Poland and 
the Baltic states it had taken under its control”.42  The “Long Telegram” represented, as far 
as Kennan was concerned, the “end of a process” drawn from a general exploration of 
Soviet behaviour.43 
This dissertation takes issue with academic criticism of Kennan’s interpretive 
model of the Soviet Union.  The Revisionists in particular wield their pens in defence of 
Stalin.  They parry Kennan’s straightforward portrayal of Soviet communism as a ruthlessly 
expansionist ideology owing to the fact that the diplomat imagined a connection between 




diplomat for failing to account for the negative impact of postwar American actions on 
Soviet policy such as Washington’s desire to reintegrate the German economy into the 
global system.44  This argument appeals more to the prejudices and emotions of late 1960s 
anti-American paradigmatic thought than offering a persuasive counter-criticism of 
Kennan’s memorandum and subsequent article.  For all of the intellectual problems 
inherent in Kennan’s use of Czarist Russia in the portrayal of Soviet expansionism, this 
tenuous link nevertheless carries considerable weight in the generalized sense.  That is, 
Stalin’s prewar and postwar territorial expansionism, total disregard for human rights, and 
the incompatibility of the economic systems helped generate the view in Washington that 
no real and lasting rapprochement was even possible. 
Kennan also clearly rejected a militarized solution.  The diplomat, adopting the 
perspective found in the initial J.I.C. reports, did not countenance overreaction.  Efstathios 
T. Fakiolas points to Kennan’s clear appeal to reject military containment and continue 
negotiations with Stalin if both democratic and communist states could establish common 
policy aims actually adhered to by Moscow.45  Not only did Kennan admit the need for 
some form of normalized political discourse with Soviet policymakers, providing that Stalin 
actually translated policy into reality, Kennan postulated that a positive American foreign 
policy actively participating in reconstruction could alone defeat the dangers of aggressive 
Soviet behaviour.  “We must formulate and put forward for other nations,” Kennan wrote in 
the “Long Telegram”, “a much more positive and constructive picture of [the] sort of world 
we would like to see than we have put forward in [the] past”.46  The telegram, seen in this 
way, argued for the articulation of a positive postwar policy that openly presented the 
capitalist democratic vision of a better world and actively sought its realization. 
Kennan’s “Long Telegram” of course did not single-handedly revolutionize the 
direction of American postwar policy.  In fact, despite the enthusiastic reaction of some 
central figures in Washington, the document in reality simply reiterated the established 
goals of the Truman administration to secure the economic health of the United States 
through the reconstruction of regions destroyed in the war through the promotion of 
capitalist prosperity.  George Elsey stated in retrospect that Kennan’s views did not surprise 
him.  He explained in an interview in the 1970s that “It wasn't as though he was proposing 
something brand new, a new course”.  “As I recall it”, he continued, “my reaction was, 
‘Fine, this is exactly what our foreign policy is, the way we're going’. This is just simply 
expressing publicly what…in a somewhat blunter fashion…was normal”.47  Truman, as 




heard similar positions a year earlier.  The telegram did not “appear to have had any 
profound or immediate effect” for this reason.48 
Other public articulations of a more revolutionary nature followed.  Truman 
introduced Churchill to a crowd assembled at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri and 
listened to the former prime minister proclaim his disgust of Soviet policy and especially 
the brutal nature of the occupation and management of eastern and central Europe.  While 
Churchill praised the wartime contribution of the Soviet military, he seriously questioned 
Stalin’s intentions and by implication the possibility for amicable relations in the postwar 
era.  “This is certainly not the liberated Europe we fought to build up”, Churchill informed 
the public audience, and he went on to trumpet that “an iron curtain has descended across 
the continent”.  Churchill indirectly adopted the essence of Kennan’s prediction of 
protracted psychological warfare.  The former prime minister bluntly demanded that the 
Anglo-Saxon democracies stand firm against the “indefinite expansion” of Soviet “power 
and doctrine”.49  The request for democratic union against both ideology and state power 
implied the establishment of some sort of a military shield to protect democratic interests in 
Europe.50 
Churchill did not clearly articulate an appeal for a formal democratic military 
arrangement.  But contemporary observers generally agreed with Stalin’s interpretation that 
the Fulton speech represented a “call for war on the U.S.S.R”.51  Nikolai Novikov, the 
Soviet Ambassador in Washington, warned Moscow that American “ruling circles” 
approved of a military alliance with Britain even though the Truman administration did not 
officially sanction Churchill’s appeal at Fulton.52  British Labour members of parliament 
downplayed Churchill’s anti-Soviet tone and believed that the wartime prime minister 
simply hoped to convince Washington to militarily support the British position in Europe so 
that Britain could shore up the defence of the empire.53  In any case, the labels “early Cold 
War” or “turning point” accompany historical analyses of Churchill’s Fulton speech.54  
Owing to Churchill’s introduction of a military component to economic or psychological 
containment, the speech did in fact represent a monumental change.  John Lewis Gaddis 
believes that the Truman administration in early 1946 now “regarded the Soviet Union not 
as an estranged ally, but as a potential enemy, whose vital interests could not be recognized 
without endangering those of the United States”.55  The president undoubtedly supported 
the tone of the Fulton speech.  Domestic opposition to Churchill’s belligerence and his 




feign ignorance or surprise.  Churchill’s conclusions however approximated those found in 
the “Long Telegram” and the personal views of Truman.56 
Byrnes and his State Department however continued to advance the aim of a 
neutral, disarmed and industrially demilitarized Germany as a means of stabilizing Europe.  
This policy, for all of the rhetoric concerning demilitarization, indicated that Clay had 
convinced Byrnes of the need to emphasize industrial reconstruction by the end of the 
summer of 1946.  The policymakers softened the conceptual glue that held civilian and 
military industries together.  The secretary of states’ policy rejected extensive dismantling 
as counterproductive and destabilizing.  Establishing the effective quadripartite 
administration of a unified economy represented the first item on the agenda.  The Soviet 
provision of statistical data and support for inspections represented necessary prerequisites 
for the building of confidence.  Byrnes throughout 1945 and 1946 believed that Moscow 
would eventually agree to an inspection system that would verify industrial demilitarization 
observe those industries required by the civilian economy.57  Based on Byrnes’ knowledge 
of how Washington rejected the Soviet appeal presented in the United Nations to control 
nuclear weapons, his demand seemed sheer fantasy.  Moscow asked for permission to send 
inspection teams to the United States to investigate nuclear facilities and demanded nuclear 
technical information to level the global playing field.  Byrnes’ demand coupled industrial 
demilitarization to the ability of the victors to coordinate the effective quadripartite 
administration of Germany.  The decision to assist the former enemy killed the prospects of 
a neutral and non-aligned Germany unless Washington could gain Soviet support.58 
Byrnes therefore proposed a long-term treaty to enforce disarmament.  The treaty 
represented a revolutionary step in American foreign policy.  The “Draft Treaty on the 
Disarmament and Demilitarization of Germany”, sent to the Council of Foreign Ministers 
in Paris in April 1946, however failed to convince the French or Soviet delegations that an 
American commitment could secure permanent security.  Byrnes responded to the negative 
response.  He requested that Clay nudge the A.C.C. into accepting another quadripartite 
commission that investigated disarmament levels in each zone.  Moscow, probably afraid 
that their nominal allies would uncover evidence of atrocities and blanket dismantling, 
rejected the notion and the plan lay on hold until January 1947.  The demilitarization treaty 
represented a significant change in policy.  Byrnes and the State Department now fell in line 
with Clay’s perspective that the United States could not follow an industrial demilitarization 
strategy that did not take the viability of the civilian industries into account.  The unilateral 




policy.  But no amount of bribery, cajoling or pressure could convince the French and 
Soviet governments to agree.59 
Three additional reports in the summer of 1946 furthermore underlined the growing 
belief in a Soviet military threat that would subsequently, from the military point of view, 
seriously question the sanity of demilitarizing Germany.  The first report was composed by 
military intelligence.  General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, who as director presided over Central 
Intelligence after 1945, targeted the apparent inefficiency and lack of a comprehensive 
approach in wartime intelligence collecting efforts.  He aimed directly at widening the 
research boundaries of the Central Intelligence Group (C.I.G.) in order to integrate the new 
focus on all aspects of state power in military calculations.  Vandenberg in particular 
established the Office of Research and Evaluation (O.R.E.) in order to strengthen the 
military’s ability to evaluate the foreign and military policies of other powers in addition to 
their military capabilities.  The effort represented yet another example of military 
penetration into the realm of the State Department characteristic of the war years and the 
understanding that warfare in the 20th Century depended on all aspects of modern states.60 
Equipped with a modest number of specialists, the small organization devoted itself 
in the summer of 1946 to the systematic study of Stalin’s military aims and capabilities.  
The first document that resulted from these efforts, simply entitled “Soviet Foreign and 
Military Policy” or O.R.E.-1, was in fact largely written by a single analyst over one 
weekend.61  Ludwell Lee Montague appeared to agree somewhat with Kennan’s 
conclusions.  “The ultimate objective of Soviet policy”, they proclaimed, “may be world 
domination” and therefore “an inevitable conflict with the capitalist world”.  The Soviet 
Union, owing to industrial and technological inferiority and the destruction brought by 
Hitler’s armies, required time to “increase its relative power by building up its own 
strength”.  This policy, the specialists believed, further demanded that Moscow undermine 
the position of the democracies throughout the globe, but more importantly husbanding the 
“massive dimensions of their military and achieving technological parity with the United 
States in terms of air power and nuclear weapons”.  The military thinkers argued that Stalin 
would focus on the development of war potential through industrial development—a policy 
reminiscent of Hitler’s rearmament efforts after 1933. 
The industrial development, which competes with the armed forces for manpower, is, 
of course, intended to enhance the overall Soviet war potential.  Beyond that, intensive 
effort will be devoted to the development of special weapons, with particular reference 
to guided missiles and the atomic bomb.  Some reports suggest that the Soviets may 




atomic explosion.  In any case a maximum effort will be made to produce a practical 
bomb in quantity at the earliest possible date. 
 
Such a policy demanded the exploitation of German resources and the O.R.E. warned that 
the “Soviet Union will endeavor to extend its predominant influence to include all of 
Germany and Austria”.62 
Another report exposed disturbing conclusions relating to Soviet doctrine as well as 
reinforcing the conclusions reached in O.R.E.-1.  The Joint Intelligence Chiefs, partly based 
on the experience of the Wehrmacht during the war, warned in J.C.S. 1696 that “[i]n a war 
with the Soviet Union we must envisage complete and total hostilities unrestricted in any 
way on the Soviet part by adherence to any international convention or humanitarian 
principles. Preparations envisaged on our part and our plans must be on this basis”.63  While 
most of the document merely reiterated the type of thinking expressed by Montague, this 
statement in particular diverged considerably from the cold and calculated tone of O.R.E.-1. 
It is probable that the military derived this viewpoint from the work of men such as 
Robert D. Murphy.64  Clay’s political advisor had gained considerable authority in both the 
Roosevelt and Truman administrations as a bridge between the State and War departments.  
The grandson of German immigrants, his grandmother having equipped him with a solid 
knowledge of the German language, displayed great sensitivity to the plight of the German 
population after May 1945.  As explained in previous chapters, numerous reports issued by 
Murphy emphasised the Soviet “terror” in eastern Germany and the use of the Gulag and 
other tactics such as “systematic starvation” in order to underline Soviet power in the 
conquered regions.65  This knowledge incidentally erodes academic classifications of early 
American perceptions of the Soviet Union as “irrational”, “cynical” or as representative of 
some type of American scheme to mobilize the public in pursuit of aggrandizement.66  
These reports clearly helped deepen Clay’s understanding that prevailing conditions in 
Germany negated the utility of level of industry calculations and emphasized the Soviet 
unwillingness to establish a functioning occupation system.  But these reports also painted 
the Soviet Union in a manner that identified the barbarism of Stalin’s regime.  Memories of 
Nazi atrocities freshly imprinted on the minds of all policymakers, the link between Hitler 
and Stalin seemed especially strong.  J.C.S. 1696 reflected this understanding and 
emphasized the inhuman nature of Stalin’s policies. 
A third report attempted to clear up some the confusion in Washington brought by 
the various and unrefined views concerning Soviet policy in Europe.  Truman demanded 




fumed, “Damn it, there are people coming in from all over the place, different agencies, 
different interests, telling me different things”.67  Truman requested his friend and fellow 
Missourian Clark M. Clifford, the president’s special counsel, to tackle the problem.  
Clifford delegated the task to his aid George Elsey.  Clifford understood Truman’s mindset 
and quickly rose through the ranks partly for this reason.68  Elsey set to work and he 
energetically interviewed a wide variety of officials at the State, War and Navy 
Departments to establish as broad a perspective as possible.  The report that followed 
largely represented a response to the president’s statement in the summer of 1946 that he 
was tired of being “pushed around” by the “chiseling” Russians.69 
The Clifford-Elsey memorandum entitled “American Relations with the Soviet 
Union” and dated 24 September 1946 seriously questioned Stalin’s intentions.  The report 
attacked the previous concept of a conciliatory stance and instead now firmly argued that 
the dictator aimed at world domination through military means.70  The memorandum 
mirrored the conclusions and tone of Kennan’s telegram and the military’s reports 
concerning the Soviet Union.  But the mixture of these diplomatic and military analyses 
placed greater emphasis on the construction of a viable military deterrent to potential Soviet 
aggression.  The report even discarded the utility of employing economic power as a 
deterrent.  “The main deterrent to Soviet attack on the United States, or to attack on areas of 
the world which are vital to our security”, the report espoused, “will be the military power 
of this country”.71  Geopolitical concerns informed the work. 
The Near East is an area of great strategic interest to the Soviet Union because of the 
shift of Soviet industry to southeastern Russia, within range of air attack from much of 
the Near East, and because of the resources of the area. The Soviet Union is interested 
in obtaining the withdrawal of British troops from Greece and the establishment of a 
'friendly' government there. It hopes to make Turkey a puppet state, which could serve 
as a spring-board for the domination of the eastern Mediterranean.72 
 
The report rejected the diplomatic and J.I.C. interpretation of limited Soviet 
intentions.  Elsey fell in line with Washington’s anti-Stalin faction led by a converted 
Byrnes, James Forrestal, Averell Harriman, William D. Leahy and Harry Hopkins.73  The 
memorandum called for a militarized response that, owing to the favourable reception at the 
highest levels, characterized subsequent policies.  Robert Ferrell in fact argues that the 
Elsey’s work further radicalized Truman’s already extremely negative view of the Soviet 
dictator.74  “This is so hot”, Truman exclaimed, “if this should come out now it could have 
an exceedingly unfortunate impact on our efforts to try to develop some relationship with 




The perception of a grasping and potentially violent Soviet foreign policy helped 
deepen the fears that Stalin seemed bent on some sort of adventure predicated on the 
collapse of economic conditions in western Europe.  These fears underlined the paradox 
inherent in the transfer of German dual-use capacities to the Soviet Union.  This form of 
reparations only promised to increase the military industrial strength of a potentially 
dangerous adversary.  Industrial demilitarization, seen from this perspective, did not 
contribute to postwar European national security.  An awareness of this change in thinking 
helps explain why Washington accepted Clay’s decision and subsequently embarked on a 
policy which denied even issue of reparations from current production during 1946. 
Two additional policy papers surfaced in September 1946 that demonstrated the 
complete collapse of the industrial aspects of the demilitarization conceptions owing to the 
focus on the sordid state of the European economy and a new perception of Soviet 
intransigence or even aggressiveness.  The State Department had created a “special policy 
committee” in July 1946 that included John K. Galbraith, Henry P. Leverich, Edward 
Mason, and James W. Riddleberger to evaluate policy in Germany.  These men generally 
entertained liberal economic values that stood in stark contrast to those expressed earlier by 
Henry Morgenthau.  Riddleberger, the Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs 
between 1944 and 1947, had been at Truman’s side during the Potsdam negotiations and 
remarked that the economic conditions of Germany “were just appalling, I don't know any 
other word to describe it”.76  Economic realities required an alternative course that was hard 
to navigate during the initial months after the defeat of Germany. 
The political transition that Truman had to make—was a very complicated one. Don't 
forget the Morgenthau point of view was still very popular. A lot of people, you know, 
simply said, well, let the bastards starve and so forth, and Morgenthau is right, etc., etc. 
Why don't we just convert Germany into a goat pasture?  And, therefore, within the 
United States, as within the United Kingdom, there was this political problem of 
appearing to change a policy which had been followed. [Henry] Wallace, for example, 
of course, always tended to side with the Soviet position. I'm talking now of the 
immediate postwar period. He was very much inclined to criticize us for any change in 
the policies he approved.77 
 
These men generally adhered to liberal economic notions that rejected collectivist 
ideologies and argued that depressed conditions in Germany during the early 1930s assisted 
the rise of totalitarian thought.  It followed from this belief that only the improvement of 
conditions could lead to real peace. 
This committee of experts criticized what they believed to be the essential problem 




inherent in demilitarizing all of German industry through the elimination of downsizing of 
dual-use capacities and yet still proclaiming the need to maintain a functioning economy.  A 
sense of urgency in regards to the need for neutralizing the military industrial complex 
remained, but the report minimized the threat of a revanchist Germany and instead shifted 
the purpose of demilitarization to denying all other European states access to the defeated 
states’ military industrial resources.78  This conclusion represented the crucial postwar 
departure from the national security goal of European peace through industrial 
demilitarization.  The paper took the contradiction of a physically destroyed urban 
infrastructure that still maintained the ability to positively assist reconstruction efforts for 
granted.  Instead of positing the German people with some sort of genetic military impulse, 
the solitary rationale for an extensive demilitarization effort, the writers now pointed an 
accusing finger at Stalin.  They believed the dictator wanted all the central European 
nation’s resources for himself.  The writers insisted that the Kremlin opposed the concept of 
a unified Germany to undermine American influence by promoting economic decay.  Stalin 
intended either to “make their zone…a permanent bastion on the Elbe” or “await 
developments” that might permit full annexation.79  The United States government, the 
report stated, “could not tolerate a communist-dominated Germany”.80 
Galbraith, Leverich, Mason and Riddleberger understood that the postwar 
sentiments of the domestic American population and policymakers in Washington still 
demanded a form of military industrial restructuring.  But they questioned the feasibility of 
earlier conceptions.  Their report pointed out that the Truman administration became 
“increasingly impressed by the ineffectiveness of economic disarmament to accomplish its 
security objectives and with the prejudicial effect of this policy on its other objectives in 
Germany and in Europe”.81  Demilitarization as it stood slowed the political integration of 
Germany into Europe and more importantly retarded European recovery.  The victors 
should, the writers pleaded, sponsor the rebuilding of the heavy industrial facilities of the 
Ruhr and organize the shipment of critical raw materials such as phosphate and manganese 
to stimulate production.82  The latter point attempted to mask military industrial potential 
with the false hypothesis that the war destroyed the bulk of Ruhr productive capacities.  The 
second part of the conclusion, that manufacturers simply required raw materials, hit reality 
on the head.  The report therefore proposed a new conception that rejected the earlier 
premise of removing or severely restricting all elements of the civilian dual-use industrial 
sector with a potential military application.  The writers requested that the victors discard 




and instead focus on more traditional forms reminiscent of the Versailles Treaty.83  This 
notion suggested that the western democracies for example destroy armaments assembly 
facilities and clearly military dual-use enterprises such as the producers of armour plating. 
The report nevertheless clung to a set of principles already rejected by Clay as 
incongruent with recovery.  There is therefore reason to believe that industrial 
demilitarization new acted as a political tool to soothe the fears of Moscow, Paris and 
domestic critics.  The writers added that the destruction of clearly defined military 
production facilities would result in “a substantial decline in the importance of German iron 
and steel, heavy chemicals and engineering industries”.  No examples were cited because 
none existed.  Industrial participation in postwar reconstruction obviously demanded a shift 
in emphasis from military to civilian production.  That observation represented a banality.  
“Despite this inevitable decline”, the report continued, “Germany must continue to be a 
highly industrialized country, if it is to attain at some stage a decent standard of living and 
contribute to the economic prosperity of Europe”.84  To heal the wartime wounds of Europe 
and establish the basis for recovery, the report proposed to permit German economic 
recovery within the existing limits of capital plant, manpower and resources.85 
The evidence indicates that Washington, after a long period of vacillation, now 
envisioned the “full restoration” of German industry by October 1946 and had fallen in line 
with Clay’s military government.86  Although the military governor believed that the 
purposes of occupation continued to demand the “destruction of the war potential of 
Germany”, that “destruction” now entailed a revolutionary change in wording.87  Clay 
proposed to “demilitarize and to de-Nazify Germany, and to reduce the war potential of 
Germany through the removal but more importantly the control of heavy industrial 
production”.88  The evolution of eradication into reduction and then control neared 
completion. 
6.4 Byrnes’ Speech and the Official Change of Heart 
But how would the world’s population respond?  Byrnes left the Paris Peace 
Conference and traveled to Stuttgart to address a German audience on 6 September 1946.  
His speech demonstrated the impact of Clay’s views as expressed in the 19 July policy 
statement.89  Written in cooperation with Charles P. Kindleberger—economist with the 
Office of Strategic Services—and Clay, the speech also incorporated a sharp rebuke of 
Soviet policy.  Byrnes officially presented the world with a “new course” that in Dean 
Acheson’s opinion officially killed the Truman administration’s support of J.C.S. 1067 and 




Department’s opponents of a more positive policy in Germany, the hardliners of the 
Division of German Economic Affairs, were now powerless to stop the march of the 
business conservatives.91 
The secretary of state declared to the electrified crowd that the “conditions which 
now exist in Germany make it impossible for industrial production to reach the levels which 
the occupying powers agreed were essential for a minimum German peace-time economy”.  
Byrnes openly attacked the Level of Industry agreement.  He argued for an “increase” in 
industrial production.  Only a unification of the zones could make higher output possible.  
Indicative of the degree of Clay’s influence, Byrnes’ speech focused primarily on unifying 
the four zones of occupation under a provisional German government to permit 
manufacturers access to the domestic resources necessary for production.92  The Stuttgart 
speech firmly transformed economic rehabilitation from a secondary priority—as written in 
J.C.S. 1067—to the official tenet of American policy in Germany.93 
Byrnes correctly realized that the Europeans might need some convincing.  The 
events of the previous summer underlined the stiff French and Soviet opposition to the 
argument that domestic prosperity and general postwar recovery depended on German 
manufacturing.  The secretary of state reminded Europeans that “Germany is a part of 
Europe” and that they depended on unification to stimulate recovery as much as 
Germany.94  An early return to normalized economic conditions would ease the suffering 
witnessed throughout Europe after 1945.  Byrnes, taking aim at Stalin and even Congress, 
furthermore warned that turning Germany into a “poorhouse” would “slow” economic 
recovery and place a “heavy burden” on the backs of American taxpayers. 95  A revised 
occupation policy was in everyone’s interests. 
The reminder that Germany sat in the middle of Europe represented one of the 
banalities that signified that the Truman administration had tossed out the policy of 
collective guilt along with the usefulness of extensive societal restructuring.96  The Stuttgart 
speech plainly admitted that Europe required a functioning German political apparatus and 
economic system for reconstruction.  But Byrnes also questioned the extent of postwar 
Polish and Soviet territorial adjustments.  The German economy could not function as the 
motor of Europe without enough food for the workers.  The Secretary of State therefore 
indicated recognition of the reports outlined in the previous chapter holding the loss of 
Germany’s agricultural heartland as partly responsible for economic disruption after 1945.  
Byrnes kept the territorial issue open and spoke of “revision”.97  Jean E. Smith’s 




and Poland on the Oder-Neisse and to the economic integration of the Saar with France” 
unexplainably dismisses this notable request for “revision”.98  This element of the speech 
represented an undeniable challenge of Soviet policy in Germany as well as a strong 
declaration of support to the German people. 
 Byrnes assured Germans that the United States government officially rejected the 
punitive policies characteristic of the immediate postwar.  By arguing for economic 
recovery, an end to reparations, a provisional democratic government, and questioning the 
postwar territorial adjustments, Byrnes aimed at convincing the German population to reject 
communism.  He therefore rejected the Potsdam Agreement.  The secretary warned that the 
previous deindustrialization policies characteristic of the Level of Industry agreement kept 
Europe weak and undermined the resolve of the general public to withstand communist 
propaganda.99  But this challenge represented more than a psychological ploy aiming at 
cultivating German popular support and thwarting communist appeal in the defeated state.  
A “Star & Herald” editorial recorded that the speech demonstrated American resolve to 
remain in Europe and prevent the spread of communism.100 
One important exception persisted.  German neutrality based on an imprecise 
definition of demilitarization remained the only enduring element of previous negotiations 
left untouched by Byrnes.  “It is not in the interest of the German people nor in the interest 
of world peace”, the secretary of state argued, “that Germany should become a pawn or a 
partner in a military struggle for power between the East and the West”.101  Considering 
Byrnes’ open and provocative perspective on territorial adjustments, the decision to assist 
the return of German industry to the prewar status as “workshop of Europe”, and the clear 
challenge to communism, this appeal for continued German neutrality seems akin to comic 
relief.  The Truman administration’s plans for Europe sanctioned the maintenance of the 
Ruhr as Europe’s most valuable region in economic terms.102  The Elsey report 
demonstrated that the rejection of dual-use demilitarization required long term occupation 
for national security reasons. 
6.5 Conclusion 
Galbraith furthermore composed an analysis of occupation policy for the National 
Planning Association (N.P.A.) in November 1946.  This organization formed in 1944 to act 
as a forum for business leaders to address economic issues of national significance.  The 
economist’s conclusions, published in “Fortune Magazine” that month, repeated those 
derived from his study of strategic bombing’s effect on German industry.  The bulk of 




the mismanagement of the economy by the occupation authorities, the general 
demoralization of the defeated population and insufficient stocks of raw materials resulted 
in the low levels of industrial production evident in Germany.  The deliberate policy of 
industrial demilitarization from this perspective failed to significantly reduce industrial 
capacity and only paralyzed production.  Galbraith pointed out that the military 
governments could have utilized the large stocks of industrial equipment found in the Ruhr 
to have restored German industrial facilities to “near-capacity production” within a year.103  
German industry, Galbraith speculated, could still double its industrial production in a 
matter of months provided the occupation authorities resolved the currency problem and 
increased food and raw material imports.104  Germany, he stressed, still operated “the most 
powerful and highly developed industry in Europe” in 1946.105  The complete rejection of 
the Potsdam and Level of Industry agreements by the Truman administration, and the 
substitution of a traditional concept of disarmament, promised to stabilize the “machine 
shop of Europe” and push the continent towards recovery.  European reconstruction 
depended largely on confidence-building measures in Germany and certainly not on any 
expensive program of industrial renewal. 
 The openness of this article and the frank rejection of industrial demilitarization 
pleased Riddleberger.  The acknowledged State Department expert on German affairs had 
long supported an alternative policy in Germany.  Riddleberger, Leon Henderson and 
James C. Dunn in particular had attempted to combat the punitive thinking characteristic of 
the Treasury Department as early as March 1945.  To Morgenthau’s consternation, 
Riddleberger had issued Roosevelt a policy paper stressing the vital role that German 
industry should play in European recovery efforts.106  This faction of the State Department 
predicted that the economic prostration of Germany would only disrupt European trade 
patterns and significantly delay economic normalization.  This principle of employing 
German industry in a positive role had competed against the Morgenthau concept of 
stripping Germany for reparations throughout the initial years of the occupation.107 
The Stuttgart Speech announced the victory of a “new course” in American 
occupation policy that permanently discarded the earlier conceptions of J.C.S. 1067 and the 
Potsdam negotiations.  The liberals in the State Department, assisted by their strong 
economic arguments and growing fears throughout the Truman administration of Soviet 
military and political goals, had pushed out the opposition.  Traditional interpretations have 
long explained that the Truman administration changed gears in response to the serious 




the reorientation of political views spawned by Kennan and Churchill paralleled Truman’s 
overall perceptions of Stalin.  These views predated the Kemlin’s unreasonable and Soviet-
centric stance in 1945 and 1946.  Economic realities based on the failure to adopt a logical 
industrial demilitarization strategy that answered the nagging problem of dual-use facilities 
influenced this “new course”.  The survival of millions of European civilians, as 
demonstrated in the previous chapter, depended on heavy industry for the commodities 
needed for the agricultural and textile sectors alone.  The political split between Washington 
and Moscow assisted the verbal reformulation of hard-line policy already rejected by Clay’s 
government as unworkable.  The Truman administration now rethought their positions 
concerning all aspects of German industry.  
CHAPTER 7 
 
The Marshall Plan and the End of Demilitarization 
 






In 1947 Harry S. Truman’s administration finally tossed the Potsdam industrial 
demilitarization policy into the dustbin and set the American Military Governor Lucius 
D. Clay free to work on German industrial recovery.  An extraordinary confluence of 
“economic, financial, political, ideological, humanitarian, historical, and geopolitical 
elements”, John Gimbel aptly insists, contributed to the American decision to include 
Germany in what officially became the European Recovery Program (E.R.P.) or 
Marshall Plan.1  The intricate postrevisionist search for systemic explanations behind 
this policy shift, while useful in explaining the complexity of the American decision, 
unfortunately somewhat obscures the radical alteration in Washington’s approaches to 
industrial demilitarization and the primary attention granted western Germany as the 
“motor of Europe”.  The Marshall Plan clearly marked the end of support for the broad 
dismantling of dual-use capacities as a suitable national security measure.  This chapter 
therefore agrees to a certain degree with revisionist interpretations that national security 
and domestic economic concerns prompted Washington to support the “expansion of 
West European free trade as an absolute requirement for the United States”.2  The 
evidence however demonstrates that the State Department and Clay’s Office of Military 
Government United States (O.M.G.U.S) militated against Premier Josef Stalin’s version 
of demilitarization primarily to save the dual-use industries needed by the German, 
European and American economies. 
The Marshall Plan did of course articulate a form of economic containment.3  
Revisionists such as William Appleman Williams blamed the outbreak of the Cold War 
on the capitalist search for new markets and domestic economic stability.  The intrinsic 
strength of the American economy, as demonstrated in the Marshall Plan, unnerved and 
then alienated Stalinist Russia.4  Watered down attacks on American capitalism 
emphasize that Washington’s foreign policy employed the “incurable desire to maker 
the world a better place” in order to spread the tentacles of American industry 




Brands even criticizes American policymakers for believing that only a free enterprise 
system could provide the high industrial productivity required for reconstruction and the 
establishment of a stable social order.6  These revisionist and postrevisionist 
interpretations posit that basic capitalist greed, anti-communism, and general diplomatic 
frictions in the relationship with Stalin influenced an American change in direction.  
This interpretation does not sufficiently emphasize that Stalin as dictator clung to a 
brutal and egocentric postwar policy that Washington correctly rejected as unworkable, 
inhumane and dangerously destabilizing.  The conservatives surrounding Truman 
frankly believed in the efficacy of capitalism.  Academic opponents of capitalism must 
prove their hypothesis by demonstrating the economic advantages of communist state 
control in postwar Europe—a futile undertaking that would disregard over half a 
century of Soviet mismanagement. 
American prosperity at home required prosperity abroad.  The Truman 
administration’s concern with the health of the domestic economy conditioned the 
positive pursuit of international stability for trade purposes.  “We cannot have full 
employment and prosperity in the United States”, the Under Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson announced, “without the foreign markets”.7  Driven by domestic economic 
concerns, a near banality considering the weight of economic calculations on all 
modern political and economic ideologies and systems, the Truman administration 
placed the general prosperity of the American economy at the forefront of policy.  
Washington realized that American industry required stable and aligned foreign 
governments to ensure that markets remained open to exports.  Already at Bretton 
Woods in 1944, the American delegation pushed hard for a controlled international 
financial regime to ease international trade.  Policymakers therefore hoped to guarantee 
foreign trade in a world threatened by the poverty resulting from war and an equally 
dangerous political ideology that openly rejected American capitalism and at least in 
ideological expressions sought European domination. 
The geopolitical and military implications of the Marshall Plan however 
indicate the growing importance of national security matters in the framing of American 
foreign policy.  Melvyn P. Leffler argues that even though the Truman administration 
aimed primarily at assisting the American economy, Marshall aid restructured the 
balance of power to “enhance” the American position in Europe.8  According to 
Leffler’s interpretation, the Marshall Plan helped American policymakers control the 




European states, and justifying an American military presence which together helped 
“prevent any potential adversary or coalition of adversaries from mobilizing the 
resources and economic military potential of Europe for war-making purposes”.9  The 
Marshall Plan therefore embodied a host of aims including the assurance of continued 
domestic economic success, stabilizing Europe through economic recovery and an 
American presence, and thwarting Soviet exploitation of Europe’s assets and the spread 
of communism.10 
Undue attention to anti-communism inhibits a balanced understanding of Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (J.C.S.) worries that the Soviet Union might gain either military or 
political control of a revived Ruhr region.  The J.C.S. pressured Washington in the 
summer of 1947 to construct an “overall plan” that reflected the decision to assist 
“those nations on the periphery of Soviet controlled areas”.11  The clamouring for a 
military defence of Germany reflected both the prevailing anti-communism and the 
realization that the Ruhr represented a critical region for the security of American and 
European interests. 
7.2 George C. Marshall and the Solidification of the New Course 
Truman replaced Secretary of State James F. Byrnes with George C. Marshall 
and the former general was sworn in on 21 January 1947.  The appointment helped 
bring a Republican Congress behind the president.  The Republican Arthur Vandenburg 
pushed Marshall’s nomination through Congress without any opposition.  Truman like 
the rest of the country thought highly of Marshall.  “The more I see and talk to him”, 
the president wrote, “the more certain I am he’s the great one of the age”.12  Dean 
Acheson, who in March 1947 insisted in executive session hearings that “it is a mistake 
to believe that you can, at any time, sit down with the Russians and solve questions”,13 
was overjoyed at the replacement of Byrnes.14  Marshall brought the military’s high 
regard for economic issues with him into the State Department and thereby corrected a 
serious deficiency in policy formulation at the highest levels.  Despite the friction 
between the American and Soviet positions over Germany, Byrnes never relinquished 
his staunch belief in Stalin and rejected conservative notions of Stalin’s primal 
intransigence or the basic revolutionary nature of his policy.15  Marshall learned quickly 
that Byrnes had erred. 
The serious economic and political challenges of late 1946 and early 1947 
convinced the Truman administration to reformulate policy in order to safeguard the 




of American postwar policy to shield the domestic European economies from postwar 
recession.  The winter, as outlined in the previous chapter, dealt Europe a serious blow.  
Freezing temperatures destroyed the winter wheat crop and reduced food stocks already 
at dangerously low levels.  Thousands of Germans died of exposure in the ruined cities.  
The heavy snowfall forced factories to shut down.  “The patient”, Marshall warned in a 
radio broadcast to the American people on 28 April 1947, “is sinking while the doctors 
deliberate”.16  Worse still, the European society, the largest importers of American 
products, seemed on the verge of collapse.  American exports across the Atlantic had 
already fallen sharply from a maximum of $14 billion in 1944 to $9.7 in 1946.17  
Marshall emphasized an alternative to privation in the radio message.  The secretary of 
state reminded his listeners that Germany retained “great resources and industrial 
plants”.18  The American public by now generally agreed with the change in direction 
sanctioned by Byrnes at Stuttgart in 1946.  The State Department’s Public Affairs 
Division reported that 72 percent of Americans accepted the reconstruction of a 
denazified and demilitarized Germany.19 
Certain historians point out that the Truman administration presented a slightly 
false image of the European economy.  Werner Abelshauser for example established 
that Britain and France achieved high economic growth rates immediately prior to 
injections of American assistance.20  This reality should not obscure the serious balance 
of payments problem that emerged in 1947.  The imbalance that appeared, Alan S. 
Milward demonstrates, was “attributable to the remarkable speed and success of 
western Europe's economic recovery”.21  The substantial increase in capital goods 
imports from the United States, structural alterations to world trade patterns and a 
general lack of investment helped accelerate the dollar shortage.  But the European 
population, depending on increased production to repair wartime damage, nevertheless 
suffered from a serious drop in coal-mining and agricultural output.  The need for coal 
and fertilizer turned American eyes on Germany. 
Washington by the start of 1947 now fully accepted that European 
reconstruction required a significant German contribution.  The American economy 
could not simply replace German industry as the “workshop of Europe” and provide the 
critical commodities such coal, fertilizer and machine-tools without incurring serious 
economic risks to the stability of the domestic economy.22  Nor could the Soviet Union 
provide an alternative for a multitude of reasons.  Washington cited reasons of 




baulked at any notion of an integrated German economy that included the resources and 
capacities of all zones in a unified manner.  “[T]he Soviet government”, The Council of 
Foreign Relations asserted, “for its part was not likely to propose, or to accept, any plan 
for the reorganization of a united Germany which did not make allowance for the 
political and economic structure developed in the Soviet zone”.23  These specialists 
might have added that Washington questioned the utility of integrating a region that the 
Soviet military had brutally returned to the pre-industrial era. 
The priorities of reconstruction in any case challenged the sanity of instituting 
the Potsdam Agreement and Level of Industry conceptions.  The negative Potsdam 
policy of demilitarizing German industry and imposing a host of permanent sanctions, 
embargoes, and other punitive measures threatened to unravel the European economic 
system without substituting an alternative.24  The threat of economic recession, more 
than any other factor including geopolitical military concerns, convinced the Truman 
administration in early 1947 to admit that the “reabsorption [of western Germany] into 
the western European trade and payments framework...was essential for 
sustaining...recovery”.25  The restructuring of German industry through dismantling 
failed to account for traditional European trade patterns that relied on German heavy 
industry for a long list of commodities including coal, steel, machines and chemicals.  
German producers provided Italy, Switzerland, Sweden, and Holland with over 25 
percent of total imports.26  Without significant manufacturing in Germany and the 
availability of Europe’s largest market, non-German producers lost both an important 
trading partner and potential consumers.  These conclusions in turn promoted the 
concept that German self-sufficiency required an expansion and not a reduction of 
industry.27  This relationship more importantly underlined the “air of unreality in the 
attention given to economic disarmament”.28  As demonstrated in previous chapters, the 
need to utilize German industrial production for reconstruction, a concept that battled 
against the national security demand for dismantling, overcame the opposition and 
received official approval even prior to the harsh winter of 1946-1947. 
Policymakers clearly articulated the rejection of widespread industrial 
dismantling in early 1947.  Acheson argued in a speech to a variety of businessmen in 
Cleveland Mississippi on 8 May 1947 that European reconstruction required German 
industrial participation.  He pointed out that American industry could not simply supply 
the estimated $16 billion in goods required by European countries.  A host of domestic 




importantly the general European shortage of foreign currency reserves restricted a 
policy of buying American.  The economic realities of 1947, Acheson believed, 
demanded that the Truman administration “push ahead with the reconstruction of those 
two great workshops of Europe and Asia—Germany and Japan—upon which the 
ultimate recovery of the two continents so largely depends”.29 
The Economic Working Group on Economic Aid refined the conceptions 
offered by Allen Dulles explained in previous chapters.  Dulles, owing to his work with 
Soviet representatives in the Council of Foreign Ministers, represented the archetypical 
anti-communist who even militated against Truman’s containment policy as an 
inadequate measure for the purpose of stopping the “evil” dictator.30  The cold warrior 
had accentuated the importance of German industry for European recovery and 
American global policy.  The working group echoed this last concern.  “Failure to 
provide for recovery in Germany”, the group argued, “will consequently have the effect 
of increasing net capital import requirements needed to achieve objectives in other 
European countries”.31  The group fused German industrial production with the major 
policy aims of the Truman administration.  German economic reconstruction therefore 
represented the “real test of the will and capacity of the Allies to make peace”.32 
A flood of American reports emphasized the importance of a German industrial 
contribution.  These studies addressed the most basic problems confronting European 
society.  The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee in May 1947 somewhat 
simplistically concluded that European reconstruction could not proceed without 
sufficient food for the workers, energy and machinery for the factories and a 
functioning transportation network to move raw materials and production.33  The 
committee however refused to cut the European infrastructure into segments and for 
example viewed the transportation network as a single entity.  That entity, the 
committee argued, “cannot be examined and described on a country by country basis”.  
An examination of the European system underlined the fact that Germany held the 
“central position” in the flow of raw materials and manufactured goods.  The 
reconstruction of the German transportation system in particular represented the “prime 
requisite of rehabilitation”.34 
But the production or repair of trucks, rolling stock, railways, marshalling yards, 
roads and bridges demanded an extraordinary increase in coal and steel output.  The 
insatiable appetite of European economies for steel alone convinced the State-War-




facilities to full capacities and thereby jettison the now outdated conceptions of 
industrial downsizing to secure national security.  The Level of Industry philosophy 
therefore collided with the alternative perspective that stressed the interdependent 
nature of the European economy and which pushed the reintegration of German heavy 
industry in recovery efforts to the forefront.35  These policy papers surpassed any form 
of “control” and even intimated pursuing the return of German industrial dominance in 
Europe. 
The bulk of equipment manufactured on the Continent use[d] to be in Germany.  
Manufacture in other countries was increased before the war and can be expected 
to increase still further in the future.  There are no figures to tell whether the 
production of industrial equipment generally in any of the European nations has 
recovered to prewar quantities.  When present plans are completed production 
capacity in Germany will be greater than prewar.  Available data do not permit of 
any calculations as to the position of Europe as a whole, inclusive of Germany, as 
compared with prewar.  Prewar, however, Germany was the big producer.  One is 
inclined to doubt, therefore, that expansion elsewhere could make up the difference 
caused by reduced German output.36 
 
The J.C.S. emphasis on German industrial recovery as the cornerstone of wider 
European reconstruction motivated the change towards expansion.   
Other reports underlined these findings.  Gimbel writes that at the start of 1947 
“there appears to have been almost universal agreement in the United States that the 
program could not succeed without major industrial input from Germany”.37  The 
evidence is overwhelming.  The final report of the subcommittee of the President's 
Committee on Foreign Aid or Harriman Committee emphasized that no element of an 
assistance package “is more fundamentally necessary to the recovery of Western 
Europe than the aid asked for the rehabilitation of German industry, agriculture, and 
transport”.38  This subcommittee fused European survival to that of Germany.  “German 
recovery”, they wrote, “is a great factor in western European revival”.  Marshall 
accepted the validity of this conclusion.  The secretary of state argued later in 1947 that 
“without a revival of German production there can be no revival of Europe's 
economy”.39  This perspective implicitly rejected the substance of Foreign Economic 
Administration (F.E.A.) or Allied Control Council (A.C.C.) dual-use reduction or 
elimination strategies.  This decision predated the degeneration of the global political 
atmosphere. 
A series of geopolitical problems however only deepened the new concentration 
on German industrial recovery.  The European economic crisis that cast serious doubt 




recuperative powers of all other European states including those of Britain.  As in 
Germany, extreme coal shortages slowed British industrial production to a crawl and 
the population suffered from the debilitating numbness brought by the cold.40  A British 
Government white paper issued at the end of January 1947 concluded that the 
deteriorating economic climate demanded an immediate downsizing of the armed 
forces and commitments abroad.  On 21 February 1947 Whitehall informed the State 
Department that financial difficulties forced the termination of the provision of financial 
and military support to Greece and Turkey at the end of March 1947.  The British 
action largely aimed at drawing the Truman administration into formally committing 
economic and military resources to the defence of Europe.41  But Britain appeared in 
dire straits regardless of political machinations. 
The Greek civil war that broke out in the second half of 1946 intersected with 
American-Soviet friction along most of the Soviet periphery including Germany, Iran 
and Turkey.42  The journalist Walter Lippmann described these regions as a “seething 
stew of civil strife”.43  British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin believed as early as March 
1946 that Soviet communism aimed at eroding the strength of the democracies prior to 
targeting Britain or, as he put it, the “home of capitalism, imperialism and now of social 
democracy”.44  The anti-communist Bevin viewed his country as under siege.  But 
financial considerations induced Whitehall to withdraw the 40,000 British troops that 
propped up the royalist regime in Athens.  The skirmishes between royalist and 
communist forces, the extreme left having emerged as the principle opponents of the 
ruling elite after 1945, helped prolong the economic misery of Greece after 1945.  
Acheson remarked that “Greece was in the position of a semiconscious patient on the 
critical list whose relatives and physicians had been discussing whether his life could be 
saved”.45 
Whitehall’s actions elicited the desired effect.  Believing that the Soviet 
authorities supported the Greek communist rebels and that Stalin aimed at forcing his 
way through the Dardanelles to gain access to the Mediterranean, the State Department 
theorized that the weakened European political regimes could not withstand the shock 
of a communist victory in Greece.  The State Department reacted strongly and Marshall 
pleaded with congressional representatives on 27 February 1947 to support a 
commitment to Greece and stop the crisis that “might extend Soviet domination to 
Europe”.46  Whatever the dimensions of a future aid package, whether civilian or 




stabilization of Greece would be extensive.  John Jay McCloy, as President of the 
World Bank during this period, informed the Committee on Foreign Relations that “we 
might…not have enough money to meet all of the good hard loans that may be 
needed”.47  And any commitment in Greece meant additional dislocative pressures on 
the European economy.  Marshall, in connection to the variety of economic and 
political problems in Europe, later stated that the “dislocation of the entire fabric” of the 
European economic system constituted the most significant stumbling block to 
recovery.48 
The decision of Clement Atlee’s Labour government clearly demonstrated the 
interrelationship of economic and political problems.  The difficult demands of 
reconstruction reduced overall confidence and generated feelings of insecurity.  Truman 
authorized the formation of various organizations to study an American commitment to 
Greece and Turkey and define a future aid package for presentation to Congress.  On 5 
March 1947 Acheson requested the new Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson to direct 
a subcommittee of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee to investigate 
American financial and economic aid for Europe and draw up a list of potential 
candidates.  The report that surfaced on 21 April 1947 advised assisting those European 
states “which are vital to our national security and our national interest” and “which 
contain or protect sources of metal, oil and other natural resources which contain 
strategic objectives, or areas strategically located, which contain a substantial industrial 
potential, which possess manpower and organized military forces in important 
quantities”.49  The report therefore stressed those European states of economic and 
geostrategic interest to the United States.  Considering the concentration on resources, 
technical capabilities and industrial potential, the committee surprisingly did not include 
Germany on the list of candidates.50 
The Joint Strategic Survey Committee (J.S.S.C.) of the J.C.S. pounced on the 
committee’s omission.  The military officials recognized that any aid package “aimed at 
containing” the Soviet Union had to incorporate German industry.  The strategic and 
economic importance of the Ruhr furthermore made the Truman administration’s 
consolidation of an economic penetration in Europe dependent on a significant German 
contribution.  A revised ranking of importance placed Germany third on a list of 
potential candidates for financial and economic aid behind Britain and France.  The 
military clearly linked ideological, military and economic concerns.  The committee 




democracies of the West is taking place in Germany today” and that the “western 
democracies can win this contest only if there is drastic change in their economic 
policies for Germany”.51  The fact that this change had already taken place eluded the 
committee. 
The J.S.S.C.’s mixture of national security and domestic economic issues 
dominated the thinking of a new organization in the State Department.  Marshall 
ordered George F. Kennan to establish a Policy Planning Staff on 29 April 1947 that 
like the military “was supposed to review the whole great problem of European 
recovery in all its complexity”.52  Kennan, whose organization ultimately formulated 
and later implemented the American aid package, pointed out two pressing problems.  
He argued that the “depletion of financial reserves, particularly in foreign exchange and 
external assets” represented the primary European economic problem.  This 
observation, as pointed out, was later substantiated by historians such as Milward.  
Social developments were however of equal importance.  The general feeling of 
“disillusionment, insecurity and apathy” caused by the alarming plight of Europeans 
politically destabilized the continent and offered Stalin the potential to wage ideological 
war against the democracies.53  In true Kennan-fashion, the organization argued that a 
military response to the Soviet political infiltration of western Europe reflected “an 
uneconomic and regrettable diversion of effort”.54  The diplomat argued that financial 
and industrial aid sufficed to block communist success in Europe.  A prosperous Europe 
would ultimately force Stalin to accept American policy in Germany.55 
In later years Kennan wrote that “I had always conceived that when we had 
made it evident to the Soviet leaders that they had reached the real limits of their 
political expansion in Europe, the time would come when we would sit down with them 
and see whether we could not get their agreement to some sort of a workable 
understanding about the future of the continent”.56  Previous chapters demonstrated 
Stalin’s resolve in implementing and securing his vision of Germany even at the 
expense of favourable relations with the democracies.  Kennan understood that Stalin 
would not accept a major reversal on the matters of industrial demilitarization and 
reparations.  But the diplomat believed that the Kremlin might still accept the economic 
rehabilitation of Germany under certain circumstances.  This belief represented a clear 
illusion.  Washington’s willingness in 1947 to permit full German economic 
reconstruction or even the concept of using German industrial resources for European 




fact that the eventual Marshall Plan included Germany made Soviet support of the 
program or concept highly theoretical. 
The Policy Planning Staff therefore correctly framed the rehabilitation package 
with an ideological war in mind.  Kennan pressed hard for the adoption of a principle of 
channelling aid through a multilateral organization based on European participation but 
directed by the United States.57  Kennan’s report coincided with another study written 
by Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs William L. Clayton.  The wealthy 
cotton broker fiercely advocated that Washington support the creation of a liberalized 
multilateral trade regime.  Clayton agreed with the viewpoint expressed by Rames 
Reston that the lack of such a trade scheme would “leave a vacuum into which, 
inevitably, will move an economic system based on principles alien to our ideas, 
injurious to our interests, and highly restrictive on the volume of world trade”.58  
Clayton’s memorandum warned that the deterioration of Europe would foment 
“economic, social and political disintegration” and jeopardize the American economy.59  
The memorandum once again revealed how economic self-interest promoted the 
decision to commit resources to European recovery.60  Clayton demonstrated a focus on 
ideological factors characteristic of Kennan. 
 Truman appeared seriously concerned by the general tone of Clayton’s 
forecasts.  The president’s speech on foreign economic policy at Baylor University in 
March 1947 illustrated the connection between economic prosperity and peace and 
stressed the need to lend a helping hand if only for reasons of self-interest.  “We cannot 
find security in isolation”, Truman stressed, “Foreign relations, political and economic, 
are indivisible”.  Truman further illustrated how his administration defined an 
economically sound policy.  The president condemned the planned economies and 
nationalization schemes of socialism and communism and called them un-American.61  
Conservative American policymakers of course generally criticized the inefficiency of 
socialist economic policy. 
7.3 The Truman Doctrine 
As pointed out, Truman responded to Whitehall’s request for assistance in 
Greece and Turkey by proclaiming administrative support for the burden of 
responsibilities in Greece and Turkey.  On 12 March 1947, two days into the Council of 
Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Moscow that discussed the future of Germany, Truman 
stood before a joint session of the Senate and House of Representatives of the 80th 




in policy.  The terse 18 minute speech linked American economic and military security 
to the concept of a stable and democratic Europe.62  Fired on by the wild State 
Department reports that instability in Greece and Turkey would bring down the 
democratic governments of western Europe, Truman proclaimed in Wilsonian terms 
that “it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting 
subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures”.63  He appealed for funds to 
help Greece and Turkey fend off the threat of revolution.  Truman declared that the 
overall national security of the United States depended on the maintenance of global 
peace.  The congressmen rose to their feet and applauded in wild jubilation. 
But contemporaries immediately criticized the emotive language and tone of 
Truman’s speech.  Kennan objected to Truman’s generalizations and the “sweeping 
nature of the commitments” that the doctrine implied.64  Walter Lippmann 
misinterpreted the containment speech and criticized Truman for conjuring up the 
image of a “crusade against totalitarianism”.65  The mood in Congress quickly cooled.  
“It is…a grim and resentful Congress”, James Reston reported in the New York Times, 
“that now has begun dealing with the most important foreign policy decision since the 
end of the war”.66  Kennan in fact believed that this “hard-hitting language” aimed at 
stirring a “nation still under the spell of naïve Rooseveltian collaboration”.67  The 
American Government, seen in this way, promoted a policy of anti-communist hysteria 
in order to create the domestic consensus necessary to plan, fund, and realize a foreign 
policy aiming at a major global economic and political role for the United States.68  
Truman to a certain degree forced a policy revision on a “reluctant nation”.69  The 
speech unleashed a debate that lasted until 22 June 1947 when the Senate approved 
$400 million for Greece and Turkey. 
Truman’s speech and the doctrine of containment he preached bound the United 
States to repelling communist expansion all over the globe.  “Everyone understood”, 
Robert James Maddox points out, “that the doctrine was aimed at the Soviet Union and 
its allies”.70  The speech mobilized public opinion against the former ally.71  Kennan of 
course disagreed with Truman’s doctrine.  He argued that even a communist victory in 
Greece did not necessarily mean an “immediate and catastrophic setback”.  The 
diplomat still considered the Soviet Union incapable of supporting the expansion of 
communism since the state was “poorly set up to take responsibility either for the 
governing of Greece or for the support of the Greek economy”.72  Historians argue that 




postwar and Stalin’s policies aimed at long-term reconstruction.73  Leffler therefore 
denigrates Washington’s interpretation of Soviet goals.  The “notion that the Soviet 
Union sought world domination”, he laments, “became the fundamental postulate of 
American national security doctrine”.74  The decision to protect democracy in Greece 
and Turkey established the precedent for the militarization of policy expressed by 
economic and finally military assistance packages.75  Washington, according to Stephen 
Ambrose, focused on the three concepts of building up American military forces, 
sending military aid, and granting economic assistance.76 
Historical studies add further support to Kennan’s conclusions and deny any 
real Soviet involvement in the Greek civil war.77  Explanations of Stalin’s postwar 
behaviour stress that the dictator behaved in a traditional manner and simply reacted to 
the vacuums created by the disappearance of Germany and Japan from international 
affairs and the slow contraction of the British Empire.78  H.W. Brands, in extreme 
fashion, believes that the emerging Cold War represented “no war at all, but simply the 
management of national interests in a world of competing powers”.79  The basic 
mechanism of power rivalry drove an ideological wedge between Moscow and 
Washington that promoted a redefinition of the opposing power as inherently evil.80  
Other historians point out that Truman employed a contrived communist threat in 
Greece and Turkey to help convince the American public and Congress to support his 
longstanding commitment to military expenditures and an economic assistance package 
for Europe.81  The Truman Doctrine according to much of the historiography 
represented an overreaction to Stalin’s pursuit of a dominant position in the conquered 
territories on the Soviet periphery. 
But Truman’s verbal attack did not differ from a multitude of official and 
“unofficial” Soviet declarations during this period.  The Soviet press immediately 
responded negatively to the Truman doctrine and blamed the president for the “crude 
deployment of economic power for the purpose of political interference in European 
affairs”.82  Stalin nevertheless seemed to remain calm.  The dictator explained to 
American journalists on 9 April 1947 that the communist and capitalist systems could 
coexist and obliquely implored Truman to refrain from openly criticizing the Soviet 
Union.83  Nor did Stalin seem overly annoyed at Washington’s attempt at gaining 
forward airbases in Turkey from which bombers could reach the Soviet oil wells at 
Baku.84  Stalin’s reaction can be explained another way.  Earlier chapters pointed out 




of a soft American policy regarding Germany.  Stalin possible entertained the illusion 
that the Soviet delegation at the Moscow Council of Foreign Ministers meeting could 
still influence a shift in Washington’s policy against assisting German reconstruction 
and returning to the older notion of a Carthaginian peace for the enhancement of Soviet 
power.  Once Stalin understood that diplomacy could not bridge the rift between the 
wartime allies over policy in Germany, the dictator’s good nature changed to open 
hostility. 
Truman’s commitment to democracy represented the sort of ideological 
language Stalin understood best.  The verbal pledge to protect and foster the 
development of stable democracies, while obviously aimed at countering the threat of 
communist political success,85 can however hardly be construed by historians as 
offensive and utterly provocative in nature.  Stalin appeared able to overlook Hitler’s 
crude ideological attacks against communism in the 1930s and even form a quasi-
alliance with the most violently anti-Soviet state of the 20th Century.  Nor could the 
dictator have feared capitalist military power.  American postwar demobilization and 
the departure from Europe indicated that economic aid and ideological commitments 
represented the only practical weapons in Truman’s arsenal other than nuclear 
immolation.  Historians who condemn the Truman Doctrine for exhibiting the 
“incurable desire to make the world a better place” furthermore fail to explain how 
Stalin could possibly have viewed this positive pledge as offensive unless blinded by 
the ideological urge to expand communism.86  The criticism that Truman concentrated 
on national security concerns and the promotion of American economic welfare by 
improving global conditions furthermore offers a denigration of Truman that seems 
hollow and hard to comprehend.87  Washington naturally employed American industrial 
strength as a major component of all elements of policy.  Revisionism in particular 
seems to condemn Truman for failing to placate Stalin with either considerable 
economic assistance—largely in the form of crippling German reparations—or by 
permitting Soviet military forces to ruthlessly loot and consume the states on their 
periphery. 
Appreciations of Soviet industrial capabilities between 1945 and 1947 helped 
generate the view in Washington that communism could not assist the administration’s 
goal of rebuilding foreign markets to help buttress American industry against 
recession.88  A serious economic power imbalance existed between communism and 




reconstruction unless Stalin permitted the westward flow of raw materials for western 
European industry and especially the Ruhr.  Washington, as this chapter points out, 
however interpreted the Soviet failure to abide by the Potsdam Agreement in Germany 
and permit a unified economic administration as evidence that diplomats could not 
arrange a real economic deal with Stalin.  The visible economic weakness of Europe 
seemed alternatively to enhance Stalin’s political position by radicalizing popular 
opinion and eliciting a rejection of democratic and capitalist values.  The Truman 
administration required a solution that bound Europeans politically and economically to 
the United States and prevent either the triumphant march of communism or the attempt 
by European states to secure the raw materials they needed through negotiations with 
Stalin or returning to the prewar dependency on “quasi-autarkic arrangements with their 
colonial empires”.90  In other words, the Truman administration needed to secure 
markets for American goods by both averting a European descent into economic and 
political anarchy as well as preventing Stalin from gaining an advantageous position.   
The claim of scholars that a defensive nature characterized Stalin’s policy 
therefore seems irrelevant.  Soviet policy in Germany, whether defensive or offensive, 
threatened to bring European society to its knees.  The terrible winter of 1946-1947 
emphasized the failure of a far more positive American postwar policy to avert disaster.  
The economic situation in Europe during this period threatened the United States with a 
potential recession and a return to the depressed conditions of the 1930s.  The Truman 
Doctrine helped intensify the discussion of German industry’s place in Europe desired 
by the military.  Wilson D. Miscamble takes issue with the bulk of historians who view 
the doctrine as a “prescriptive tract for global containment” and he points out that 
Truman’s tough words did not represent an “overall plan to respond to the Soviet 
Union”.91  Seen instead as a confidence-building measure, the Truman Doctrine might 
be seen as a statement of encouragement aimed at promoting economic recovery 
through a binding commitment to western and central Europe.  Washington’s general 
policy of European economic recovery certainly imparted “form and meaning” to the 
doctrine.92  This commitment to European recovery was built on the return of German 
industry to the status of “machine shop” of Europe. 
7.4 The Moscow Foreign Minister's Conference of March 1947 
The four victorious powers conducted six Council of Foreign Ministers’ 
meetings between 1945 and 1949 to fulfill the Potsdam stipulation of constructing a 




reparations and demilitarization characterized these meetings from late 1945 onwards.  
Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov, in another example of the voracious 
Soviet appetite for power enhancement, even objected to the negligible reparations that 
Japan and Italy provided the Soviet Union.93  While the victors ultimately generated 
peace settlements for Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Italy, and Romania, in addition to 
establishing an utterly powerless four-power Allied Council for Japan, the meetings 
failed to answer the German question.94  The 43 meetings of the fourth Moscow 
meeting of March-April 1947, established to discuss the Austrian and German 
settlements, only succeeded in agreeing to the formal dissolution of Prussia—the 
acceptance of a de facto reality more than a calculated policy.  The conference ended on 
24 April 1947 without finding agreement on the dominant issues of reparations, 
unification or even disarmament.  Marshall’s meetings with Ernest Bevin, George 
Bidault and Vyacheslav Molotov furthermore convinced the secretary of state that 
neither the Soviet nor French authorities desired a real settlement.  The Moscow 
Council of Foreign Ministers’ meeting represented the clear break in relations between 
the victors concerning Germany. 
 The Moscow conference was doomed to failure from the outset.  The Truman 
administration by March 1947 genuinely believed in the necessity of activating German 
industrial potential to assist the reconstruction efforts.  These policymakers now 
consistently argued that the dismantling of industry punished European countries “even 
more” than Germany itself and threatened to “destroy the stability which is essential to 
the growth of democracy and the maintenance of western cultural thought”.95  Secretary 
of War Robert P. Patterson even argued that “the Soviet demand for reparations from 
current German production constituted a serious threat to the American social system” 
and therefore to American security.96  The American diplomats simply could not accept 
Soviet terms.  Walter Bedell Smith, American Ambassador to Moscow during this 
period, wrote that the American government did “not want nor intend to accept German 
unification on any terms that the Russians might agree to, even though they seemed to 
meet most of our requirements”.97 
Initial preparations for the conference in late January 1947, attended by men 
such as Charles E. Bohlen, John H. Hilldring, E. Allan Lightner and Willard L. Thorp, 
examined how the United States could free itself from the spirit of Potsdam.  These men 
decided to interpret the agreement in a new manner.  They trumpeted the call for 




Washington into officially seeking revision to the Level of Industry plan.98  Policy 
papers stressed the point that the Potsdam decisions did not conceive of a permanently 
controlled German economy.  They agreed with Clay’s perspective that the German 
standard of living concept “was established as a measure of reparations and not to 
prevent the German themselves from their own efforts to attain a higher standard of 
living in the future”.99  American policy during the early months of 1947 actively 
pursued the end of dual-use industrial dismantling and the easing of economic 
restrictions to grant German industrialists the freedom to pursue recovery.100  This 
“revolutionary” reading of the Potsdam and Allied Control Council decisions, while 
deliberately and openly deceptive, was built on the idea that earlier interpretations did 
not lead to stability. 
Clay kept up the American fight against dismantling plants in the British zone 
and the shipment of industrial equipment eastwards.  “It is our belief”, the general wrote 
on 17 February 1947, “that we must agree to early allocation [of war plants] by the 
Allied Control Council subsequently making our fight against deliveries to the U.S.S.R. 
until it has fulfilled other agreements in the Potsdam Protocol.  If the British accept this, 
plants destined for the U.S.S.R. would be held in reserve and not delivered”.101  
Continued Soviet intransigence prompted this decision.  During A.C.C. meetings at the 
start of 1947 Clay grew increasingly annoyed at the Soviet failure to hand over a 
statistical report outlining Soviet removals from their zone of occupation.102  Clay 
fumed that an economic plan that analysed the ills affecting German industry required a 
detailed analysis of quadripartite production capabilities.  The War Department granted 
the general’s request to withhold data concerning the American zone in retaliation for 
the continued Soviet mockery of unified economic administration.103  The evidence 
however suggests that Clay, influenced by his advisor Robert Murphy and the reports 
from military formations already outlined, discounted the practicability of eastern 
German economic integration owing to Soviet pillaging and therefore baulked at 
additional reparations from the western zones.  Clay wrote Marshall in March 1947 and 
argued that a general treaty guaranteeing permanent German disarmament should 
replace the Potsdam conception of “security through economic restrictions and 
reduction of German industry”.104 
The State Department agreed and proceeded to dismantle the arguments 
rationalizing industrial demilitarization.  Demilitarization, in the opinion of 




accord with economic realities.  The State Department cited the work of the economic 
experts.  German reliance on heavy industry for basic survival, described in the 
previous chapter, demonstrated that the Level of Industry plan contained serious 
“internal inconsistencies”.105  Policy papers pointed out that the A.C.C. already 
sanctioned the controlled manufacturing of sporting arms, ammunition and commercial 
explosives.106  Demilitarization seemed laughable under these conditions.  
Policymakers therefore articulated the impressions gained by observations of the 
destroyed German cities in the summer of 1945 and attacked the reasoning behind 
dismantling itself.  These men now argued that the war itself had destroyed militarism 
in Germany.107  This policy impacted the secretary of state.  Marshall informed Vincent 
Auriol on 6 March 1947 that a four-power disarmament treaty should replace the early 
postwar concepts of drastic industrial reductions.108 
State Department officials furthermore now clearly believed that Stalin’s 
demands for German reparations aimed at destabilizing western Europe to pave the way 
for the expansion of communism.109  Marshall emphasized that the dismantling and 
transfer of industrial facilities “had not been a profitable procedure”.110  The enterprise 
weakened European recuperative powers and increased the military industrial strength 
of the Soviet Union.  Stalin’s ruinous economic policies in both eastern Germany—and 
the Soviet Union for that matter—created a dependency on western Germany that went 
far beyond the matter of justifiable and rational reparations.  The State Department 
rejected all Soviet proposals no matter how reduced in scope.  These men even openly 
dismissed the preliminary Soviet idea of gaining reparations from current production on 
the dubious pretext that the policy demanded a substantial revision upwards in the 
levels of industry—the dominant aim of American policy at this point in time—and 
therefore conflicted with the spirit of Potsdam.111  Marshall informed Bevin during the 
conference that Stalin needed reparations from Germany in order to support his 
militarization schemes and not to rebuild the Soviet civilian infrastructure.112  The 
Anglo-American allies would have none of this.  Stalin’s rigidly selfish position 
therefore determined both the “inescapable” division of Germany and of Europe.113 
The American delegation had paradoxically travelled to Moscow intent on 
transforming the Level of Industry agreements and increasing German industrial 
production to address the economic paralysis of Europe.  Marshall rejected retribution 
as a workable concept.114  His views coincided with those of the Council on Foreign 




and distributed copies to the State Department and the Office of Military Government 
United States (O.M.G.U.S.) prior to the Moscow conference.  The report concluded that 
“denazification and the revival of the German economy are equally essential” to 
American interests.115  Only Charles Kindleberger and the Economic Division of the 
State Department continued to advance some notion of sacrificing German dual-use 
potential in order to keep Stalin happy.116  Marshall however agreed with the 
conservative elements of the State Department and believed that Stalin’s reparations 
policy in Germany prohibited any form of agreement. 
Demilitarization represented the first item discussed during the opening sessions 
of the conference that began on 11 March 1947.  The delegates tackled the troublesome 
problem of defining war potential for the purpose of dismantling.  They quickly fell into 
the old pattern that characterized all previous negotiation.  Georges Bidault expressed 
the concerns of the French government that the soft position taken by the Truman 
administration on industrial potential might weaken the resolve of the international 
community to destroy the German war potential.117  Molotov, in the typical communist 
manner of reducing complex issues to childlike simplicity, questioned the need for 
discussion altogether and quipped that he “saw no reason why war potential plants 
having no peacetime use should not be destroyed at once”.118  Bevin recoiled in disgust.  
He offered the traditional Anglo-American viewpoint that the delegates could not even 
determine which industrial facilities to dismantle until the occupying powers permitted 
a unified German economy. 119  Marshall however took the bull by the horns and 
deflected French-Soviet criticism.  He agreed with Bevin that the assembled delegates 
required a precise definition and reiterated Washington’s resolve to demilitarize 
German industry to placate the French and Soviet ministers.  But the secretary of state 
nevertheless proceeded to offer an alternative course of action that threw out the need 
for a definition of industrial demilitarization.  Marshall directly criticized the entire 
dismantling.  He specified that Germany “is not capable of waging war today and we all 
know it”.  Marshall argued that a pact or treaty and not further dismantling should act as 
the “determining factor in continuing the state of German demilitarization”.120  These 
discussions illustrated the extreme divergence of opinion. 
The Soviet delegates, realizing Marshall’s commitment to keeping capital 
equipment in Germany, shifted positions and requested reparations from German 
production.  The American delegation, in keeping with previous deliberations, flatly 




inconsistent with the American plan of reconstructing a self-sufficient German 
economy as quickly as possible.  Marshall however promised to “study the possibility 
of a limited amount of reparations from current production to compensate for plants”.  
But the American delegation introduced the now worn proviso.  Marshall emphasized 
that “deliveries from current production are not to increase tile financial burden of the 
occupying powers or to retard the repayment to them of the advances they have made to 
keep the German economy from collapsing”.121  Every argument for reparations was 
countered with the matter of economic viability. 
The rest of the conference followed a similar pattern.  The economic disaster of 
that winter illustrated the general need in Germany for increased agricultural yields 
either by a reevaluation of the eastern border with Poland or altering the levels of 
industry.  The evidence suggests that Marshall only seriously considered the latter 
solution and used the border issue to unsettle Molotov and torpedo the discussions 
concerning quadripartite rule that none of the delegates even wanted.  The assembled 
Americans, to keep up appearances, nevertheless sought to convince their French and 
Soviet counterparts to agree to the formation of centralized administrations in 
Germany.122  Marshall realized quickly enough that Moscow interpreted German 
economic “unity” somewhat differently from the other delegations.  Even though 
Molotov openly accepted the necessity of unity, the Soviet occupation authorities, in 
Marshall’s estimation, nevertheless “operated practically without regard to the other 
zones” and refused to “disclose the availability of foodstuffs and the degree or character 
of reparations taken out of this zone”.123  Marshall described the Soviet incongruity 
between policy and practice as evidence of a serious inconsistency and general lack of 
interest in solving Germany’s economic problems.124  Molotov and the Soviet 
delegation for their part utterly failed to acknowledge Marshall’s fears that continued 
German economic paralysis negatively influenced both Europe’s efforts at 
reconstruction and the domestic American economy.  The American delegation reacted 
strongly to the continued Soviet emphasis that the Allies proceed with demilitarization 
and strip German industry of dual-use potential.  Moscow, as always, emphasized 
reparations and their own security above the concerns of others.  Stalin completely 
failed to take notice of American, European and German concerns.125 
The Council of Foreign Ministers Deputies in March 1947, considering the 
degree of conflict within the quadripartite system concerning unity of action, ordered a 




of war to the occupied territories by 31 December 31 1948.  “Finding it necessary to 
limit the occupation forces in Germany”, They also ordered that “the Allied Control 
Council should consider this question and determine the size of armed forces of the 
U.S., United Kingdom, France and U.S.S.R. in Germany” and report the findings on 1 
June 1947.126  The group even demanded that the A.C.C. “establish in all of Germany a 
free exchange of information and democratic ideas by all media”.127  Considering the 
Soviet employment of millions of German slave labourers, the large Soviet military 
presence in Germany and the clampdown on non-S.E.D. political organizations in 
eastern Germany, none of these instructions appeared reasonable.  They more 
importantly, despite the disagreements concerning dismantling, reparations and 
industrial levels, paradoxically ordered the Control Council in Berlin to speed up the 
formulation of a “plan for the liquidation of the plants constructed especially for the 
production of war materials” and present a “complete” version by 1 July 1947.  These 
diplomats granted the military authorities one year to fulfill this objective once a 
detailed list of factories was established.  Failing to agree on the other categories, the 
deputy ministers seemed willing to press the issue of dismantling the “war plants”.128 
The bravado could not obscure the serious tears in the most important principles 
of four-power administration.  The ministers could not surpass the hurdles of moving 
beyond basic and general statements and working out functioning machinery.  The 
commitments to some form of interzonal trade, the maximization of agricultural output, 
and the reactivation of “peaceful industries” were meaningless without a detailed 
export-import plan, freedom of movement and most importantly the establishment of 
the future contours of German industry.  The Soviet delegates in particular refused to 
move ahead in discussions without a satisfactory solution to the matter of reparations.  
This tough stand torpedoed real work on the levels of industry, but the group of 
deputies nevertheless agreed on “the necessity of revision of the plan for reparations 
and the level of German post-war economy”.  The simplistic agreement on principles, a 
constant theme in four-power discussions during this period, presented an image of 
unanimity that distorted the complex hurdles barring precise implementation.129 
The Moscow conference represented another turning point towards cementing 
the bipolar split between communism and democracy.130  The Truman administration 
marched towards formalized German division and therefore the complete rejection of 
Soviet claims against western Germany.131  The western powers responded to Soviet 




aimed at establishing the basis of an independent West German state.  The American 
and British governments agreed to grant German economic organizations greater 
responsibilities on 29 May 1947.  The Soviets in turn withdrew their representatives 
from the A.C.C. in Berlin a few weeks later.  On 21 June 1949 Truman formally 
announced the general failure of negotiations with Stalin.  “The Soviet Union,” the 
president remarked, “...sought a return to Potsdam and its system, which the Russians 
had rendered unworkable by their misuse of the unlimited veto.  They refused to 
recognize the important progress which has been made in Western Germany since 
1945.  In these circumstances, real progress for the unification of Germany and its 
people was impossible”.132 
Moscow’s failure to provide a solution to Europe’s economic problems, and 
instead concentrate solely on extracting maximum reparations from Germany 
convinced Marshall that the rigid Soviet disinterest in general European economic 
revival seemed to indicate something sinister.  For his part, Marshall’s offer to at least 
study reparations from current production indicated a small degree of flexibility.133  The 
secretary of state however extrapolated from Moscow’s rigid behaviour that Stalin 
aimed at inhibiting American efforts at reconstruction to further destabilize Europe as a 
precursor to political subjugation.  Kennan’s assertion that a psychological rapier 
represented the best weapon in Stalin’s arsenal seemed anchored in Marshall’s mind.  
He therefore left Moscow convinced that the future of both the American and European 
economies depended on a permanent American presence in Europe.  The Ambassador 
George McGhee wrote in his memoirs that “the cooperative spirit of Yalta” existed as a 
“distant memory”.134 
Washington’s concentration on Germany, the revisionists declare, estranged and 
alienated Moscow and therefore forced the Cold War.135  A dusty revisionist line of 
interpretation argues that an unnecessary American devotion to European recovery 
forced Stalin’s obstinate reaction.136  Carolyn Eisenberg more humanely points out that 
the American delegation headed by Marshall travelled to the Moscow meeting 
“unwilling to compromise” over reparations, rejected every Soviet proposal and 
therefore killed effective four-power administration in Germany.137  Her eagerness to 
defend Stalin and play up the importance of Soviet flexibility obscures the fact that the 
Soviet delegation entertained their guests with a crude ruse.138  Stalin only superficially 
supported the American emphasis on a unified administration as a negotiating tactic.  




to safeguard their control over at least a portion of their wartime enemy.  The farcical 
eastern German “elections” in 1946 that solidified the power of the puppet 
Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands in Germany, as elsewhere in the Soviet 
sphere, attest to the incompatibility of the democratic and communist systems.  Even 
Wilfried Loth, a staunch defender of Stalin’s policy in Germany, admits that the desire 
to retain a firm grip on the eastern zone “was difficult to square with the goal of a 
unified administration of Germany, above all when such an administration was 
regarded as a preliminary step toward a government for the nation as a whole”.139  
Moscow, as demonstrated, could only reject a unified occupation authority for 
economic, ideological and political reasons. 
Leffler in postrevisionist fashion argues that both the American and Soviet 
delegations adopted inflexible negotiating positions.140  This perspective still places far 
too much of the responsibility for the developing Cold War on the shoulders of 
American policymakers.  Wilfried Mausbach’s more conservative conclusions appear 
closer to the mark.  He generally repeats a more orthodox point of view that the 
imprecision and severity of Soviet demands in Germany mingled together with the 
visible barbarity of the Red Army and fomented the break with the Soviet Union.141  
The revisionist and postrevisionist criticism of Washington’s concentration on German 
industrial reactivation to act as the motor of European reconstruction fails to 
acknowledge the problems of integrating a Soviet Carthaginian peace with a rational 
postwar policy.  Only a neo-realist perspective accounts for the seriousness with which 
the Truman administration approached the deteriorating economic conditions in Europe 
during the winter of 1946-1947, the contradictions of industrial demilitarization, and the 
importance of a reconstructed global economic system.  The argument that the wide 
dismantling of industry in western Germany could have improved conditions in the 
Soviet Union remains in any case counterfactual.  Stalin and not Truman adopted an 
impossibly egocentric position that threatened political instability and ultimately the 
lives of millions of men, women and children. 
7.5 The Harvard Speech, Marshall Plan and Soviet Rejection 
On 5 June 1947 the Secretary of State informed the alumni assembled at 
Harvard University’s 296th Commencement Day that his government aimed at assisting 
the rebuilding of the European economy.  The short but powerful speech, that 
incorporated the conceptions of Kennan’s Policy Planning Staff and the Clayton 




factories without “substantial” American assistance.  The scourge of “hunger, poverty, 
desperation, and chaos”, in Marshall’s opinion, “threatened to undermine the “political 
and social conditions in which free institutions can exist”.  Europe faced an alarming 
humanitarian catastrophe that threatened to destabilize the continent even more 
dramatically than the 1930s Depression.143 
The former Army chief of staff theoretically appealed to “all” European nations 
including the Soviet Union.  Marshall echoed Kennan and suggested that European 
governments join the drafting of an aid program composed of American loans, grants 
and technical assistance.  The secretary of state offered this assistance to “any 
government that is willing to assist in the task of recovery”.  “Our policy is directed not 
against any country or doctrine,” he said, “but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and 
chaos.  Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to 
permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can 
exist”.  Marshall’s emphasis on a “working economy” indicated a conservative 
reluctance to support the radical changes to the European economic order implicit in the 
Potsdam decision to dismantle German industry and move Europe’s industrial heartland 
deep into eastern Europe.  The Harvard speech clearly demonstrated the State 
Department’s resolve to secure capitalist democracy in Europe and to assist the 
consolidation of a dominant American economic and political position in western 
Europe by employing German industry as the nexus of reconstruction efforts.144 
Marshall’s audience applauded the initiative.  Foreign reactions to the speech 
were however mixed.  Bevin called it “a lifeline to sinking men. It seemed to bring hope 
where there was none. The generosity of it was beyond my belief”.145  Cecil Weir, 
Economic Advisor of the British military government, informed the members of the 
“Verwaltungs-, Wirtschafts-, und Länderrates” that the inclusion of Germany in the 
E.R.P. represented a “wundervolle Gelegenheit für Deutschland”.146  The French 
government faced an entirely different problem.  The insistence on binding European 
reconstruction to German industry provoked a degree of unrest in France.  Hans-Peter 
Schwarz and Edward Rice-Maximin even speculate that Washington’s shift towards a 
positive policy in Germany threatened to destabilize French politics and push the voters 
into the arms of the communists—the exact reverse of American intentions.147 
Western European governments however quickly accepted the American offer 
of assistance.  Bevin and Bidault on 19 June 1947 even invited Molotov to attend a 




conference aimed at placing a monetary value on reconstruction.  The European 
delegates determined that reconstruction required $30 billion in assistance from the 
United States.149  But the inclusion of western Germany in the program worried the 
State Department.  Washington sent a group of observers that included Clay to 
emphasize that western Germany “must be taken fully into account” in any assistance 
program.150  Marshall informed the American embassy in London during the Paris 
negotiations that the E.R.P. could only succeed if “the separate national programs and 
requirements statements were examined and coordinated such as to produce the greatest 
European contribution to recovery at the earliest moment”.  And this meant raising 
German industrial output to a considerable extent.151  In July 1947, the Economic 
Working Group on Economic Aid speculated that capital imports to Germany valued at 
$1.5 billion would immediately raise the industrial capacity of the bizonal region to 70 
percent of the 1938 level—a conclusion that made a mockery of the Level of Industry 
notion of lowering capacities to 50-55 percent by 1949.152 
Washington’s insistence on a strong German economy as the basis of European 
reconstruction did not however win the hearts of all Europeans.  Bidault later regretted 
the decision to accept American economic assistance because it effectively ended the 
French postwar policy demand of weakening German power through severe industrial 
restrictions.153  The French and Czechoslovak public in particular rejected the 
reestablishment of traditional trade patterns in central Europe.154  The State Department 
nevertheless triumphed.  On 10 July 1947 Washington advised Clay that agreement had 
been reached in the Committee of Sixteen for the Marshall Plan on the integration of a 
considerable German contribution.  The “General Report” of 22 September 1947 that 
resulted from the discussions underscored the impact of Marshall’s stern warning that 
German economic and industrial paralysis would destabilize European society.155  
The Soviet authorities responded with open antipathy.  Molotov reacted sharply 
to a suggestion from Bevin and Bidault that the foreign ministers invite 22 European 
countries to join.  Molotov believed that the plan “will lead to nothing good. It will lead 
to Britain, France and that group of countries which follows them separating themselves 
from the other European states and thus dividing into two groups of states and creating 
new difficulties in relations between them”.  Even though Stalin originally welcomed 
Marshall’s proposal to assist in European recovery, the dictator’s initial interest in the 
American aid package transformed into a mixture of distrust and fear.156  The steady 




role for Germany convinced Stalin that Washington’s policy placed a revived German 
industry at the centre of European reconstruction.  Stalin still thought of German 
reconstruction as a major threat to Soviet security.157  The dictator however also 
believed that western economic assistance endangered the Soviet position of dominance 
in eastern Europe.158  Stalin viewed the American offer as the first step towards the 
“economic and political subjection of European countries to American capital” and the 
subsequent erection of an “anti-Soviet grouping”.159  The dictator preferred to subject 
eastern European states to the Soviet rifle butt.  Stalin therefore rejected Marshall’s 
offer in order to save the Soviet ring of puppet states from the irresistible pull of 
American dollars. 
Moscow attempted to sabotage the Marshall Plan.  Molotov at the Paris 
conference battled Washington’s insistence that the United States maintain specific 
controls over the aid package and that reconstruction efforts include Germany.  
Molotov first objected to the American financial and economic conditions attached to 
the aid package.  The Soviet position advocated that each of the participating states 
determine their own unique priorities and not be tied to an integrated program.160  
Molotov furthermore requested that the United States government openly declare the 
total sum of money intended for reconstruction efforts and guarantee their delivery.  
The Soviet delegation indicated that they wanted total control over the funds provided 
by the United States and therefore rejected paying any political price for substantial 
foreign aid.  Molotov’s wholly unrealistic proposal failed to garner British and French 
support and the western allies shelved the Soviet request.  The greater Soviet concern 
rested with the role of German industry in the E.R.P.  At the conference, Molotov 
specifically demanded that German industrial contributions to the recovery program not 
take precedence over reparations issues.  This demand conflicted with the Truman 
administration’s hope of utilizing European raw materials for German industrial 
production.  The American delegation again rejected restarting the flow of reparations, 
in this case from current production, owing to the financial problems involved in 
allocating resources for a German industry unable to generate currency for trade 
purposes.161  American policy now clearly rejected reparations as incompatible with 
swift and relatively inexpensive European recovery.162  But Soviet policy nevertheless 
rejected any fundamental alteration in reparations. 
Scholars argue that this American rejection indicated a lack of sympathy with 




decision to employ a western German industrial contribution in economic recovery 
efforts therefore appears ideologically motivated.  This argument, however enticing, 
fails to acknowledge that policymakers genuinely believed that European reconstruction 
as a whole depended on German cooperation.  The dismantling of industry or a costly 
program of reparations from current production did not guarantee economic success.  
Historical accounts that castigate the American stance and instead support Soviet 
reparations policy fail to address the severely dislocative results of dismantling or 
reparations from current production and more importantly who would subsidize the raw 
materials required.  Soviet trade with Germany by definition promised Stalin access to 
the manufactured goods needed for reconstruction.  Moscow’s failure to pursue such a 
course denied the Soviet Union a potentially cooperative and lucrative market. 
Molotov withdrew from further discussions on 2 July 1947 after denouncing the 
Marshall Plan.  Forcing those states under direct Soviet control to follow his course of 
action, Stalin permanently retreated from a concerted policy with the western Allies and 
initiated a “strategy of isolation” that solidified the geographical split of Europe into 
east and west.  Historians such as Wilfried Loth point out that the Soviet rejection of 
economic and financial aid marked the decisively visible turning point in the relations 
between the victorious powers.164  Moscow clearly radicalized international politics 
after the Paris discussions.  Soviet officials adopted an openly belligerent antiwestern 
position.  Andrey Vyshinsky, the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, argued at the United 
Nations in September 1947 that the Marshall Plan attempted to “split Europe into two 
camps” and erect a “bloc of several European countries hostile to the interests of 
the…Soviet Union”.165  This clearly expressed fear of encirclement incited a host of 
countermeasures.  While concern regarding Josip Broz Tito’s independent course in 
Yugoslavia helped motivate Stalin’s decision to exert greater control over world 
socialism through a central authority,166 Stalin directed Andrei Aleksandrovich 
Zhdanov to openly denounce the Marshall Plan at the founding of the Information 
Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties or Cominform in September 1947.  
According to Geoffrey Roberts, the Soviet “adoption of a dogmatic, militant leftist” 
foreign policy reflected the inevitable return to a policy dictated by communist ideology 
in opposition to American liberal capitalism.167  The theory and the ensuing 
organization divided the globe into the “Soviet camp of peace, socialism, and 




Aggressive Soviet moves in Hungary and Czechoslovakia followed and led Truman to 
blame Stalin for initiating a Cold War in March 1948.169 
The evidence therefore clearly suggests that while the Truman administration 
frowned on the extension of assistance to the Soviet Union and the communist satellite 
states, Cold War frictions did not immediately exclude these states from E.R.P. aid.  
The violent Soviet response backfired.  American policymakers subsequently seemed 
more anxious to prevent trade the trade of critical commodities between western and 
eastern Europe.  In August 1948 the Economic Cooperation Administration, formed to 
furnish material and financial assistance to nations participating in a plan of European 
recovery and headed by Paul Hoffman, William C. Foster and William Averell 
Harriman, requested that the recipients of American aid annul a variety of economic 
contracts with eastern European states and accept the American embargo policy against 
the Soviet Union.170  This hard program did not however stop the Polish government, a 
puppet of Moscow, from participating in the recovery program.  Polish authorities 
sought and received American loans and “Poland made an important contribution to the 
success of E.R.P., especially through the export of coal to Western Europe”.171 
American policymakers generally feared that Stalin might accept Marshall’s 
proposal and undermine the program from within.  The years of negotiations with 
Moscow demonstrated that these fears were justified.  A host of American voices 
rejected Soviet participation outright and advocated severe restrictions.  American 
businessmen and political elites in particular shunned the notion of working closely 
with Soviet-style command economies and doubted the feasibility of merging planned 
and market economies.  Clayton, at a meeting with Acheson, Marshall and Kennan on 
28 May 1947, did not believe that even reconstruction required eastern European 
participation and subsequently agreed to their inclusion in an aid package only if Poland 
and other states “would abandon near-exclusive Soviet orientation of their 
economies”.172  “The United States used its power”, Stephen Krasner argues, “to 
promote general political goals rather than specific economic interests”.173  This 
interpretation derogates financial and economic concerns and plays up the political 
needs of rectifying an economic malaise in order to immunize western European states 
against communism and also to deflect particularly French criticism of American policy 
in Germany.  But the real economic priorities of reconstruction influenced the rejection 
of Soviet participation as much if not more than matters of national security.  The State 




and therefore extended the program to all European states.  American officials generally 
separated the economic nature of the ERP from the military dimensions of the Truman 
Doctrine.174  Moscow appeared unwilling to accept Washington’s notion of Germany as 
the “lynchpin” of recovery efforts.  The rigid stance on extracting wartime reparations, 
seen in this way, jeopardized the E.R.P. and reconstruction.  American suspicion was 
hardly surprising. 
The Truman administration faced an arduous struggle in the halls of Congress 
over financial aid to Europe.  The representatives of 16 nations, after discussions 
throughout July and September, suggested an American aid package of $17 billion over 
four years.  Convincing Congress to provide these funds required some convincing.  
The State Department therefore conceived of the Marshall Plan in terms that appeared 
to rectify all of the problems facing the government in 1947.  The Marshall Plan aimed 
at resolving all outstanding issues.  The effort represented the “largest peacetime 
propaganda effort directed by one country to a group of others ever seen”. 175   The 
Marshall Plan bound Germany to Europe.176  The administration issued a general 
promise of prosperity for all as propaganda aiming at the selling the plan abroad and 
especially within the United States.177  Ten months after Marshall declared the need for 
a concerted recovery program, in April 1948, Truman signed the Marshall Plan 
legislation into law.  The brilliant campaign to convince Congress to support the 
recovery program had succeeded.178 
7.6 Policy Revision: The Incongruity of Demilitarization with Recovery 
Washington’s need to increase German industrial output impacted the 
boundaries and dimensions of the industrial demilitarization debates and policy in the 
southern zone.  A series of reports by various governmental and non-governmental 
organizations indicated that the Truman organization removed the concept of industrial 
disarmament out of their vocabulary.  Edward S. Mason, an economist who had worked 
on the United States Strategic Bombing Study alongside John K. Galbraith, composed a 
study for the Foreign Policy Association in September 1947 that repeated in concrete 
terms what Clay, Marshall and the Truman administration in general had alluded to 
throughout most of the year.  “I think that my views at that time were coming very 
much to the position that Clay was coming to”, Mason later explained, and “that it was 
going to be impossible to work out a satisfactory relationship with the Soviet Union. 
Clay was unalterably opposed to the Morgenthau plan, and the problem that he was 




myself that that was the problem that we ought to concern ourselves with”.179  European 
recovery, he frankly stated, depended on German industry.  The “ineffective” and 
“unnecessary” industrial disarmament program only threatened to retard reconstruction 
and force the continent and the United States to face “drastic economic 
consequences”.180  Some “quarters”, Mason added, now characterized the industrial 
disarmament provisions of the Potsdam and Level of Industry agreements as a clear 
continuation of the Morgenthau spirit.  These concepts were a danger to peace.  Mason 
demanded a final rejection of the immediate postwar attitudes and called for a new and 
clear policy paper that acknowledged the dominant desire of Truman’s government to 
“increase” the German standard of living.181  Mason’s paper requested an official 
reformulation of policy that reflected the general consensus that the dismantling of 
dual-use capacities reflected a poor path to peace. 
The plan to dismantle German war making capacities had originally failed to 
gain the sympathy of Clay and many in the State and War Departments since it became 
apparent that the industrially demilitarized state would require the extensive importation 
of a wide variety of raw materials and manufactured goods already in short supply 
throughout Europe.182  The military authorities officially sanctioned the abandonment 
of dismantling in the summer of 1947.  The Joint Chiefs of Staff replaced J.C.S. 1067 
with J.C.S. 1779 and ended the economic restrictions placed on industry in Germany.183  
The directive took notice of Clay’s administrative style and officially granted the 
general the authority to act as he saw fit.184  The document declared that “an orderly and 
prosperous Europe requires the economic contributions of a stable and productive 
Germany”.  J.C.S. 1779 furthermore ordered O.M.G.U.S. to “enable Germany to make 
a maximum contribution to European recovery”.185 This conclusion clashed with any 
attempt at prescribing the levels of dual-use industries. 
The War Department had supported Clay’s idea of renegotiating a bizonal level 
of industry in the spring.186  The revised plan raised the levels of industry in Germany 
to the full levels of 1936 in order to maintain a sufficient industrial capacity for German 
self-sufficiency and to permit a significant contribution to European recovery.  The 
revised plan announced significant increases in such areas as machine-tool production 
and heavy chemicals.  American authorities even speculated that “the retained level of 
capacity in industry as a whole would permit a volume of production significantly 
above that prevailing in 1936”.187  This “remarkable shift” permitted a higher level of 




support exports and reparations.188  The plan scratched half of the 1,200 plants 
earmarked for reparations off of the dismantling lists.189  Clay in fact speculated that the 
influx of refugees determined that this figure required even further adjustment.190  But 
even the revised plan portended a significant change.  “If production in the combined 
zones reached these levels”, the Council on Foreign Relations pointed out in 1948, 
“Germany would again be the biggest single factor in European machinery and machine 
tool production”.191  “Beneath the deathly exterior lay the bones and sinews of a nation 
that had been—and would be again—the strongest nation in Europe”.192 
Washington still feared a political backlash.  It came.  Clay was informed to 
refrain from announcing the change in policy to the German people even though the 
military governor hoped that such an action would increase morale.193  This order 
aimed at avoiding unnecessary provocation of the French and Soviet governments.194  
Bidault later threatened to resign in late 1947 after he received news of the A.C.C. 
renegotiation of the levels of industry.195  An outcry of criticism in Poland over the 
revised plan induced the American ambassador to propose the public announcement of 
the “unqualified success of demilitarization” on 18 August 1947 in order to soothe the 
plan’s opponents.  The ambassador requested the State Department to announce that the 
Allies had destroyed 100 percent of all German war material and that 36 or the 128 
industrial installations targeted for demilitarization “have been put entirely on a 
peacetime basis, while work on the rest is steadily progressing”.196  These authorities 
bemoaned the lack of detailed economic analysis “either or minimum German 
requirements or of export possibilities” and argued that the Truman administration’s 
intention of raising German production to full capacity within a few years represented a 
severe erosion of the previous security conceptions.  “The levels of capacity left in the 
industries producing capital equipment”, it was speculated, “are such as to permit rapid 
expansion of war industries in the absence of other controls on such expansion”.197 
The Truman administration had not yet worked out a political solution that 
soothed European fears that the bulk of German industrial strength would survive 
postwar dismantling.  The language of the ERP demonstrated the willingness of the 
United States to employ the German economy for wider reconstruction efforts as an 
“integral” element of the recovery program.198  The Marshall Plan demanded large 
increases in Ruhr coal production and “other peaceful industries” in order to integrate 
the German and European economies.  The Truman administration changed gears and 




Marshall Plan required German “peacetime productive capabilities”.199  But the 
language of demilitarization continued to echo through the halls of power despite the 
obvious end of dismantling.  The policymakers realized that a certain danger remained 
in total German economic recovery and weakly announced that “Every precaution must 
be taken against a resurgence of military potential in Germany”.200  The demilitarization 
of industry after the summer of 1947 took an altruistic form.  Politicians in the Truman 
administration argued that German financial, economic and technological success could 
“purge all nations of poverty, ignorance, and despair” and most importantly of war 
itself.201  German industry now represented a weapon against militarism. 
The grandiose and nebulous terminology indicated that the Truman 
administration still had not worked out a satisfactory delineation of military and civilian 
industries.  The American Consul Martin J. Hillerbrand in Bremen announced the 
reopening of “large industrial plants” in the Bremen region on 18 September 1947.  The 
Consul proudly stated that various firms now produced tractors and other agricultural 
equipment instead of armoured cars and tanks for the German military.  Other 
“moderately large shipbuilding” firms such as the Atlaswerke and Bremervulkan 
continued to engage in repair work.  But some of the most important German firms in 
this region, such as the Norddeutsche Huette steel mill and three large aircraft factories, 
were still “earmarked for reparations”.202  These three instances in the Bremen area 
illustrate the general American disregard for the obvious military applications of 
automotive production and the uncertainty of dealing with military armaments 
assembly points. 
The evidence instead suggests that Washington completely discarded the plan to 
restrict dual-use industries in Germany.  Kennan clarified this approach.  The words 
chosen by policymakers to articulate the new policy indicated that full German 
industrial recovery now dominated over any real sense of demilitarization.  Other 
matters counted.  In a speech to the National War College on 6 May 1947, Kennan 
demanded that “the improvement of economic conditions and the revival of productive 
capacity in the west of Germany be made the primary object of our policy”.203  The 
occupation authorities responded by proclaiming the intention of rescuing the entire 
scope of the western German industrial system.204  The demilitarization conceptions, as 
conceived in 1945 in the Level of Industry plans, changed direction and now clearly 







A perception of extreme European economic problems of 1946-1947 prompted 
American policymakers to react.  Washington generally understood that wartime 
destruction limited Stalin’s choices and that the weakened state of the Soviet economy 
prohibited a military adventure.  But the Truman administration realized by early 1947 
that the Potsdam reparations policy itself destabilized the economies and radicalized the 
politics of European states.  The policymakers interpreted Stalin’s inflexibility on the 
reparations issue as evidence that Moscow did not appreciate the Truman 
administration’s interest in stimulating trade with European markets through swift 
economic recovery.  Stalin’s ambitious reparations policy in Germany aimed at creating 
an industrial Soviet powerhouse at the expense of Germany.  Revisionists minimize 
economic factors and seem unable to grasp the plain facts that Soviet interference in 
economic matters threatened to ruin Germany, significantly retard European economic 
recovery and therefore ultimately impact the domestic American economy.  The 
Marshall Plan aimed at containing Stalin’s ambitions in the Ruhr and minimizing Soviet 
interference in German economic recovery.  The Marshall Plan clearly rejected Stalin’s 
postwar policy. 
The attempt by scholars to wash both Truman and Stalin of responsibility for 
the outbreak fails to explain why the Truman administration reacted so strongly to the 
intrinsic immorality of Soviet policy in Germany.  A close examination of the 
demonstrates that the Truman administration clearly understood that the Potsdam 
reparations policy itself threatened to destabilize Europe politically and economically 
and therefore threaten the wellbeing of American society.  The revisionists denigrate 
Washington’s firm commitment to a capitalist western Europe economy.  The reduction 
of the American change of heart to ideological-economic reasons clouds the simple fact 
that the reparations policy in actual fact did threaten to impoverish Germany far beyond 
the mysterious and imprecise levels of industry agreed to at the outset of 1946.  The 
evidence furthermore strongly suggests that severe reductions in German economic 
capacities would ruin the European and later American economies.  The American 
decision to rebuild Germany actually made good economic sense.  Stalin’s hold on 
reparations policy for the purposes of revolutionizing Soviet industry did not.  Viewed 
in this manner, the Truman administration understood Stalin’s firm perspective on 




The extremely varied interpretations of the Cold War schools consistently 
conclude that Washington’s decision to integrate the western German economy in a 
general recovery scheme did not entail a rejection of industrial disarmament.  The 
evidence presented in this chapter clearly illustrates that the Truman administration 
understood the security implications of revisions in German industrial production 
levels.  The State Department attempted to soothe fears of German revival with a four-
power treaty aimed at containing industrial power in Germany and not at destroying it.  
The four victorious powers never again sat down to discuss the demilitarization of 
German industry.  The Council of Foreign Ministers postponed discussions of a 
German peace treaty after the fifth meeting in London in December 1947 and after a 
brief attempt meeting between 23 May and 20 June 1949 it broke up never to meet 
again.  The Truman administration grew tired of the struggle for a unified Germany.205  
The western powers charged ahead with the creation of a separate West German 
State.206  Stalin responded in kind.207  The Cold War was reality.  
CHAPTER 8 
 
Explaining the German Productivity Boom 
 
If you can't convince them, confuse them. 
 




The Marshall Plan aimed primarily at cultivating a stable capitalist economic order 
in western Europe capable of significant trade with the United States.  This American self-
interest redefined the German future.  Issues of economy and efficiency determined that 
various groups in Washington promoted a “soft” peace with Germany that focused less on 
reparations and more on what might be termed a return to normalcy.  The Truman 
administration proposed a comprehensive aid package that required the economic and 
political integration of German industrial resources in European reconstruction efforts.  
German participation offered the services of Europe's “workshop” and opened up trade with 
the largest national population in central and western Europe. 
This postulate, outlined in the previous chapters, contradicts the traditional accounts 
of industrial demilitarization that argue that wartime bombing and postwar dismantling 
reduced the German economic infrastructure to a heap of rubble.  This theory relies on 
emotional accounts of the burned out residential centres and utterly fails to explain the 
importance attributed by American policymakers to the industrial capacities in Germany.  
The theory also implies that Washington constructed a new demilitarized industrial system 
from the wreckage of the old.  The records of O.M.G.U.S., examined more closely in this 
chapter, seriously question this interpretation.  A description of the demilitarization of the 
Alkett Rheinmetall-Borsig plant and others in the Berlin sector illustrates that the orthodox 
perspective cannot explain why strategic bombing and dismantling failed to substantially 
lower productive capacities.  The American handling of the Borsig Berlin plant, an 
armaments factory that provided a significant percentage of the Wehrmacht's weapons 
systems, demonstrates that significant residual industrial strength contributed to the process 
of recovery that returned western Germany to a position of economic leadership on the 
continent.  The same forces that worked towards saving the bulk of German heavy industry 






8.2 The Dismantling of Rheinmetall Borsig-Alkett and Intervention 
This dissertation turns to an examination of the impact of dismantling on German 
tank production capacities in select Berlin “war plants” between 1945 and 1950 to 
demonstrate the strength of the hypothesis developed in previous chapters.  A brief review 
of armour’s importance to the war effort in eastern Europe and the German failure to match 
the productive output of the Soviet Union, an issue raised earlier in the context of German 
military preparedness at the outbreak of war, helps place the Alkett plant in historical 
perspective and demonstrate the importance of the mobile weapons system.  Earlier 
chapters explained how the American military government, supported by their British 
counterparts, chose not to immediately reduce production capacities in critical areas such as 
automotive production, metal fabrication and the chemicals industry in order to permit the 
reconstruction of the German transportation network and rectify shortages in fertilizer.  Did 
Alkett follow a similar pattern?  The O.M.G.B.S. records offer a detailed record of the fate 
of facilities uniquely tied to the German war effort such as the Alkett plant in Berlin.  It 
stands to reason that the survival and conversion of these war plants to civilian production 
would reveal a serious breach in Allied industrial demilitarization policy. 
Armour of course represented a weapons system of primary importance for the war 
effort of all the belligerents and a primary target of the strategic air forces and later 
demilitarization conceptions.  It must be emphasized that the military potential of Alkett 
rested in productive potential and not specifically with output itself.  The German rates of 
fabrication, as mentioned earlier, remained surprisingly low during the 1930s and early 
phases of the war.  German factories only assembled 62 units per month immediately prior 
to September 1939 and the Nazi war machine only mustered 3,000 tanks in 6 or 7 divisions 
during the invasion of Poland and later of France.  Tank output represented only 3.8 percent 
of all armament costs in 1942.1  The U.S.S.B.S. placed German output statistics alongside 
those of the Allies and concluded that “German tank production both in the prewar period 
and in 1939-40 was considerably overestimated by Allied intelligence”.2  Nor did the 
situation dramatically improve.  Even though tank production soared to 1,854 per month at 
the end of 1944, largely as a result of Albert Speer's rationalization efforts, battlefield 
attrition kept frontline strength low.  German producers could not keep pace with the Allies 
who produced 68,000 tanks in 1943 alone.3  German industry seemed incapable of 
competing with their adversaries. 
The Soviet military consistently employed far larger numbers of tanks than Adolf 




German military on 22 June 1941 hurled little more than 3,000 armoured fighting vehicles 
against a Red Army equipped with well over 10,000 tanks.  The situation hardly changed 
after a year of arduous struggle and an astounding series of pulverizing German victories.  
The fighting on the eastern front and the hardships of the 1941 and 1942 campaigns 
reduced the total German stock of tanks in this period to fewer than 1,000.  The three Soviet 
fronts that participated in Operation “Uranus” to recapture Stalingrad in the winter of 1942, 
the operation that came at the lowest ebb of Soviet fortunes during the war, alone mustered 
1,463 tanks.  The Kalinin, Western Fronts and Moscow Defense Zone held an additional 
reserve of 3,375 armoured vehicles in reserve.4  This storm of steel doomed the Wehrmacht 
to defeat.  Soviet tank production continued at relatively high rates after 1945.  The Soviet 
assembly plants continued to produce over 500 tanks per month even after victory and 
assembled the astonishing total of over 40,000 armoured fighting vehicles in 320 divisions 
by 1948.5  “How can such a primitive people”, a flustered and typically racist Hitler 
proclaimed on 29 November 1941 after being informed of Soviet armaments output, 
“manage such technical achievements in such a short time!”6 
Tank manufacturing represented a complicated undertaking from the 1930s 
onwards.7 The armoured fist required far more than high velocity cannon mounted a chassis 
that could move under its own power.  Tank production first of all needed such major 
components as a hull, turret, chassis, motor, transmission, suspension, tracks and cannon.  
15 major German producers such as Alkett-Berlin and Krupp produced the face-hardened 
steel and rifled tubing for the larger components.  The Daimler-Benz A.G. and Maybach 
produced some of the standard motors and Henschel among others built transmissions and 
steering equipment.  But the weapons platform required a wide variety of other elements 
such as electrical systems, fuel tanks, radios, optical and other instruments.  A long list of 
associated firms manufactured these items and transported them to the assembly plants.  
Strewn throughout Germany, with major assembly plants in Berlin, Kassel, Nürnberg, 
Magdeburg and other cities, the tank industry therefore reflected the same lack of 
geographical concentration characteristic of other weapons systems such as fighter and 
bomber aircraft.8 
The morphology of the Alkett-Berlin tank plant demonstrates, like that of other 
German firms, close ties to western firms.  The British firm of Babcock & Wilcox Ltd. 
originally owned 51 percent of the shares of Borsig until Nazi nationalization policies 
forced the merger of Rheinmetall and Borsig into the Rheinmetall-Borsig A.G. in 1936.  




operation in Berlin exclusively devoted to tank and artillery production, followed a year 
later.  The huge state-owned Reichswerke A.G. Hermann Göring, which consisted of 
hundreds of companies strewn throughout Germany and the occupied territories,9 finally 
absorbed Rheinmetall-Borsig in 1941 and replaced the “civilian” board of directors with 
Nazi functionaries.  Rheinmetall-Borsig and therefore the Alkett-Berlin plant represented 
the only major nationalized firm participating in tank production.  The British authorities 
however hoped to return to the pre-Nazi status quo and spared those plants falling under 
their administrative control.  The British military government, as with Volkswagen, even 
permitted the reconstruction of certain Rheinmetall-Borsig facilities such as at Oberhausen-
Düsseldorf and the factory initiated the production of civilian commodities under the new 
managers.10 
Alkett-Berlin represented one of the most productive industrial facilities in Hitler’s 
arsenal during the war.  The plant shed off any pretence of civilian production, 
discontinuing the production of components for tractors and other domestic usages, and 
devoted all energies to the armaments needed by the frontline troops.  The Rheinmetall-
Borsig conglomerate itself produced approximately 20 combat systems for the German 
armed forces including the P.z.K.W. III and IV tanks, M.K. 108 30mm cannon, the M.G. 
42 medium machine gun and the “Rheintochter” surface-to-air missile.  The Alkett-Berlin 
plant in particular played a vital role in assembling armoured fighting vehicles.  
Rheinmetall-Borsig assembled 2,500 tanks or 26.6 percent of total production in 1943.11  
Alkett-Berlin therefore joined the ranks of Daimler-Benz and a host of Krupp factories in 
the Berlin area that produced components or assembled major weapons systems. 
The Alkett-Berlin tank plant, like the other facilities strewn throughout Germany, 
offered tantalizing targets for the strategic bombing forces.  These plants faced roughly 80 
official raids during the war.  The number of direct missions flown against the tank industry 
nevertheless remained curiously low.  Over half of the bomber missions did not take direct 
aim at the facilities.  Bomber Command and the 8th Air Force chose to focus on the terror 
bombing of the general urban population and demoted the tank producers to secondary 
targets.  The B-17s and Lancasters only struck Alkett-Berlin on four occasions and dropped 
a paltry 3,387.4 tons of high explosive and incendiary bombs on the Berlin factory.  Most of 
these bombs missed the factory complex and tore down the houses in the Tegel district 
instead.  The results disappointed the U.S.S.B.S. teams. 
On the whole, the concentrated bombing attack on tank plants was not a success. Of 




production. During the last five months of 1944 the period in which production loss 
can be attributed directly to plant attacks, the total industry had a production loss of 
about one-fifth of potential. Losses in 1945 were far heavier but were due to as much 
indirect causes as to the bombing of the tank plants. This raises the question of whether 
tank plants were so immune to bombing that they did not warrant the expenditure of 
the necessary weight of attack that would have been required to knock out the 
industry.12 
 
Allied bombing tactics proved faulty.  The heavier bombs tore through roofing and 
sent debris plummeting to the factory floor.  The small incendiaries that followed burned 
and set fire to inflammable materials without damaging the equipment.13  The authorities 
could not move much of the heavy equipment needed for armour production and instead 
devised schemes of either protecting the machines from falling debris or simply continuing 
production in factory shells without roofs.  The German management organized repair 
crews and gangs of workers to repair the minimal damage to the machines and clear the 
debris.  During this process, lighter equipment, parts and raw materials were shifted from 
plant to plant until the damage was cleared.  The latter strategy reduced the precision of the 
U.S.S.B.S. studies and general appraisals of the war industries.  While the bombing and 
countermeasures limited the output of the factories, owing to the disruptions and work 
stoppages, the mediocre fall in production did not however indicate a loss of capacities.  
The equipment remained intact.  The investigating teams concluded that “no fixed 
relationship existed between total building damage and damage to machine tools”.  Nor did 
the attacks kill workers.  The bombers only killed an estimated one percent of those 
employed or 464 workmen.14 
Postwar factors played a more important role in terms of Berlin industrial capacities.  
The American Military Government detachment that first entered Berlin on 1 July 1945, a 
group of 300 officers and men commanded by Frank L. Howley, discovered that the Soviet 
military had looted every corner of the city without any regard for a rational program of 
industrial demilitarization or reparations.  The Soviet military did not account for the 
equipment taken or follow any rational concepts that accounted for the survival of a 
functioning residual German economy.  As pointed out in earlier chapters, this discovery 
helped engender a severely negative Soviet image among American military personnel.  
“From an economic point of view”, Howley concluded, “the city had been stripped, 
particularly the western sectors.  Everything movable of real value – from the equipment of 
the American-owned Singer Sewing Machine Company plant to the power equipment of 




estimated that wartime bombing and particularly post-hostilities looting had removed 85 
percent of Berlin's productive facilities. 
The bombing damage and looting should not have troubled Howley or O.M.G.B.S. in 
relation to Alkett-Berlin.  The Economic Directorate of the A.C.C. quickly understood that 
the plant represented a near perfect example of the type of war plants the Allies wished to 
destroy.  None of the concerns that influenced the decision to maintain the nitrogen fixation 
industry originally impacted these heavy industrial manufacturers.  The American 
authorities did not even initially view Borsig as necessary for “essential requirements such 
as mining supplies, transport maintenance and repairs”.  The Economic Directorate in 
November 1945 classified Alkett-Berlin as a “Category I” plant under the number 2045 and 
it faced complete elimination.16  The firm’s devotion to armaments production justified the 
decision.  The A.C.C. furthermore ordered the military governments to shut down the other 
operations of the Rheinmetall-Borsig conglomerate and place the factories under the control 
of the Allies and their trustees. 
Alkett-Berlin, to the distaste of Whitehall, was located in northern Berlin and fell 
under French military control.  The French authorities moved into the grounds of the 
factory and immediately coordinated dismantling efforts on a unilateral basis without 
waiting for A.C.C. valuation.  Lucius D. Clay’s reparations stoppage in May 1946 put a 
damper on French efforts by interrupting the work of the Economic Directorate and a final 
decision concerning the overall value of the facilities.  Crates loaded with equipment sat 
idle awaiting the resolution of the overall reparations issue for transportation to France and 
other I.A.R.A. states.  Paris decided to change direction and on 10 November 1946 
encouraged the company’s repair teams to unpack the crates and rebuild and enhance the 
assembly lines for the production of civilian goods.  The French custodians even provided 
the company with financial loans as permitted by a generous implementation of A.C.C. 
Law No. 5.  The law handed the military governments the power “to operate, control and 
otherwise exercise complete dominance over all such property, including where this 
essential to the preservation of the value represented by the property”.17 
In the spring of 1947, during the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in Moscow, 
the French military again shifted directions and ordered the German workers to desist in 
recovery efforts and prepare to liquidate the whole company in accordance with original 
A.C.C. wishes.18  The German management protested immediately.  They threw 
themselves on the mercy of O.M.G.B.S. and pointed out that the Soviet military already 




represented repaired equipment necessary for civilian purposes. 19  The Americans in Berlin 
strongly supported the German case.  Howley like Clay questioned the wisdom of Allied 
and A.C.C. policy in Germany.  The military commander reported to Clay that Berlin and 
eastern Germany needed Alkett-Berlin’s heavy industrial equipment to repair or produce 
commodities for “public utilities, coal mines, the food industry, slaughter houses, cooling 
houses, public health, sewage, the water supply [and] gas supply”.  Howley not only 
stressed the potential of the war plant for civilian production.  He pointed out that the 
company’s “entire capacity does not meet the present demand”.20  Another report dated 2 
July 1947 emphasized the importance of Alkett-Berlin for the overall German economy and 
specified that dismantling would “have a serious effect on the industrial recovery and on the 
maintenance of Public Utilities.  It is recommended that removal of the plant be strongly 
opposed”.21  Howley introduced another strong argument against the Level of Industry 
conceptions.  Simply permitting the short-term operation of banned facilities to help repair 
the transportation grid or produce fertilizer did not deal with long-term future 
considerations such as the continued flow of spare parts or general repairs. 
Howley’s support of continued operations at the Alkett-Berlin plant places a degree 
of doubt on his original observation that the Soviet’s had looted the city in toto.  
O.M.G.B.S., similar to the military government detachments in western Germany, could 
not even determine the pre-surrender composition of facilities owing to dispersal strategies, 
bombing and looting.  The German authorities themselves, as pointed out, could not move 
the heaviest equipment during the war.  It is questionable whether the Red Army organized 
the effective transfer of this material in the weeks following German defeat and the entry of 
the other Allies into Berlin.  The precise statistics concerning Soviet seizures at the plant 
therefore fluctuated wildly.  Howley reported to O.M.G.U.S. in March 1947 that only 482 
machine-tools survived the war from a prewar stock of approximately 2,000.22  The 
Economics Branch estimated in October 1947 that 600 machine-tools from an original total 
of 5,765 remained.  The final agreed number speaks volumes.  The A.C.C. listed 1,749 
pieces of general purpose equipment—this total included typewriters, radios and other 
marginally military machinery—of which 1,661 were granted as I.A.R.A. reparations.  88 
tools with a residual value of 379,132 R.M. would officially remain.  A warning by the 
Economic Directorate underscored the dual-use potential of the expensive residue.  The 
directorate demanded that the decision to retain Alkett-Berlin “not serve as a precedent in 




more than the full complements of other war plants or dual-use facilities valued by the 
Allies.23 
The Allies, despite the agreement reached by the Economic Directorate, failed to 
resolve the matter.  Placed on bureaucratic hold, owing to the need for further clarification 
at higher channels, the future of Alkett-Berlin went unresolved until the French authorities 
once again decided to solve the issue and act unilaterally.  German workers hired by the 
occupation government began loading the crates of “scrap metal” from Alkett-Berlin onto 
railway cars at the end of 1949.  The French authorities had originally negotiated an 
agreement with the Belgian government whereby 100,000 tons of scrap metal was 
purchased for 1.5 million Belgian Franks.  Against the wishes of both the Americans and 
British in Berlin, the French military organized the transport of approximately 40,000 tons 
of semi-finished goods and scrap from the Alkett-Berlin plant to Belgium between the 
middle of 1947 and 1949. 
O.M.G.U.S., informed of the operation by the German trustees, decided to push hard 
for the retention of the equipment.  American military officials protested that full realization 
of the Belgian order would completely strip the plant of all equipment and therefore 
represented a ruse to circumvent A.C.C. instructions.24  The matter went once again before 
the Economic Directorate.  Standing shoulder to shoulder on the issue, the British 
authorities informed their American counterparts that any attempt at revealing the truth of 
the French operation using German sources would fall on deaf ears.  These letters of protest 
represented a general “appeal against reparations”.25  The Anglo-American faction needed 
a different approach.  The new strategy emerged at the second meeting of the new 
Economics Committee called to discuss the future of Alkett-Berlin on 11 January 1950.  
The American representatives once again stressed the need to retain the heavy equipment of 
the war plant for the benefit of the German civilian economy.  Colonel Yvon, the French 
representative tried to counter the approach.  He pointed out that, while he understood the 
German pressure to restart the foundry and begin production, the machinery collected by 
his countrymen consisted of ruined lathes, semi-finished cannon barrels, stolen French 
equipment and general scrap.  The British sided with the American position and delicately 
attacked the French defence by emphasizing the contradictory nature of Yvon’s argument.  
The British representative interjected that the scrap junk steel contained a high percentage 
of carbon and was of “no value in industry” and should not be moved.26  The opposition 




A host of examples in the western sectors of Berlin demonstrate that Alkett-Berlin did 
not represent a solitary example.  American inspection teams quickly found fault with the 
superficial early observations of Howley and his men.  A series of more detailed reports 
issued by O.M.G.B.S. indicated that considerable material remained and that production 
continued in areas ranging from car parts to machine-tools.  The shops and factories 
remained crammed with semi-finished military equipment such as tubes for cannon and 
shells and more importantly heavy industrial equipment.  The American strategy of playing 
up reparations seizures by the Red Army and thereby circumvent the entire elimination of 
“Category I” plants paid off elsewhere.  Technicians retrieved “battlefield material” and 
used “war surplus” to repair or manufacture new machines from such banned commodities 
as armour plating.  These activities “brought Berlin's industrial capacity back towards 
normalcy” and O.M.G.B.S. later indicated that a “large, though indeterminate, amount of 
productive equipment has been re-established in the U.S. Sector”.27 
Other firms in the automotive, chemicals and general manufacturing sectors benefited 
from the moderate American policies in the Berlin sector.  The Daimler-Benz A.G. (Berlin-
Marienfelde) received special attention.  The factory had produced half-tracks, tanks, 
aircraft engines and operated a major repair center during the war.  O.M.G.B.S. continued 
the production of car parts, diesel engines and operated the repair facilities in the postwar.  
A total of 32 Berlin firms participated in reviving automotive production facilities in the 
city.  These firms, while not assembling vehicles in large number, more importantly 
produced and exported engines and parts such as “carburettors…component chassis parts, 
gas generators and brakes” to the western zones.28 
The Pintsch Öl G.m.b.H., taken over by American military authorities in the summer 
of 1945, experienced difficulties in finding customers until O.M.G.B.S. arranged an 
agreement with the Red Army whereby the company supplied the Soviet military with 
refined automobile and aircraft motor oil.  The company, having assisted the development 
of German rocket propulsion systems, therefore secured its future under American 
guidance.  The company issued the Soviet Union with 2,514.1 litres of oil between July 
1947 and June 1948.  “At the beginning of 1946”, the company recorded in a letter to 
O.M.G.B.S., “we succeeded in coming to an agreement which was very favourable to 
us…After initial difficulties with the operation of the plant caused by the war, we were able 
to fulfil not only our quota [for the Americans] but also to create working capacity for 
additional orders”.  These orders helped the company absorb other competitors and 




The American military authorities, such as was the case throughout western 
Germany, encouraged the employment of the raw materials and equipment for the 
production of critical commodities such as trucks.  This policy included the protection of 
machinery necessary for the dual-use chemical compounds and tools that maintained the 
basis of an explosives industry.  On 16 February 1949 the Zehlendorfer Chemie G.m.b.H. 
asked for permission to restart the production of sulphuric acid, sulphate of ammonia and 
nitric acid through nitrogen fixation in Tegel in the American sector.  The longstanding 
policy of maintaining German fixed nitrogen capacities now reduced the Level of Industry 
concepts to meaninglessness.  The firm specified that their plants could already produce the 
commodities and that “production is principally dependent on raw materials available in 
Berlin”.30  Owen S. Curran, the Chief of the Commerce & Industry Branch in Berlin 
underlined this conclusion.  He informed O.M.G.U.S. that the firm satisfied the city's need 
for critical industrial chemicals for the manufacturing of nitrate fertilizers.31  O.M.G.U.S. 
even specified that West German industry could supply the Berlin company with additional 
equipment to expand production.32  Not only did the Zehlendorfer plant retain the 
equipment necessary to produce banned substances, but other German firms could supply 
additional equipment for purposes of expansion. 
 Like a large number of other German companies formerly heavily involved in 
armaments production, Rheinmetall-Borsig emerged from the war tremendously shaken but 
far less transformed than the historiography suggests.  Other military industrial assets of a 
less physical nature also survived.  This dissertation has not explored the fate of German 
technology and intellectual assets in great detail.  It does however stand to reason that the 
demilitarization of universities and research organizations alone, a concept more difficult to 
define than military industrial demilitarization, achieved relatively little.  Scientists adapted 
the technologies developed for war for civilian purposes or they simply re-emerged in later 
decades to form the basis of a new generation of weapons.  Companies such as Bosch 
G.m.b.H. for example employed wartime technological developments for the civilian 
market and developed fuel-injection pumps from those used in the aircraft industry.33  
Other companies found adaptation more difficult.  Rheinmetall-Borsig initially flirted with 
a similar path and produced typewriters, shock absorbers and “more direct conversion 
products related to the military expertise like bolt fixing devices operating with calibrated 
ammunition used in the construction industry at the time”.34  But the firm quickly returned 
to military production in the 1950s and 1960s and quickly overtook foreign competitors in 




producers.35  Technical skill combined with dual-use productive capacities to fuel renewed 
armaments production.  A modern analysis of European armaments manufacturers 
described the return of the “merchants of death”: 
The know-how and designs of the sophisticated production in 1944/45 were still at 
hand…Some of the products were apparently unrivalled in quality at the time and were 
accordingly already exported in the early sixties to other European countries where 
they replaced American and British supplies among others.36 
 
8.3 The Joint Logistics Committee and Dual-Use Calculations 
The traditional accounts of the postwar German economy and especially the 
armaments producers assert that industrial production sputtered and the factories closed 
shop after May 1945.37  The lack of direct armaments production—as measured by tanks, 
guns or fighters—between 1945 and 1952 further feeds the assumption that military 
capacities disappeared.  “The history of Germany's postwar rearmament”, J.J. Carafano 
writes, “is common knowledge”.38  The “disappearance” of the weapons producers 
rationalizes the viewpoint that wartime destruction and successful dismantling industrially 
demilitarized Germany.  The accounts of subsequent remilitarization in the late 1940s and 
early 1950s focus on the structure and form of a defensive western German military 
contribution.39  Historians even focus on largely secondary issues to underline German 
pacification.  Wolfgang Krieger for example emphasizes that the Ruhr Region, one of the 
“five regions in the world where the sinews of modern military strength could be produced 
in quantity”, was denazified in 1946.40  This important form of psychological 
demilitarization does not however tell us much of what happened to the war plants and 
particularly the machine-tools that produced the weapons of war.41 
The work of the Joint Logistics Committee (J.L.C.) and the National Security 
Resource Board (N.S.R.B.), in conjunction with statistics gathered from other sources, does 
however offer a solid contemporary American appraisal of German military and civilian 
industrial capacities between 1947 and 1950.42  The J.L.C. and N.S.R.B. examined global 
economic issues in significant detail and covered every conceivable element of dual-use 
industry from sewing machines to lamps and a long list of critical commodities including 
aluminium, antimony, apparel wool, asbestos, coal, cobalt, copper, lead, nickel, salt, soda 
ash, steel and synthetic fibres.  The work of these military organizations was predicated on 
the firm belief that civilian industrial resources represented the starting point of military 
procurement.  The studies revealed a great deal of information concerning the relatively 




industry in the overall reconstruction efforts.  The data collected furthermore emphasized 
the intact nature of German heavy industry and the geostrategic importance of these 
facilities in any calculations of European military strength.43 
Coal-mining as pointed out represented a critical factor influencing every 
dimension of German industry.  Small increases in coal allocation after 1945 resulted in an 
immediate upsurge in overall productive output.  The power stations that fed the factories 
with electricity burned coal.  Coal itself represented a major component of the chemicals 
industry required to derive synthetic fuels to fill the tanks of trucks and create the fixed 
nitrogen to manufacture fertilizers needed by the farmers.  Industrial output in the Anglo-
American zones returned to 31 percent of 1936 levels in the first quarter of 1946 owing 
predominantly to the improvements in coal allocation.44 
The paralysis of the transportation grid by the strategic bombers during the war 
explains the slowness in returning to higher productivity after 1945.  The tonnage of coal 
mined mattered little if German locomotives, barges and trucks could not move the 
commodity to the factories.  The occupation authorities could only transport approximately 
60 percent of the coal hauled from the mines in the Ruhr during the early days of the 
occupation.45  The transportation system therefore demanded significant repairs, new 
vehicles and particularly fuel.  But these three prerequisites in turn depended on coal.  
Furthermore, since even agricultural produce required coal for fertilizers and therefore 
sufficient crop yields, the problems relating to the movement of the fossil fuel lowered the 
caloric intake of the workers and miners and in turn lowered general productivity.  Werner 
Abelshauser points out that the strides in coal-mining after the resolution of the 
transportation problems in 1947 stabilized agricultural output in western Germany which 
led to general increases across the entire spectrum of industry.46  Monthly German coal 
extraction increased from 219,000 tons to 270, 000 in June 1948—the same mines yielded 
384,000 tons per month in 193647—after the American and British authorities significantly 
increased the number of miners and provided sufficient food.48 
The original Level of Industry plan placed minor caps on coal-mining and argued 
for the maximization of coal output “as far as mining supplies and transport will allow”.  
The A.C.C. initially established 155 million tons per annum as the minimum requirement.49  
The levels reached between 1945 and the end of the decade attests to Anglo-American 
resolve.  German miners were expected to haul 149.3 million tons from the Ruhr or nearly 
30 percent of the European total in 1947.  Western German companies exceeded these 




German mine output, hardly surprising owing to the extensive Soviet seizure of equipment 
and a far less resolute transportation grid reconstruction policy, stagnated.51  The western 
Allied devotion to the mining system, by taking the demand for machine-tools and 
transportation into account, resulted in the success of this policy. 
The desire to severely restrict dual-use capacities in Germany had led the A.C.C. to 
adopt a policy aiming at significant reductions in chemicals output.  The list of targets had 
included calcium carbide, chlorine, fixed nitrogen, sulphuric acid, synthetic ammonia and 
soda ash.  The A.C.C. had originally stipulated that German companies would retain 
expanded production of these critical commodities to offset immediate deficiencies in the 
postwar, but they had aimed at a general reduction of capacities to 40 percent of prewar 
levels by 1949.52 
Soda ash represented a special case.  Soda ash or anhydrous sodium carbonate 
production, which the American Chemical Division National Production Authority 
considered a primary industrial indicator, continued unabated and unhindered by defeat.  
“Soda ash is so important to the industrial economy”, the “Survey on Soda Ash” of 1950 
declared, “that its industrial potential can be measured by the quantity consumed and by the 
uses which are made of it”.53  Although soda ash represented “one of the oldest 
commodities known in commercial trade” and industry employed the substance for soap 
and glass, technical developments based on the application of ammonia revolutionized the 
chemicals industry.54  Industry employed the white powder as a cleansing agent for the 
manufacturing of chemicals, paper, textiles, and petroleum and even used the compound for 
the softening of water.55  The chemicals and metallurgical industries employed soda ash for 
a large number of purposes including the processing of nitrates for the creation of 
explosives and for the extraction of aluminium, chromium, radium, uranium and 
vanadium.56 
German industry traditionally derived soda ash from the ammonia-soda process 
which employed ammonia gas to extract ammonium hydroxide from salt brine.  German 
soda ash production ranked second in the world in 1929.  The country produced 1.1 million 
short tons that year.  The economic depression that afflicted all aspects of the global 
economy nearly halved production in 1932 and the rearmament drive of later years only 
revived volume to between 0.9 and 1.4 million short tons roughly equally distributed 
between east and west.57  Chemical plants in southern Germany returned to producing soda 
ash and other dual-use compounds such as calcium cyanamid by October 1945.58  




soda ash in 1950 and therefore nearly the equivalent of rearmament and wartime levels.59  
Again, the western zones outpaced eastern Germany by a remarkable degree.  Whereas 
production in the western zones zoomed from 450,450 short tons in 1936 to 827,000 in 
1950, eastern German levels shrank to approximately 100,000.60  The survey team pointed 
out that Soviet dismantling in eastern Germany, which included the Bernburg plant with an 
annual capacity of 420,000 tons, deprived the region of Europe’s largest facility.  Eastern 
German capacities could not meet the needs of the zone much less assist the rest of the 
country or Europe.61  The Soviet occupation authorities eventually altered their policies and 
announced on 16 October 1950, as part of the East German Five Year Plan, that two new 
plants would “make up for production lost through dismantling”.62 
 
Table 6: Estimated Production of Soda Ash (Select List)63 
Country 1939 (short tons) 1950 (short tons) 
France 781,000 700,000 
Germany (all zones) 1,375,000 927,000 
U.S.S.R n.a. 800,000 
United Kingdom 1,650,000 2,500,000 
United States 3,300,000 n.a. 
World Total n.a. 7,035 
 
The statistics concerning soda ash demonstrate that widespread chemical industry 
dismantling and plant closures in the western regions did not take place.  The numbers 
listed here themselves indicate that O.M.G.U.S. and the other western military governments 
did not apply the Level of Industry agreement to the soda ash sector.  The development and 
application of new techniques during the war based on desulphurizing pig iron actually 
modernized the industry and contributed to the sharp western increases.  The large number 
of German plants, such as the Deutsche Solvaywerke in Rheinberg or the I.G. 
Farbenindustrie in Oppau, continued to increase production throughout the occupation.64  
As demonstrated in previous chapters, this development held true for other “banned” or 
“controlled” commodities such as fixed nitrogen and sulphuric acid. 
The Anglo-American preoccupation with securing natural resources for the German 
economy clearly violated the spirit of industrial demilitarization.  Cobalt and antimony 
consumption, for example, continued in Germany irregardless of the fact that steel 
manufacturers could theoretically employ these items for military grade steel alloys.  The 
same materials needed for the construction of face hardened armour plating found during 
the war on such armoured fighting vehicles as “Tigers” and “Panthers” had useful civilian 




refine cobalt after May 1945.  Of the principle refineries, only the Norddeutsche Raffinerie 
in Hamburg ceased production during the occupation.  The Letmathe refinery in 
Westphalia, the Gebr. Borchers A.G. in Goslar, the Duisburger Kupferhütte in Duisburg all 
continued to process cobalt oxides from ores supplied by Burma, Canada and Finland.65 
 
Table 7: 1948 World Consumption of Primary Antimony (Select List)66 




% of World 
Production 
United States 6,000 15,500 34.1 
United Kingdom -- 5,700 12.5 
Germany -- 3,300 7.3 
France n.a. 2,000 4.4 
World Total 45,500 45,500 100.0 
n.a.: data not available 
   
Antimony use furthermore hardly abated.  Western Germany represented the 
world’s third largest consumer of antimony in 1948 and utilized 7.3 percent of global 
resources.  The lack of access to global antimony mines during the war had actually forced 
German industry to rely on second-rate European producers such as Yugoslavia, 
Czechoslovakia, Serbia and Belgium to the detriment of armaments quality.  Traditional 
import patterns rematerialized after 1945.  The American focus worked wonders.  The 
Metallgesellschaft A.G. in Frankfurt, who operated the largest German antimony refining 
operation after 1945, developed operations under American sponsorship so smoothly that 
the company paid the shareholders a handsome dividend in 1949.67  The examples of cobalt 
and antimony hardly demonstrate a deterioration or significant reduction in critical resource 
allocation for German industry. 
The German synthetic industries also paradoxically flourished during the 
occupation.  Germany, despite the A.C.C. Level of Industry demand that total production 
be restricted to 185,000 tons for all types,68 led Europe in the production of rayon and other 
synthetic fibres by 1949.  The United States in particular lent a helping hand.  Even though 
I.G. Farben scientists developed nylon 6 in 1938, shortly after its discovery by DuPont, 
Bayer constructed the first German commercial plant for the commodity in the late 1940s 
under American guidance but using domestic resources.  Synthetic fibre production in this 
case was based on chemical derivatives from caustic soda, soda ash, and ammonia that by 
themselves represented the critical components of explosives, fuels, plastics, synthetic 
rubber and “other products for military or essential industrial purposes”.69  The Americans 




expense of other states.  The availability of what amounted to restricted dual-use base 
commodities pushed this process forward. 
 
Table 8: 1949 World Rayon Production by Areas and Leading Countries 70 
Area and Country Millions of Pounds % of Area Total % World Total 
North America 1,060.8 100.0 39.2 
United States 993.8 93.7 36.8 
Europe 1,454.3 100.0 53.8 
Germany 375.0 25.8 13.9 
United Kingdom 280.2 19.3 10.4 
France 159.1 10.9 5.9 
World Total 2,704.6 -- 100.0 
 
Steel capacities also remained high during the immediate postwar period.  Raw 
materials shortages and not an absence of machinery kept actual output low.  Shortages of 
coal and electricity forced the Americans and British to concentrate production in larger 
facilities and smaller firms shut down operations.  O.M.G.U.S. for example temporarily 
closed seven critical smelting installations in June 1947 owing to a lack of energy.71  The 
Economic Working Group speculated in July 1947 that basic steel requirements far 
surpassed 15 million tons per year.  The Level of Industry provision of 7.5 million tons, 
according to the group, unrealistically restricted German and European reconstruction 
efforts.72  Since the capacities still existed, the group speculated that Ruhr steel 
manufacturing alone maintained a capacity of 14.2 million tons or half of wartime 
production for all of Germany—a figure that incorporated regions lost to the Soviet Union, 
Poland and even France.73  The high increases in output in the late 1940s demonstrate that 
the American and British military governments husbanded these capacities instead of 
dismantling or destroying them.  Steel production alone rose from 204,000 tons in June 
1947 to 343,000 tons in March 1948.74  West Germany returned to the prewar output levels 
of nearly 20 million tons in the early 1950s.75 
The A.C.C. had originally planned a significant reduction in German machine-tool 
capabilities—11.4 percent of 1938 machine-tool, 31 percent of 1938 heavy engineering, 
and 50 percent of other mechanical capacities.  These figures translated roughly into 38.1 
percent of 1938 capacity.76  These priorities evaporated owing to the focus on coal-mining.  
The Economic Working Group on Economic Aid estimated at the beginning of 1947 that 
the maintenance and development of coal mines for Germany, Poland and the United 
States, the three most important coal exporters for the European market in the immediate 




deemed the “largest supplier of such equipment”, should provide Poland and other coal-
mining states with the heavy machinery they needed.77  The State-War-Navy Coordinating 
Committee even argued that “only” Germany and the United States could export 
“substantial quantities of mining equipment”.78  The Polish coal-mining industry, expanded 
through the acquisition of Silesia, required capital goods imports from Germany in 
accordance with prewar patterns.79  In reflecting on the large Polish industrial appetite for 
German manufactured goods, in addition to the equally voracious hunger of nearly all other 
European states, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee demanded that the European 
economy free up raw materials for the breadth of German industry.80  This committee 
entertained a new vision of industry in the central European state.  “When present plans are 
completed”, the committee speculated, “production capacity in Germany will be greater 
than [during the] prewar”.81  The utilization of domestic capacities and certainly not the 
rebuilding of a destroyed system characterized their vision. 
Nowhere did the American policy of protection, allocation and expansion manifest 
itself more clearly than in automobile manufacturing—the core of the mid-20th Century 
military industrial muscle.  The American support of the German automobile sector ended 
with results that shook the foundations of the Level of Industry conceptions.  The A.C.C. 
initially placed severe restrictions on this branch of industry and limited production to 
40,000 passenger cars, 40,000 trucks and 4,000 light trucks.82  Recovery however moved so 
swiftly that West Germany returned to 1937 levels of production by 1949.83  West German 
motor vehicle production for example jumped from 304,000 in 1939 at the height of 
rearmament to 451,000 by 1950.84  It is necessary to emphasize that the soaring output of 
automobile and truck production in the western zones represented precisely the form of 
latent military industrial or dual-use capacities that the Allied policymakers originally 
sought to eliminate.  The fact that western German automotive capacities, as reflected by a 
simple comparison of output between 1939 and 1949, demonstrates that the West German 
potential to manufacture armour was in fact theoretically much higher after the dismantling 
programs than during Hitler’s rearmament phase. 
8.4 The Demilitarization-Marshall Plan Contradiction 
A general postwar view of utter destruction, as emphasized in earlier chapters, 
characterized postwar views of the German economy.  A Fabian Society research paper 
even prophesied in 1945 normal reconstruction methods would not rebuild industry in the 
defeated country.  “So much of Germany's industrial capacity has been shattered”, the paper 




would take a long time and would call, if it were to be done at all quickly, for large imports 
of capital goods at the outset in order to get the re-equipment going”.85  Clay like so many 
believed that the damage was far “greater” than he had anticipated.86  Popular opinion in the 
United States and particularly Germany, largely derived from these rudimentary 
observations at ground level, generally held that the factories and industrial equipment 
vanished in the fires of war.  “No tears, no fury, no melancholy, nothing”, a German scholar 
later remembered, “I perceived the debris of my home town like I had the debris of Warsaw 
or Dünaburgs, Königsbergs or of Smolensk.  That is, the ruined sceneries of a stage for 
which there was no more play.  Europe, onto which I clung with all the fibres of my being, 
was dead.  I had seen it die.  I lacked the imagination to believe in resurrection”.87 
Certain contemporary observers, particularly those assigned with industrial 
demilitarization, later employed this perspective to substantiate the efforts aimed at 
transforming the German industrial landscape.  Initial J.C.S. analyses of economic potential 
pointed out that the meagre industrial output indicated that only a small fraction of German 
industry remained in operation after 1945.88  Traditional accounts of the German economy 
after 1945 emphasize that industrial output fell to 29 percent of the prewar level by 
February 1946.89  This dissertation has demonstrated that a host of factions in Washington 
agreed with the general assertion of the Fabian Society that “the destruction of German 
industry would do nobody any good, and would react disastrously on the more backward 
European countries, including some which have been our allies”.90  But these lower levels 
of production do not necessarily substantiate the claim that the execution of policy 
diminished civilian capacities by destroying the means of production.  These early statistics, 
as pointed out, offer a better insight into the organizational and allocation problems facing 
industrialists and the occupation authorities.  The successful industrial demilitarization 
postulate, if true, would have significantly reduced German dual-use capacities and 
therefore recuperative powers.  The records of the J..L.C in any case seriously erode the 
traditional perspective. 
Actually attributing a value or percentage to the industrial demilitarization 
enterprise is exceedingly difficult.  The reports and analyses handed down to historians by 
the A.C.C. and O.M.G.U.S. do not enable a precise determination of the value and extent of 
industrial dismantling in western Germany.  Discrepancies surface that relate to the murky 
world of intellectual assets such as patents, and the value of items of limited significance in 
assessing hard production capacities such as typewriters, telephones or even semi-finished 




furniture, spare parts, replacement equipment and not merely machine-tools.  Hans W. 
Gatzke suggests that it is “difficult to determine any reliable figure” and that “estimates 
range in the vicinity of a billion dollars, at least”.91  The standard interpretation places an 
overall figure of about 900 million R.M. or $250 million for “real” industrial equipment 
seized from the western zones between 1945 and 1950.92  This value theoretically 
represents all of the gains made by the western German economy between 1939 and 
1944.93 
These statistics, irregardless of the work of dismantling and the postwar intentions 
of policymakers, do not offer insight into the western German capacity to produce military 
hardware.  This dissertation has already seriously questioned the definitions provided by the 
A.C.C. and O.M.G.U.S. and surmised that even the completion of the immediate postwar 
programs did not necessarily fulfill the overall desire for an industrially demilitarized state.  
The evidence offered by the J.L.C. however does not even attest to the completion of the 
Level of industry plans or industrial demilitarization as conceived by politicians and 
specialists in 1945.  The monetary figure attached to the dismantling effort therefore 
provides little insight in determining overall reductions in capacity or the success of the 
industrial demilitarization enterprise.  The establishment of dollar or monetary values, 
generally used by the valuation teams for reparations purposes, cannot help determine 
overall real reductions in capacity.  The determination of these values requires accurate 
prewar, wartime and postwar data concerning for example the quantity, type and age of 
machine-tools used throughout Germany.  The work of the J.L.C. actually demonstrates a 
significant inconsistency in the standard value of 900 million R.M. if historians take the 
substantial gains in the chemicals or automotive industries into account. 
But the official statistics of the period nevertheless fed the suppositions in line with 
Fabian thinking.  Data provided by the I.A.R.A. and official West German estimates 
conflict regarding the percentage or amount of industry seized by the Allies and what 
remained in Germany.  They both however clearly demonstrate a significant drop in 
capacities.  The I.A.R.A determined that the dismantling teams removed 3.1 percent of 
1938 industrial capacities.  Subsequent West German government estimates placed the 
figure at 5.3 percent of 1945 values.94  The I.A.R.A. statistic implied that the Allied 
dismantling teams removed nearly all of the advances in increasing capacities made during 
the war years and they underlined the success of the occupation forces in translating at least 
a measure of the Level of Industry agreements.  The West German studies placed more 




that the strategic bombers already accomplished a large percentage of industrial 
demilitarization.  Both these traditional accounts suggest that the events of the war and 
postwar destroyed approximately 15-20 percent of overall industrial capacities.  This figure 
approximates the expansion of German industry after 1936.  Strategic bombing and 
dismantling by implication returned the defeated nation to the industrial level of 1936 in the 
Soviet zone and 1939 in the western regions.95 
 
Table 9: Gross Industrial Fixed Assets in the Western Zones 
1936-4896 
(1936 = 100) Percent 
Gross investments (in real terms), 1936-1945  
as a percentage of gross assets, 1936 + 75.3 
Depreciation (in real terms), 1936-1945  
as a percentage of gross assets, 1936 - 37.2 
Capacity losses as a result of war damage  
as a percentage of gross assets, 1936 - 17.4 
Gross industrial assets, 1945 120.6 
Gross investments (in real terms), 1946-1948  
as a percentage of gross assets, 1936 + 8.7 
Depreciation (in real terms), 1946-1948  
as a percentage of gross assets, 1936 - 11.5 
Restitution (in real terms), 1945-1948  
(percent of 1936) - 2.4 
Dismantling losses (in real terms), 1945-48 
(percent of 1936) - 4.4 
Gross industrial fixed assets, 1948 111.1 
 
These statistics require scrutiny since the numbers again reveal nothing in terms of 
the nature, composition and age of industrial equipment and facilities.  The 900 R.M. value, 
does not, for example, prove significant reductions in the automobile, chemicals or metal 
fabricating sectors.  The examples cited by the J.L.C. illustrate that the impact of 
dismantling on German military industrial potential, defined by the liquidation or extensive 
downsizing of dual-use sectors, is overstated.97  Fixed nitrogen output in particular, as 
described in earlier chapters, hardly declined.  Even scientific research in banned areas 
continued.  The scientists and technicians that filled the laboratories of the Kaiser Wilhelm 
Institut für Kohlenforschung in Mulheim were busy improving synthetic technologies while 
Clay, O.M.G.U.S. and Washington fought the political battles to secure their future.98  A 
detailed examination of select industrial branches and not merely a restatement of A.C.C. 





The production levels reached by the end of the 1940s stemmed from these 
capacities.  Certain modern studies in fact motivate historians to revise the older 
interpretation that the construction of new means of production inspired the “economic 
miracle”.99  Since highly accurate macroeconomic data covering this period does not exist, 
economic historians employ a series of alternative techniques to determine overall 
capacities for the postwar period and attempt to explain what they mean.100  The work of 
these scholars since the 1970s first of all generally relegates the “Stunde Null” 
interpretation to myth.  Abelshauser's work in particular demonstrates that the survival of 
the bulk of German capital equipment permitted the political changes after 1947 to bear 
fruit in terms of economic reconstruction.  Abelshauser’s evaluations of western German 
fixed capital assets or productive potential strengthens the hypothesis that strategic 
bombing, military ground operations, postwar dismantling, and plunder did not reduce 
aggregate capacities.  The extent of investment made during the war far outweighed these 
reductions.  This evidence only reaffirms that the bulk of the industrial facilities and capital 
equipment, as measured against the prewar, survived and that the postwar valuation teams, 
either the U.S.S.B.S. or military detachments, found great difficulty in establishing an 
accurate basis of measurement.101 
Both statistics offered by the I.A.R.A. and West German government concerning 
the value of dismantling seizures conflict in spirit with the work of the economic historians.  
These scholars hypothesize that German industrial capacities were much higher in 1945 
than admitted by contemporary authorities.  The historical record demonstrates that the 
value of industrial facilities increased from 51 to 62 billion R.M. between 1936 and 1945 
and more importantly that aggregate industrial capacity grew by 11 percent between 1936 
and 1948.102  The approximate value of 1 or even 2 or more billion R.M. in western 
German reparations transfers, according to these standards, did not materially reduce 
capacities even if the seizures focused primarily on dual-use sectors of more obvious 
military potential such as aircraft manufacturing. 
The historians do not employ the post-1945 fall in production output to substantiate 
the fulfillment of the Level of Industry agreement.  Scholars have uncovered a long list of 
associated factors and do not stress either wartime damage or dismantling as solitary 
explanations of reduced industrial output after 1945.  The shortage of raw materials, 
insufficient numbers of workers and low food stocks impacted production.  The desperate 
production of tanks and planes during the final days of Hitler’s Reich consumed much of 




of civilian commodities.  The serious disruption of the transportation network restricted the 
movement of workers and the raw materials to those factories that remained in operation 
after 1945.  Too many German men sat idle in prisoner of war camps and deprived the 
factories of labour.  The millions of former slave labourers, on whom German industry 
increasingly depended during the war, lay down their tools and assembled at collection 
points awaiting repatriation.  Millions of other refugees and expellees wandered through 
Germany and generally added to the image of misery.  Food shortages demoralized the 
population and further reduced the effectiveness and will of those who remained in the 
mines and working the steel mills.103 All of these factors helped lower industrial 
productivity to one-third of prewar levels.  This sharp reduction however only explains the 
economic paralysis that befell Germany after 1945.  The statistics do not imply that 
strategic bombing or dismantling removed the machine-tools and industrial equipment 
needed for production. 
Low postwar industrial output or even a reparations value of one or more billion 
R.M. furthermore does not quantitatively prove that hard productive capacities were 
significantly reduced.  The downturn in production during the early 1930s Depression, for 
example, reflected the impact of market forces and not the elimination of capabilities.  
Hitler’s rearmament drive released German companies from the grip of the global 
economic downturn and production increased.  Western German production also increased 
dramatically after 1947.  The traditional perspective cannot explain this surge unless it is 
admitted that the Marshall Plan (or the aid precursors) injected large amounts of capital 
equipment into western Germany while the A.C.C. proceeded with dismantling.  The 
policies of the Treasury Department, F.E.A. and A.C.C. aimed at restricting the dual-use 
production that included the German ability to repair the machine-tool industries.  A 
successful dismantling program by definition aimed at a significant change in the nature of 
German production.  But Germany rebounded within a decade to take second place to the 
United States as the world’s second largest exporter of manufactured goods.104  Historians 
cannot bridge the gulf between misery and success without demonstrating that the United 
States revolutionized the nature of postwar German industry. 
An overview of British dismantling activities in the Ruhr industrial heartland 
reinforces the Anglo-American commitment to reconstruction.  As previously 
demonstrated, the British military like their American counterparts objected to the 
unofficial seizure of industrial equipment that threatened economic recovery.  The British 




considerable analysis and that seizures prior to the accumulation of accurate data conflicted 
with other priorities.  The British military issued a directive that “no machine tools or plant 
therefore which might be required in production can be taken away without the approval of 
Military Government/ Control Commission”.105  This strict policy limited the excesses 
typical of Soviet behaviour.  Historical research demonstrates that the British military 
government collected the bulk of reparations through the appropriate I.A.R.A. channels and 
not through sweeping and unquantifiable seizures.106  Despite some evidence of looting by 
each of the western occupying powers, more pronounced in the French case, the official 
total sum of acknowledged reparations seized by the British amounted to the paltry sum of 
£30 million.107  This figure does not even represent the equivalent value of a single German 
war plant the dimensions of Alkett-Berlin—one subsidiary in the Rheinmetall-Borsig 
industrial empire. 
 
Table 10: British Category B Reparations at 31 May 1952.71 
(all figures in £ million)108 
Industrial equipment 3.7 
Merchant shipping 8.2 
Multilateral removals debited to UK 0.4 
Unilateral removals debited to UK 2.7 
Totals 15 
 
The high rates of industrial output in banned sectors forced policymakers to come to 
terms with a serious contradiction.  John J. McCloy, who ultimately replaced Clay as head 
of O.M.G.U.S., commented on the high rates of economic growth in Germany and 
proclaimed to Congress in June 1951 that  
We have done all this in spite of the ruins that were about us.  When I say ‘we’ 
I do not mean only the United States by any means, for the energy and industry 
of the German people has been the first factor, but I venture that it would have 
been utterly impossible without the aid which we were able to inject into the 
community.109 
 
The difficulty for policymakers was coming to terms with the upsurge in production.  
German industry expanded at a relatively high rate after 1947 despite wartime damage, 
dismantling, general chaos, a lack of foreign currency and an underfed workforce.  The 
statistics speak for themselves.  The western German gross national product rose over 80 
percent between 1948 and 1952 and industrial production grew by 110 percent.110  




finished goods.  Patterns did not radically change.  The amount of industry devoted to 
manufacturing, as a percentage of total commodity output, remained constant at 60 percent 
between 1936 and 1950 despite postwar fluctuations.111  Significant increases in dual-use 
commodity output, as demonstrated by the J.L.C. materialized. 
8.5 The Marshall Plan and Western German Industrial Recovery 
Establishing the starting point of economic recovery and gauging the effects of the 
Marshall Plan on the German economy represents a dominant question raised by economic 
historians.112  These explanations of the nature and speed of recovery add considerable 
weight to the argument that postwar dismantling did not excessively lower German 
capacities in dual-use industries.  It should however be noted that quantitative issues again 
demonstrate certain problems.  Abelshauser in particular points out that an evaluation of 
economic performance unfortunately suffers from the inability to determine the prewar 
production levels in Germany by which to establish a sound macroeconomic basis of 
comparison.  The American British occupation authorities, as emphasized, only began 
collecting general production data after June 1946 and comprehensive reporting 
commenced only after German economic organizations took full responsibility later in the 
decade.113  This section therefore only endeavours to gauge the rudimentary temporal 
aspects of economic performance to evaluate the conclusion that Washington actively 
promoted a reconstruction policy in Germany that took residual or latent heavy industrial 
power into account. 
Previous chapters outlined Washington's growing insistence that German industry 
assist European recovery efforts.  Driven by the concerns of Clay’s military government, 
the Truman administration significantly altered the meaning and methods of industrial 
demilitarization policy.  National security imperatives lost ground to economic 
determinants.  The relaxation of excessive controls on the German industrial system, and 
increases in most areas banned or restricted by the Level of Industry plans, did not however 
imply that American policymakers discarded the postwar viewpoint that dual-use capacities 
translated directly into military power.  The desire to control Soviet access to dual-use 
technologies supplanted previous concerns by 1947.  The State and War Departments and 
the National Munitions Control Board strenuously advocated the replacement of the prewar 
Neutrality Act with a more comprehensive Munitions Control Act in 1947.  After a two 
year delay, Washington adopted an extremely broad definition of the “implements of war” 
on which to build an anti-Soviet trade embargo aiming at denying the communist state 




increasing bipolar superpower friction.  The Munitions Control Act demonstrated 
Washington’s continued proclivity to hold onto a rigid definition of dual-use capacities in 
geostrategic calculations.  This definition however no longer applied to western Germany.  
Generous support characterized American plans for non-communist European 
states.  The sums provided by Washington proved colossal.  Truman signed the Economic 
Cooperation Act (E.C.A.) on 3 April 1948 and thereby freed $5.3 billion for the fiscal year 
1948-49 alone.  The Organization for European Economic Cooperation (O.E.E.C.), 
founded in Paris on 16 April 1948, coordinated this assistance package.  Between 1948 and 
1951 Congress authorized the transfer of a staggering $13.3488 billion to prime the 
European pump.  Washington later even extended the program to include Japan and other 
Asian states.  This total sum covered financial, industrial and intellectual assistance.  While 
grants represented most of the E.R.P. capital flow, 20 percent of the funds took the form of 
loans with interest rates of 2.5 percent.  The list of commodities transported across the 
Atlantic ranged from agricultural produce to raw materials and industrial machinery.  
Special E.C.A. teams also inspected European factories to help modernize production 
techniques.115 
 In keeping with Washington’s decision to salvage Germany’s status as “workshop” 
of Europe, the data indicates that the Truman administration placed far greater emphasis on 
resource allocation than on shipments of machine-tools and machinery.  It should however 
be mentioned that the dismantling program proceeded concurrently with financial 
assistance.  This policy, one that also set the halls of Congress alight with anger, further 
indicates the weaknesses in dismantling policy as a method of industrial demilitarization.  
The rough and uncut statistics of the Marshall Plan clearly emphasize that the aid package 
did not substantially contribute to the redevelopment of large industrial capacities in 
Germany.  A straightforward examination of E.R.P. assistance reveals that American 
taxpayers pumped $1.3173 billion into the western German economy or about 11 percent of 
the total amount granted.  Britain and France received a substantially larger share.  Between 
1 April 1948 and 31 December 1950 Britain received the largest portion of E.R.P. 
assistance.  The totals represented double that of western Germany.  Despite minor 
grievances brought about by the indignity of the status of aid recipient, British attitudes 
towards the Marshall Plan remained favourable throughout the late 1940s and Whitehall 
welcomed American economic, political and moral support.  British recovery, in the 





 Table 11: Distribution of the Marshall Plan Credits Granted by the USA to Participating 
Countries (April 1948 to January 1952) (In Millions $)117 
Thereof 
Country Total % Subsidies % Loans % Grants % 
All Countries 12992,5 100 9290,2 100 1 139,6 100 1 517,2 100 
England 3 165,8 24,4 1 956,9 21,0 336,9 29,6 532,1 35,1 
France 2 629,8 20,2 2212,1 23,8 182,4 16,0 61,4 4,0 
Italy 1 434,6 11,0 1 174,4 12,6 73,0 6,4 87,2 5,7 
West Germany 1 317,3 10,1 1 078,7 11,6 - - 213,6 14,4 
Netherlands 1 078,7 8,3 796,4 8,6 150,7 13,2 31,6 2,1 
Austria 653,8 5,0 556,1 6,0 - - 4,6 0,3 
Greece 628,0 4,8 514,9 5,5 - - - - 
Belgium + 
Luxemburg 546,6 4,2 32,4 0,3 68,1 6,0 446,0 29,4 
Denmark 266,4 2,1 217,3 2,3 31,0 2,7 9,1 0,6 
Norway 241,9 1,9 196,0 2,1 35,0 3,1 10,9 0,7 
Turkey 184,5 1,4 62,4 0,7 72,8 6,4 17,3 1,1 
Ireland 146,2 1,1 18,0 0,2 128,2 11,2 - - 
Sweden 107,1 0,8 - - 20,4 1,8 36,7 5,7 
Portugal 50,5 0,4 5,5 0,1 36,7 3,2 8,3 0,5 
Spain 26,8 0,2 15,9 0,2 4,3 0,4 3,5 0,2 
  
The E.R.P. historiography concerning Germany reveals a far more heated 
atmosphere.  The bare statistics lead scholars such as Abelshauser to question the impact of 
assistance on stimulating industrial recovery.  American dollars cannot directly explain the 
surge in output.118  Other less direct measures supplemented the Marshall Plan and 
strengthened the German economy.  In 1945 alone the American military for example 
employed over 168,000 Germans as clerks and translators and in other capacities.119  The 
dollars provided circulated through the German economic system and ultimately facilitated 
the purchase of required raw materials for industry.120  E.R.P. funds furthermore only 
balanced the considerable sums that Germany provided the Allied authorities to subsidize 
the costs of occupation.  Marshall Plan dollars effectively erased the impact of some of the 
occupation's more negative policies and did not constitute a real surge in foreign 
investment.  Abelshauser minimizes the E.R.P.'s impact for this particular reason.  The 
Marshall Plan, in his opinion, helped stimulate trade by reintegrating the German economy 
into the global system.  American dollars solved the headaches involved in resource 
allocation and therefore helped initiate a process of recovery from within.121  Abelshauser 
points out that American policy even unintentionally lowered output in certain cases.  The 
Allied policy of controlling steel prices in the manner of a control economy convinced 
manufacturers to reduce investment in machinery and search for other business 
opportunities to increase profits.122 
Increases in industrial output in any case predated the initial transfer of E.R.P. 




the summer of 1947.  American assistance after that period helped eliminate bottlenecks 
that emerged once industrialists returned to production.  American investment in German 
electrical power stations—another infringement of A.C.C. policy in Germany since the 
Allies originally intended on capping capacities—helped expand the infrastructure 
necessary to support greater levels of production.123  Large shipments of industrial 
machinery into Germany did not take place.  Western Germany, as indicated, exported 
machinery instead. 
Several historians disagree with Abelshauser’s emphasis and instead point out that 
other factors explain the tremendous surge in German productivity after 1947.  These 
scholars place far greater emphasis on the positive effects stemming from E.R.P. financial 
assistance, the introduction of Ludwig Erhard’s “soziale Marktwirtschaft” and currency 
reform.124  Their work presents a strong case that Marshall Plan funds decisively cleared 
bottlenecks through the purchase of foreign raw materials.  American and British officials 
in Germany consistently argued that coal shortages and electrical power generation 
represented the central bottlenecks impacting industrial production.  Major investments in 
the support structures of industry helped clear the way for economic success.125  E.R.P. aid 
even continued the wartime process of modernization such as that found in the automotive 
sector, and maintained and generated even higher levels of productivity.126  American 
support furthermore helped reorganize the insurance and banking sectors through technical 
aid and helped such firms as the Phoenix Gummiwaren A.G. regain a strong market 
position in Europe.127  The examples of Daimler-Benz and Rheinmetall-Borsig evaluated at 
the start of the chapter can be added to this list. 
Domestic political factors also helped create a favourable economic climate.  
Erhard, chosen by Clay to take charge of economic affairs in the American zone, promoted 
a liberal economic order that rejected the formation of a planned economy.  Erhard fought 
against significant opposition in Germany that preferred the nationalisation schemes 
adopted by countries like Britain.128  Washington fortified the German economy three years 
after war’s end by reforming the currency in June 1948 and only a few months later solved 
the problems associated with resource allocation using Marshall Plan dollars.  Coupled with 
the maintenance of a large stockpile of modern capital equipment and assisted by 
significant technical and scientific skill, Erhard helped integrate a resilient German 
industrial structure into the American liberal market system.  Richard Overy writes that the 
“economic miracle” of the1950s depended on these favourable factors.  “Most historians”, 




material conditions but on political and psychological adjustment”.129  American assistance 
only greased the wheels of German industry.130 
O.M.G.U.S. could not of course remedy all of the problems facing manufacturers 
regarding the acquisition of raw materials.  Shortages initially determined that a significant 
proportion of manufacturing capacity went unused between 1947 and 1949.131  Extremely 
rough estimates of the value of exports for 1946 indicated that the flow of heavy machinery, 
electrical products, automotive parts, chemicals decreased substantially when measured 
against 1938.  The surprising fact is that a large number of these exports, including bauxite, 
soda ash and heavy machinery, represented commodities originally forbidden by the Level 
of Industry agreements.132 
Helge Berger convincingly argues that the Marshall Plan aided German 
reconstruction by altering the political climate and allowing the reintegration of German 
industry into Europe.  In circumventing the traditional analyses of economic data, Berger 
asserts that the Marshall Plan would have assisted Germany “even if effective transfers had 
been zero”.133  United States policymakers regarded the Marshall Plan as a method of 
rebuilding Europe on the back of western German political and industrial integration.134  
The establishment of a functioning capitalist system in Europe demanded that Germany 
regain its position as the major exporter of industrial goods.  Washington intended Marshall 
Plan aid to prime the pump of European countries, but the major initial goal of the program 
aimed at resurrecting Germany as the “industrial center” of Europe.135 
The focus on political factors should not obscure either the direct or indirect impact 
of Marshall Plan support on the German and European economic future.  The recovery and 
subsequent expansion of western German industry changed economic patterns and 
influenced the political realm in several important ways.  The eastern zones, plundered by 
the Soviet Union and locked out of global markets, stagnated while western Germany 
recovered and prospered.  The disparity between the regions and American allocation 
efforts negatively impacted inner-German trade patterns.  Economic unity no longer looked 
as attractive to the western powers.136  East German historians dismissed the apparent 
success of their neighbours by stressing that wartime investment in the eastern regions 
emphasized the construction of armaments facilities without potential civilian 
applications.137  The example of Alkett-Berlin demonstrates the erroneous logic behind this 
assertion.  But eastern Germany fell to the wayside. 
Postwar reconstruction more importantly helped transform the nature of 




market economy assisted the triumphant march of democracy.138  The economy continued 
the prewar economic shift away from textiles, agriculture and mining and into the 
metalworking, electrical and chemical industries.139  Washington, as demonstrated in this 
chapter, helped propel the German automotive industry forward and sponsored new 
branches such as synthetic material manufacturing.  The impetus granted industrialization 
in Germany fulfilled the predictions of American policymakers.  Manufactured goods 
represented 83 percent of all exports by value at the end of the 1950s.140  The Marshall Plan 
also helped further the reconstruction of the western European trade system on traditional 
patterns.141  But the reintegration of the Ruhr into the western European economy 
represented a slight but crucial change.  The allocation of raw materials for industry 
presented problems for other European states.  But other European states needed German 
high-valued exports such as machinery, chemicals, electro-technical equipment and 
vehicles.  The economic recovery and development of other European states offered 
lucrative export markets for German manufactured products and absorbed two-thirds of 
Germany’s total exports.142  The increasingly complex ties between Germany and 
neighbouring states, heavily dependent on trade and German manufactured goods, helped 
permit a general rising standard of living in Europe which in turn fed the process of 
integration.143 
European recovery required the restoration of prewar trade patterns with German 
business.  Western European countries even pushed hard for a conciliatory peace with 
Germany after 1945.  The Dutch authorities offered to help finance German raw material 
imports in order to increase the flow of replacement parts for industrial equipment 
originally produced in Germany.  This request for replacement parts exhibited the change 
on the part of reparations claimants against moving German plant and instead concentrating 
on receiving production.144  Washington instructed Dutch authorities to use “private 
channels” for the distribution of funds to German firms and bypass O.M.G.U.S.  The only 
worry of the administration concerned that of maintaining the “preferential position” of 
American and British bankers.145  The Truman administration accepted the view that 
European recovery depended on coal, steel, and “high-value goods” shipped from German 
plant.146  A State Department memorandum in October 1946 mentioned two factors 
impeding the flow of German goods.  Europe needed hard currency to pay for trade and a 
functioning trade apparatus.147  The Truman administration responded by encouraging the 




reserves the military government needed to purchase raw materials from other European 
states.148 
Lawrence S. Kaplan emphasizes that economic self-interest motivated the Marshall 
Plan.149  The incredible dimensions of E.R.P. aid however weaken the claims of revisionists 
who reject a positive American contribution to European recovery.  Other historians look at 
the broader political dimensions.  Leffler argues that “although American officials hoped 
the Marshall Plan would benefit the American economy, they also wanted to redraw the 
European balance of power and to enhance American national security”.150  Economic 
assistance, according to this theory, aimed at increasing American control over western 
Europe through the “control of raw materials, industrial infrastructure, skilled manpower, 
and military bases”.151  This search for control sought the integration of western Germany 
into a North Atlantic trade system and the expulsion of the Soviet Union from any position 
of influence in the Ruhr.  The Marshall Plan, according to Wolfram F. Hanrieder, aimed at 
containing both Germany and the Soviet Union by immersion in the first case and exclusion 
in the second.152 
Seen in this way, E.R.P. assistance therefore acted as a psychological and economic 
tool against economic demilitarization and dismantling.  The Marshall Plan certainly 
accorded with Kennan’s hope of employing real American assistance to blunt the Soviet 
threat of pursuing the advance of socialism through a psychologically debilitating 
deterioration of living conditions.153  Aid instead promised to force Moscow to react in 
kind.  The economic recovery of western Germany drew the attention of the eastern 
population like a magnet and therefore complicated Soviet control unless Josef Stalin’s hard 
policies were modified.154  Stalin could only employ far less enticing methods in attempting 
to sway German opinion.  Leffler for example points out that Stalin “could hold out the lure 
of Eastern markets, Polish territory, and German national unification; they could bargain for 
a participatory role in supervising Ruhr industry; they could covertly manoeuvre to bolster 
the influence of German communists”.155  The American inclusion of Germany in an aid 
package, according to this interpretation, aimed at keeping western Germany and 
particularly the Ruhr free of communist influence.156  A bilateral trade arrangement 
between western Germany and the Soviet Union—as can be seen in the economic 
degeneration of eastern Germany—only threatened to derail the hopes for swift recovery in 
western Europe at the expense of the Soviet Union. 
Marshall Plan aid therefore also tackled the spirit of the Level of Industry 




French public’s fear of unilateral western German industrial revival.157  The E.R.P., as 
demonstrated by the statistics cited throughout this chapter, also worked wonders in 
Germany.  The German population, growing increasingly belligerent over the industrial 
demilitarization discussions, “widely criticized” the dismantling of industry as a policy of 
permanently removing the central European state from global markets.158  Assistance 
promised to swing German opinion by deflecting attention from the demilitarization 
debates.  Washington’s desire to run the demilitarization experiment in Germany reached a 
low ebb in 1947 in any case.  The nominal revisionists argue that the decision to integrate 
western Germany in reconstruction efforts implied an effort at controlling German 
economic strength through “Americanization”.  The Truman administration, the 
interpretation posits, followed a program that sought the creation of a politically and 
economically integrated Europe resembling the United States or “God's own country”.159  
But this perspective obscures the fact that Washington hoped to integrate the Ruhr in the 
overall aid package primarily because the experts viewed German participation as vital to 
overall western recovery.  This viewpoint acted both as a primary argument against 
industrial demilitarization and offers strong evidence that the program did not achieve the 
results desired.  “Americanization” and a positive European recovery program erased the 
rationale for industrial demilitarization. 
8.6 Conclusion 
This chapter outlined how economic historians such as Abelshauser posit that 
wartime damages and dismantling only marginally impacted the overall strength of German 
industry.  These statistics demonstrate that the industrial infrastructure survived and that 
Germany continued to operate a large and more importantly expanding heavy industrial 
base.  The economy also survived reparations seizures from current production and 
“hidden” reparations such as patent seizures and the emigration of large numbers of 
scientists.160  The failure to dismantle plant and machine-tools in particular left western 
German industry in a position to utilize American assistance for ever-increasing rates of 
production.  Global markets, motivated by the need to rebuild wartime damage, depended 
on German manufactured goods.  The greatest boom in western European history emerged.  
Domestic capacities in Germany remained high irregardless of some weak intimation to the 
contrary based on early output levels.  These capacities did not accord with the Level of 
Industry agreements and western Germany quickly surpassed wartime production levels in 




Large infusions of American capital helped industrialists allocate the raw materials 
their factories needed to continue production.  Economic historians can debate whether the 
political creation of “Bizonia” or the introduction of a solid currency in 1948 stabilized the 
socio-economic climate and convinced industrialists to fill orders and release horded 
equipment and raw materials.  O.M.G.U.S. in particular went to great lengths to stabilize 
elements of the German economy with obvious dual-use characteristics and outright 
military potential.  Despite these efforts, production consumed resources so quickly that 
capacity went unused, orders exceeded output and millions of Germans remained 
unemployed.161  The limited supply of raw materials, the lack of currency, the chaotic state 
of the transportation network, and zonal division represented the most significant factors 
retarding German production.  For these reasons, certain historians emphasize that the 
Marshall Plan did not represent the essential element of postwar recovery.162  The evidence 
nevertheless suggests that Marshall Plan dollars at least assisted western German economic 
recovery in the late 1940s. 
The issue of industrial demilitarization is clearer.  The postwar survival of Alkett-
Berlin, a “Category I” armaments firm, and the statistical compilations of the J.L.C. further 
demonstrate that historians cannot document a serious erosion of dual-use capacities 
according to the postwar industrial demilitarization conceptions expressed by such groups 
as the F.E.A.  Washington promoted and assisted broad industrial reconstruction in 
Germany.  This policy actively sought the rejuvenation of traditional heavy industry and 
clear dual-use capabilities for the benefit of the American and European economies.  Part of 
the reason for this change in mentality rested with the survival of large capacities in 
Germany and the growing American desire to bind these resources to an overall aid 
package.  All of this fit well with Washington’s postwar dreams.  The E.R.P. secured 
continued American domestic economic success, revived the wartorn European economy, 
helped reintegrate western Germany into Europe by healing the wounds caused by the war, 
and reconstructed a strong but controlled German economy.163  The retention of heavy 
industrial capacities to such a large degree in any case seriously questions the hypothesis 





Our capacity to retaliate must be, and is, massive in order to deter all forms of 
aggression. 
 




The previous chapters demonstrated Washington’s decision to base European 
economic recovery partly on western German industrial production irregardless of Soviet 
outrage.  The incorporation of German industry favourably addressed the bulk of American 
postwar economic and political concerns at the least cost to taxpayers.  The intractable 
Soviet stance on reparations on the other hand threatened to plunge Europe and the United 
States into chaos.  The Kremlin however interpreted Washington’s policy as a threat to 
Soviet interests.  This perception influenced a host of defensive moves which in turn 
aroused western military concerns.  The nature of American military contingency planning 
changed radically in this climate and strategists advocated limited rearmament and a 
military defense of continental Europe.  Melvyn P. Leffler writes that this process “brought 
about the final division of Germany and Europe”.1  The Joint Chiefs of Staff (J.C.S.) altered 
contingency planning during this period to incorporate a defense of western Germany 
aimed at preventing the Soviet Union from politically or militarily gaining the industrial 
resources of the Ruhr.  The widening Cold War breach between the Superpowers bound the 
United States and western Germany tightly together according to national security and 
geopolitical principles. 
This chapter demonstrates that Washington’s understanding of European recovery 
clearly accepted the inherent military potential of civilian industry and the fused 
relationship of dual-use commodities.  The J.C.S. hoped to convince Harry S. Truman that 
the postwar retention of German heavy industry demanded the incorporation of the defeated 
state into a defensive system in order to forestall an unlikely but potentially disastrous 
Soviet seizure of the Ruhr.  This hypothesis accords with the argument of Fred L. Block, 
William S. Borden and Thomas McCormick.  These scholars argue that American military 
assistance to Europe represented a second stage of economic assistance whereby 
Washington transformed the European Recovery Program (E.R.P.) into the Military 




military digested the clear change in the Truman administration’s policy toward Germany 
during 1947 in accordance with military principles.  The newly founded National Security 
Council (N.S.C.) reappraised the Soviet military threat and lamented American and 
European military lack of preparedness to defend western Europe against an invasion.  The 
inclusion of Germany in the E.R.P. as the “nexus” of European economic recovery forced 
strategists to initiate studies of continental defense that included German and regional 
national security priorities.  This process marked the true starting point of German military 
reactivation, but was predicated on the survival of dual-use industries demonstrated in the 
previous chapters. 
9.2 The Berlin Blockade and Other Disasters 
A series of events in 1948 and 1949 further altered the foreign policy of the Truman 
administration and injected a more heightened sense of urgency or a degree of militarization 
into Washington’s views of containment policy.3  This dissertation examines the impact of 
the Soviet blockade of Berlin, the detonation of a Soviet nuclear device and the success of 
communism in China.  These three events illustrated that Josef Stalin either directly 
endangered American industrial designs in Europe, pressed the development of military 
technologies that invalidated the security conceptions of the Pentagon and directly 
challenged the pre-eminence of American power, or supported the march of communism.  
Historians typically view the Berlin Blockade, the fall of nationalist China and the Soviet 
explosion of a nuclear bomb as the three key events leading towards the open American 
demand for German rearmament.4  While of utmost importance in the investigation of the 
heightened sense of a military imbalance on the continent at the end of the 1940s, these 
events do not adequately address Washington’s already clear focus on the industries of the 
Ruhr as the lynchpin of civilian recovery efforts and the Pentagon’s even clearer 
appreciation of the military potential of the same factories. 
On 20 March 1948, the Soviets walked out of the Allied Control Council (A.C.C.) 
in Berlin and on 24 June the Soviet occupation authorities, citing “technical difficulties”, 
denied rail and road access to the western sectors of Berlin.  The city was cut off from the 
west.  The Truman administration’s decision to employ German industrial production as an 
important component of the Marshall Plan and European recovery had motivated Stalin to 
act.  The dictator matched western resolve with a determination of his own.  Historical 
investigation of the Kremlin’s reasoning for the blockade generally agrees that Stalin’s 
action represented a reaction to the western hopes of binding recovery efforts to German 




“provided the proximate cause for this new Soviet provocation” since the stabilization of 
commerce promised to energize American-inspired recovery efforts and demonstrate the 
superiority of western capitalist civilization to those millions of poor souls under the 
hammer and sickle.5  The unilateral currency reform endangered the “stability” of the 
Soviet zone of occupation.  As evident throughout the early postwar years, Moscow met 
any policy out of line with truncation and systematic plundering with a bewildering degree 
of opposition.6 
Stalin, it again appeared apparent, hoped once more to obstruct economic recovery 
throughout Germany to neutralize the pull of the American capitalist magnet.7  Charles F. 
Pennacchio argues that the general failure of the Kremlin to obtain large-scale reparations 
from the western zones and the threat of an economically and politically independent 
western Germany essentially forced the Soviet authorities to try and throw their former 
allies out of Berlin.8  The dictator obviously understood that eastern Germans might grow 
increasingly frustrated in the face of western recovery and agitate against Soviet 
pastoralization.  Stalin therefore acted to salvage his unique plan for Germany from the 
jaws of defeat by shutting down capitalist operations in Berlin.   
This portrayal of Stalin’s policy as defensive puts the cart before the horse and 
inaccurately emphasizes a tenuous causal relationship between the dictator’s unilateral 
action and the American decision to reconstruct western Germany.  This perspective fails to 
clarify the humanitarian and generally logical argumentation behind Washington’s 
decisions.  The need to expedite the recovery program, the dominant postwar conception of 
the Truman administration’s policy in Europe, drove that process.  Stalin’s policy of lashing 
Ruhr industry to Soviet reconstruction, as pointed out, jeopardized the welfare of the rest of 
Europe.  The dictator’s readiness to force starvation on the inhabitants of western Berlin in 
order to sabotage the creation of an independent and economically sound West Germany 
furthermore indicated a total disregard for basic human rights.  The blockade instead 
offered the American authorities an opportunity to demonstrate their solidarity with the 
German people and build an atmosphere of trust conducive to the economic recovery they 
sought.  Stalin instead seemed to uphold the maxim that whoever ruled Berlin ruled 
Germany.9  Revisionists must clarify their “defence” of Stalin’s brutal use of starvation as a 
bludgeon to ensure a compliant eastern Germany and perhaps secure reparations from the 
Ruhr. 
 The Truman administration responded immediately and with force.  Negative 




Berlin had already induced serious discussion concerning the importance of the city in 
regards to overall American policy.  Lucius D. Clay had already noted the serious 
deterioration in relations and reported to Washington on 5 March 1948 that “[f]or many 
months, based on logical analysis, I have felt and held that war was unlikely for at least ten 
years. Within the last few weeks, I have felt a subtle change in Soviet attitude which I 
cannot define but which now gives me a feeling that it may come with dramatic 
suddenness”.10  While American intelligence officers discounted the possibility of outright 
war, the opening Soviet moves to blockade Berlin at the end of the month represented a 
significant political challenge for Washington.  The J.C.S. viewed the brewing Berlin crisis 
and a host of large-scale Soviet military exercises in the region as a crude display of power 
aiming at outright coercion.  The planned rehabilitation of western German industry, they 
believed, mattered most.  The military theorized that the tensions demonstrated that 
Moscow now gave up all “hope...for interfering through quadripartite means with the 
production of Western Germany upon which the success of the European Recovery 
Program substantially depends”.11  Clay and the J.C.S., who now openly argued that Berlin 
represented the lynchpin of the American hope to “hold Europe against communism”, 
expressed the conviction that a withdrawal from Berlin meant a clear defeat for American 
policy in Germany and Europe that jeopardized the E.R.P. itself.12 
Truman shared this economic perspective and the psychological importance of 
Berlin for Germany and the E.R.P. in general.  The president furthermore believed that the 
Soviet “international counterattack” related to Stalin’s failure to gain access to Ruhr 
production for Soviet recovery and American attempts at protecting western Europe 
through the erection of a military alliance.13  Stalin seemed more determined than ever to 
use the hammer and sickle to pound and slice his opposition into compliance.  Truman 
decided to make a stand in Berlin.  “Let's get one thing straight right now”, the president 
informed the Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, 
and Under Secretary of State Robert Lovett in the Cabinet Room of the White House on 28 
June 1948, “We are staying in Berlin.  Period!”14  George Marshall backed the president 
and more importantly proclaimed that Washington would not abandon the new American 
direction in Germany.15  The Americans therefore matched Stalin’s bold action with an 
even more brash determination to hold the line in Berlin. 
Over two million Berliners, with only two weeks of critical supplies in stockpile, 
faced complete economic breakdown and even starvation.  Clay decided to supply the city 




Americans, British and eventually the French massed their transport aircraft, converting 
bombers in the process, and began moving tons of food, coal and other supplies into Berlin 
on 26 June 1948.  Even the American air force, the largest of the democracies, could not 
handle this job alone.  The citizens of Berlin required a minimum of 2,500 tons of supplies 
per day.  The Air Force in Germany started the operation with only 102 C-47 transports 
capable of carrying 3 tons each for a total of 306 tons.  Truman therefore ordered the 
military to divert aircraft from other regions and assemble all available transports for the 
operation.  Employing a host of German airfields such as those at Wiesbaden and Fassberg, 
these military installations having obviously survived the war and the demilitarization 
efforts intact, the transports of the western allies moved roughly 5,000 tons a day into the 
city by the end of January 1949.  By the time the operation officially ended on 30 
September 1949, after Stalin stepped down and ordered the reopening of the land routes 
into Berlin, the western Allies had flown 276,926 sorties to deliver 2,323,067 tons of 
supplies at a cost of $233,887,624 to American taxpayers.16  This total represented almost 
16 percent of the total E.R.P. package received by West Germany. 
Berlin had endured 320 days of western airlifts.  To explain Stalin's decision to lift 
the blockade, historians mention the success of the airlift, the counter-blockade of the 
eastern zone, the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (N.A.T.O.) and the 
creation of West Germany.17  Two of these factors stand out in importance.  The Allied 
counter-blockade, essentially an economic embargo of the Soviet Union, helped melt 
Stalin’s resolve.  The operation hit hard at the Soviet ability to maintain the semblance of an 
orderly occupation of eastern Germany.  The democracies deprived the Soviet zone of 
occupation of one million tons of coal and 30,000 tons of steel per month from the Ruhr.  A 
general western embargo on eastern European imports and exports also jeopardized the 
speed of recovery in the Soviet sphere of influence.  Stalin’s blockade, which ostensibly 
aimed at freeing Ruhr resources for Soviet recovery, failed miserably and only heightened 
Soviet reliance only their already hard-pressed satellites.18  The blockade however also 
helped weld the democratic militaries together in a joint operation.  This development 
foreshadowed and helped assist the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, explored in the 
next section, whose signatories agreed that an attack on one must be considered an attack 
on all.19  The establishment of N.A.T.O., the treaty signed by 14 states analysed later in this 
chapter, amassed considerable economic and theoretical military power in a non-Soviet 




Washington to press for a greater concentration on military assistance.  Truman later 
remarked that “Berlin had been a lesson to us all”.20 
The Berlin Blockade however only represented the first in another series of 
“shocks” that galvanized the opinions of the Truman administration and emphasized that 
only military power could hold Stalin at bay.21  The demand for a central German 
contribution found at the core of the Marshall Plan had precipitated a belligerent Soviet 
response that deepened the Truman administration’s sense of military inferiority and further 
justified the direction of policy in Europe.22  The fact that the J.C.S. concluded that the 
Soviet blockade did not represent a prelude to invasion should not reduce the seriousness 
with the Truman administration viewed the Soviet action.23  Revisionists such as Jean E. 
Smith use this J.C.S. assumption to argue that the confrontation with the Soviet Union 
represented a “self-fulfilling prophecy” and that policymakers jumped on the split with 
Stalin to justify the further militarization of policy.  This hypothesis carries some weight.  
The Truman administration, in Forrestal’s opinion, did employ the blockade to help 
convince Congress and the American public to accept the need for a general militarization 
of American foreign policy.24  Historians such as Georg Schmundt-Thomas analyze 
domestic reactions to Stalin’s venture and point out that the crude and belligerent Soviet 
action demonstrated a dangerous expansionism.25  Time Magazine portrayed the German 
population as innocent victims of Soviet aggression and offered pictures of hungry Berlin 
children to play on the sentimentality of Americans.26  The American media therefore 
recast the image of Germans as a helpless victim and away from the older stereotypes of the 
inveterate enemy.  The journalists forecast a dangerous possibility.  The loss of Berlin, 
Time Magazine hypothesized, “would give the Russians a chance to rally all Germans 
around their old capital: that might wreck America's plans for a Western German state and a 
healthy Ruhr, on which the Marshall Plan depends.  Last week's ruthless siege of Berlin 
was a siege of all Germany and Europe as well”.27  But obvious humanitarian aspects, and 
not just grand geopolitical calculations, accompanied the change of opinion.  The blockade 
helped the Truman administration sell the longstanding policy of German revival to the 
American people.  The Soviet Union “had blockaded itself”.28 
The Soviet detonation of a nuclear device and precipitated yet another panic in 
Washington for rather obvious reasons.  The explosion of the first Soviet atomic device in 
late August 1949 forced the Truman administration to reassess the Soviet military threat 
and American national security policy.29  The military responded swiftly.  General Omar 




at the mercy of a Soviet attack.30  American military planning until 1949 depended largely 
on the nuclear deterrent.  With the fading of the nuclear advantage, General Matthew 
Ridgeway pointed out that the military demanded immediate investment in new 
conventional military hardware to at least replace the “leftovers” from the war.31  Nuclear 
weapons added another frightening dimension to the growing Cold War.  The Truman 
administration faced the possibility of a nuclear attack on American soil.  The Air Force 
therefore argued for extensive expansion of American strategic bombing capabilities in 
order to deter a Soviet nuclear first strike.32  Strategic deterrence on both nuclear and 
conventional levels was born. 
The proposed expansion of a strategic nuclear option and the simultaneous building 
up of conventional forces hit against budgetary limitations that reduced Truman’s options.  
The Defense Department’s obligation to increase the strength of both conventional and 
non-conventional weapons systems to protect interests abroad and the American population 
itself, the merger of foreign and domestic security concerns into a single all-encompassing 
policy, emphasized the utility of allies to help shoulder the burden.33  The level of 
investment deemed necessary by the military threatened to derail Truman’s domestic policy 
of budgetary frugality at home and generous assistance abroad.  The wide commitments 
entailed by the military response widened the rifts between the Air Force, Army and Navy.  
The Air Force continued to argue that strategic bombing represented the best method of 
containing the Soviet Union without overburdening the American economy.  But the Navy 
questioned the morality of nuclear deterrence and instead proposed that the Department of 
Defense adopt a more traditional peripheral strategy based on conventional forces.  The 
Soviet detonation helped heat up this debate, addressed later on in the chapter, by forcing 
Washington to make an important choice—namely where to stand fast and hold the line.  
The Truman administration required a clear global policy itself taking military capabilities 
into account. 
Events in Asia dramatized the “weakness” of the American military.  Mao 
Zedong’s communist expulsion of Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalist forces and the seizure of 
most of China during the summer and autumn of 1949 upset Washington’s previous 
geopolitical and seemed to presage the failure of communist containment.34  A new threat 
to American national security emerged in the Far East.  Stalin’s response mattered.  The 
dictator reacted to Zedong’s success by pragmatically offering further Soviet assistance in 
order to bind the two communist states.  The Soviets had already provided the Chinese 




nationalists favoured by Washington.35  “If socialism is victorious in China and our 
countries follow a single path”, Stalin now openly asserted, “then the victory of socialism in 
the world will virtually be guaranteed”.36  The dictator viewed the political transformation 
of his southern neighbour as an opportunity to terminate American dominance over 
Chinese policy and slightly redress the immense economic imbalance between communism 
and democracy.37  Zedong agreed.38  The communist states negotiated the Sino-Soviet 
Treaty of 14 February 1950 and the expulsion of American influence over a vast area of 
Asia seemed guaranteed. 
Contrary to the revisionist claim that crude anti-communism and an inconsistent 
policy eroded American relations with the Soviet Union and China and drove Zedong and 
Stalin together, the considerable Soviet material investment in China after 1945 indicated 
that the  Soviet dictator pursued a traditional form of bloc expansion grafted onto vague 
ideological principles.39  Stalin’s support of communism in China demonstrated a 
willingness to enlarge the Soviet sphere of influence and penetrate regions traditionally 
linked to the democratic powers.  This successful fusion did question the success of 
Truman’s containment policy and the “loss” of China reflected poorly on the State 
Department and the administration as a whole.  But Truman did not drive the two states 
together nor did Washington’s policy represent a “comedy of errors”.40  Ideological 
affinities naturally drew the communists together.  Chen Jian for example points out that 
Zedong feared capitalist sabotage of the Chinese revolution and preferred Stalin as a natural 
ally.41  The American economic commitment to Europe had limited the financial resources 
available for a nationalist Chinese assistance package that might have saved Kai-shek from 
his forced flight to Taiwan.42  Congress, influenced by the resources diverted to the E.R.P., 
set significant limits on the provision of funds for European remilitarization during this 
period.  European forward defence strategies were obviously far less costly than any real 
participation in the Chinese civil war.  This focus on European recovery and security 
incidentally also strained any American ability to bribe Zedong.  Stalin had more cards to 
play.   
Official American views concerning the developments in China did however 
appear in an extreme form.  The J.C.S. had proclaimed the necessity of applying 
containment to “all areas of the world” in 1947.  Zedong’s success represented a serious 
blow in geopolitical and financial terms.43  Politicians lashed out against both Stalin and 
Truman.  Dean Acheson openly accused Moscow of wishing to “dominate Asian peoples” 




reacted differently.  Many Republicans including Senator McCarthy withdrew the 
bipartisan support for Truman’s foreign policy that had been so necessary for policy in 
Europe.45  The “loss” of China also helped cultivate the already manifest “public paranoia” 
that quickly degenerated into the rabid form of anti-communism loosely referred to as 
McCarthyism in the 1950s.46  This expression of fear mixed both directions taken in 
Washington and, as shown in the next chapter, even led to an attack on State Department 
officials and the president himself.  It was hardly surprising that policymakers became 
acutely aware of the negative repercussions of communist expansion and strove to protect 
China’s neighbours and particularly Japan from revolution.47  This paranoia also played a 
role in accentuating demands for German remilitarization and nudged the democracies in a 
militarized direction.  J.C.S. planners and the Truman administration after the Berlin 
Blockade, the Soviet acquisition of nuclear weapons and the fall of China placed greater 
emphasis on assisting the Europeans in taking up arms in defence of democracy.48 
9.3 Perceptions of the Soviet Military and Stalin’s Plans for War 
These events however only gave more impetus to a direction already adopted.  The 
global economic developments and Soviet reactions after 1947 already significantly altered 
attitudes.  American military planning prior to that year, mirroring the work of George F. 
Kennan, emphasized the postwar weakness of the Soviet state and military.  The Joint 
Intelligence Staff predicted in October 1945 that Stalin would avoid war for up to ten 
years.49  The military planners in particular focused on the backward state of the Soviet air 
force, navy and the lack of nuclear weapons.  The Joint Logistic Plans Committee and the 
Military Intelligence Division of the War Department predicted that Stalin required  
approximately fifteen years to overcome wartime losses in manpower and industry, ten 
years to redress the shortage of technicians, five to ten years to develop a strategic air 
force, fifteen to twenty-five years to construct a modern navy, ten years to refurbish 
military transport, ten years (or less) to quell resistance in the occupied areas, fifteen to 
twenty years to establish a military infrastructure in the Far East, three to ten years to 
acquire the atomic bomb, and an unspecified number of years to remove the 
vulnerability of the Soviet rail-net and petroleum industry to long-range bombing.50 
 
The focus on Soviet naval and bomber strength derived the conclusion that the Soviet 
military could not strike the United States and remained vulnerable to an American 
equivalent of the British “blue water strategy” on the periphery. 
Several problems hindered the intelligence officers.  Truman dissolved the wartime 
Office of Strategic Services on 1 October 1945 and the State and War departments divided 
the intelligence specialists that remained between them.  Most of the experienced and 




virtually autonomous intelligence arm that competed with that of the Army.52  While a new 
Intelligence Division emerged from the postwar restructuring programs that incorporated 
the new focus on national security matters such as foreign economic and political issues, the 
reorganization of wartime agencies after victory hampered intelligence assessments with a 
high degree of “organizational turbulence”.53  The deficiencies in manpower and the 
organizational disarray prompted the Intelligence Division to incorporate the German 
Gehlen organisation into the American intelligence apparatus.  Reinhard Gehlen 
immediately helped correct the initial assumptions of Soviet backwardness and the total 
reliance on qualitative over quantitative factors.54  But these initial organizational problems 
and military conceptions assisted the air arm in gaining a dominant role in postwar strategy 
formulation.  The belief in Soviet weaknesses reduced the threat of a ground offensive and 
played up the deterrent value of strategic bombing.  
The sharp reductions in American combat strength after 1945 indicated the minimal 
degree of importance attached to military defence prior to 1947.  The downsizing of 
military forces eroded defensive capabilities and created a power vacuum in Europe and 
elsewhere.  The ten postwar American field divisions operated far below their paper 
strength.  Nine of these divisions maintained only 2 of 3 infantry battalions, 2 of 3 artillery 
batteries, but the full complement of World War II weaponry including armoured fighting 
vehicles.55  American logistical studies however emphasized that postwar disarmament and 
industrial reconversion significantly reduced overall stocks of weapons and replacement 
parts.  Wartime advanced in weapons technology further reduced the value of a large 
number of American weapons systems such as the “Sherman” tank to little more than scrap 
metal.  Until industry reorganized and replaced obsolete designs, the postwar United States 
could only support 18 modern divisions and field an army of 960,000 soldiers.56  Civilian 
reconversion impacted military capacity as swiftly as early 1940s rearmament. 
These studies failed to recognize the initial speed with which the United States 
rearmed after 1940.  Initial military planning prior to December 1941 requested the creation 
of over 120 armoured and mechanized divisions in a total force of 215 Army divisions 
numbering 8.8 million men.  The United States in fact only mobilized 16 armoured 
divisions and a total of 89 divisions or approximately 6 million men.  Military industrial 
production proved another matter.  American factories poured out enough equipment for an 
additional 101 divisions.  The freighters and transports of the western democracies shipped 
this material across the Atlantic as part of Lend-Lease aid.  The industrial achievement of 




military industrial power than the counting of formations actually raised in the United 
States.57  The military reports underemphasized American economic power.58  This self-
serving tactic helped support the military’s proposals for expansion and need for allies. 
The nuclear monopoly of the immediate postwar cultivated a unique sense of 
security.  Various organizations within the American military, the Air Force in particular, 
believed that the American monopoly of nuclear weapons alone negated the likelihood of a 
Soviet invasion.  This overly optimistic appraisal of nuclear deterrence cultivated the belief 
that Stalin would not risk military action and face a potentially ruinous strategic bombing 
campaign.59  The Army and Navy did not share the same faith in nuclear containment 
partly because such a policy significantly reduced their own importance.  These two 
services considered nuclear strikes as an adjunct to tactical operations and not as a strategic 
weapon acting alone.  The Army and Navy also questioned the feasibility of a nuclear 
bombing campaign owing to the relatively small stockpile in the immediate years following 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki.60  The evidence furthermore suggests that Soviet intelligence 
based on espionage uncovered the American nuclear bluff.  Stalin did not recognize the 
American monopoly as a serious hindrance to his policies.61  The dictator, according to 
David Holloway, remained convinced that Washington employed the threat of nuclear 
attack purely “as an instrument of political pressure”.62  The deterrent value of nuclear 
weapons remained low.63 
Truman’s government presented the National Security Act in February 1947 prior 
to the Council of Foreign Ministers Meeting in Moscow.  The document announced a 
radical shift in military impressions of Soviet military capabilities and caught up with the 
negative political view of Stalin’s intentions within the State Department.  Passed by 
Congress on 25 July 1947, the National Security Act represented a major attempt at 
creating a streamlined military in peacetime that kept a close eye on military preparedness 
by balancing capabilities against the activities of foreign powers.  Truman unified the 
separate military branches into the Department of Defense, created an independent Air 
Force, and established the National Security Council to the Central Intelligence Agency 
(referred to as N.S.C.).  The Joint Chiefs of Staff (J.C.S.), an organization that combined the 
three service chiefs into a single body, still formulated pure military strategy.  The newly 
formed N.S.C., composed of the President, the Secretary of Defense, the three service 
secretaries and various military and foreign policy officials, now however coordinated a 
national security policy that fused military policy with more general foreign policy aims.  




incorporating the lessons of past history and protecting the United States from surprise 
attack, providing long-term provisions to enable the prosecution of total war and building a 
military organization capable of dealing with the revolutionary armaments of modern 
warfare.64  The act represented far more than the simplification of the process of national 
security policy formulation.65 
The act also preserved some of the military’s wartime responsibilities in directing 
industrial production patterns through the determination of contracts and research and 
development priorities.  Military industrial production and research and development 
hereafter absorbed a considerable proportion of American state revenues in peacetime.  The 
complexities and experiences of total war however prodded Washington to view the planet 
from a highly militarized perspective.  As seen in the previous chapter, industrial facilities 
in Germany or nickel mines in Canada took on a militarized character based on the 
dominating dual-use conception.  Truman officially sanctioned the maintenance of 
considerable military industrial power in peacetime.  The act initiated a process that 
culminated in the huge bureaucratic management machinery of the Department of Defense 
after 1960 that employed hundreds of thousands of men and women and consumed 
hundreds of billions of taxation dollars in what amounted to an exponential increase of 
direct American control over the planet.66 
The National Military Establishment now challenged the State Department in 
foreign policy formulation and took a large bite out of the budget.67  The emerging Cold 
War induced the N.S.C. to formulate defensive requirements on the basis of total war with 
the Soviet Union.  The necessity of defining the nature of such a conflict and specifically 
which weapon systems required development led to heated debate.  Civilian politicians and 
even military professionals doubted that the N.S.C. could set realistic defense requirements 
that did not overburden the economy.68  The pressure for frugality pitted the services 
against each other in the fight for taxation dollars.  “The administration”, Paul Y. Hammond 
points out, simply could not spend the moneys the services thought they needed”.69  
Truman slashed the initial gargantuan military budget proposals.70  The long list of postwar 
American commitments, including the military support of Greece and Turkey and the 
Marshall Plan, impinged on military preparedness by cutting investments and inducing 
politicians to interfere and keep a close eye on expenditures.  Alternatives were required to 
counteract these trends. 
Western European defensive capabilities from 1947 onwards seemed wholly 




Branch concluded that Soviet infantry and tanks could overrun Germany, France, Italy and 
Spain in a “short time”.71  The thousands of Soviet tanks, artillery pieces and airplanes 
reduced this conclusion to near banality.  Nor did western Europe appear interested in 
military expenditures.  Wartime destruction and the needed period of reconstruction 
convinced governments in Britain and France to concentrate on rebuilding and 
strengthening the industrial infrastructure at the expense of national security priorities.  
European industry could not simultaneously convert military industry back to civilian 
production, rebuild the shattered cities and infrastructures and provide the necessary air, 
ground and naval forces necessary to provide an adequate deterrent.  Since Congress 
constrained the military impulse of the Truman administration at home and American allies 
militated against military spending abroad, Truman’s containment strategy appeared purely 
political and therefore of minimal deterrent value.  The growing fear of Soviet military 
power required a solution. 
The historiography offers three hypotheses to explain the shift in American military 
perceptions of Soviet military preparedness and Stalin’s intentions in central Europe.  
Traditional approaches emphasize the causal relationship between Stalin’s aggressive 
moves on the periphery and the consequent progressive militarization of containment that 
culminated in the de facto replacement of the Marshall Plan with the M.D.A.P.  John Lewis 
Gaddis resuscitated this older traditional view in the 1990s.  He argued that American 
economic-military containment represented a response to a real Stalinist program of 
conquest and domination.72  The revisionists instead point out that the latent anti-
communism of the Truman administration itself influenced how policymakers viewed 
Stalin’s political moves and the potential of the Soviet military.  Revisionists suggest that 
American military assistance aimed largely at bringing western Europe into the American 
camp and preventing the Soviets from gaining access to the resources of regions that the 
Truman administration and general business desired.  This form of containment—actually a 
policy of empire—attempted to “stop the Russians from stopping us from what we want”.73  
The postrevisionists on the other hand generally assert that Stalin’s violent reaction to the 
E.R.P. and Washington’s conciliatory policy in western Germany fed the anti-communist 
proclivity of policymakers to fear the possibility of communist political success or military 
victory.  The postrevisionists generally allege that Stalin violently reacted to the E.R.P. and 
Washington’s effort at binding western Germany to Europe and that this reaction fed the 




These interpretations somewhat avoid basic military realities by minimizing the 
dangers of a significant imbalance of military power in central Europe.  This dissertation 
has already established the central importance that American policymakers attached to 
Germany and western Europe and Stalin’s wholly negative policies concerning the 
“lynchpin”.  “The center of the Cold War”, Leffler proclaims, “was the struggle for 
Germany”.75  Stalin had remarked at Potsdam in 1945 that the United States plainly tried 
“to force us to accept their plans on questions affecting Europe and the world.  Well, that's 
not going to happen”.76  The dictator appeared resolute in his demands for the neutralization 
of German industry by chopping the infrastructure of the country to bits.77  It is therefore 
reasonable to suggest that Stalin’s postwar aims centered on the creation of “traditional 
geostrategic dominance” in central Europe through the extension of his power outwards.  
Stalin clearly rejected the communist ideological platform of world revolution and sadly a 
humanitarian recognition of Europe’s needs.78  The retention of considerable German 
industrial capacities to rebuild a European market, the cornerstone of American policy by 
early 1947, clashed with Stalin’s demand that the victors permanently neuter German 
power, extract maximum reparations for the enhancement of Soviet military power and 
shift the balance of economic power to the east.  The dictator’s policy in Germany did 
threaten to destabilize European society and plunge the global economy into long-term 
chaos.79 
Did Stalin however require greater military muscle after 1945?  This dissertation 
already pointed to the Soviet’s regime ingrain sense of insecurity.  Some historians however 
argue that the American military exaggerated Soviet military strength in order to cultivate a 
sense of vulnerability for their own purposes.  Noam Chomsky, in a typical castigation of 
overall American foreign policy, supports the revisionist standpoint and argues that the 
Pentagon employed an unreal Soviet threat as a pretext to expand the military industrial 
system for reasons of greed.80  Most scholars avoid such a denigrating assessment.  Both 
Matthew Evangelista and John S. Duffield argue that military strategists deliberately 
inflated the number and strength of Soviet divisions to frighten Congress into providing 
financial support for new weapons systems, prevent excessive American demobilization, 
and help convince the public to support universal military service.81  Daniel Yergin points 
out that the Navy and Air Force in particular based their postwar requirements on a large 
Soviet military in order to ensure funding in an atmosphere of considerable hostility 
between the three branches of the military.82  These scholars, it must be pointed out, 




Hixson therefore denounces postwar American policy and emphatically states that “[n]o 
evidence exists that the U.S.S.R., the most devastated of all World War II belligerents, 
seriously contemplated an invasion”.83  David Holloway also adds that “[t]here is no 
evidence to show that Stalin intended to invade Western Europe, except in the event of a 
major war”.84 
 The major contradictions with this argument bubble to the surface rather quickly in 
any rational inquiry.  Stalin’s postwar designs are made dependent on the size of his 
arsenal—at least in relative terms to those of other powers.  Here the evidence does not 
appear in favour of the revisionists.  Despite their claims, Ernest R. May demonstrates that 
Allied intelligence did in fact locate a large number of Soviet divisions and an extremely 
large cache of weaponry.  American intelligence officers, in his opinion, only 
misinterpreted the evidence by failing to understand that these divisions represented 
skeleton formations required for the occupation of eastern and central Europe.85  The 
armies of the Soviet Union and United States, according to this perspective, underwent a 
similar process of manpower demobilization.  Philip A. Karber and Jerald A. Combs 
however point out that Stalin’s army nevertheless retained considerable strength.86  Not 
only did the Red Army preserve an apparatus that permitted the swift fleshing out of the 
skeleton divisions in a crisis, but Allied intelligence believed that the Soviet military 
industrial system continued to produce the latest generation of armaments at what 
amounted to unprecedented levels.  Moscow therefore retained far more than the theoretical 
ability to rearm after the adoption of a murky but reasonable period of demobilization.  It 
should be noted that Hitler’s propaganda armies of 1939 were only able to field a small 
proportion of the military hardware that reinforced Stalin’s mailed fist. 
The American experience was of course markedly different.  The American 
military industrial system “reverted” to manufacturing civilian goods after 1945.  Even 
though the research facilities had thought up new and exciting ways of killing people, the 
stockpiles of the western hemisphere remained filled with obsolete leftovers from the war.87  
Moscow on the other hand continued to support a first-rate and gargantuan arsenal of T-
34/85 and J. Stalin tanks and other offensive weapon systems.  Western intelligence teams 
estimated in 1948 that the potential frontline strength of the Soviet air force numbered over 
20,000 machines of all types and that the ground forces were furthermore fortified by 
128,000 artillery pieces and 28,000 tanks.88  Active American military strength itself 
represented a tiny fraction of total potential Soviet ground strength.  Since the war had 




irregardless of training or expertise and that Soviet military doctrine was primarily based on 
mass and firepower,89 American military planners estimated during the winter of 1946-
1947 that the Soviet military could mobilize six million soldiers in 30 days and an 
additional 12 million in six months.90  The guardians of national security could not possibly 
ignore these facts.  The weight of arms fortified Stalin’s position in eastern Europe in a way 
that unbalanced the European power relationship in an unprecedented manner. 
Democratic observers of Soviet military potential could not simply ignore the 
weaknesses of their own armed forces and hope to protect their economic interests in such a 
dangerous climate.  Civilian organizations joined in this process.  The “internationally 
oriented” and “European-oriented” banks and corporations worried about the safety of their 
investments abroad.91  The possibility of Soviet invasion motivated various lobbyists to 
pressure the Truman administration for the creation of an adequate military deterrent.92  The 
structural determinant of administrative survival obviously conditioned military 
interpretations of Soviet strength, but other groups joined in and pushed Washington along 
this path as well.93  Michael J. Hogan asserts that the military succeeded at lobbying the 
government for financial support and generated “a powerful political constituency” that 
“depended more and more on capturing a share of the defense budget for local contractors 
and on building a reputation as an ardent defender of the country's military interests 
internationally”.94  A very real Soviet menace helped push the United States in this 
direction.  American foreign and military policy therefore reflected the interests of broad 
sections of the government and society and not just those of the military. 
Kennan represented an influential critic who questioned whether imagined and real 
Soviet paper strength translated into solid military muscle.95  The foreign policy specialist 
recalled in his memoirs that a wide acceptance of what he termed “highly inflated” statistics 
determined the western fear of a potential Soviet invasion.96  Washington, according to this 
logic, only justified the militarization of policy by demonizing the Soviet Union through 
widespread acceptance of a worst-case scenario.97  Kennan later argued that the decision to 
respond militarily failed to utilize the basic superiority of the American capitalist system 
and progressively erode popular support for communism from within over the long-term.  
An aggressive democratic response only induced Stalin to tighten his hold on eastern 
Europe.  This reaction weakened the economic power of the United States by withholding 
potential markets from capitalist penetration and also pushing state expenditures into arms 
development and procurement.  Hindered by the emphasis on weapons, Washington could 




Kennan’s analysis demonstrated two unrefined postulates not shared by either 
Truman or the bulk of his staff.  The diplomat believed that Stalin’s aims in Europe did not 
significantly clash with those of the Truman administration and that the dictator like the 
president concerned himself primarily with postwar reconstruction.  These assertions did 
not accord with the realities of Soviet policy as witnessed in Germany by the delaying 
tactics of 1947.  Stalin’s unwillingness to harness German industry for European economic 
recovery, and instead focus primarily on extracting reparations for the Soviet Union, failed 
to solve any outstanding international economic problems.  The diplomat furthermore 
believed that an increase in the size of the American military presence or the creation of a 
western military organization represented an inevitable escalation in tensions.  Kennan’s 
revisionist argument could not explain how Stalin could possibly interpret an American 
defensive contingent positioned in Europe as a serious threat to the safety of the Soviet 
Union or his newly annexed territories.  Until American ground forces appeared in Europe 
in larger numbers during the 1950s, Washington depended on the deterrent value of 
strategic bombing and nuclear weapons.  Precisely why a few western divisions—even 
western German divisions—upset a perceived balance of power in Stalin’s mind was 
difficult to explain.  So to was the demand for acute attention to Soviet sensibilities.   
American military planners focused on the perception of overwhelming Soviet 
military power and in keeping with their profession adjusted their plans accordingly.  The 
J.C.S. had originally adopted a defensive concept that ordered a general strategic 
withdrawal from the European mainland in order to subsequently amass sufficient strength 
in Britain for an operation reminiscent of “Overlord”.99  The military also proposed the 
development of Japanese and Italian divisions to hold the ground on the peripheries in 
Europe and Asia.  Following the pattern set by the war against Hitler, airpower would once 
again strike from the sidelines and clear the way for the ground forces during this phase.  
Atomic weapons seemed to offer the most satisfying solution.  Operation “Halfmoon”, 
accepted by Washington on 19 May 1948, advocated the dropping of 50 atomic weapons 
on 20 critical Soviet targets.100  This extreme refinement of strategic bombing policy, the 
inundation of certain targets nodes with overwhelming explosive force, might suggest either 
that the military completely abandoned all interest in obeying the conventional rules of 
engagement or perhaps the seriousness with which they viewed the disparity in troop 
strength. 
Certain additional plans lend weight to the latter observation.  The J.C.S. for 




armoured columns to avoid any repeat of Dunkirk.  A study of the defensive requirements 
of “anticipated” allies and the potential candidates for Soviet occupation—planners realized 
that most of continental Europe would fall to Soviet arms—by the Joint Logistics 
Committee in July 1947 argued for the erection of a supply system for 100,000 guerrillas in 
central and northern Europe.101  The subsequent inclusion of France among the list of 
doomed states resulted in the escalation of this total by another 25,000 men.102  The J.C.S. 
more importantly considered “strategic demolitions” in Germany and Austria to prevent the 
Soviet Union from profiting from the hypothetical invasion.103  This strategy of scorched 
earth existed in one form or another until well into the 1950s.104 
This last idea generated a sobering realization over the space of months.  The 
economic consequences of losing western Europe, both for civilian reconstruction and in 
terms of the military industrial balance, shifted defensive strategies during 1947 and 1948.  
Planning after “Halfmoon” was however slow to discard the belief in a strategic 
withdrawal.  Successful military operations, it seems, exert some sort of magnetism.  
Operation “Offtackle”, approved in February 1949, retained the notion of retreating to 
Britain while the strategic bombers struck Soviet lines of communication, military and 
industrial targets.105  This plan argued that the American Army could raise 25 infantry, 
armour and airborne divisions within a six month period and retake the continent with the 
assistance of the other services.106  Navy analysts in particular recoiled at the consequences 
of losing most of Europe to a Soviet invasion.  Rejecting the Air Force’s premise of 
defending Europe using strategic bombing and nuclear weapons, the Navy pointed out that 
the Soviet military would plunder the areas of western Europe they occupied and increase 
the strength of their military industrial complex.107  The Navy therefore questioned whether 
25 American divisions could drive the enemy out of western Europe.  Only a defiant 
defensive stand in the heart of Europe, the Navy believed, could prevent an unacceptable 
increase in Soviet economic and military power.  “If we don't fight them there”, the military 
now espoused, “we'll have to fight them in San Francisco”.108  Planning thereafter shifted 
the line of defense across the English Channel and then eastwards. 
The dominant question of whose troops would fill the front lines and what arms 
they would carry remained.  The unwillingness of the Truman administration to devote 
sufficient resources to the manufacturing of armaments in sufficient quantities restricted the 
options available to military planners.  Unlike the Soviet Union, the American military 
required new equipment and not just time to flesh out existing divisional structures.  




stability, feared that rearmament jeopardized economic growth in the United States and 
recovery in Europe.  Military authorities recognized in April 1948 that “any real 
rearmament by the United States would spell the end of E.R.P. and would consequently, 
war or no war, only assist the progress of communism in Europe”.109  The need to divert 
raw materials and civilian industrial capacities to direct military production already created 
painful headaches.  The Navy requirements alone demanded amounts of steel, copper and 
aluminium that exceeded the peak capacities of World War II.110  The projected manpower 
requirements for a static defense on continental Europe called for an increase of between 18 
and 25 divisions.  Mobilizing the men required for 25 divisions in peacetime threatened to 
strip American industry of its workforce and lower the output of commodities needed by 
domestic and foreign markets.111  Defense required alternative sources of manpower, raw 
materials and industrial products to lessen the negative impact on the American economy. 
Military planners eventually established the principle of rearming methodically 
over a longer term to ease pressures on American industry.  But they also turned to Europe.  
By November 1949, after the inception of the Military Defense Assistance Program 
(M.D.A.P.) and the start of N.A.T.O., military planners reduced the numbers of American 
divisions required for static defense by relying on European ground forces and industry.  
“The assignment of equipment and supplies to fulfill military objectives”, a report by the 
Joint Munitions Allocation Committee declared, “will be a peacetime venture and 
consequently not subject to the complex problems of shortages and production capabilities 
of critical items experienced under wartime duress”.112  Like the solution for potential 
postwar European economic demise, however, the military could only rely on real 
industrial strength and not embark on any fanciful restructuring of existing capacities and 
strength.  Did this development, the congruence of civilian and military industrial capacities 
in policy calculations, already foreshadow the emergence of a German contribution?  The 
logic seemed clear enough. 
9.4 The Military Defense Assistance Program 
The Truman administration generally rejected Kennan’s longstanding aim of 
ameliorating the negative direction of Soviet policy.  The diplomats and military dismissed 
Kennan’s tacit support for Stalin’s primary postwar aim of German neutralization through 
the “restructuring” of the defeated state.  Industrial, military and even humanitarian realities 
prohibited such a venture.  After 1947, considerations of Soviet military strength on the 
ground and in the air mixed induced prominent Americans to tweak their postwar policy 




democracies to include western Germany in an economic political and military alliance.113  
The Potsdam decision to erect a demilitarized buffer zone between the eastern and western 
peripheries therefore fell to the wayside.  The militarization of American policy witnessed 
at the end of the decade, itself largely derived from real and imagined fears of the Soviet 
Union, pushed the matter of western German remilitarization to the forefront.  Indirect and 
direct German military industrial potential played a dominant role in these considerations. 
The years between 1940 and 1950 witnessed growing support in the United States 
for a new global security arrangement directed from Washington.  The contours of this 
supra-national security system only seemed to originate elsewhere.  Whitehall decided in 
early January 1947 to work towards fusing western Europe into an economic and more 
importantly military block.  What resulted approximated prewar patterns more than any 
novel approach to national security strategies.  The British and French governments formed 
a bilateral arrangement two months later on 4 March 1947, the Dunkirk treaty, that aimed at 
containing any future form of German aggression using a “framework” that encouraged 
cooperation in mutual economic, political and social affairs.114  For most historians, the 
Dunkirk Treaty marked the beginnings of the direct process that led to a western European 
military alliance and established the basis of N.A.T.O. and a military structure binding 
Europe and the United States.115  Stalin obviously could not yet perceive of this causal 
relationship and that he would subsequently be faced with a democratic alliance that set its 
sights on the Soviet Union.  The joint statement calling for a four-power German 
disarmament and demilitarization treaty that followed the announcement of the treaty 
further strengthened the attachments to Potsdam.  Stalin surprisingly in any case, while not 
acting on the British suggestion for him to join the democracies and form a tripartite bloc, 
did not react negatively to the Dunkirk treaty and found the arrangement in line with the 
United Nations Charter and the spirit of wartime cooperation.116  Any policy in general 
agreement with his negative vision for Germany did not seem to aggravate the dictator. 
Matters changed a year later.  Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, after informing 
Marshall of his intentions to extend the bilateral Dunkirk arrangement, went forward and 
announced to the world on 22 January 1948 that the “free nations of western Europe must 
now draw closer together.  I believe the time is ripe for a consolidation of western 
Europe”.117  Bevin invited other western European states to join the process and form “an 
important nucleus in Western Europe”.  The foreign secretary even spoke of permitting 
Italy and “other historic members of European civilisation”—an obvious reference to 




Netherlands, partly accelerated due to the Soviet crushing of political opposition in Prague a 
few weeks earlier,119 formed the Brussels Pact or Western Union Defense Organization on 
17 March 1948.  The “Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and 
Collective Self-Defence” retained the standard postwar focus on containing Germany.  
Article IV however spoke in more general terms:  
If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in 
Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of 
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the 
military and other aid and assistance in their power.120 
 
Believing that this change represented an extension of the American-led program of Soviet 
containment, Stalin reacted very differently and pulled the Soviet representative out of the 
Allied Control Council and set off on a course of action that led to the Berlin Blockade and 
the first of the shocks of 1948.  That the dictator did not pursue a more radical policy is 
normally attributed to his understanding of western weakness in the face of overwhelming 
Soviet superiority.121 
Older interpretations, either supportive or dismissive in heavily laden moral terms, 
stress the American involvement in nudging European states down the path of especially 
military union after the Berlin crisis in 1948 by focusing on Stalin’s crude tactics or 
emphasizing ulterior American motives.122  Postrevisionist multipolar interpretations since 
the 1980s have moved rather far from any rigid adherence to the notion of sole American 
responsibility.123  Certain historians in fact stress that “British documents reveal that in 
some crucial areas the Americans had to be persuaded and cajoled into the imperialism 
described by the revisionists”.124  Irregardless of the strengths of individual arguments, the 
Truman administration approved wholeheartedly of the direction taken.  The State 
Department, as pointed out, continually pressured European statesmen to rethink their fear 
of German resurgence and accept a form of western European economic cooperation that 
included the former enemy.125  Washington supported these initiatives as evidence of the 
western European decision to cooperate with the United States in solving the serious 
postwar economic problems evident in 1947.  The multipolar perspective downplays the 
enthusiasm of American policymakers for strong mechanisms that soothed fears of German 
reconstruction and tolerated economic ties to the “lynchpin” of American policy in western 
Europe.126 
Developments within the United States however displayed a movement towards 




bind the United States to a multilateral and binding alliance gripped the Truman 
administration after the signing of the Brussels Treaty.  For this and other reasons, the State 
Department attempted to assist the western Europeans in forging ahead on the principle of 
including western Germany in a more comprehensive defensive system.  The Europeans 
put forward a foot forward and created the Western Defense Organization at the end of 
September 1948.127  The White House itself matched Whitehall’s enthusiasm for a military 
commitment to Europe within the context of a viable alliance structure. 
Shelving the old American traditions of isolationism proved far less difficult in the 
aftermath of the war.  Talks between Under Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett and the 
Republican Senator Arthur H. Vandenburg in early 1948 centred on State Department and 
J.C.S. demands for the creation of a large European defensive organization that included the 
United States.  This direction technically conflicted with the American tradition of rejecting 
rigid alliances and it also implied enormous financial injections for Europe and the 
redirection of funds and resources from the Marshall Plan.  Kennan, as pointed out, 
disapproved of the principle of entering and coordinating a military assistance program and 
therefore accepting an “entangling alliance with Europe”.128  Vandenburg more importantly 
realized that Congress again required some convincing in order to loosen the purse-strings 
and support an expensive rearmament package built on an officially sanctioned transatlantic 
alliance.  He framed a resolution that advocated the “progressive development of regional 
and other collective arrangements”, the involvement of the United States in such 
arrangements based on “mutual aid”, and the maintenance of the principle of unilateral 
action if “any armed attack occur affecting its national security”.129  The notion of 
assistance fit well with the paradigm that emerged in 1947.  The call for enhanced national 
security and the freedom to act unilaterally soothed the conservatives.  Framed in this way, 
Congress failed to hear the voices of doubt and passed the Vandenburg Resolution in the 
Senate on 11 June 1948 by a vote of 64 to four. 
The stage was set for an expansive defensive system on the European continent.  
But this decision, like those relating to the E.R.P., were not predicated on a large-scale 
transfer of American production or industrial resources.  Statements to the general public 
again only made it seem like the United States would shoulder a heavy burden.  Truman for 
example early in 1950 announced that his government aimed at employing American 
financial and economic resources to resurrect the defensive capabilities of “friendly” 
nations to defend against the “general Soviet threat”.130  The verbal expressions of policy 




clearly expressed the concepts characteristic of civilian recovery.  Averell Harriman for 
example stated on 12 April 1949 that Europeans would not “save and plan for the future” 
under the Soviet gun.  He added that military support would not therefore contradict the 
need for economic recovery.131  Washington now fused both civilian and military industrial 
sectors into one and the same phenomenon.  Truman himself proclaimed that the E.R.P. 
aimed at the restoration of economic stability in order to increase the military strength of 
foreign states to build a foundation for lasting peace.132  National strength could no longer 
be defined by artillery and tanks alone.  The understanding of national security at the end of 
the decade amalgamated social, economic, political, military and even spiritual factors.133 
American military officials nevertheless found it hard to discard the fear that any 
extensive military assistance package might seriously impact their own rearmament 
program.  The Pentagon for this reason pushed hard for the development of foreign military 
industrial capabilities to eliminate allocation bottlenecks within the United States and 
release any domestic industrial pressures that might accumulate.134  A first step was needed.  
The Joint Munitions Allocation Committee requested that a study group of specialists 
“examine exhaustively all known factors” to determine the military requirements of foreign 
states.135  Washington acknowledged the request and ordered the committee to complete a 
survey by 15 May 1949. 
A dominant postulate informed their work.  The committee believed that the 
strengthening of foreign states to deter the Soviet threat exceeded the economic and 
industrial capabilities of the United States in peacetime.136  The committee therefore 
proposed to employ American financial and intellectual resources to help transform 
Europe’s “considerable military potential in manpower and resources” into direct military 
muscle.137  The burden of the industrial contribution fell on Europe.  Once again 
reminiscent of the E.R.P., the specialists believed it more economical to concentrate on the 
traditional European industrial core and concluded that the “first priority should be given to 
Western Europe”.138  Simple infusions of armaments were not considered enough.  The 
committee focused providing European manufacturers with raw materials and capital goods 
such as aluminium, steel, machine-tools and spare parts.139  Washington ultimately 
distributed military assistance according to a system of priorities for each particular country 
relating to economic, political and psychological considerations.140  That is, participating 
states would receive assistance according to their potential to make a real difference. 
The Secretary of Defense on 9 November 1950 directed the J.C.S. to incorporate 




proceeding.  The J.C.S. set to work calculating the required military contributions of 
European states and how the United States could support their general mobilization.  This 
directive included both states directly participating in the arrangement and states such as 
West Germany that still remained outside formal incorporation.  For all the verbiage 
technically obscuring the German role, the former enemy state represented the lynchpin for 
the M.D.A.P. in a manner similar to the E.R.P.  By the late 1940s and early 1950s, 
American strategists based their defensive calculations on the premise that western Europe 
could not stand against a Soviet invasion without employing German soldiers on the east-
west axis.  Factories and industrial installations mattered more than any other factor.  The 
specialists, as explained earlier in the context of operational planning, hoped to deny the 
Soviet Union access to German military industrial potential.141  The J.C.S. strategists now 
determined that western Germany represented the “first line of defense to the east of the 
United States”.  Soviet seizure of the region jeopardized the national security requirements 
of western Europe and tilted global manufacturing capacities in favour of the Soviet Union.  
The “economic and industrial advantages” of the Ruhr mattered at the end of the 1940s.142  
The decision to defend this region meant a shift towards the defence of West Germany 
itself.  Some sort of German industrial contribution therefore sat at the heart of M.D.A.P. 
thinking irregardless of whether Ruhr factories built armaments or not.  No real 
distinguishing features separated E.R.P. and M.D.A.P. conceptualizations in terms of 
German industry. 
The manpower issue represented another issue altogether.  The need to defend Ruhr 
industries implied that Britain, France and the United States shouldered all military 
responsibilities and burdens unless West Germany could offer a direct military contribution 
in the form of soldiers and the weapons systems these men carried into battle.  While 
various American military commanders and analysts advocated putting Germans back into 
uniform as early as 1947 to solve the growing manpower shortages brought by 
demobilization, this aspect of German rearmament gained currency in 1948 during the 
European attempts at forming a defensive organization. 
The Americans again pressed the issue.  At a meeting of the N.S.C. on 20 May 
1948, Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall demanded that Washington refuse to offer 
military assistance to Europe unless the participating states considered a German military 
contribution in the form of ground forces.  The State Department however understood that 
European governments and the general public cringed at the general concept of Germans in 




military’s unemotional calculations.  The State Department denounced the Pentagon’s 
request at the May N.S.C. meeting and argued that it would unravel the Western European 
Union (W.E.U.) and therefore efforts at forging an effective defensive organization on the 
continent.  Truman, who generally supported the Department of State fear that raising the 
issue of German rearmament would unravel the W.E.U., agreed that it was still too early to 
raise the question of direct German participation.  Washington informed the union of this 
decision in June 1948.143  The politics surrounding the manpower issue should not obscure 
the facts that Washington clearly banked on western German military industrial cooperation 
and only waited for an opportunity to eventually mobilize German infantry. 
The American military therefore incorporated western German military industrial 
capacities in their strategic calculations long before the official reactivation of a military 
structure in 1955.  The imperative stemmed from calculations as to how the United States 
could frugally assist the building of a static defence line that protected western German 
industry from Soviet annexation.  Even the Soviet potential to neutralize German industrial 
capacities through bomber strikes did not deter the strategists.  Considerable worrisome 
thought was however devoted to finding a solution to the poor strategic location and heavy 
concentration of industry in the Ruhr region—a shortlived problem that briefly intensified 
after the Soviet detonation of a nuclear device and subsided after modern advances in 
rocketry.  The J.C.S. even tinkered with the idea of employing M.D.A.P. funds to raise new 
factories “located in those areas which are least vulnerable to capture, bombing or 
interdiction”.  But the same sense of urgency that nullified the Level of Industry plans 
interfered with what would have amounted to a costly and time consuming experiment in 
economic engineering.  In order to “balance” military security and economic feasibility, the 
J.C.S. determined that the M.D.A.P. concentrate on “existing stocks, tools and facilities” 
and that “priority for production should be given to those items which each nation is best 
fitted to produce” in order to achieve “the greatest flow of end products”.144  Practical 
considerations killed the idea of developing new military industrial regions.  The size and 
potential output of German industry again moved minds away from more radical ventures. 
 The J.C.S. in any case speculated that the development of an armaments industry 
from scratch required a “minimum of ten years” if the technological and mechanical skills 
of the population “are low in the industrial arts”.145  The military linked technological 
prowess and the general level of overall industrialization of a state to military industrial 
capabilities.  They argued that “arsenals built in foreign agrarian nations…will require 




substitute for German weapons merchants.  The J.C.S. also argued that resource-poor allied 
states would in any case only compete with the United States and thereby degrade overall 
global production levels.147  “Nations which lack industrial and economic power”, the 
J.C.S. plainly stated, “are not capable of supporting [the] heavy industry necessary for 
armament production”.148  The military therefore concluded that only highly industrialized 
states could operate a sufficient military industrial complex.  The J.C.S. also accepted an 
important premise of E.R.P. planners.  The military analysts, after examining individual 
states, happily concluded that western Europe maintained a large number of “unused” 
industrial facilities that could shift production to military goods without overburdening the 
civilian sector.149  It was assumed that these states could rearm without seriously 
jeopardizing general postwar recovery.150  This state of affairs existed only as long as the 
United States promoted the status quo in western Europe and did not embark on a radical 
course of restructuring.  Any departures from traditional industrial patterns only promised to 
complicate both general recovery efforts and subsequently the allocation efforts of the 
various military organizations involved. 
The creation of a suitable military deterrent to a Soviet attack on western Europe 
required West German support and Washington included that state in the M.D.A.P. support 
structure.  Before summarizing the level of support offered Germany, it should be borne in 
mind that the United States already assisted the erection of military forces in other states 
that were either like Germany officially deemed demilitarized or did not fit well with the 
determination to concentrate on states capable of industrially supporting a military system.  
While Austria did not figure prominently in American remilitarization schemes in terms of 
industrial strength, the Truman administration developed as significant Austrian 
gendarmerie and army in early 1949 to hold the line to Germany’s south and prevent any 
Soviet breach of the Tyrol region.  The Defense and State Departments employed a Council 
of Foreign Ministers decision that permitted the development of the “strongest possible 
Gendarmerie and Army under the Treaty Limitations for the purpose of maintaining 
security and as a possible aid to defending the Tyrol against any Russian attack directed at 
Italy”.151  This policy furthermore aimed at preventing a communist political victory in 
Austria that might drive a wedge between Italy and Germany.152  Even though Austria like 
Germany did not qualify for direct military aid through the M.D.A.P., the occupation forces 
planned for a 53,000 man army and secretly developed a military “nucleus”.  Washington 





The most elementary look at a map of Europe suggests that the United States 
promoted the militarization of Austria as a precursor to an official policy of holding the line 
in Germany itself.  The expenditure of resources on what would have amounted to a 
massive salient thrusting deep into the Soviet line of advance seems completely 
incomprehensible.  Political realities in Germany and not just opposition elsewhere 
nevertheless still held back the obvious decision to rearm the former enemy.  The American 
military nevertheless began a psychological warfare campaign aiming at the reduction of 
“frictions” between the German population and western military forces in order to 
“minimize German antagonisms toward the use of the Federal Republic as a base for 
western operations”.154  A report issued by the Joint Subsidiary Plans Division even 
advocated the removal of “foreign language signs” and other “symbolic reminders of the 
occupation”.155  These reports specified that the German population appeared 
psychologically unready for mobilization.  The American military also feared that Soviet 
propaganda could induce any future German military personnel to defect or easily surrender 
in times of war.  The M.D.A.P. was however structured in such a way as to build on the 
progress achieved by the E.R.P. and the new plan ultimately helped push western Germans 
and the rest of western Europe to resist the Soviet Union.156  The biggest stumbling block, 
once Washington had agreed on employing western German industry for military purposes, 
was a political one. 
 Policymakers therefore hoped to use investment to “stiffen the will of the Western 
Union Nations to resist”.157  Generous American investment and support helped.  Fortified 
by the original $1.314 billion in funds approved by Congress, the J.C.S. provided European 
states with finished armaments and technical assistance for the training of soldiers.  But the 
American military supplied much more than the direct tools of war or the knowledge 
needed to wield them.  The assistance plan aimed at encouraging western European 
armaments self-sufficiency and therefore included machine-tools and production equipment 
as part of the overall package.  West Germany benefited from these actions after the 
Defense and State Departments finally officially agreed to provide funds for rearmament in 
1951.  Even prior to this seminal decision, Washington offered West Germany a grant of 
$200 million in order to stockpile armaments intended for other allies “pending the final 
decision to rearm”.158  This move obviously made complete nonsense of demilitarization 
and even technically breached an important condition Congress attached to M.D.A.P. 
funding.  The American government demanded that the military only issue armaments to 




equipment issued by the United States, something growing increasingly unlikely after 1947, 
a German defensive contribution appeared laughable. 
After 1951, the real dimensions of the J.C.S. plans for Germany emerged.  A list of 
priorities issued by the Joint Military Advisory Group concerning the setting of regional 
defence requirements for Europe defined three major strategic aims that included the 
defence of Germany, Britain and secure sea communications.160  The German military 
contribution took the dimensions of a traditional ground force army.161  The Americans 
requested that a $1.2235 billion grant help build 10 divisions, 10 squadrons of aircraft and a 
basic coastal defence contingent of patrol boats and mine layers.162  Since the future 
composition of the German military remained in doubt, with the matter of an air force still 
hotly contested by other powers, the official J.C.S. list of recommendations did not include 
the $250 million considered necessary for the 10 squadrons.  Instead, the J.C.S. requested 
an additional $250 million for German “economic assistance to offset unmanageable 
European defense costs”.163  The total figure for West Germany deviated little from the 
American subsidization of other states such as France and Britain and was dependent on the 
role envisioned.  The J.C.S. requested $0.4326 billion for Britain and $2,2964 billion for 12 
French divisions.164  The military strategists ultimately requested the massive sum of 
$8.76275 billion for all countries within the MDAP program for 1952.165 
The American decision to extend forward defence to protect West German industry 
from falling into Soviet hands eroded every premise of postwar demilitarization policy.  
The acceptance of the military industrial importance of the Ruhr informed every aspect of 
American military calculations.  The general economic concerns that saved West German 
industry from dismantling after 1945 had however predated these developments.  But 
historians focusing on the rearmament of Germany prefer to focus on the western reactions 
to aggressive Soviet behaviour to explain how American and European rearmament 
schemes focused on the military mobilization of German manpower to address severe 
deficiencies in western troop strength. 
Others examine the birth of Allied demands for German troops from a civil-military 
perspective totally divorced from the calculations engrossing American military specialists.  
Thomas Alan Schwartz for example argues that the British High Commission supported 
mobilization in 1949 only after West German police forces proved unable to protect British 
dismantling teams from demonstrators at a Salzgitter factory.  The High Commissioner 
Brian Hubert Robertson subsequently supported the creation of a 25,000 gendarmerie with 




against a possible East German attack”.166  Schwartz even points out that the State 
Department opposed British efforts in this regard and expressed concern that Robertson 
was “utilizing pressure for the creation of a German police force as a first step toward the 
remilitarization of Germany”.167  These arguments seem trite when confronted by the J.C.S. 
worries concerning the safeguarding of German industrial installations from foreign 
invasion.  J.J. Carafano seems wide off the mark with his assertion that the “history 
Germany’s postwar rearmament is common knowledge”.168   
These hypotheses neglect to mention why the Pentagon found it necessary to reject 
their original strategy of withdrawal and adopt a static defence posture on the German-
German border.  The historiographical conflation of rearmament with direct manpower 
mobilization therefore obscures important swaths of the historical record.  While it seems 
convincing that American pressure led directly to the creation of the Bundeswehr in 1955, 
the employment of German troops was only an offspring of a long-term policy trend that 
ensured the survival of civilian industrial capacities and therefore real military-industry 
capabilities.  The specific form of the future German military contingent represented the 
chief problem in diplomatic discussions only.  The J.C.S. debates concerning European 
security implicitly remained centred on how to save Ruhr military industrial capacities from 
Stalin’s grasp.  The geopolitical ramifications of the Soviet annexation of western Germany 
shocked the American military into a significant alteration of their operational planning.  
Any forward defence strategy—holding the line as it were—on German soil now 
demanded a security arrangement capable of standing against the ground forces of the Red 
Army.  Such a strategy required sufficient manpower and the military turned their eyes 
towards the Germans themselves. 
9.5 The Atlantic Military Alliance System and American Designs 
The start of N.A.T.O. should paradoxically enough not be seen in the Dunkirk or 
Brussels arrangements.  American policy in Germany, a policy that aimed at economic 
reconstruction and then militarization to save the industrial dual-use potential, represented a 
far more powerful incentive in Washington than foreign attempts at eliciting their support.  
These arrangements were nevertheless the essential organizational starting point of a 
transatlantic alliance.  The State Department and representatives of Canada and the Brussels 
Pact governments met in Washington on 6 July 1948 to establish the basis of any future 
defensive arrangement that spanned the Atlantic Ocean.  These meetings, and the first 
shipments of American military goods, took place even while Vandenburg worked towards 




decided to continue to operate on the basis of the United Nations Charter.  On 9 September 
1948 they produced a document of guiding principals that clang somewhat lofty 
considering the basic intention of securing national security interests in the face of an 
aggressive Soviet Union.  The “determination of the Parties to resist aggression” “based on 
self-help and mutual aid” aimed to “promote peace and security” in an as of that point 
undetermined area in an organization that would “be more than military: that is, promote 
the stability and well being of the North Atlantic peoples”.169  Only the formalization of the 
alliance stood in the way and Vandenburg’s work ensured its success. 
Signed in Washington on 4 April 1949 and ratified later in the year, the short 
document represented the complex attempt to erect an alliance structure based on both 
military and political principles.  The treaty first of all followed the patterns set by the 
Dunkirk and Brussels examples and accorded with the United Nations Charter.  Article 51 
of Chapter 7 stipulated that states retained the right to form alliances providing the Security 
Council failed to devise a functioning international system that maintained international 
peace and security.170  The security area of the new alliance included a complex 
arrangement of the territories of the signators such as colonies and even the occupation 
zones of Germany and Japan.  Article 10 determined the possibility of a future expansion of 
the alliance by suggesting that “any European state may be invited to join the Treaty if all 
the members agree that it is in a position to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic 
area”.171  The treaty proclaimed the desire of the members to promote “strengthen their free 
institutions”, “stability” and “well-being” and to denounce the use of force.  The alliance 
surpassed pure military coordination and advanced the alignment of economic, social and 
cultural policy in order to stabilize Europe in a similar manner to Marshall aid.172  N.A.T.O. 
therefore represented an international effort to establish an effective and mutually beneficial 
collaboration in protecting perceived vital national security and political interests. 
A form of collective security and deterrence nevertheless represented the salient aims 
of the new association.   The signators pledged to resist aggression against any of the 
member states.  The treaty also proclaimed the intention to employ the “means of 
continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid” to “maintain and develop their 
individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack”.  Article 5 represented the heart of 
this new system.  It stated that 
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe 
or North America shall be considered an attack against them all. Consequently 
they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the 




Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by 
taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action 
as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain 
the security of the North Atlantic area.173 
 
The treaty did not form a clear defensive system with proscribed roles or a division of 
responsibilities.  Other than determining that the members would erect military structures of 
sufficient weight to deter aggressors or respond to direct military attack, no hard and fast 
program was provided.  Worse still, the treaty allowed members to individually determine 
their own specific course of action.  This concession obviously stemmed from the 
American desire for a healthy degree of independence.  Vandenberg commented on the 
N.A.T.O system to the Senate on 6 July 1949 and stated that “[t]he pledge dependably 
means that whoever is attacked will have dependable allies who will do their dependable 
part, by constitutional process, as swiftly as possible to defeat the aggressor by whatever 
means it deems necessary”.  All of this did not sound particularly military, at least in terms 
of the usually rigid planning and direct division of responsibilities, but the treaty remained a 
watershed.  It also, and most importantly, demonstrated that Washington had finally 
abandoned isolationism unequivocally.174  This important aspect of N.A.T.O. represented 
the American “pledge” to Europe.175 
The doctrine of individual freedom of action should not conceal an incontrovertible 
meaning within the new treaty.  The emphasis on national responsibility for the allocation 
of logistics first of all negated the possible success of any armaments standardization 
scheme.176  The development of an Atlantic defence system designed to protect each of the 
member states more importantly pushed the Pentagon into a final commitment to a land 
defence of the European mainland.  The inclusion of the zones of occupation in Germany in 
the arrangement axiomatically pushed the members into guaranteeing the inviolability of 
the Ruhr.  Political policy therefore eventually dictated the defeat of any military 
contingency planning based predominantly on strategic bombing.177  This development did 
not at first appear apparent.  The initial N.A.T.O. meetings established that the American 
military would assume strategic air and sea responsibilities, Britain and France would take 
over the tactical air component, and the rest of the continent would assist by fielding the 
necessary conventional ground formations.178  Some historians suggest that the Pentagon 
did not focus on a land defence of continental Europe until after the detonation of the first 
Soviet nuclear bomb.179  This argument implies that the invalidation of nuclear coercion by 




discard strategic bombing as useless.  But the decision to include western Germany under 
the N.A.T.O. shield already bound the organization to a land defence arrangement since the 
peripheral bombing strategy was predicated on the withdrawal of American forces from 
Europe and not holding the line. 
The brief survival of the peripheral strategy reflected economic realities more than 
any other factor.  The N.A.T.O. arrangement itself originated from the significant economic 
weaknesses of western Europe.  That Whitehall acted as progenitors of an Atlantic alliance 
should not obscure the meaning of the significant financial problems that had helped draw 
the United States into assuming the defence of Greece and Turkey in 1947 and then of 
western Europe itself.180  British officials did not initiate a consequent rearmament program 
until after the breakout of the Korean conflict in 1950.181  The alliance system aimed at 
distributing military costs among a group of allies.  Only German industrial resources, 
Acheson and others had long argued, could stabilize the European economy and new 
military system.  For this reason, a viable military defence of western Europe, the offshoot 
and corollary of an already binding economic association, depended on more than 
American involvement.  The primacy of a defence of the frontlines pushed German 
rearmament to the forefront of American policy concerning Germany.  Rearmament 
surpassed all other European or German-specific issues such as political unification or 
reunification in importance.182  The treaty rather importantly was devoid of the calls for 
German industrial demilitarization that had influenced the predecessors.  None of the 
clauses of the agreement mentioned the need to erect a system containing future German 
ambitions.  The Atlantic treaty aimed at bringing Germans and German industry into the 
Atlantic fold.183  These realities lead Kaplan towards the strong assertion that “from the 
beginning N.A.T.O. was linked to Germany”.184  Only the Ruhr could help address the 
massive Soviet superiority in terms of infantry and armour at the lowest cost to the western 
Allies. 
N.A.T.O. therefore operated as the political mechanism for securing the Marshall 
Plan concept of binding German industry to western Europe.  High-level Washington 
policymakers, including the president and secretary of state had concluded that European 
economic and military integration required “the broader framework of the North Atlantic 
community”.185  These men understood only too well that the political integration of West 
Germany preceded a more formal declaration of the intent to husband and reinvigorate 
German military industrial potential.  The French government still feared that Washington 




strong German military.186  The political battles that accompanied the establishment of the 
western European defence structures, especially in regards to the place of Germany, raged 
throughout the early 1950s.187  None of this wrangling should obscure the fact that the 
J.C.S. continued to urge that western Europe and Germany “build and maintain maximum 
feasible strength”.188  The traditional interpretation that Washington continued to 
countenance the demilitarization of German industry using a dismantling strategy clashes 
with both the E.R.P. and M.D.A.P. concepts.189  Washington supported economic recovery 
and the military based German rearmament on economic and more basic military grounds. 
American military planning it must be emphasized followed the precedent of 
economic policy set by E.R.P. policy.  The military variant required the mobilization of 
German manpower and more importantly German industry for any meaningful “immediate 
military buildup”.190  Much of this assistance took the form of what might be termed a 
supplying of marginally military goods—that is, providing the dual-use commodities 
needed by foreign manufacturers to assemble weapons systems.  A primary explanation for 
the “slow and leisurely” deployment of German manpower and material strength rested 
with strong devotion to nuclear weapons and general concepts of strategic bombing 
efficacy.  John J. McCloy, viewing the situation on the ground in Germany, retained the 
strong belief that nuclear deterrence would hold back Soviet ambitions.191  The slow pace 
of American financial support for military priorities throughout Europe, while quickening 
after 1949, characterized efforts outside of Germany as well.192 
The Soviet Union at least theoretically faced significant retaliation in the face of any 
armed aggression.  On 18 March 1950, two weeks before the Truman administration 
officially sanctioned the binding or “entangling” Atlantic alliance, the treaty was presented 
to the general public.  Soviet intelligence, either through the vaunted spy network or a 
standard reading of newspapers and other sources, had already understood that the bold 
words of the N.A.T.O. declarations did not translate into real military power.193  The 
historiography therefore points out that heads in Moscow remained relatively cool despite 
the alliance that now united the arsenals of democracy against them.  The Soviet Union did 
not initiate a large increase in military production.  The 20 percent increase in defence 
spending that followed aimed largely at positioning more troops in eastern Germany and 
promoting the modernization of satellite armies.  The open change towards German 
remilitarization represented the only threat from the perspective of Moscow and only for 




Academics generally explain the lack of a strong anti-N.A.T.O. response by 
Moscow in terms of power.  That is, Stalin understood the vast superiority of his forces.  
Western forces in Europe amounted to a tiny fraction of the forces at Soviet disposal and 
could hardly parry a Soviet offensive let alone launch an offensive strike.194  The 
construction of a viable alliance required time, considerable resources, and the 
organizational talent to integrate the military forces and weapons of so many different 
nations.195  The dilemma lay with the very fact that this integration aimed at weaning 
western Germany from potential Soviet penetration and keeping Ruhr factories working in 
western interests.  Stalin understood that a significant danger to the national security of his 
state rested in the industrial potential of Germany.  Understanding this perspective is 
nevertheless difficult.  Marshall, as pointed out in earlier chapters, already openly discussed 
his belief that the results of the war itself indicated that Germany could not possibly muster 
the strength necessary to unleash another destabilizing war for at least generation.  The 
activities of the western Allies also appeared at least theoretically intent on industrial 
demilitarization.  On 6 December 1949, the European branch of the Office of International 
Trade from the Department of Commerce issued a pamphlet that placed another 136 
German industrial facilities on the reparations lists.  The implicit commitment to industrial 
demilitarization clashed with other agreements and pronouncements aiming at a complete 
cancellation of the haphazard program.  Stalin also  easily enough understood that the 
E.R.P. and military assistance schemes aimed at integrating Germany into an American-led 
bloc.  This policy represented the very problem. 
9.6 The National Security Council Memorandum No. 68 and the German Role 
The N.S.C. reached precisely these conclusions in deliberations concerning West 
Germany and American national security.  This organization, formed by statute in 1947 to 
match military capabilities with overall state interests and therefore to coordinate American 
foreign and defence policy during peacetime, progressively extended the military’s 
influence over Washington in the worsening atmosphere of the Cold War breach.  The 
J.C.S. had found it impractical to produce strategic appraisals that were not conditioned by 
other considerations such as financial expenditures.  Truman had originally requested 
Acheson to review global policy from a diplomatic-economic-military perspective and the 
secretary of state promptly transferred the task to the Policy Planning Staff.  The State 
Department had formed a special Policy Planning Staff of the State Department in order to 
develop long-term solutions to current foreign policy problems in consultation with the 




director.  The continued inability of the J.C.S. to sustain close relations with the State 
Department had limited the immediate influence of military issues in the formulation of 
overall policy.  The J.C.S. did however direct Major General Truman H. Landon of the 
Joint Strategic Survey Committee to represent the military in discussions with the Policy 
Planning Staff.196 
Kennan continued to argue that the Soviet Union could not afford a war against the 
democratic powers and advocated a long-term policy of political containment.  “It is clear”, 
the foreign policy specialist argued, “that the main element of any United States policy 
toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant 
containment of Russian expansive tendencies”.197  The replacement of Marshall with 
Acheson as Secretary of State in 1949 however immediately reduced Kennan’s influence in 
foreign policy formulation.  Acheson moved quickly to isolate the diplomat.  In the summer 
of 1949 Acheson allegedly placed Paul Nitze on Kennan’s team to ease relations between 
the Policy Planning Staff and the Defense Department.  Nitze, who had worked alongside 
Kennan on the strategic bombing reports and thereafter as Deputy Director of the Office of 
International Trade Policy and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, 
had helped introduce the State Department to the economic concerns of the strategic 
planners concerning Germany.  Nitze`s strong support of Marshall’s western European 
rehabilitation policy and his vigorous call for the defence of Germany in 1949 had 
impressed Acheson.198  The strong support for an extension of the American “frontline” of 
defence into Germany itself, a victory for the J.C.S., obviously represented a rejection of 
any hopes for West German neutrality.  Kennan resigned at the end of 1949 and 
responsibilities were handed over to Nitze at the start of the next year. 
The discussions concerning the economic aspects of official American policy 
between Nitze and Kennan relating to the Paris Peace Conference of 1949 demonstrated the 
wide divergence in perspectives.  Nitze introduced the issue of economic capacities in the 
deliberations over military policy and initiated the analysis of the Soviet military industrial 
infrastructure.199  Nitze immediately rejected the basis of Kennan’s views concerning 
Germany.  Kennan’s “Plan A” had advocated the reunification of Germany based on the 
“phased withdrawal of foreign forces from Germany”, “free elections”, and “limitations on 
German rearmament under four-power control”.200  Nitze instead focused on the economic 
importance of western Germany for the democracies.  Nitze indicated that the American 
military conceptions of the postwar period were not focused exclusively on dealing with the 




system, and according to Nitze represented a “policy we would have to pursue even if there 
were no Soviet threat”.201  For this reason, Nitze argued that the “prime concern” of policy 
“remained with the economic situation in Europe”.202 
Nitze noted that N.S.C. 68 or the “United States Objectives and Programs for 
National Security'“, a document that Christopher Thorne describes as a “secular hymn to 
American values”,203 sounded the tocsin.204  The alarm bells were already ringing loudly.  
The paper argued that Soviet nuclear capabilities offered Stalin a devastating strategic 
weapon against a host of targets including the “vital centers” of the United States itself.  An 
unprepared United States, the document argued, might tempt the Kremlin “to strike swiftly 
and with stealth”.  The loss of the strategic trump card meant a significant alteration in 
overall policy.  N.S.C. 68 demanded a “rapid build-up of political, economic, and military 
strength in the free world” through a massive escalation of financial support.  Estimates 
ranged upwards to a maximum of $40 billion or far more than the total bill of Marshall Plan 
aid.  A clear view of Stalin’s empire and the democratic response to communism emerged.  
NSC-68 stated in clear terms that  
The integrity of our system will not be jeopardized by any measures, covert or 
overt, violent or non-violent, which serve the purpose of frustrating the 
Kremlin design, nor does the necessity for conducting ourselves so as to affirm 
our values in actions as well as words forbid such measures, provided only 
they are appropriately calculated to that end and are not so excessive or 
misdirected as to make us enemies of the people instead of the evil men who 
have enslaved them.205 
 
The plan was “stalled in the bureaucracy” owing to the prohibitive costs involved but 
nonetheless kept under advisement by Truman.206 
N.S.C. 68 relied on the unproven hypothesis derived from wartime experience that 
the American economy could simultaneously support the civilian sector and military 
requirements.  “One of the most significant lessons of our World War II experience”, the 
document asserted, “was that the American economy, when it operates at a level 
approaching full efficiency, can provide enormous resources for purposes other than 
civilian consumption while simultaneously providing a high standard of living”.207  The 
postwar experience of shortages and strike had however demonstrated that serious 
economic disruptions could nevertheless occur.  Unease concerning the Soviet Union 
complicated matters.  The Truman administration feared a potential Soviet invasion of 




policymakers framed N.S.C. 68 to deal with this threat and also emphasized economic 
issues such as the European balance-of-payments deficit with the United States.208 
An undue focus on other issues obscures the military’s focus somewhat.  N.S.C. 68 
described the Soviet system in blatant religious terms and thereby firmly established the 
contours of the ideological Cold War.  “The system becomes God”, Truman described in an 
attack on communism, “and submission to the will of God becomes submission to the will 
of the system”.209  This heavy-handed emphasis on ideology aimed at selling the notion of 
military expenditures.  But the military understood that civilian capacities mattered most.  
That budget constraints necessarily downsized the possible financial expenditures on the 
military during times of peace should not be taken as necessarily retarding military 
development during the period of a revolution in military technology.  General Omar N. 
Bradley, the Chairman of the J.C.S. stated before the House Appropriations Committee of 
the Senate on 15 March 1950 that “…the eventual strength of our country depends upon its 
industrial capacity. We must not destroy that by spending too much from year to year. So if 
we came here and recommended to you a $30,000,000,000 or $40,000,000,000 budget for 
defense, I think we would be doing a disservice and that maybe you should get a new 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff if I were the one who did it”.210 
N.S.C. 68 fused both civilian and military industrial realms into a single concept.  
The most important element of the document called for a strengthening of America’s allies 
both militarily and economically.  This fusion of M.D.A.P. with the E.R.P. formed an 
important element of a concept of defense on the periphery.  Implicit in the policy, 
however, was the belief that any industrial transfusions or the supply of weapons were 
simply not enough.  Nitze stated that “[i]n NSC-68 the need for and use of power—military 
power in particular—are of fundamental importance to the successful pursuit of foreign 
policy objectives and the protection of national interest”.211  A sound military policy could 
only be built on sound political principles.  The document therefore represented a 
“comprehensive and integrated general statement of the American position in the 
international political world, of its objectives and capabilities in that world, and of the 
means which were necessary to achieve those objectives”.212  But foreign policy concerns 
also implied that an important plank of the American military defensive system in Europe 
remained concealed.  The planners, while convinced of the importance of mobilizing 
German resources for the defence of western Europe, simultaneously still viewed 
rearmament as one of the “greatest dangers” to N.A.T.O. owing to a potential backlash.  




perspective, created a level of sovereignty that permitted a dangerous degree of flexibility.  
American planners more importantly worried that West Germany might move into the 
Soviet orbit to reunify the country and therefore kill the fledgling German democracy and 
seriously weaken the western alliance.213 
One last issue however demonstrated that, irregardless of political issues, the 
military clearly understood the need for German industry.  The development of European 
military strength raised the issue of standardization.  One of the dominant principles 
advanced by the American military related to the need for the standardization of 
armaments, methods, and doctrine.  The military established military attachés or M.A.A.G.s 
at embassies of Britain, France, Italy and other N.A.T.O. signators in order to help 
streamline weapons purchases and domestic development and production.214  The military 
equipped their European allies with the intention of cultivating a wide degree of 
standardization that sought to create a “comparable” level of military performance.215 
This policy did not necessarily entail “buying American”.  Major General L.L. 
Lemnitzer, the director of the Office of Military Assistance, believed that the European 
economies only required a “liberal trade policy” that granted access to technical information 
for the production of their own weapons according to standardized patterns.216  The United 
States could simply not divert the resources necessary to produce the needed weapons for 
all of western Europe.  But could Europe correct their woefully inadequate armaments 
deficit in reasonable time and in keeping with a standardization policy?  The answer was an 
emphatic “no”.217  The immediate and earnest mobilization efforts that followed the 
outbreak of the Korean War by the United States and western Europe placed “heavy 
competitive demands for military supplies and equipment”.218  The J.C.S. analysts for 
example believed that European manufacturers could only produce the American 105mm 
howitzers after two years of restructuring and retooling their industrial facilities.  In order to 
spur the creation of basic infantry formations in western Europe, the J.C.S. decided that 
American industry provide most of the field artillery and that the “remaining 86 percent of 
the equipment (comprising signal, fire control and individual equipment, transportation, and 
ammunition–which present much simpler production problems) [be] produced in 
Europe”.219  The military as found in the N.S.C. conceptions was predisposed to a reliance 
on West German industry. 
9.7 Conclusion 
Late 1940s American military policy drew on two developments.  The growing 




rethinking of policy and the readiness of the Armed Forces.  The general awareness that the 
troop complements of the Soviet Union represented a significant although hypothetical 
threat to American interests in Europe resulted in the pervasive militarization of American 
military and foreign policy.  The analysis of the dominant national security issues facing the 
United States brought the soldiers into new territory.  Military calculations, based on the 
need to protect foreign markets, represented a change in the direction of overall policy that 
induced more than simple demands for fiscal support of rearmament. 
According to military conceptions, these foreign markets represented allies in a 
potential struggle against the Soviet Union in a development that predated the actual 
formation of political and military alliance systems.  German industry, similar to earlier 
developments, figured prominently in the calculations of war.  Washington’s employment 
of the Ruhr for reconstruction purposes permitted the continuation of older industrial 
patterns that granted the German state a large degree of intrinsic geopolitical power.  This 
policy demanded that the military analyse the consequences of losing German industry to a 
Soviet invasion and the obvious results, dependent on the understanding of dual-use 
capacities, did not inspire the theorists with confidence.  Planners after 1947 feared that the 
Soviet acquisition of Ruhr industrial strength might actually tip the balance of power in 
Stalin’s favour.  Not only did the J.C.S. respond by moving the European line of defence 
westwards into Germany itself, but the soldiers predicated any peripheral defensive strategy 
on an integration of both an industrial and military German contribution.  From this 
perspective, the Marshall Plan therefore initiated a process of European economic 
integration that made complete nonsense of pervious military strategies, German neutrality 
and industrial demilitarization.  H.W. Brands summarizes this development in compact 
although syllogistic and incomplete terms: “American prosperity rested on the prosperity of 
other countries. American democracy depended on the survival of democracy elsewhere. 
American security could not be achieved separate from the security of Europe and Asia”.220  
Brands’ conclusion downplays the importance of German industry in these calculations.  
CHAPTER 10 
 
Rearmament and Military Industrial Capacities 
 
A political problem thought of in military terms eventually becomes a military 
problem. 
 




American generals and diplomats, although somewhat differently, had advocated 
either open German rearmament or at least a severe relaxation of industrial controls since 
the early days of 1947.  This demand for remilitarization, as pointed out, stemmed from a 
wide assessment of real German military and particularly military industrial capacities.  
Developing a rational plan of industrial demilitarization after 1945 that balanced economic 
and national security concerns had proven an illusion for the simple reason that Lucius D. 
Clay and the Office of Military Government United States (O.M.G.U.S.) had diluted the 
Level of Industry conceptions to ensure German economic survival and recovery.  
Washington’s complete reversal in regards to German industry after 1946, by integrating 
German factories into the Marshall Plan recovery effort, further underlined the importance 
of the Ruhr.  The Joint Chiefs of Staff (J.C.S.) studied the strategic value of the occupied 
territories and concluded that Soviet seizure of western German dual-use industrial 
capacities could swing the balance of power in Europe significantly in their favour.  
Occupation policy and not strategic farsightedness played the dominant role in this 
development.  The Cold War tensions in Europe and elsewhere only subsequently 
introduced the need to mobilize sufficient strength in Germany to protect the Marshall Plan 
investments.  The residual dual-use potential of German industry drove the strategic need 
for re-establishing a German defence contribution—primarily as a cost-effective measure to 
offset growing American military commitments in an expanding global system aiming at 
Soviet containment. 
The historiography, by downplaying the American emphasis on German heavy 
industry and especially the strategic calculations derived from an analysis of these 
capacities, clings to the political developments of 1950 to explain the surge in American 
and European support for German rearmament.1  This analysis stresses the delicate 
handling of the future forms of manpower mobilization and organization.  The discussions 




uncertainty concerning such important military issues as command structure, the highest 
level of unit size, and even whether to permit an autonomous national military structure.  
Matters of industrial production followed a similar pattern.  But this political uncertainty 
cannot be employed as evidence that West Germany reinitiated military production from a 
deindustrialized state. 
This chapter emphasizes that the political discussions concerning rearmament were 
largely built on the basic premise of existing West German military industrial capacities.  
The central question for the Americans regarding military production related to what 
commodities should be permitted and not necessarily how to produce them.  But political 
issues far outranked basic fundamental economic realities in importance during the months 
prior to the outbreak of the Korean War and after.  Convincing the reluctant French and 
West German populations to accept the need for an adequate defence of western Germany 
that included German soldiers represented the chief stumbling block faced by State 
Department officials.  Here Konrad Adenauer and the new West German government 
played a vital role—one that emulated an American strategy.  Bonn paradoxically used the 
need for a German defence contribution to press for the removal of all industrial restrictions 
while simultaneously stressing the success of industrial demilitarization to the public.  This 
chapter briefly examines the work of such organizations as the “Dienstelle” Blank to 
demonstrate how the Germans themselves viewed their own military industrial capacities 
and how Bonn and the inter-Allied debates glossed over matters of industrial potential.  The 
rearmament discussions stressed controls on production as the last act in the attempt to 
control German industry.  The demilitarization strategies of the immediate postwar had 
utterly failed and the western Allies had returned to the system envisioned at Versailles 
decades ago. 
10.2 Konrad Adenauer and the Issue of German National Security 
The visible march towards a political unification of the three western zones under 
American leadership quickened after the crises of 1948.  The French zone of occupation 
joined “Bizonia”, the economic and administrative fusion of the British and American 
zones, on 8 April 1949.  The Allied Control Council (A.C.C.), spared the relentless 
interference of the Soviet representatives, approved a new German federal constitution less 
than a month later and set the stage for the first elections in a new West Germany.  The 
voters responded in a manner hoped for by Washington and elected Konrad Adenauer as 




faction surrounding the “Christlich Demokratische Union” or C.D.U. on 15 September 
1949.  The Bundesrepublik Deutschland (B.R.D.) was born. 
This new government represented a middle-class coalition of conservative, liberal, 
and Catholic forces—a fulfillment of American aspirations that helped further integrate 
western Germany into Washington’s democratic world order.  The conservative orientation 
of Adenauer’s government also assisted the domestic stabilization of the new country.   The 
new chancellor helped pull the conservative right into the new democratic system and 
therefore neutralize the forms of opposition that had destroyed Weimar.2  The western 
democracies, in line with their own predilections and the heated international climate, 
generally supported Adenauer’s conservative policies and especially the new government’s 
determination to keep West Germany free of communism and focus on rebuilding a new 
liberal-capitalist economy.3 
A brief look at Adenauer’s political mindset indicates a range of perspectives 
closely in tune with those of the Truman administration at the end of the decade.  This 
disposition bore special importance for the B.R.D. since Adenauer, as emphasized by the 
historiography, exerted a dominating influence over German foreign policy during the 
formative years of the new country and especially after he personally took control of 
foreign policy on 15 March 1951.4  A search for sovereignty characterized Adenauer’s 
thinking.  “The foreign policy of a country”, Adenauer wrote, “is primarily derived from 
their real or alleged interests”.5  The chancellor appraised the constellation of powers during 
the early years after the war and concluded that binding western Germany to the United 
States offered the best opportunity of easing occupation restrictions, returning western 
Germany to the international negotiating table, and therefore providing for domestic 
stability and national security.6  Considering Washington’s strenuous efforts to protect the 
German heavy industrial system and then center European recovery on Ruhr production 
from 1945 onwards, Adenauer’s derived his conclusions from an open and honest 
evaluation of postwar trends.  It seems hardly surprising that the chancellor’s foreign policy 
conceptions and general aims for an expanded economic and political role, one 
commensurate with the position of major industrial power, therefore exhibited clear 
American traits—ones that demonstrated an unwillingness to decouple geostrategic military 
from economic realities.7 
Adenauer’s foreign policy framework exhibited the longing for sovereignty that 
fought against excessive controls on German actions in the avenues of international 




search for Allies, partners willing to remove the Potsdam restrictions, represented a 
cornerstone of this policy.  Here the chancellor’s realism impacted his impressions of the 
four occupying powers.  He first of all understood the extreme geopolitical dangers for 
Germany emanating from Moscow.  Josef Stalin seemed an unlikely partner in the search 
for any improvement of economic and social conditions.  The horrific record of Soviet 
atrocities and the significant differences between communism and Ludwig Erhard’s 
“Sozialmarktwirtschaft” drove the belief that the east-west split was inevitable.8  That this 
split subsequently benefited western Germany should not obscure Adenauer’s belief that 
blocking Soviet access to western German industrial facilities or influence in economic 
decision-making superseded most other considerations.  While the dictator’s domination of 
the eastern regions confronted Bonn with the serious dilemma of long-term division, the 
chancellor feared the more significant impact of Soviet interference on western German 
recovery. 
Adenauer therefore employed a tested strategy of the State Department to keep the 
Soviets out.  Like the State Department during the March 1947 Foreign Ministers 
discussions and afterwards the chancellor advanced the notion of German unity and refused 
to recognize the existence of a Soviet-dominated eastern region.  He even demanded the 
return of those annexed eastern territories not parcelled out by the Potsdam agreements.  
This adherence to the letter of international agreements forced Moscow onto the defensive.  
The leaders of the Soviet Union, in the manner of 19th Century conservatives and not 
modern revolutionaries, equated land with state power and understood that the permanent 
and sweeping erosion of German national power represented a premier aspect of Soviet 
policy in the defeated state.  The destruction of Prussia, the Carthage of the modern era, was 
part and parcel of the postwar Soviet world.  That Adenauer in all probability cared little for 
the fate of these regions, a well-documented theory in the historiography, should not deflect 
attention from his rational realization that all western efforts at accommodation with the 
Soviet over zonal division represented a serious danger for the new democratic and liberal-
capitalist West Germany.9  This political expedient deepened the bipolar division of 
Germany but hardened the foundation for West German reconstruction.  The Soviet Union 
found no place in Adenauer’s or western concepts of European integration and the 
chancellor, like so many western figures of his period, seriously doubted the potential for 
rational accommodation.10 
The past weighed heavily on Adenauer’s mind.  Two potential developments 




to merge east and west and therefore destroy his efforts at binding West Germany to the 
western Allies.11  The policy of international and national security neutralization, a 
cornerstone of the Potsdam conceptions, threatened to give renewed energy to the 
arguments for industrial controls and promote a new round of uncoordinated and loose 
dismantling.  Neutrality as a concept stoked the justifications for policies that, as explained 
in earlier chapters, were incompatible with German and European economic recovery or 
domestic political stability.  German division represented a necessary evil and, considering 
Stalin’s conceptions, a de facto inevitability despite heated claims by some historians.  
Western integration and cross-cultural interaction represent the single most important 
factors influencing the post-Nazi normalization of German society. 
The chancellor also feared a revival of a French-Russian alliance system aimed at 
isolating Germany.12  A seemingly permanent anti-German containment strategy was built 
into the concept of neutrality.  Terminating the post-1945 encirclement of the defeated state 
represented a clear policy aim of the chancellor.  Postwar France, from Adenauer’s 
perspective, seemed too economically and politically weak to assume a leadership role in 
Europe.13  His astute mind understood that this weakness unfortunately drove French 
demands for increased national security and generated support for the types of policies 
frowned on by the C.D.U. in Bonn.  A close relationship with London, preferable from 
Adenauer’s standpoint, did not necessarily counteract these French fears and prevent an 
encircling continental anti-German alliance.  The chancellor furthermore doubted Britain’s 
commitment to European integration.  The British, he believed, perceived of themselves as 
“a neighbour of Europe rather than a European nation”.14  Even though Adenauer nurtured 
hopes for cultivating especially close ties with Britain, Hans-Peter Schwarz demonstrates 
that Adenauer discarded this dream in the early 1950s and focused his energies on creating 
a solid and lasting French-German partnership.15  Only integration through negotiation and 
not isolation through withdrawal could bring recovery and stability. 
The United States, a country euphoric after the defeat of the Axis and in the midst 
of an unprecedented economic boom, offered the greatest chances for securing a better 
German future.  Only Washington appeared willing and able to neutralize the postwar 
constraints placed on industry and society and reintegrate the defeated state back into the 
international order.16  This rather dull conclusion was hardly surprising considering the 
visible shift in American policy after March 1947.  The Truman administration openly 
expressed support for what amounted to the bulk of Adenauer’s policy aims and in 




foundations of heavy industry.  Exceptionally strong ties to the United States, the virtual 
adoption of the role of supplicant, consequently characterized Adenauer’s foreign policy 
stance.17  Bonn repaid Washington’s assistance in resource allocation for industrial orders 
in several important ways that included support for American troops stationed on West 
German soil—an acceptance of military occupation—and the political backing of Truman’s 
staunch anti-Soviet position.18 
Considering the dominance of economic and industrial issues in the mindset of 
American and German politicians at the end of the 1940s, it seems frankly hard to imagine 
any real and satisfactory alternatives to Adenauer’s pro-western approach.  The chancellor 
strayed from neutrality as the only method for circumventing the Potsdam decisions and 
providing for reconstruction.  He also realized that détente and disarmament kept the 
neutrality issue alive and that this alternative only promised to energize demands for 
dismantling.  The presence of American divisions in western Germany, the de facto 
acceptance of prolonged occupation, represented a trade-off of sorts.  Adenauer therefore 
opposed the American military doctrine of nuclear deterrence and instead placed great 
emphasis on a conventional strategy that drew in larger numbers of American troops.  This 
policy tightened the bonds between Washington and Bonn and more importantly permitted 
the relaxation of controls on economic sovereignty owing to the sense of security afforded 
by a strong military presence on German soil.19 
In a similar fashion to George F. Kennan, Adenauer hypothesized that an 
armaments race between the Cold War belligerents would ultimately seriously weaken the 
Soviet economy and perhaps even spearhead the collapse of communism.20  This potential 
outcome pales in importance to the understanding that heightened tensions between 
Washington and Moscow worked in his favour by elevating the importance of Germany 
and creating a contest between communism and capitalism for German industrial 
capacities.  The chancellor correctly and not surprisingly believed that the United States 
would eventually emerge victorious.  The desire for German industrial revival figured 
prominently in Adenauer’s foreign policy and drove the chancellor into the arms of the 
Americans.  Here the chancellor exhibited a keen understanding of the fusion between 
military and civilian industries and the knowledge that any continuation of industrial 
demilitarization only harmed West German and European recovery efforts.  While the 
chancellor’s gaze westwards helped condemn Germany to years of division,21  Adenauer 
understood that the Soviet Union offered Germany nothing but a future of economic ruin 




backing of Washington fuelled the fires of the warming Cold War to a certain degree.  A 
political strategy that emphasized the increase of the American military presence on 
German soil soothed the western European public’s fears of any revanchist proclivities 
while simultaneously irritating Moscow.  Explanations of Stalin’s national security 
demands however fail to explain why the dictator dismissed the presence of western 
military formations on German soil as a significant control mechanism on German policy.  
Stalin also seems to have shrugged off the importance of German heavy industry in western 
economic recovery strategies.  Adenauer, like other leaders of the intermediate powers, 
helped justify the path taken by Washington.22  Evaluations of the morality of Adenauer’s 
path seem pointless when balanced against the simple fact that Moscow offered Germany 
and the West little other than the semblance of peace.  The chancellor placed a premium on 
the removing the shackles of military occupation.23 
Adenauer furthermore presented the High Commission with a memorandum 
covering central European security issues that argued strongly for a German defence 
contribution.24  Adenauer’s conservative ethos refused to sanction the “positive” effects of 
demilitarization.  The chancellor, unlike the Allied policymakers of 1945, realized that 
military organizations offer the state a necessary weapon against subversion from within.  
The civil-military function of the armed forces generally went unnoticed by the victorious 
governments after 1945.  Adenauer saw an opportunity to bind traditional conservatives to 
the new democracy.  The chancellor believed that the new democracy required the staying 
hand of a domestic German military organization and generally believed that a “democratic 
state can least afford to do without the lofty values of true soldierdom”.25  A military 
contribution also promised the return of Germany as a sovereign state in the international 
community by removing the bulk of the restrictions imposed on Germany.  Bonn’s policies 
helped the former officers and enlisted men of Hitler’s Wehrmacht polish their tarnished 
image by helping create a positive German military role in western defence strategies.  “In 
its eagerness for sovereignty and legitimacy”, Jay Lockenour points out, “the Federal 
Republic pursued policies that gave former officers a stake in the new democratic 
society”.26  The officers returned the favour by assisting the consolidation of democratic 
values in Germany.27  Not all of the officers, of course, agreed with Bonn.  Dissenting 
voices criticized doctrines and structures chosen during the course of the rearmament 
discussions.28  Remilitarization nevertheless offered a long list of positive benefits. 
Adenauer’s government charged forward and formed special groups of experts to 




stand in the way of Adenauer’s exertions.  Nor did the new German “Grundgesetz” or 
constitution present a problem for Bonn.  In 1948 the military governors had instructed 
German authorities to form a parliamentary council and draft a constitution in consultations 
with the occupation authorities.  The new council met on 1 September 1948 and started 
with an extensive examination of previous legal systems to forestall the creation of another 
deficient and weak system of government that had failed to protect the Weimar Republic.29  
The “Grundgesetz” was finished on 8 May 1949, accepted by the occupation authorities on 
12 May, and officially inaugurated on 24 May 1949.  The German and Allied authorities 
erected a legal system primarily concerned with safeguarding Germany against anti-
democratic forces.  The “Grundgesetz” contained only a few articles dealing with the 
military.  This absence of concrete military provisions technically indicated continued 
support for permanent demilitarization since no contingency planning concerning an 
indigenous defence structure existed.30  The military security of Germany, as defined by the 
Brussels Treaty of 17 March 1948, was provided by the occupation forces under the 
direction of the Allied High Commission.31   
The absence of references to demilitarization in the “Grundgesetz”, an extremely 
strange oversight considering that Allied policymakers used nearly every possible occasion 
to announce their firm devotion to a neutralized German state, hinted that some form of 
domestic defensive system was at least legally possible.  Article Nine of the Japanese 
“Peace” Constitution, also written under American tutelage, proclaimed Japan “free of the 
military and war” and outlawed a standing army.32  The Japanese constitution severely 
restricted rearmament by fixing permanent disarmament firmly into place.  The legal 
specialists that wrote the German constitution left the door to remilitarization wide open.  
The history of amendments to the Grundgesetz during 1949 and after displayed a swift 
movement towards militarization.  The judicial branch of the new German government 
followed the pattern of restoration already established by the American authorities in terms 
of German industry.  The democratic governments altered the Grundgesetz to permit the 
issuing of licences to heavy industry for the manufacturing of dual-use and military end 
products until plans for German models surfaced.33 
10.3 The Korean War and the 1950s War Scare 
A general militarization of American policy followed the outbreak of the Korean 
War in mid-1950.  The Asian conflict, that officially covered the period from 25 June 1950 
to 27 June 1953, sprang from complex origins with the South Korean elections in May 




fortunes of socialism in the south.  The Soviet-equipped North Korean invasion force once 
again demonstrated the communist contempt for international agreements and the 
employment of brute force to address political concerns.  Even though the region did not 
initially represent an “essential” American priority in military strategic doctrinal terms after 
1945, Truman’s government responded swiftly and with urgency.34  The dangers of a 
military escalation between the superpowers nevertheless remained minimal during the first 
phase of the war.35  A period of jostling for an improved global position characterized the 
summer months of 1950.  Washington appealed to the Security Council at the United 
Nations, boycotted by the Soviet regime for the American-led support of the Nationalist 
Chinese faction, and received support for the principle of collective security.  With a 
significant proportion of the global community behind him, Truman ordered General 
Douglas MacArthur to land emergency forces in South Korea to resist the communist 
invasion. 
But rearmament more importantly followed on the heels of military action.  The 
war scare that accompanied the outbreak of the Korean War induced the generals on both 
sides of the Cold War to scramble for additional military manpower and additional 
resources.  The Truman administration introduced sweeping economic controls on global 
raw materials and natural resources to help manage the needs of the western military 
industrial system.36  Truman sent increasingly large numbers of soldiers to South Korea and 
discarded his earlier policy of restricting military expenditures.  American expenditures on 
armaments more than tripled during this period and they reached $50 billion by 1952.37  
The United States military nevertheless appeared outnumbered and under-gunned on every 
front.  American intelligence estimated that the 110,000 men of MacArthur’s 8th and 10th 
Corps faced roughly 100,000 North Korean and later 256,000 Chinese soldiers.38  The 
chilling new threat of Soviet nuclear weapons heightened American insecurity.  The J.C.S. 
speculated in 1953 that the Soviet nuclear arsenal included 120 atomic weapons and 
approximately 1,000 bombers that could strike targets throughout Europe and Asia and 
even hit the United States provided the pilots flew a one-way suicide mission.39  A 
perception of declining fortune increased the importance on America’s allies and especially 
West Germany. 
The Korean War intensified the American feeling of military insecurity and fired 
the drive for countermeasures.  Moscow had moved first on the German issue.  The Soviet 
authorities responded to the Cold War crises with the creation of a 50,000 troop contingent 




pattern developed in the United States.  The subdued high-level criticism of the J.C.S. 
position concerning the mobilization of West German industry and manpower vanished.  
The American military, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, had already formulated a 
strategic concept of European defence that incorporated a German contribution in the late 
1940s.  In May 1950, a month prior to the outbreak of the Korean War, the J.C.S. requested 
the initiation of West German rearmament in line with these conceptions.41  The American 
military, based on their preliminary work, understood that the task for the most part did not 
represent a complex matter.  John J. McCloy, who had replaced Clay as High 
Commissioner in 1949, had hypothesized that West Germany could construct a 
“substantial” military “within a year or eighteen months”.42  The Korean War injected a 
sense of urgency into the demands of the military.  “If we are to defend Western Europe”, 
the J.C.S. declared in June 1950, “German manpower and industrial resources must be 
employed; and the defensive position must be established east of the Rhine River”.43   
The military’s demands and the German capacity to fulfill them did not of course 
quiet the unease in various quarters concerning the ramifications of early rearmament.  
McCloy did not originally support the idea.  He denounced the trend towards 
remilitarization in a speech in Stuttgart in early February 1950.  The high commissioner 
feared that rearmament “would mean the abandonment of all serious efforts to nurture the 
German state into a liberal constructive element in Europe”.44  Any attempts at direct 
remilitarization spelled the official end of the social experiment in Germany.  Harry S. 
Truman and the State Department in general also shared McCloy’s view and still debated 
the need for German rearmament itself.  They cited the requirements of answering critical 
organizational and international issues before moving ahead in that direction.45  Henry 
Byroade, the Director of the State Department’s Bureau of German Affairs, summarized 
this opinion: 
There came a time in this when I was very leary about German rearmament as such. I 
wanted to find some safe way to do this. But things reached the point in Washington, 
at one stage, where it was pretty obvious—you know, after Korea and so on—it was 
pretty obvious that there was going to be German rearmament whether I liked it or not. 
I remember calling McCloy on the telephone and in gobbledygook, saying, you know, 
“This is going to happen whether we want it or not”. McCloy felt about like I did—
whether we want it or not. So what we had to work out, right away, and we've got to 
hurry, is to get some acceptable way to do this.46 
 
The Korean conflict transformed the rearmament debate by generating a sudden wide 
acceptance of the need for a West German military contingent that cut through the 




contribution, their ranks already swelling after 1947, marched forward in bold fashion.  The 
chorus of voices demanding German rearmament grew louder after the North Korean 
invasion.47  Winston Churchill demanded the creation of a European army that included 
Germany at a European Council meeting in Strasbourg on 11 August 1950.48  McCloy now 
stressed the immediate mobilization of “German resources and men”.49  General Hays, the 
military advisor to McCloy, even visited Graf von Schwerin, a former Wehrmacht general 
and Adenauer’s Berater für Militär- und Sicherheitsfragen or Military and National Security 
Advisor as of May 1950, during that summer and declared that “we must immediately 
begin the formation of German defensive strength”.50  Dean Acheson informed the 
president that the State Department now considered the formation of German soldiers 
unavoidable and began debating the form of a military contribution.51  The next step 
represented the search for the specific contours of a new West German military. 
The initial American political discussions demonstrated the difficulties ahead.  Henry 
Byroade formulated a plan in consultation with the Department of Defense during August 
1950 that exhibited two specific directions—ones that characterized the rearmament debate 
for the next four years.  The overriding consideration, Byroade stated, was “how do we 
safely add German strength to the West”.  Byroade at first advocated the creation of a 
“European Defense Concept” that would merge all western military forces into an 
international conglomeration under American direction.  This concept aimed at removing 
the worries involving a large and independent German military.  The Pentagon however 
baulked at the idea and recognized that the State Department concept would sacrifice 
efficiency for political priorities.  The American military stressed the retention of national 
military structures.  The use of division-strength formations accorded with military thinking 
and promised to quicken the pace of rearmament by avoiding complex discussions 
concerning the structure of mixed international units.  The Army more importantly stressed 
the idea of “controlled rearmament” without at first establishing the “nature of the controls”.  
Byroades stated in a later interview that “We just didn't want to say there should be a 
German Air Force, and there should be thirteen divisions, etc”.  This work would follow.  A 
modified approach, one based on the employment of divisions in a united force, eventually 
won over Byroade’s sympathies.52 
Scholars for obvious reasons view the outbreak of the Korean War as the primary 
motivating factor determining the western decision to rearm Germany.  Thomas Alan 
Schwartz points out that the Korean conflict, the “Pearl Harbor of the Cold War”, helped 




German rearmament to the top of the American agenda, the apocalyptic fear of a Soviet 
attack against western Europe nevertheless drew its strength from earlier events.  The 
Soviet detonation of a nuclear device and Mao Zedong’s victory in China in 1949 had 
already unleashed a wave of fear in the United States.54  Revisionist historians in particular 
point out that these events and the feelings of insecurity that followed assisted the efforts of 
Joseph McCarthy, the alcoholic senator from Wisconsin, to wage a domestic war against 
the communist political ideology by unleashing a destabilizing wave of “public paranoia”.55  
Fear of communist expansion abroad and especially domestic subversion at home chilled 
western governments.  Domestic developments in this case helped influence foreign policy 
to a certain degree.  David Cambell asserts that “the Cold War at home loomed even larger 
than the Cold War abroad”.56  This interpretation, while it offers some insight into the 
forces driving Washington’s international policies, fails to answer why the Truman 
administration responded to the Korean conflict in a nearly hysterical manner.57 Senator 
McCarthy’s witch hunt had already assisted the efforts of hardliners in the Truman 
administration in gaining support for N.S.C. 68 and a general policy of rearmament within 
the United States.58  Both McCarthy’s anti-communist hysteria and the military’s plans for 
expansion predated the Korean conflict.  The militarized worldview symbolized by N.S.C. 
68 therefore formed long before North Korean forces had moved against the south.  The 
war only revised the timetable. 
The Korean War underscored the economic importance of Germany for the western 
democracies.  A host of difficulties for example struck the British economy.  The socialist 
Atlee, whose political ideology did not share Truman’s fears of communism,59 did worry 
that the Korean conflict would draw resources away from European civilian markets.  The 
United Nations “should not be trapped into diverting a disproportionate effort to the Far 
East”, the prime minister informed his cabinet in late November 1950.  “Korea was not in 
itself of any strategic importance to the democracies”, he continued, “and it must not be 
allowed to draw more of their military resources away from Europe and the Middle East”.60  
Rearmament siphoned resources away from the civilian economy.  The resulting 
bottlenecks in crucial commodities such as steel impacted overall production levels.61  The 
demands of rearmament further exasperated the postwar shortages caused by the priorities 
of reconstruction on an industrial system already employing most of the available British 
manpower.  The strains of war preparation also drove up market prices for raw materials 




The Korean episode, more than anything else, represented the final disaster for the 
Soviet policy of German power neutralization.62  The conflict helped remove most of the 
obstacles to rearmament and influenced radical changes in the administration of western 
Germany.  German military experts now initiated work on purely military matters such as 
armaments procurement and operational tactics.63  American generals, dissatisfied with 
Ludwig Erhard’s focus on consumer production, now pressured Adenauer’s government to 
shift attention to large increases in such areas as steel manufacturing to meet the demands of 
the military industrial sector.64  The urgency that characterized planning underlined the 
plain and widely acknowledged fact that only West Germany could mobilize unused 
capacities to assist the rearmament effort.65 
The rearmament drive also influenced general changes in policy to psychologically 
assist Adenauer’s government.  McCloy released 79 German war criminals, including 
industrialists, from their prisons in 1951.  Strong public pressure, Thomas Alan Schwartz 
concluded, contributed to McCloy’s decision.66  Not all of these industrialists however 
wished to cooperate with the Americans and work for western rearmament and security 
schemes.67  Political motivations underscored their decision.  Constraints on the armaments 
industry nevertheless fell away.  In terms of the West German military contribution, the 
historiography by and large deals with the contours of future manpower mobilization and 
does not deal with military industrial matters.  The dual-use capacities remain an implicit 
issue.  Scholars recognize the strategic importance of German industry as a whole and 
demonstrate that both Moscow and Washington hoped to prevent the other side from 
gaining control over all of German industry.68  Questions relating to manpower far 
outweigh industrial issues in the historiography.  The American military call for increased 
production underlines their conclusions concerning large German heavy industrial 
capacities.  Other more surprising developments followed.  Even controls on 
experimentation with fissile materials disappeared.  As early as 1949 the United States 
Atomic Commission had worked towards establishing “adequate administrative controls” 
to control the export of “atomic energy materials and equipment” from Germany.69  West 
Germany ultimately assumed the responsibilities of nuclear energy in part because of the 
Korean War. 
10.4 Domestic and Foreign Pressures against Visible Remilitarization 
The international and especially domestic German discussions concerning 
rearmament treated German industry as a thoroughly demilitarized entity and viewed any 




significant alarm.  S.P.D. criticism of Adenauer’s policies assist in drawing out some of the 
reasoning behind McCloy’s claim that early rearmament threatened to destabilize German 
society.  The socialists pointed out that Bonn’s policy of providing foreign troops stationed 
on German soil with industrial production and labour negatively impacted civilian 
economic recuperative power.  West Germany provided approximately 1.5 percent of total 
G.N.P. for foreign military occupation and thousands of non-combatants for the needs of 
Allied troops in Germany.  The socialist politicians questioned whether such activities 
constituted a preliminary form of military service since the assistance theoretically implied 
a dual-use capacity if switched to purely military expenditures.70  Considering this financial 
support of the western occupations, coupled to the American military’s acceptance of basic 
western German dual-use industrial strength, the evidence supporting the S.P.D. contention 
that rearmament meant a revolutionary change in policy appeared thin.  Things were far 
different in the political realm. 
Adenauer had led his coalition against an S.P.D. that adopted an “ohne mich” 
attitude regarding German rearmament.  The socialist party of Kurt Schumacher, a man 
scarred by ten years' imprisonment in a Nazi concentration camp, accurately recognized the 
dominant antiwar sentiments of the German population and pressed for neutrality in the 
Cold War against the wishes of the conservatives.  Two-thirds of the German electorate 
opposed rearmament in the early 1950s even though the same population had rewarded the 
C.D.U. with electoral success in 1949.71  Prevailing opinion in Europe and especially in 
West Germany espoused the belief that rearmament constituted a needless reversal of a 
generally successful policy.  The S.P.D. in particular believed that only neutrality based on 
complete demilitarization offered a realistic chance to lessen American-Soviet tensions and 
achieve reunification.72  Without the majority support of the population, and facing a strong 
opponent in Schumacher,73 Adenauer could not loudly broadcast his decision to move 
forward with rearmament.  Clay had understood that a slow approach was necessary and 
remarked on this process years later. 
Well, that was something that had to evolve. It has evolved to where now a German is 
commander over Allied forces. Adenauer saw this necessity for a gradual evolution. 
But you also had a group of youngsters who were completely against any kind of 
military activity. They didn't realize the basic necessity of a country being able to 
defend itself. All they wanted to do was to create world peace by world disarmament, 
and they were perfectly happy for Germany not to be armed. There were a lot of 
them.74 
 
Bonn mobilized several political agencies to fight pacifist tendencies—particularly 




seemed to clash with the government’s stated priorities of rebuilding the urban 
infrastructure and generating a high degree of economic growth.75  The 
“Volkswirtschaftliche Gruppe des Bundesministeriums der Finanzen” comprehensively 
attacked the viewpoint that rearmament threatened the civilian economy.  The organization 
offered a host of reasons why state expenditures on armaments benefited the entire 
economy.  The group asserted out that future rearmament would stimulate increases in 
industrial capacities, decrease unemployment levels, and increase wealth in general.76  The 
“Bundeswirtschaftsministerium” cautiously echoed these views in meetings held on 7 and 8 
June 1952.  “The growth rate of the national product should be sufficiently large”, they 
surmised, “to enable ever larger support for defence in addition to maintaining the net 
increase of investments and consumption necessary for the maintenance of the growth”.77 
A significant stumbling block nevertheless stood in the way of the conservatives.  
Postwar attitudes in Germany, at least on a popular level, appeared thoroughly 
demilitarized.  This development, when balanced against industrial capacities and 
productive trends, should not however be used as evidence of real industrial 
demilitarization.  It was also clear that the more traditional German conservatives 
understood the necessity of a national security contribution as a method of freeing industrial 
production from outside influence and moving the process of European integration forward.  
Luckily for the chancellor and American military planners, domestic opposition to 
rearmament never emerged as a cohesive movement capable of seriously threatening the 
call to arms.78  Domestic German attitudes in this important case eventually followed those 
of the political leadership. 
The attitudes of western European politicians and the populations they represented 
presented the greater danger to the erection of a solid defensive barrier in central Europe to 
forestall Soviet aggression.  The British government generally supported a German military 
contribution even though policymakers originally feared that the rearmament discussions 
might alienate Paris and provoke Moscow.79  But Whitehall generally withdrew somewhat 
from international discussions concerning Germany during the early 1950s.  Until the 
middle of the decade, a process pointed out later in this chapter, American, French and 
German politicians struggled to find a suitable format for a new West German military.  In 
1954 British politicians salvaged the still torturous rearmament discussions with a proposal 
to integrate West Germany into N.A.T.O.  Whitehall opposed the French government’s 
desire for a unified European military structure that restricted the sovereignty of the 




coloured their perspectives.  British negotiating tactics supported Ludwig Erhard’s demands 
for economic sovereignty in order to slow the movement towards European political 
integration.81  The British government therefore did not take a leading role in the 
discussions concerning a unified military community and the negotiations concerning West 
German rearmament between 1950 and 1954.82 
Paris adopted a far different position.  Adenauer generally viewed the policies of the 
French government as hostile to German interests prior to 1950.  French postwar policy, 
like that of Stalin, aimed at creating a new balance of power in Europe by dramatically 
increasing domestic industrial power at German expense.83  Adenauer understood that Paris 
advocated a significant reduction of their neighbour’s industrial output to remove a major 
competitor and impose a security arrangement that prevented German economic revival 
over a longer term.  Parisian politicians worried that the economic revival and later 
rearmament of their traditional enemy might destabilize the Fourth Republic from within 
and adopted a rigid policy that hindered Bonn’s attempts at attaining sovereignty.  French 
politicians plainly feared the reestablishment of German economic and military 
predominance in Europe.  “The French have an almost hysterical fear”, Dwight D. 
Eisenhower remarked in 1951, “that we and the British will one day pull out of Western 
Europe and leave them to face a superior German armed force”.84  Men such as André 
François-Poncet openly opposed any form of remilitarization.  The “creation of a German 
army in any form”, the former French high commissioner and ambassador in Bonn after 
1949 declared, “was absolutely out of the question”.85  The French government, as 
demonstrated in earlier chapters, nevertheless compromised behind the scenes despite the 
outward projection of rigidity.86  American dollars and general support once again counted 
more than the unlikely spectre of a new German menace. 
Adenauer understood that the weakened postwar state of France heightened the 
general fear of Germany and negatively impacted his pursuit of attaining sovereignty and 
assuming a major leadership role.87  This French fear threatened Adenauer’s plan to 
convince the western democracies to accept the creation of a sovereign German military 
structure.  The chancellor looked to the United States for assistance.  He understood that the 
Truman administration clearly advocated West German rearmament by mid-1950 to help 
erect a defensive alliance with substance.  France lacked the industrial capacities and 
manpower to “bear the brunt of Western Europe's defense”.88  But Washington in this case 
avoided undue pressure to avoid destabilizing the new French government.89  The State 




economic advantages.90  The French need for dollars and resources drew that state slowly 
into the American orbit and forced the government to ameliorate its position over Germany 
and reevaluate their stance concerning the dangers of a Soviet offensive.91  Washington for 
example had persuaded the British and French governments in early 1949 to accept a series 
of embargo arrangements against eastern Europe to limit trade with the Soviet Union.92 
The Truman administration employed two tactics to prepare the political ground for 
German rearmament.  Washington first of all continued to pay lip service to industrial 
demilitarization to quiet the critics of German rearmament.93  This deflection strategy stood 
in stark contrast to the requirement of a sizeable German military contingent for the creation 
of an adequate conventional defensive bulwark against a Soviet invasion.94  The J.C.S., 
although committed to the creation of an independent West German military organization 
with only a few limits on armaments production, accepted the need for political caution in 
dealing with the critics.95  This admission did not however modify the insistence that the 
transfer of further American divisions to Europe would be built on “iron-clad commitments 
by the Europeans to their own contributions, and in particular, upon unequivocal acceptance 
of an immediate start on German rearmament in a form technically acceptable to American 
strategists”.96  The tacit support of dismantling therefore continued to echo through the 
administrative buildings of London, Paris and Washington at the start of the 1950s even 
though industrial demilitarization as a practical national security solution was long dead.97  
What followed from these half-hearted discussions mirrored the results of earlier years.  
The western democracies still spoke of targeting companies like Siemens for 
deconcentration in 1951 but again terminated the discussion a year later without taking any 
actions.98  This tactic represented a clear ruse. 
The second and more important tactic accepted the termination of industrial 
demilitarization and instead related to establishing what types of weapons should be 
produced.  Here the J.C.S. played down the importance of German industry even though all 
of the calculations indicated otherwise.  “Without West German forces it will not be 
possible to hold the Ruhr”, they stated, “which is vital to Western Europe.  The U.S. cannot 
afford to jeopardize its own security and that of Western Europe by not utilizing all of the 
forces that can be made available for European defense”.99  This concept linked American 
national security to Ruhr production capacities—another clear recognition that Soviet 
acquisition of this region threatened the global military position of the United States.  This 
tactic also paradoxically aimed at limiting the German production of such modern and 




second-rate military without any real bite.  McCloy had originally proposed the creation of 
a “small” police force to grant West Germany the minimal comfort of a civil-military 
capability.100  Now the argument turned to what weapons West Germany should produce.  
The J.C.S. offered a political solution that distracted attention away from their real 
intentions: 
German industry should provide only light transportation and equipment.  Tanks, 
heavy weapons and other heavy equipment for German forces should come from other 
sources.  In order properly to exploit the potential of the Ruhr, Germany should 
provide substantial quantities of steel and iron for fabrication in other European 
countries' munitions factories.101 
 
This concept first of all positioned the Ruhr as a dominant dual-use producer in 
military allocation strategies.  That this viewpoint did not accord with European 
manufacturing realities, namely that German machine-shops represented the largest and 
potentially most productive in Europe, was also relatively clear.  A decrease in official 
controls on German industry and not a rebirth of industrial demilitarization characterized 
this period.  As pointed out in earlier chapters, more and more industrial facilities were 
struck off of the dismantling lists.102  The same governments that outwardly clung to the 
concept of industrial demilitarization revised the statutes in March 1951 to permit German 
rearmament and fully countenanced military industrial production.  The re-emergence of 
companies such as Borsig demonstrated this process.  The American military clearly 
desired the positioning of effective firepower on German soil by using German 
manufacturing.  Washington’s commitment to defend West Germany deepened throughout 
the early 1950s and the first American nuclear weapons arrived in Germany in 1953.103 
The military planners nevertheless understood the need for a political arrangement 
with France and that only slow and deliberate negotiations could lead to satisfactory results 
without splitting the alliance.104  Here industrial and military issues merged.  Washington 
brokered a series of deals between Bonn and Paris such as the compromise over Ruhr 
industry in 1950.  These arrangements again generally ignored British perspectives even 
though the island nation represented the zone’s occupying authority.105  Jean Monnet and 
the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman presented a plan for the merger of western 
European coal and steel industries in May 1950.  The plan proposed the creation of a central 
authority to regulate the French and West German coal and steel industries.  Paris chose to 
alter direction after policymakers recognized the general failure to stand against the 
predominantly American decision to recharge West German industry after 1947.106  The 




clearly outperformed French industrial growth.107  The French government also 
increasingly viewed American military and economic domination in Europe with a degree 
of alarm.108  Adenauer and the Truman administration embraced the offer as a method of 
quieting French opposition by establishing a control mechanism.  The Schuman Plan went 
into effect on 1 July 1952.  The plan deepened Franco-German cooperation and presented 
Paris with the opportunity of placing German industrial expansion “in a controlled, 
politically balanced, and economically liberal environment” to quiet domestic 
opposition.109 
10.5 The German Perspective on Dual-Use Matters 
The apparent economic weakness of western Europe and the growing list of 
American global commitments underscored the benefits of integrating a German military 
contribution.  French policymakers felt the winds of changes and attempted to control the 
future form of a West German military contribution.  In October 1950 René Pleven 
proposed a supranational western European military force administered by a central 
authority that regulated all military aspects including armaments production.  Pleven 
formulated the plan in response to a clear demand by American authorities at the North 
Atlantic Council meeting in New York in September 1950 that the western democracies 
support German rearmament.110  Paris responded with a militarized version of those 
concepts presented in the earlier Schuman Plan.  The new proposal attempted to control the 
nearly inevitable rebirth of the German armaments industry.  Paris argued for the 
development of a supranational military organization, the European Defense Community 
(E.D.C.), to operate as a safety mechanism and control the extent and nature of German 
rearmament.111  Industrial demilitarization, from the French perspective, had changed to a 
policy of controlled armaments production.112 
American policymakers, in the supercharged atmosphere of the Korean War, had 
decided to accept the E.D.C. as a method of encouraging swift German rearmament.113  
The Defense Department nevertheless generally opposed a unified European force owing to 
the inherent problems associated with organizing such an institution.114  The American 
military and State Department furthermore deemed the attempt at controlling German 
military industrial production a hindrance to the efforts at attaining real European 
security.115  The American planners understood that neither Britain nor France retained the 
military industrial resources required for general rearmament and especially that the French 
armaments industry could not equip the proposed German military forces.116  Political 




The Allied High Commissioners did not relinquish the powers of disarmament or 
demilitarization in Germany even after the western democracies granted Germany “full 
sovereignty” during the Nine-Power Conference in London in the autumn of 1954.117 
The defence ministers of Britain and the United States met with their French 
counterparts to remove all opposition to the establishment of an autonomous German 
military within the N.A.T.O. framework.  Both made little headway.  Paris only agreed to 
the strengthening of West German police forces and the resumption of planning for the 
production of light military equipment and strictly rejected any larger contribution.  The 
Truman administration chose not to proceed on the matter without French acquiescence.118 
Adenauer had moved boldly forward on the matter of rearmament despite the 
protracted negotiations with France.  The chancellor attempted to capitalize on the Korean 
War scare in order to increase western interest in a military solution.  The war raised 
Adenauer’s hopes of binding West Germany to the western powers using a military 
option.119  As stated at the outset of this chapter, Adenauer therefore accepted a permanent 
foreign military presence in West Germany based on the adoption of a conventional 
forward defence policy.  This policy promised to remove foreign and domestic obstacles to 
remilitarization and illuminated Adenauer’s tactic of weakening the occupation statutes in 
pursuit of sovereignty.120  Policy papers composed after this period illustrate that the 
chancellor desired an end to the occupation statutes altogether, a stop all remaining 
dismantling, and the removal of all theoretical limits to German industrial growth.121  In 
view of the advantages gained by the “military option”, it seems secondary in importance 
that the Korean War actually heightened Adenauer’s fear of Soviet expansion into western 
Europe.122 
In a memorandum entitled “Memorandum über die Sicherung des Bundesgebietes 
nach innen und außen”, the chancellor demonstrated acute awareness of the political 
constraints inhibiting remilitarization.  In order to calm foreign and domestic fears of a new 
German army, Adenauer declared his unwillingness to form a national army under 
exclusive West German control.123  The defense of West Germany, he understood, “lies 
primarily lie in the hands of the occupation troops”.  Considering the reluctance of the 
American, British and French governments to muster the strength necessary to defend the 
Ruhr against a Soviet onslaught of over 40 divisions bolstered by 70,000 East German 
police, Adenauer strongly requested the increase of troop strength in West Germany to 
demonstrate the level of a western commitment to his electorate and to shield the 




number of East German soldiers by between 10,000 and 20,000 to add urgency to his 
request.125 
Adenauer’s strategy worked.  Washington and London supported the chancellor.  
At the Foreign Ministers Conference of 12-18 September 1950, the western powers agreed 
in principle to West German autonomy, and declared the intention of ending the state of 
war with Germany, revising the occupation statutes, loosening economic restrictions, and 
promised to defend West Germany from attack by East German police forces with an 
additional four divisions.  The American delegation demanded the establishment of a 
relatively strong 10-division German contingent to accompany a general increase in 
western military power.  The delegation exhibited a firm resolve to end all opposition to 
German rearmament by binding this policy to the continual presence of American troops on 
European soil.  Conditions in Germany changed even negotiations with the French 
government lingered on.  The Allied High Commission decided on 6 March 1951 to lift 
important restrictions on West German political and economic sovereignty.  The 
commission granted the West German government greater control over foreign policy 
under the responsibility of the Auswärtiges Amt.  West German industry was furthermore 
included in raw material procurement programs initiated to ease the by now inexorable 
movement towards military production.126 
Adenauer’s government also blatantly disregarded the initial inter-Allied failures to 
agree on the forms of rearmament.  After negotiations with the western Allies in late 
summer and early fall 1950, the West German government ordered former generals of the 
Wehrmacht to study the strategic conditions of German remilitarization and formulate 
proposals for action.  Certain members of Adenauer’s administration questioned the legality 
of Adenauer’s flight forward and Gustav Heinemann, a prominent cabinet minister and 
pacifist, resigned his post.127  Adenauer for his part held traditional conservative values in 
high regard and stated openly that “precisely the democratic state can least afford to do 
without the lofty values of true soldierdom”.128  This process of enhancing democratic 
legitimacy “gave former officers a stake in the new democratic society” and contributed to 
the “ultimate survival” of the new state.129  The Truman administration, hardly surprising 
after the outbreak of the Korean War, sponsored the reconstitution of the old conservative 
administration to combat communism and general disruption.130  The American occupation 
authorities in fact now tolerated postwar Wehrmacht lobby groups who pressed for an 




important step towards legitimizing the military profession in Germany in an extremely 
difficult climate. 
A host of former Wehrmacht officers found new posts in Adenauer’s government 
and the emerging military.  In May 1950 General Gerhard von Schwerin had already started 
planning for the creation of a federal police force—a force to be equipped with heavy 
mortars and other weapons not normally associated with such organizations.131  Three other 
retired generals, later joined by a long list of others, formed ranks in a small organization in 
the “Zentrale für Heimatdienst”.  Johann Adolf Graf von Kielmansegg, Axel von dem 
Bussche and Achim Oster had already worked on defence concepts for several years.132  
Many of these officers had completed their training during the “Kaiserreich” and had 
witnessed the interwar political conflicts between the democratic politicians of the Weimar 
republic and the armed forces.  Hans von Seeckt’s attempt in the 1920s to isolate the older 
Prussian military class from revolutionary ideologies had decisively weakened democratic 
support in Germany and assisted the rise of Hitler to power. 133  Political issues counted in 
the future army.   
Working in a new climate after the summer of 1950, one where American military 
planners now rejected the utility of an enlarged West German police force, the German 
generals could conceive of alternative measures to those adopted by the Soviet Union in 
eastern Germany.  As stated, the Soviets had built up the East German “Volkspolizei” to a 
contingent numbering over 70,000.134  That the “People’s Police” in reality represented a 
military force was clear.  Rolf Steininger describes this development as a sign of tentative 
Soviet “Remilitarisierung”.135  Contemporary western observers, as described earlier, 
maintained a similar viewpoint in regards to the Soviet Union and their own actions in 
Germany.  The American military considered the “Bundesgrenzschutz” an interim solution 
to the problem of military defence, having tinkered with the idea of fluid guerrilla forces, 
and almost half of the members of this organization later filled the ranks of the Bundeswehr 
in 1956.  The militarized nature of the West German police forces, as a precursor to real 
rearmament, could not be more evident.  
A small group of “retired” generals met at the Eifelkloster Himmerod from 6-9 
October 1950 in order to plan for an eventual German military contribution.  Kielmansegg 
acted as Secretary.  The meeting, not attended by the occupation authorities and therefore 
outside of Allied jurisdiction, represented a breach of the occupation statutes.  The western 
failure to respond to the meeting indicated that military matters now completely 




logistical, and territorial questions into a single document that represented the West German 
program for negotiations with the western democracies.  The planners also tackled military 
capabilities and evaluated Germany's ability to field 12 armoured divisions.  The generals 
worked from experience since military documents that had survived the war were still in the 
hands of the Allies.137  The meeting resulted in the “Denkschrift über die Aufstellung eines 
Deutschen Kontingents im Rahmen einer übernationalen Streitmacht zur Verteidigung 
Westeuropas”. 
The document espoused the end of the formal occupation and the restrictive statutes 
and the re-establishment of sovereignty including the right to bear arms as an equal 
partner.138  The generals concluded that the creation of 12 armoured divisions, stationed on 
the inner-German border and supported by a tactical air force and coastal marine, would 
afford western Germany a sufficient level of security.  The generals rejected the notion that 
large police forces could assist N.A.T.O. and instead called for a strict division between the 
constabulary and military.  The document also supported the idea of a forward N.A.T.O. 
defensive arrangement on German soil and argued for an end to American preparations for 
partisan warfare using German irregulars.  The generals hoped that N.A.T.O. would instead 
send sufficient military strength to create a shield behind which West Germany could 
rearm.  The document clearly reflected the developments found in American strategic 
planning.139 
While the Himmeroder discussions had been undertaken by former officers of the 
Wehrmacht, with a virtual monopoly of control exerted by Kielmansegg, Oster and 
Bussche, a political development however induced Adenauer to change direction and place 
a civilian at the head of a new organization formed to handle “all questions arising out of 
the reinforcement of Allied troops”.140  Against the wishes of Adenauer, Schwerin had 
spoken openly to the press and explained the activities of the “retired” generals.  Schwerin’s 
action conflicted with Adenauer’s desire to conduct rearmament planning as quietly as 
possible in order to prevent a destabilizing political reaction by the largely anti-military 
German population.  Bonn correctly feared that a significant domestic and foreign outcry 
would negatively impact the attempt at creating an autonomous West German military and 
grant support for French designs of using Germans in foreign armies.141  It was also 
rumoured that Schwerin was closely attached to the British military while his principal 
opponents were closely associated with the Adenauer’s favoured Americans.142  




from the “Zentrale für Heimatdienst”.  The incident reinforced the reality that domestic and 
foreign constraints determined the timetable for rearmament. 
Bonn granted Theodor Blank, a catholic trade unionist and C.D.U. Bundestag 
member, the responsibility for carrying on the work of the generals and establishing an 
“embryonic Defense Ministry and plan for the creation of the German forces”.143  The 
organization, which grew in size and importance until taken over by the subsequent 
“Verteidigungsministerium”, developed a civilian orientation that generated friction with 
the military professionals.  Major cleavages grew out of military opposition to the 
rearmament of Germany while that state was still so comprehensively occupied, prisoners 
of war still languished in prisons and work camps, and the fate of veterans remained unsure.  
Despite these problems 174 former Wehrmacht officers jointed Blank’s organization by 
September 1952.144  But the open rehabilitation of military values still required 
considerable foreign prodding.  Blank stated to Kielmansegg at the end of 1950 that the 
greatest problem faced in rearming Germany was the alteration of perceptions cultivated by 
the denazification process and Allied propaganda in general.145  The officers demanded the 
re-establishment of the “honour of the soldier” as the basis of a defence contribution. 
The American military agreed.  The occupation authorities that had dismantled the 
German military could not simply expect the occupied population to take up arms after 
years of considerable anti-military propaganda.  Former German officers and experienced 
soldiers often chose to remain at their more lucrative civilian posts instead of accepting 
employment in service of the government.  The Truman administration, realizing that their 
postwar policies of re-education might now harm the new course, initiated a propaganda 
drive to clean up the Wehrmacht’s image.  Eisenhower for example stated during his 
January 1951 trip to Germany that the views expressed in his booklet entitled “Crusade in 
Europe” were flawed and that the German army did not share collective guilt for Nazi 
crimes.146 
These issues should not however obscure the basic premise of military capabilities 
emphasized by the Himmeroder discussions.  The German records themselves emphasize 
the conclusions reached by the J.C.S. during the late 1940s concerning residual military 
industrial capacities.  This work, that in part centered on analyses conducted under the 
supervision of the “Dienstelle Blank”, uncovered significant latent military industrial 
potential and demonstrated the virtually universal point of view that West German industry 




These conclusions were discussed by the “Ausschuss für Wirtschaftspolitik” or 
Committee on Economic Policy in October 1952.  The committee, comprised of 
representatives of the major West German political parties and government agencies that 
included the “Dienstelle Blank”, met at the Bundeshaus in Bonn to examine the future 
rearmament measures from the perspective of the “Convention on Relations between the 
Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany” or “Deutschlandvertrag”.  The 
agreement, signed by the western powers and Germany on 26 May 1952, had returned 
sovereignty to West Germany and prepared the grounds for a military contribution. 
The political tone of the exchanges demonstrated the heightened emotional 
atmosphere surrounding rearmament and the difficulties of selling the idea of mobilizing 
the existing dual-use capacities.  The discussions furthermore revealed the typical political 
stratification over rearmament issues between the conservatives and socialists.  The S.P.D. 
generally criticized Bonn for providing N.A.T.O. troops stationed on German soil with 
industrial production and labour since they believed that these contributions already 
violated the substance of demilitarization.  The socialists raised issues of economic frugality 
to attempt to erode the emphasis on national security.147  Other ministers however 
applauded the opportunity of resuming the production of armaments and hinted that no 
shortages of strategic raw materials such as copper existed.  The discussions focused on the 
problems inherent in coupling armaments production to civilian economic policy such as 
the allocation of resources and not the complicated matter of producing machinery or 
training a new generation of specialists for a new military industrial system.148 
The S.P.D. did not recognize the plain and simple fact that Washington greatly 
assisted the German search for raw materials.  Nor did they fathom that Bonn needed to 
demonstrate political goodwill and support for American global interests in order to ensure 
the smooth continuation of this policy.  The notion that military expenditures and civilian 
recovery were incompatible was in any case purely theoretical.  One member in particular 
echoed the work of others and argued that German industrial growth levels permitted 
military production without the potential for straining the overall economy.  He referred to 
the work of Blank’s organization—who in turn cited initial American conceptions—and 
argued that a large part of the initial German military budget would be spent on troop 
transport or communications systems and not just uniforms, ammunition and guns.149  
1950s rearmament priorities would follow the pattern set by previous governments and 




chapters, demonstrated that modern rearmament strategies emphasized investment in the 
civilian automotive sector as much as purely military outlays. 
The “Ausschuss für Wirtschaftspolitik” in consequence attempted to define the 
meaning of armaments on 22 October 1952.  The difficult separation of military from 
civilian, an incredibly complex distinction that caused serious headaches for military 
planners and politicians throughout the 1930s and 1940s, once again surfaced.  Kalbitzer, 
another S.P.D. representative, brought up the issue of the German shipbuilding firm Blohm 
& Voss to explain the difficulties in creating a precise definition.  He mentioned that the 
Allies had dismantled a part of the firm after 1945 and wondered whether or not the 
company could return to production in the near future.  Kalbitzer drew attention to the fact 
that all machine-tools contained a military potential.  “In my opinion and based on the 
experiences from the war”, he explained, “the danger still exists that all that is required for 
civilian demand is also required for war and vice versa”.150  Dr. Thieme even responded 
with a clarification of the definition that machines capable of producing weapons 
constituted armaments according to German law.  Thieme however explained that the 
attempt at classifying “Einzelsweckmaschinen” or specialized machine-tools used 
exclusively for weapons production by a group of experts resulted in a list encompassing 
only four or five examples.  The legal system, Thieme continued, permitted all industrial 
equipment with a dual-use potential and that this list included shipbuilding.151  In the case 
of Blohm & Voss, the company used existing machine-tools to return to the production of 
naval vessels such as the training ship “Gorch Fock” by the end of the decade. 
Blank addressed the committee on the next day and dealt specifically with the West 
German readiness to manufacture armaments.  Blank first tackled the matter of armoured 
vehicles from the perspective of standardization.  The French politician Rene Pleven’s plan 
of 24 October 1950 had advocated a unified European armed force commanded by a central 
European authority employing standardized military hardware.  Military policymakers 
outside of France ultimately rejected the Pleven Plan concept of a united European military 
partly owing to the immense impracticality of forming a working military organization 
from disparate nations and military industrial systems.152  Blank addressed remilitarization 
from this perspective.  “The question that plays a role here”, the minister declared, “is what 
armaments orders await us”.153  Blank explained that studies conducted by his department 
underlined that the capacities of West German industry already permitted the production of 
essential components such as motors for the assembly of weapon systems elsewhere.  The 




year owing to the unresolved problems of standardization confronting the western 
democracies.154  The governments of the N.A.T.O. members needed to resolve outstanding 
political and organizational issues prior to a German industrial commitment.  The ability of 
West Germany to produce tanks, hardly surprising owing to the rapidly expanding 
automotive production capacities of the early 1950s, was beyond question. 
Blank turned to a discussion of the “powder line”.  E.D.C. industrial planning 
created the concept of a “strategically endangered zone” in order to subject industrial 
facilities on the immediate Soviet periphery to specific limitations.155  The French 
government proposed, among other things, that all explosives production on the Soviet 
border cease and that the responsible authorities dismantle the facilities.  The policy 
theoretically aimed at preventing Soviet acquisition of valuable military resources in case of 
war, but it was obvious that the French government aimed at slipping in yet another 
industrial demilitarization proposal to counteract earlier decisions reversing the original 
Potsdam decisions.  Blank and the Adenauer government realized that the policy in fact 
represented a thinly disguised attempt by Paris to further dilute German industrial 
effectiveness by making coal-mining dependent on foreign explosives imports and basically 
removing any pretence of a functioning German military.  Blank argued that German 
defensive requirements necessitated a domestic explosives capability and emphasized that 
Germany retained the right to build such facilities.  He did not of course wish to add fuel to 
the fire and mention the explosives plants already in existence.156  The industrial capacities 
to build a broad range of military hardware that included motors and explosives, as 
recognized by the West German government, were already in existence prior to 1955.  The 
Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie or B.D.I., the umbrella organization of German 
industry concluded in 1955 that the West German economy could sustain a standing army 
of over 500,000 soldiers—a number comparable with the peacetime forces assembled by 
Adolf Hitler.157 
10.6 Conclusion 
The need to develop controls on German civilian and dual-use industry faded in the 
years after 1950.  The short-lived resurgence of the issue as part of the French proposals for 
an E.D.C. based on a fully integrated western military and military industrial system failed 
to gain the support of either West Germany or the other allies.  Paris still held to their course 
in later years.  At the end of the 1950s, for example, the French government lobbied for the 
establishment of joint Franco-German aircraft factories in Africa to harness German 




however form the basis of an argument supposing the industrial demilitarization of 
Germany.  The United States military did not think highly of such schemes.  Nor did certain 
West German politicians and industrialists agree.  American and West German opposition 
to the E.D.C. concept of a “strategically endangered zone”, one that only promised to place 
less emphasis on the forward defence of the Ruhr, helped undermine support for a type of 
unified military structure desired by Paris.  The diplomatic tensions over the issue of 
German rearmament continued into the Eisenhower presidency until formal declaration in 
1955.159 
The evidence therefore suggests that significant industrial capacities were in 
existence by the early 1950s.  The rearmament discussions brought these realities to the 
forefront of parliamentary debate in Germany.  The 1950s political discussions concerning 
a German military contribution only thinly obscured the fact that American and German 
military planners acknowledged an intrinsic military industrial potential in Germany.  The 
major issue, as far as the French government was concerned, related to erecting a system 
whereby foreign states could control this potential.  The military and diplomatic experts 
involved in the rearmament debate faced a considerable amount of work over the next few 
years.  Historians however cannot employ these debates to substantiate the claim that the 
Allies demilitarized German industry after 1945.  The evidence clearly suggests that West 





To wage war on misery and to struggle against injustice is to promote, along with 
improved conditions, the human and spiritual progress of all men, and therefore the 
common good of humanity. Peace cannot be limited to a mere absence of war, the 
result of an ever precarious balance of forces.  No, peace is something that is built up 
day after day, in the pursuit of an order intended by God, which implies a more perfect 





11.1 The Characteristics of American Industrial Demilitarization Policy 
A divided postwar Germany emerged as two entities that seemed largely unrelated 
to the state ruled by Adolf Hitler between 1933 and 1945.  The victorious powers according 
to much of the historiography “remade” the defeated nation.1  The outward political 
appearance of both states, one democratic and the other communist, underscored these 
changes.  It is hardly surprising that the conventional and extant historiography views the 
postwar pursuit of disarmament and industrial demilitarization, two of the primary Allied 
national security goals in Germany, in view of these revolutionary changes.  The victors 
quite simply removed all military capabilities and productive capacities and in the process 
created a purely civilian manufacturing system.  “If there was one thing that everybody in 
the West was sure about during World War II”, Gordon Craig writes, “it was that, once 
National Socialism was defeated, Germany would never again be allowed to have an army.  
This was the view of the man in the street and of the people who sat in government offices 
and worked on postwar planning”.2  “Everyone” seemed certain that the Allies would 
“remake” German industry as a part of this process. 
What did the victors however mean by industrial demilitarization, and what 
attributes or elements formed this concept?  Contemporaries thought of the first part of this 
question in rather simplistic fashion.  “Industrial capacity for war”, as stated in a postwar 
Industrial College of the Armed Forces lecture, “may be defined as that part of the 
economic potential that relates to the ability of the industrial facilities of a country to 
produce and transport those manufactured and processed items that are necessary for the 
prosecution of a war, excluding the elements of manpower and raw materials”.3  This view 
of the military manufacturing system conceptually separated war-making capacity from 
civilian processes using the end product as the means of classification.  Military-industry 




civilian manufacturing.  Contemporaries understood the removal of military industrial 
potential as an act of destroying these attributes. 
Defining these attributes proved much harder than initially believed.  With the war 
effort fresh on their minds, the policymakers realized that all elements of the civilian system 
constituted parts of the other genus.  The strategic bombing theorists had understood this 
reality and modified their plans to incorporate a total war against the civilian population 
itself.  This realization also induced the spring in logic that inspired Morgenthau’s 
pastoralization concepts and the indiscriminate looting of the Red Army.  Politicians and 
specialists accepted the viewpoint that “soap is as indispensable as small arms ammunition” 
for the prosecution of war.  That is, the real differences in usage between armoured fighting 
vehicles and automobiles or explosives and fertilizers distorted the similarity of the 
processes from which they were derived.  Industrial demilitarization from this perspective 
did not separate civilian and military usages into separate categories.  It became 
increasingly apparent that only a massive reduction in overall German productive capacities 
or even the wholesale termination of complete branches of industry could fashion the new 
and pacified state.  The deliberations in the Foreign Economic Administration (F.E.A) and 
Allied Control Council (A.C.C.) therefore concentrated on the level of reductions necessary 
for the creation of a subsistence economy that only met the most primitive basic needs of 
the population.  The lists developed by both organizations, the first theoretical and the 
second as official policy, nevertheless represented the qualitative and quantitative guides 
with which scholars can judge the effectiveness of the operation. 
Despite the fact that the industrial demilitarization policy is mentioned in a large 
number of analyses of postwar Germany, from either the specific focus on Allied 
occupation policy or as part of explanations of the seminal events of the immediate postwar 
such as the Marshall Plan or the Cold War rupture, no conceptual analysis of the actual 
adopted definition or its logical consistency exists.  Scholars rarely surpass the primitive 
encyclopedic definition of the concept or discuss the real meaning of the A.C.C. lists.  John 
H. Backer, characteristic of every work consulted with only a few minor and meaningless 
variations, cites contemporaries such as Lucius D. Clay and notes that Washington’s “first 
objective is to smash whatever remaining power Germany may have with which to develop 
a future war potential”.4  This vision nevertheless required substantial definition unless 
Germany itself was to be “smashed”.  Backer for his part struggles throughout his 
monograph citing the A.C.C.’s lists of percentages and figures, revisions of these strange 




to take a step back and question the assumption of an easy separation of military and 
civilian industries and then evaluating the validity of such documents as the Level of 
Industry plans.  The postwar fate of dual-use industries such as automotive or tableware 
firms, never prevalent in the discourse and yet vital to the modern war effort, is left 
unexplained and shrouded by the mysterious category known as the “war plant”. 
Prior to pointing out what industrial demilitarization actually represented, it is 
useful to describe what the policy was not.  The Allies determined to surpass any traditional 
disarmament project that only hoped to reduce, limit or control Germany’s armed forces 
and military equipment.  Industrial demilitarization was a departure from policy norms in 
keeping with the seriousness of the war itself.  This disarmament and not industrial 
demilitarization nevertheless proceeded swiftly after 1945.  The variables are easily listed 
and studied.  The Allied governments demobilized and disbanded all German armed forces, 
destroyed or quarantined the bulk of the Wehrmacht’s arsenal including weapons systems 
such as tanks and artillery, officially stopped the output of new armaments at assembly 
points, and initiated a number of supplementary measures to ensure the cessation of 
hostilities.  Backer cites these measures and concludes that “the occupying armies had been 
able to implement most of demilitarization in the American zone before responsibility 
shifted to the military government”.5  These measures did not however imply the 
eradication of military industrial potential and only represented the initial steps taken by the 
military to secure the occupied regions.  Scholars for example generally consider the United 
States a disarmed country in 1939 even though the state was blessed with the world’s 
greatest potential to build and take up arms.  Backer’s work therefore exhibits a serious 
confusion of traditional disarmament with industrial demilitarization. 
Nor did a host of other measures adopted by the American military entail the 
restructuring of the German productive system.  Backer for example dotes on the attention 
placed on what might be termed the demilitarization of the mind: 
In a collateral effort to remove all vestiges of Germany’s military past, Clay 
ordered not only Nazi names of streets, parks, and public buildings obliviated, 
but also those of Bismark, Moltke, Gneisenau, and other historical figures 
antedating the present century.  Even a world-renowned research organization 
like the Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft was permitted to resume its work only 
after the name had been changed to Max Planck Institute.  In accordance with 
American public sentiment, the same directive called for the removal of 
monuments, statues, emblems, and symbols associated with German 
militarism.  Other measures were under preparation, Clay reported to 






The destruction of signs and renaming of institutes represented a policy of abstract 
demilitarization that was only related to the material productive attributes of state power in 
the most modest of manners.  A concentration on these policies only tends to warp the 
objective appraisal of the material aspects of demilitarization strategies.  The desire and 
steps taken to destroy German “militarism”—yet another vague and slippery concept that 
begs substantive classification—hardly offer the stuff with which to judge either the 
meaning or translation of industrial demilitarization.  
The concept of industrial restructuring as stated initially took the division between 
military and civilian realms for granted.  As pointed out at the beginning of this dissertation, 
however, no easily comprehensible or clear definition of the military production network 
existed.  Military industrial production depended on precisely the same technologies and 
productive capacities that manufactured goods as moving as automobiles or as mundane as 
tableware.  These firms produced the bulk of the weapons systems used by either side to kill 
during the war.  What historians might acknowledge as military production facilities—the 
so-called war plant—such as Alkett-Berlin in fact represented assembly points where 
workers milled steel or hammered out armoured plating to a certain degree but mostly put 
together a large number of parts manufactured by an equally large number of firms 
spanning vast networks.  The complexity of these networks proved so great that essentially 
every aspect of the modern industrial system represented constituent elements of both 
military and civilian production.  Policymakers could not escape the vortex of dual-use 
industries.  Every aspect of the industrial system could be employed for military production.  
The sum of these parts meant much more than individual components. 
Scholars too often take a mid-20th Century separation between civilian and military 
industrial realms for granted.  Part of the reason stems from the unique Anglo-Saxon 
perception of Hitler’s war machine that, according to recent accounts, does not harmonize 
with reality.  This dissertation must stress the point presented in the introduction that dual-
use industries themselves represent a nebulous categorization or even some form of 
conceptual expedient.  Military theorists during the interwar period, drawing on the wealth 
of experience obtained in the first of the world wars, discarded an important qualification of 
the rules of engagement.  Differences between combatant and civilian vanished.  Military 
power in the modern age first of all represented far more than a quantifiable amount of 
weapons systems.  “National leaders on all levels”, Holger Herwig points out, “must 




planning, and economic and armaments production in order to arrive at a coherent concept 
of national strategy”.7  Military planners have understood the importance of what is termed 
civilian industry as an essential element of the power equation since at least the early 20th 
Century.  The strategic bombing pundits hoped to smash the productive capacities and 
willpower of an opposing nation.  The notion of a separation between civilian and military 
industrial systems—and of combatant and civilian—disappeared during over the skies of 
Europe after 1939. 
The strategic bombing theorists initially attempted to formulate a policy during the 
interwar whereby aircraft could destroy an opposing nation’s military industrial system and 
starve the frontline forces into submission.  Military specialists expended considerable 
thought analysing the disruptions caused by bombing a host of factories, power plants or 
synthetic oil installations.  Strategic bombing was therefore an important precursor of 
industrial demilitarization.  But far too many potential targets presented themselves during 
the war.  The pundits encountered the bewildering problem of defining which targets 
represented the heart of the enemy’s overall infrastructure and no satisfactory results 
initially followed the heavy raids prior to 1944.  During the year marked by the invasion of 
France and the Soviet destruction of German fighting power on the eastern front, the 
American and British air staffs decided to forgo raids on panacea targets such as the ball-
bearing works at Schweinfurt to concentrate on wearing down the Luftwaffe, eliminating 
synthetic oil production, and pounding the German transportation network and cities to 
rubble.  The policy of paralysing industrial and military movement in Germany instead of 
eliminating key industrial sectors worked wonders and production plummeted in 1945.  But 
the enormous efforts of the men of Bomber Command and the 8th Air Force, who flew 
thousands of sorties against virtually every conceivable target in Germany between 1939 
and 1945, still failed to destroy the sinews of industry—the machine-tools in the factories. 
The notions of “war plants” and dual-use industrial facilities represented aspects of 
the contradictory beliefs that Hitler had created an enormous war machine between 1933 
and 1939 and the realization, partly based on domestic observations and the resiliency of 
the German system to strategic bombing, that the industrial network was much wider than 
originally conceived.  The strategic bombing pundits, as demonstrated, did not really 
differentiate between civilian and military industries—that is, of course, unless a warped 
definition dumping ball-bearings or steel into the latter category is employed.  The United 
States Strategic Bombing Survey (U.S.S.B.S.) teams uncovered an important result of the 




from the strategic bombing campaign was that the bombers threw relatively limited 
amounts of explosives at targets such as the tank assembly facilities of Alkett in Berlin in 
relation to those dumped on apartments and general living quarters.  The actual destruction 
of industrial equipment, as opposed to the buildings housing then, remained relatively 
minor.  Wartime repairs and expansion more than compensated for the losses.  The desolate 
image of most German cities nevertheless underlined the frightening capabilities of 
strategic warfare.  To the annoyance of Kenneth Galbraith, the view circulated through 
American quarters that the bombers had already demilitarized German industry despite his 
provision of actual statistics that proved otherwise.  The American military, the 
organization ultimately tasked with the occupation of southern Germany, ultimately 
confused the destruction of what amounted to the civilian urban infrastructure with military 
capabilities—hence Clay’s stated objective to “smash whatever remaining power [in] 
Germany”.  It was curious that the rational and essentially justifiable confluence of military 
and civilian industrial realms that led to such widespread urban destruction conditioned 
postwar beliefs in a manner that subsequently underscored a false appraisal of remaining 
industrial capacities in Germany. 
The concept of industrial demilitarization in the latter stages of the war represented 
a general idea or abstraction without any established list of attributes.  A series of policy 
papers and agreements nevertheless gave the conception a minor degree of clarity.  It is 
worthwhile to repeat the essence of some of the examples cited in this dissertation.  The 
American Treasury Department, the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (J.C.S.) 
all presented extremely unsophisticated definitions of industrial demilitarization.  Industrial 
demilitarization as a concept was still predicated on the understanding that a determinable 
gulf existed between civilian and military industries, that a refining process could remove 
armaments potential from the modern industrial system, that the civilian economy could 
function without these “redundant” military elements and that this final cleansed product 
would remain permanently pacified.  While it was clear that the production of aircraft by 
German firms would cease after 1945, for example, the documentation from the early 
period does not indicate any awareness that automobile manufacturers represented the 
major producers of aircraft components during the war.  Scholars cannot simply infer as 
sufficient any comprehensive industrial demilitarization strategy that ignored such basic 
realities.  The temporal dimensions of the proposed program during this period are also hard 





Allied postwar policy in Germany demonstrated that policymakers could not 
initially move beyond a jumble of contradictory and poorly explained notions.  This logic 
was not lost on Henry Morgenthau and he aimed at avoiding the problem altogether using a 
definition that negated the need for any detailed industrial demilitarization program.  He 
instead targeted most of the tools and equipment within Germany and argued, rather 
shockingly in light of the basic realities of modern industrial society such as the need for 
considerable agricultural machinery, that only the barest minimum sufficed to support the 
population.  This perspective, irregardless of its severity, nevertheless still failed to offer a 
specific program of industrial demilitarization with which historians can judge 
effectiveness.  The Allies did not pastoralize western Germany. 
The F.E.A. and A.C.C. as mentioned represented two organizations that established 
a basis by which scholars can judge industrial demilitarization.  Clay and his military 
government ignored the results of the F.E.A.’s work, calling them utterly impractical, and 
worked according to his own understanding.  The deliberations and conclusions of the 
organization nevertheless help illustrate the difficulties inherent in the attempt to control 
military industrial potential in the modern world.  The various F.E.A. groups tasked with 
industrial demilitarization chose an especially broad definition that accorded with wartime 
experience.  Civilian and military industries were not separable into distinct families.  They 
for example argued that “[a]ny vehicle industry is a major force for war” and that “German 
automotive manufacturing should be prohibited because it was a war industry”.9  The same 
belief informed the work of the A.C.C. in Germany.  This organization, after relatively 
swift deliberations, itself referred to war material as “any material of whatever nature and 
wherever situated, intended for war on land, sea, or in the air, or which is or may be or has 
been at any time in use by, or intended for use by, the armed forces, civil defence, or other 
formations or organizations”.10  An equally loose definition of military-industries followed 
and covered “all plant and related equipment employed in armaments manufacturing 
including, for example, “machinery, plant, jigs, instruments, moulds, models, patterns, 
punches [and] dies”.11  Both organizations employed definitions that implicitly assumed 
major alterations to sectors traditionally deemed civilian in nature. 
11.2 The End Results of Industrial Demilitarization 
This dissertation demonstrates that the Allied governments in western Germany 
failed in their aim to remove military potential from German industry by reducing the 
overall capacities of the civilian economy.  This program aimed at restricting levels of 




importantly destroying manufacturing facilities and machine-tools.  The work of economic 
historians since the 1980s that intensified with Werner Abelshauser quite definitively points 
out that western Germany even surpassed general prewar capacities.  Overall differences 
between 1939 or even 1944 and the postwar remained slight and related to bottlenecks in 
production caused by shortages of raw materials and not of theoretical productive potential.  
The debate concerning whether or not the Marshall Plan acted as the catalyst of this postwar 
development unfortunately obscures the importance of increased capacities for judging 
industrial demilitarization.  Abelshauser’s diminution of the importance of American 
assistance and the scholar’s dissenters refer to the impact of price stabilization and other 
developments not necessarily associated with hard productive capacities.  The Marshall 
Plan in any case offered more dollars to Britain and France than flowed to Germany.  The 
chapter relating to the Marshall Plan pointed out those domestic German capacities prior to 
and after 1947 remained high.  The Allied military governments therefore did not 
significantly reduce the number of “machinery, plant, jigs, instruments, moulds, models, 
patterns, punches [and] dies” in Germany.  The economic historians have laboriously 
assembled the macro-economic data to substantiate these claims. 
The American Joint Logistics Committee also compiled their own indices of 
German economic war potential in the late 1940s and early 1950s.  Backer, like so many of 
the analyses tentatively addressing industrial demilitarization, chronicles the delays and 
alterations in A.C.C. handling of the program and yet still concludes that the Allies 
removed the German potential to rearm.  This dissertation, employing the work of the 
A.C.C. as the guide by which to judge the overall effectiveness of the ambitious program 
and judging them against assessments gleaned from American military government and 
J.C.S. records, demonstrates another interpretation.  The central planks of the Level of 
Industry plans such as the elimination of synthetic nitrogen production, the downsizing of 
automotive facilities and especially the destruction of “war plants” such as Alkett-Berlin 
were never realized.  Empirical inquiry using the available definitions most importantly 
demonstrates that at least some important elements of direct military production survived 
the occupation period.  The work of the logistics committee in any case demonstrated the 
continuity of German capacities in a wide range of dual-use areas such as nitrogen 
synthesis, automotive production, and steel generation.  This understanding lay at the heart 
of military appraisals of the strategic importance of German industry in the emerging Cold 
War.  The next sections summarize the radical importance of this development.  For the 




industrial demilitarization program, employing terms much too broad and ultimately 
untenable, failed in a comprehensive manner.  Where is the quantitative evidence for any 
other conclusion? 
11.3 The Mechanisms that Spoiled Industrial Demilitarization 
A wide variety of reasons explain why the United States government—and that in 
Great Britain to an equal degree—departed from the industrial demilitarization project in 
Germany long before the A.C.C. and military governments had supposedly completed their 
work.  Scholars nevertheless seem bound to the letter of the proclamations elicited by 
contemporary policymakers like John J. McCloy as late as 1951 that the destruction of a 
German war potential would continue.  If this argument is accepted, then the Bundeswehr 
that emerged after 1955 represented a new course or “Neugründung” in German history 
based on a monocausal explanation that is simply difficult to comprehend.12  Why did 
American military specialists for example push the concept of West German rearmament if 
postwar policy had removed all military potential from that state?  However, the proclivity 
to judge the form of the Bundeswehr and not the foundation on which it was built drives 
this contradictory hypothesis.  The Pentagon and State Department as demonstrated clearly 
accepted a West German remilitarization project by 1950.  The primary motivator for this 
decision rather characteristically sprang from two related issues.  Washington in the 
postwar accepted the survival of a large German heavy industrial core as the lynchpin of 
their international policies and an important element in promoting domestic stability.  The 
subsequent break in American-Soviet relations forced the realization that Europe required a 
security arrangement protecting the Ruhr from either political or military encroachment.  
The decision to stop industrial dismantling and concentrate on recovery therefore fuelled 
the mechanism that led to the weakening of support for industrial demilitarization itself and 
then to binding West German industry to what became N.A.T.O. (North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization). 
Several seemingly unrelated postwar elements drove this mechanism.  A 
misunderstanding concerning the results of the strategic bombing campaign indirectly 
implied that the wartime pounding of the German urban infrastructure seriously 
compromised the efficacy of any future occupation.  The A.C.C. adopted a level of industry 
conception in March 1946, one that reflected a core argument found in J.C.S. 1067, which 
attempted to integrate both the maintenance of a peacetime economy with the radical aim of 
removing all military industrial potential.  This imprecise policy of restructuring German 




conducive to a sustainable society plagued military government officials.  This argument is 
not new.  Earl F. Ziemke pointed out in his seminal work on the American occupation that 
the military in particular took great pains in maintaining a “decent standard of living”.13  A 
basic understanding that the war had destroyed the infrastructure of Germany took hold and 
militated against further reductions.  Clay wrote in his memoirs that “[w]e were shocked at 
the…failure to grasp the realities of the financial and economic conditions which 
confronted us.  It seemed obvious to us even then that Germany would starve unless it 
could produce for export and its industrial production be promptly revived”.14  The 
historiography clearly documents the American military’s distaste for the high-level policy 
decisions reached either in Washington or in unison with other governments.  An emphasis 
on reconstruction then rapidly overtook the immediate postwar concern with national 
security priorities in the months after victory. 
This dissertation points out that this perception was based on what might be termed 
a false premise largely derived from a contemporary dismissal of the conclusions reached 
by the bombing survey teams.  The U.S.S.B.S. for example uncovered a large number of 
intact machine-tools and pointed out that the bombing had not significantly reduced civilian 
or military productive capacities.  Economic analysis over the last decades has substantiated 
this argument.  The major contribution of air power rested with the paralysis of society 
brought by the Transportation Plan’s neutralization of movement through the destruction of 
railway nodes and the suppression of petroleum synthesis.  The strategic bombing 
campaign, according to contemporaries on the ground, had nevertheless negatively affected 
the civilian attributes of German industry.  The farmers did not receive the fertilizer needed 
to boost crop yields, all industry suffered from the energy shortages brought by insufficient 
coal-mining, and the general population huddled in the basements of shattered houses to 
escape exposure to the elements.  The extremely low postwar production levels most of all 
seemed to question the U.S.S.B.S. results and the basis of industrial demilitarization itself.  
Removing the nitrogen fixation plants that provided the materials for explosives, for 
example, also impacted the generation of fertilizer since both relied on the same process.  
Military government focused on this problem for obvious reasons and it more than any 
other factor drove the argument against the poorly defined manipulation of the German 
industrial system.  It simply seemed like the bombers had torched industrial capacities 





Postwar American occupation policy was therefore always predicated on an uneasy 
separation of military and civilian industrial realms.  But the end product of years of 
consultation and deliberation on the subject, conceived during the final months of the war 
and encapsulated in the Morgenthau Plan and the work of the A.C.C., only managed to 
construct a worthless conception concerning the understood elements of a supposed 
separate military industrial sector.  It was of course natural for Clay to dismiss this 
academic separation.  The general followed the lessons he had learned regarding weapons 
allocation during the war and what amounted to a basic understanding of 20th Century 
military theory.  He realized that nearly all elements of German civilian industry required 
the same infrastructure that fed the war machine and that this fluidity even held true for the 
specific machines that manufactured armaments.  The pundits of strategic bombing, as 
witnessed in lists of targets that they assembled, did not distinguish between military and 
civilian industry.  Clay’s perceptions therefore reflected disarmament and not industrial 
demilitarization.  Clay revolted when the State Department proceeded in negotiations with 
the other occupiers and established a Level of Industry agreement that promised only mass 
starvation and total industrial breakdown.  Here the U.S.S.B.S. inadvertently helped remove 
the basis of the postwar policy by stressing the wartime strangulation of Hitler’s war 
machine.  The visible destruction of Germany’s urban core helped remove the urgency 
behind demilitarization schemes as originally conceived by Washington.  This mindset 
influenced the belief that job was already completed—a point pushed by George Marshall 
in negotiations with the other foreign ministers in Moscow in early 1947 and already 
adopted by Clay in the weeks after German defeat. 
The activities of the Soviet military worked in unison with the impressions of a 
destroyed industrial state and the weak conceptual basis of industrial demilitarization to 
modify American attitudes in Germany.  The Red Army’s ruthless treatment of the German 
population in the dying months of the war and after the Wehrmacht’s official surrender 
further emphasized the difficult situation that awaited the American military on the ground.  
The military formations that entered Berlin in the summer of 1945 and the reports issued by 
Clay’s political advisor informed Washington of a barbarism that in quantitative and 
qualitative terms hardly distinguished themselves from those of Nazism.  The recent 
scholarly appraisals of the treatment of Germany by the Red Army stress the negative 
reactions of Harry S. Truman and his government to what amounted to “brutal chaos”.15  
While it is true that the historiography seems moving in a direction that draws correlations 




of the Truman administration, the connection between Soviet rape, killing and looting and 
the creation of an effective postwar administration of Germany still seems far too weak.  
Considering that the Allies at Potsdam predicated their postwar policies on the flow of 
goods across zonal boundaries, inter-German trade, it is difficult to accept that the extensive 
Soviet seizures did not influence industrial demilitarization strategies.  The Soviet actions in 
fact invalidated the A.C.C. calculations because they chose not to operate according to any 
rational or coordinated system.  Truman’s personal anti-Soviet reactions to this sort of 
brutality or Clay’s speculation that Germany would be reduced to the status of pauper in 
permanent dependency on American charity were only expressions of something larger—
namely the clear understanding that the ideas hammered out in quadripartite discussions 
like a rational system of industrial demilitarization were based on nothing but illusions. 
Historians have debated whether Washington’s reactions to Soviet behaviour, 
reactions that included Clay’s stoppage of reparations shipments or the revolutionary 
decision expressed by Byrnes’ Stuttgart speech late in 1946, stemmed in part from the 
desire of American elites to bring their brand of market capitalism to Germany and other 
countries in order to enhance overall American power.  The revisionist literature in 
particular views postwar Soviet activities as generally innocuous, at least vis-à-vis the 
military security of the United States, and attributes aggressive hues to American policies 
instead.  In essence, domestic economic concerns induced the elites to pursue the 
reconstruction of foreign markets for American industry.  Thomas Paterson for example 
argues that “[c]oercion characterised United States reconstruction policy”.16  While 
recognizing the importance of these findings for understanding Washington’s need for 
German heavy industry to help rebuild European markets, a central plank of Truman’s 
postwar vision, unilateral Soviet activity nevertheless promised to ruin Germany even 
according to the Level of Industry plans regardless of American designs.  Pervasive Soviet 
looting furthermore preceded any American economic penetration of continental Europe or 
indications of an ameliorated policy in western Germany.  Washington, as argued by the 
realists and adapted here, therefore reacted to the general impossibility of dealing rationally 
with Josef Stalin and the Soviet government.  Not only did Moscow invalidate the already 
tenuous industrial demilitarization plan, Soviet activities questioned the future of most 
aspects of western postwar policy such as general economic recovery and the establishment 
of a stable international system.  The industrial demilitarization project, hard to define and 




anything else, was compromised by the pull and tug of divergent American and Soviet 
interests that characterized the Cold War.17 
The mechanisms that helped erode the industrial demilitarization project therefore 
included general reactions to the results of the strategic bombing campaign, the American 
military’s understanding of dual-use commodities, general postwar American economic 
policy, the actions of the Soviet military and most importantly that the plan was poorly 
defined and out of alignment with modern economic and democratic realities.  While it is 
apparent that the turgid communist-capitalist dichotomy of many Cold War analyses 
assisted the breakdown of dismantling, this monocausal explanation is simply far too 
simplistic a tool to help understand the extremely complex developments and movements 
in occupation policy after 1945. 
11.4 Dual-Use Industry as a Component of the Developing Cold War Calculus 
Traditional appraisals of the industrial demilitarization project generate a series of 
assumptions concerning the Cold War breach.  These studies generally describe A.C.C. 
aims and uncritically assume their translation into reality.  This hypothesis in turn implies 
more than a strong degree of American-Soviet cooperation regarding what represented the 
single most important postwar national security issue.  This argument asserts that the 
erosion of Allied unanimity in either the administration of a unified German economy or 
political developments in far off countries transformed—in fact revolutionized—occupation 
policy.  The Cold War therefore predated and influenced most changes in industrial policy 
and subsequently industrial demilitarization itself.  Policymakers subsequently reversed 
directions and sought West German assistance in first containing Stalin’s political 
ambitions and then in constructing a military ring around the Soviet Union. 
Before summarizing the various weaknesses of this theory, it is necessary to take a 
step backwards and define the Cold War more precisely.  Scholars generally assert that the 
dominant global conflict after 1945 in essence represented one of political tension or even 
military confrontation by proxy whereby Washington and Moscow jostled for an improved 
power position in relation to the other.  That this conflict never erupted into an outright test 
of arms reflected a wide range of factors such as the change in strategic conceptions 
brought by nuclear weapons.  Answering when and why the two new superpowers wrapped 
their fingers around each other’s throats nevertheless represents a central point of 
contention.  The traditionalists stress that the Truman administration reacted to Stalin’s 
violation of international agreements such as the Yalta accords and particularly the global 




shoulders and accuse Truman of altering understood agreements such as dismantling in 
Germany and thereby provoking an understandably sharp reaction from Stalin.  The 
postrevisionist school, although recognizing the economic advantages brought by the 
reactivation of German industry, takes the middle road and attributes systemic mechanisms 
such as mutual distrust and ideological differences as leading to the transformation of 
postwar policy on both sides.  All of these historiographical schools take basic postwar 
policy unanimity concerning the restructuring of German industry for granted. 
A serious problem arises out of this certainty.  The prevailing theory fails to explain 
and acknowledge why American military thinkers after 1947 pushed for the inclusion of a 
theoretically military deindustrialized and therefore militarily worthless state into an 
Atlantic defensive system.  This argument also fails to address the importance that both 
Washington and Moscow attached in regards to the future of German industry.  This 
dissertation grapples with these complex issues and in fact points out that both superpowers 
understood and responded to the military potential of Ruhr production. 
The American attempt to define industrial demilitarization, either by the F.E.A. or 
by others, displayed the immense difficulties confronting those responsible.  No streamlined 
and workable concepts emerged from these efforts.  The inability to separate military from 
civilian production stood at the heart of this dilemma.  American policymakers therefore 
continued in the direction taken by the strategic bombing pundits and targeted the broad 
expanse of industry in Germany.  The major questions tackled by the A.C.C. subsequently 
related to how much civilian downsizing the German state could withstand and yet still 
function within the norms of modern industrial society.  Washington like Moscow 
remained outwardly dedicated to industrial demilitarization throughout this period.  Both 
capitalist and communist states however operated according to value systems completely 
out of alignment with one another.  A general and not necessarily ideological difference 
coloured their approaches in different hues.  Marc Trachtenberg argues that the need to 
construct a mutually acceptable German peace initiated the polarization process that 
sparked the Cold War.18  Stalin wanted to neutralize German power for the conceivable 
future and his particular understanding of the proximity of civilian and military industrial 
power, whether motivated by his Marxist philosophy or not, influenced what amounted to 
an extremely rough and cruel handling of postwar Germany.  This extremely negative 
policy was bound to create frictions in inter-Allied negotiations if only for humanitarian 




In the simplest terms, basic policy proved impossible to define and this imprecision 
doomed any agreement concerning Germany.  The military specialists and diplomats of the 
Roosevelt administration already understood that the official direction of occupation policy 
between the Yalta and Potsdam agreements was based on dangerously destabilizing 
conceptions.  Postwar economic problems, caused as much by the results of the war and the 
unrealistic appraisal of global industrial patterns, surfaced after May 1945.  Preliminary 
calculations had anticipated this eventuality.  Economic malaise and a humanitarian disaster 
surfaced.  Clay reacted immediately and in a manner that accorded with the opinions of 
some influential policymakers in Washington.  Domestic and foreign economic problems 
and aims, from the perspective of the conservatives, focused attention on husbanding 
German industrial potential for later activation.  This dissertation demonstrated how 
domestic fears of a return to depression conditions motivated the support of foreign markets 
for the benefit of American industry.  Basic economic, humanitarian and geopolitical 
realities relating to the inherent weaknesses of the Potsdam system therefore influenced the 
course of policy in Germany as much as international developments such as responses to 
perceived Soviet attempts to penetrate beyond their periphery.  Criticizing Washington for 
the adoption of a more lenient occupation policy, a favourite of the revisionists, appears 
cold, callous, and illogical. 
In contrast to the Soviet government, that swung the pistol to smash all opposition 
throughout eastern and central Europe and subjected eastern Germany in particular to 
rampant looting and worse, American policy remained fixed on an essentially positive 
direction for the postwar world.  This spirit seized hold of occupation policy even though 
certain groups in Washington such as the Treasury Department questioned the merits of a 
humane plan for Germany.  The proponents of a more positive German policy achieved a 
substantial victory in early 1947.  In that year, the Truman administration rejected the 
concept of widespread dismantling and instead sought to employ German resources as part 
of a comprehensive European aid package.  The American government even argued for a 
return of the Ruhr to its former position as “workshop of Europe”.  The documents 
demonstrate that the survival of these industrial capacities, coupled to the clear 
understanding that tampering with traditional economic patterns threatened Europe and the 
United States with disaster, helped determine this process.  The Marshall Plan, as depicted 
by Melvyn P. Leffler and others, defined Germany as the nexus of recovery efforts in 




long-term political stability, and avoided a return to depression conditions in the United 
States.  The European Recovery Program succeeded. 
The survival of western German industry, as dictated by the dual-use postulate, 
endowed postwar Germany with considerable military industrial potential.  This 
dissertation contends that the survival of these dual-use capacities acted as an important 
motor of Cold War.  Explanations of the bipolar split must therefore take both the unsound 
and destabilizing basis of industrial demilitarization into account.  Differences in 
demilitarization practices mattered.  This dissertation demonstrates that the Truman 
administration generally adopted an openly anti-Soviet attitude during 1946 for a multitude 
of reasons that included the deep gulf between both governments’ policies in Germany.  
Washington interpreted dismantling as potentially ruinous and Moscow appeared intent 
such a course.  The widening breach helped create a framework that presented the actions 
of the other in an extremely negative manner.  The experience in Germany however 
underlined Stalin’s clear and brutal pursuit of reparations in order to increase the power of 
the Soviet Union.  Some interpretations stress the passive nature of Soviet reparations 
claims.  Historians such as Lea Brilmayer even condemn the United States for failing to act 
as a benign international hegemon and rejecting the traditional framework of international 
relations.19  It however became clear in Washington that reparations and dismantling 
potentially threatened to increase Soviet military industrial capacities at great expense to the 
populations of Germany, Europe and the United States.  Contrary to some historical 
interpretations, these pages demonstrate that the difficulties in forging a workable postwar 
order, most evident in Germany, shifted attention towards appreciating the impact of 
Stalin’s grand design for Europe.  Policymakers in Washington shuddered at what they 
saw. 
There is no reason to argue that a “misunderstanding” characterized this debate or 
that Washington in fact departed from a supposedly logical and worthwhile set of inter-
Allied postwar agreements.  The survival of heavy industry in western Germany—on 
which the future of Europe and the United States depended—demanded a wide range of 
answers to the pressing national security issues that resulted.  Few of the post-1945 
developments, along with the decision to support remilitarization, make any sense unless 
scholars accept that significant constraints hampered and ultimately doomed the military 
deindustrialization project in western Germany.  The Truman administration chose political 
and then military integration for rational reasons.  “Double containment”, as can be 




industry from the dismantling program by binding the United States to Europe.  
Washington’s interpretation of the N.A.T.O. concepts did not see “double containment” as 
a measure to protect against a renewed German drive for European dominance.  The 
N.A.T.O. alliance served to integrate Western Europe into the system of mutual defense 
pacts that worked against concepts of German neutralization. 
American military planners seized on the importance of German industry and 
redefined their strategies for the defense of Europe by 1948.  The strategists established the 
need to organize an effective military defense of Germany in order to safeguard the 
investments made in industrial recovery.  The growing Cold War only accentuated the 
pivotal role of German industry for global American economic and political policies.  The 
expense of a comprehensive economic rehabilitation package and the needs for rearmament 
emphasized the “German solution”.  Congress, regardless of the economic and military 
power of the United States,20 quite simply baulked at the idea of committing a vast 
percentage of American domestic industrial capacities towards their ambitious foreign 
policy.  Military and State Department planners reacted to the complexity of the world of 
the late 1940s and gravitated towards German remilitarization for the very same reasons 
that had influenced the rejection of postwar industrial dismantling.  The continued existence 
of German dual-use industrial capacities made these developments possible.  These 
conclusions corresponded with American military thinking and the military potential of 
Germany drove the United States to recommend full remilitarization as the most 
economical method of safeguarding the dual-use potential of Ruhr industries. 
Once officially sanctioned, other groups analysing German military industrial 
potential easily discovered the A.C.C. failure to restructure the defeated state after 1945.  
German organizations analyzing military potential offered what amounted to startling 
conclusions.  The Amt Blank for example concluded that no significant issues stood in the 
way of the production of armoured fighting vehicles.  As demonstrated by various 
examples including the work of the J.C.S., this reality held true for a wide array of clearly 
military products that included artillery and explosives.  This latter point should not 
however obscure the fact that American planners considered the West German export of 
dual-use commodities more important than the stimulation of a revived domestic arms 
industry.  As stressed throughout this dissertation, the immediate postwar plans for 
Germany had targeted precisely these capacities. 
Western Germany officially rearmed after 1955.  A host of international, domestic 




military strength and therefore help construct an anti-Soviet barrier.21  This time lag 
between the original American decision to pursue German rearmament and the actual 
initiation of military industrial production should not however obscure the failure of the 
postwar policy of industrial demilitarization.  “Postrevisionism”, Nigel Gould-Davies points 
out, “stressed the tragic and inevitable character of the [bipolar] conflict.22  This school, as 
mentioned, focuses on the dynamics of American-Soviet interaction to explain the 
breakdown of Potsdam unanimity.  This dissertation however adds that important 
constraints on these policies, such as the inability to define industrial demilitarization, 
shaped the course of international relations after 1945.  The Allies continued to proclaim the 
need to demilitarize German industry until 1954.  At the Nine-Power Conference in 
September-October 1954, the governments of Britain, France and the United States 
declared that the Allied High Commissioners would not relinquish the powers of 
disarmament or demilitarization in Germany even after “full sovereignty” returned the 
former enemy but that the former enemy would now prepare a defense contribution.  A 
year earlier, the Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson had declared that the time had 
come to stop talking out of “both sides of our mouth at the same time, on the one hand 
urging an increase in the level of armament for the defense of the free world, and on the 
other urging the virtues of arms limitation”.23  The duality that had characterized industrial 
demilitarization, a duality that reflected the complexities of the dual-use industries 
themselves, even existed after the rise of West Germany to European industrial dominance, 
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